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Abstract
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter gives an 
overview of the external financial flows to the Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) between 1970 and 1980. It explains why these countries increasingly 
turned to private sources of external finance and why the banks in 
particular were willing to provide that finance.
Noting the needs of these countries for continued access to private 
external finance, the thesis proceeds to investigate four areas 
fundamental to the continuity of that access. They are:-
1) The determinants of the financial terms of bank and bond finance.
2) The impact of further lending to LDCs upon bank balance sheets.
3) The attitudes of the lending bankers to ways of increasing
private financial flows.
4) The reasons for the limited role played by the eurobond market
in providing such finance.
As a preliminary to investigating these points chapters two and three 
discuss the nature of the eurocurrency market generally, reasons for its 
growth and the statistical sources relating to that market. Chapter three 
also develops a theoretical model of the eurobank lending function.
Returning to the fundamental points noted above, chapter four investigates 
the determinants of the financial terms of private finance ie euro 
money-market interest rates, the spreads on syndicated loans to LDCs and 
the interest yield on LDC bond issues.
Chapter five investigates the impact of the growth in bank lending to LDCs 
upon UK banks' balance sheets.
Chapter six reviews the literature making suggestions for reducing the 
risks associated with lending to LDCs. Chapter seven reports results of a 
questionnaire survey of nearly two hundred London banks regarding the 
suggestions noted in chapter six. The presumption behind these two 
chapters is that reduced risk will, ceteris paribus, increase the flow of 
finance. The responses to the survey confirm the validity of this 
presumption.
The reasons for the limited role of the eurobond market in providing 
private external finance to LDCs is investigated in chapter eight with the 
aid of a second questionnaire. This survey was directed at the London 
managers of eurobond syndicates.
The last chapter gives a resume of the thesis and makes recommendations 
for easing the external debt problem of the borrowers and bankers.
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Chapter 1
AN OVERVIEW
1. 1 Introduction
The United Nations designated the 1970's as the second development 
decade. Development did indeed take place. The poor countries of the 
world experienced an annual rate of growth of GNP averaging 5.375%. 
Populations also grew, making the increase in per capita GNP average 3.3% 
according to World Bank figures. The same institution estimates that the 
rate of gross investment averaged 26.025% per annum while the savings rate 
averaged 25.375% per annum, (World Bank Annual Report 1982, pl30).
These rates of growth and investment were achieved with the 
assistance of flows of external financial resources to these countries. 
Financial flows can be classified into those that create debt obligations 
and those that do not. The former consist of the many forms of borrowing 
that take place in international financial markets, or from governments, 
or from the suppliers of goods and services. The latter consist of direct 
investments, and of grants and gifts, generally in the form of aid to 
governments.
This study is about a section of debt creating flows - the borrowings 
from financial institutions. In particular, the aim of the research is to 
analyse the role of financial institutions in providing or facilitating 
the financial flows to developing countries via the eurocurrency markets 
between 1970 and 1980. Where possible or appropriate, the role of 
financial institutions located in the United Kingdom will be highlighted. 
Moreover, where events make it apposite, the time period of analysis is 
extended to the time of writing (end 1983).
In the context of this research the term "UK Financial Institutions" 
includes the United Kingdom offices of financial institutions registered 
abroad.
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i.2 The Flow of Financial Resources to LDCs 1970-1980
During the decade of the 1970's total annual net resource
receipts by the less developed countries (LDCs) grew from US $20.04
billions in 1970 to US $96.05 billions in 1980 according to OECD data, 
(OECD 1983). During this period Official Development Assistance grew 
from US $8.23 billion or 41% to US $37.33 billion or 39% 
of the total. Non-concessional Flows, on the other hand, grew from US 
$10.95 or 54% to US $56.41 billion or 59% of the total.
Of the Non-concessional Flows US $9.08 billion or 45% were from
private sources in 1970 whereas US $45.04 billion or 46% were from
private sources in 1980.
Of these private sources of finance, direct investment 
constituted US $3.69 billions or 18% in 1970 compared with US $10.54% 
billion or 11% in 1980. This decline has been compensated for by the 
rise in private debt creating flows from US $5.39 billion or 27% to US 
$34.5 billion or 36% over the same period.
A notable feature is that private flows were greater in the years 
1978 and 1979 (ref Table 111-1 OECD 1983), when the proportions of 
private flows in total flows were 55% and 52% respectively, than 
they were in 1980.
It is to be expected, a priori, that the benefits derived by a 
recipient country are positively related to the quantity of funds 
received. Therefore the distribution of the total flow between types 
of recipients, as well as the types of flows, where these have 
different terms attached, is an important consideration in this 
respect.
Below, the distribution of the total flow for 1978 is given. The 
classification of developing countries follows that used by the OECD. 
An alternative classification used by the IBRD is also used in this 
study where the data require it. Appendix 1 to this study gives 
details of these classifications.
It can be seen that the majority of the concessional flows go to 
the poorest countries while most of the non-concessional flows go to 
the richer developing countries particularly the newly industrialised 
countries (NICs).
It is particularly notable that the distribution of financial 
resources between LDCs bears little relation to the recipients' share 
of total LDC population. For example in 1978 the NICs had 15.7% of the 
total population but received 28.7% of total external financial 
resources. The least developed countries (LLDCs) had 11.7% of
population but only received 6 .0% of total external financial resource 
flows.
16
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Specific discussion of the distribution of bank debt amongst LDC 
borrowers is included in pages 54 to 70 below.
Returning to the changes in the quantities of debt during the 
1970's, IBRD World Debt Tables (IBRD 1983) show the stock of disbursed 
debt outstanding to LDCs rising from US $91 billion in 1972 to US $404 
billion in 1980. Of these amounts public and publicly guaranteed debt 
rose from US $68 billion to US $331 billion and private non guaranteed 
debt rose from US $21 billion to US $73 billion. However, these figures 
will under estimate actual debt outstanding. The weaknesses of the 
statistics covering international debt are discussed in chapter 2 page 
of this thesis.
Looking in more detail at the public and publicly guaranteed debt 
onlyjbecause of limitations of data on the private unguaranteed debt, 
we note that disbursed debt owed to official creditors rose from US $44 
billion to US $155 billion between 1972 and 1980. During the same 
period debt owed to financial markets rose from US $14 billion to US 
$154 billion. Thus, whereas official debt constituted 67% of total debt
in 1972, it constituted only 46% in 1980. Debt to the financial
markets, on the other hand, only accounted for 21% in 1972 but 
represented 46% of total debt in 1980.
Accompanying the changing nature of the sources of debt have been 
changes in the debt servicing commitments and the financial terms 
attached to the debt. These are discussed in detail on page 55 of this 
chapter, but at this point a few figures are in order. Between 1972 and 
1980 total debt service payments rose over 700% but such payments to 
the financial market creditors rose nearly 1400% compared with the 
1100% rise in debt outstanding to those creditors.
The average interest rate on debt to official creditors rose from 
4.3% to 5.3% during this period, maturities shortened slightly from
25.3 to 23.7 years, grace period shortened from 6.7 to 6.1 years and
the grant element fell from 41.5 to 34 per cent. However, the average
interest rate on debt owed to private creditors rose from 7.3% to 
12.8%, the average maturity fell slightly from 9.2 to 8.9 years, grace 
periods actually rose from 2.9 to 3.4 years and the grant element fell 
from 11.1% to minus 12.5 per cent, (IBRD 1983 p3).
The substantial rise in both the amount and relative importance of 
LDC debt owed to the financial markets, and to the banks in particular 
begs four questions:-
1) Why was there such a need for the financial flows to 
developing countries to grow as fast as they did?
2) Why have the developing countries turned so convincingly 
to the private financial markets of the developed 
countries for their external finance?
3) How does this shift towards private sources of finance 
alter the net benefits enjoyed by the borrowers and 
their ability to service existing and future debt?
4) Why have the private financial sources been so willing 
to provide funds to the developing countries?
These questions are answered in the following sections of this 
chapter. However, analysing the answers raises further fundamental 
questions. They are:
1) What influences the financial terms attached to bank 
and bond finance to LDCs?
2) How has this increase in LDC debt influenced bank 
balance sheets?
3) What factors will help maintain the flow of,particularly^ 
bank finance to the LDCs?
4) Why has the bond market played such a small role in the 
external financing of LDCs?
These questions are answered in the following way:-
Question one is answered in chapter four where the deter­
minants of eurocurrency money market and bond market 
interest rates and the spread on syndicated loans are 
analysed.
Question two is answered in chapter five by analysing 
the impact of increased bank lending to LDCs upon the 
financial health of banks, particularly UK banks as 
indicated by their balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts.
Question three is answered in chapter seven with the aid 
of the responses of a survey of bankers in the City of 
London.
Question four is also answered with the aid of a survey 
of City bankers reported in chapter eight.
As a preliminary to these chapters, an analysis of the mechanics of 
the eurocurrency market is the subject of chapter two and a model of the 
eurobank lending function is the subject of chapter three.
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1.3 The Need for Such Growth in Financial Flows 
Balance of Payments Deficits
The immediate need for the substantial increase in international 
financial flows to the developing countries during the 1970's stems 
from their balance of payments disequilibria.
These disequilibria were caused by policies of economic growth, 
import substitution and after 1973 the higher costs of imported fuels, 
particularly oil, together with recessionary induced contraction of 
export markets in the industrialised countries. Internal mismanagement 
of the developing economies could also have resulted in balance of 
payments difficulties, but there seems little evidence of mismanagement 
for the LDCs as a group, although there are isolated examples, 
(Avromovic 1982, Britti'an 1977, Hailwood 1980, Killick 1981). The policies 
of growth and import substitution precluded the substantial economic 
adjustment that would have been required in order to eliminate the 
balance of payments deficits.
The higher cost of oil is just a specific case of a secular 
deterioration in the .terms of trade experienced by non oil exporting 
developing countries, as researched in such papers as Prebisch (1950), 
Sproas (1980) and reviewed in Bird (1978). However, it is not intended 
to investigate the impact of any secular deterioration of NOPEC terms 
of non energy trade because any deterioration that may have taken place 
is overwhelmed by the deterioration in terms of trade caused by higher 
prices of energy imports.
The following figures show that there were substantial deficits for 
LDCs as a whole until 1973. Thereafter, however, substantial deficits 
were suffered by the non oil exporting developing countries (NOPEC), 
while the oil exporters experienced very large surpluses.
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Table 1.2
Balance of Payments Disequilibria of LDCs
NOPEC OIL EXPORTERS
DEFICITS SURPLUSES
1970 8.6 0.3
1971 11.0 2.1
1972 8.9 1.7
1973 11.5 6.6
1974 36.9 67.8
1975 45.9 35.0
1976 32.9 40.0
1977 28.6 31.1
1978 37.5 3.3
1979 57.6 68.4
1980 82.1 112.2
Source: IMF Annual Report 1981 pl8 and 1974 p22
Figures in billions US $
Given that the developing countries would have found speedy 
internal adjustment to these deficits incompatible with their 
aspirations of growth, it was essential for these deficits to be 
financed.
The following figures show how the NOPEC deficits were financed 
from 1973-1980:
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The decline in the relative importance of direct investments and 
the growing importance of external borrowing, and particularly the 
borrowing from financial institutions has already been discussed. It 
must be noted that some of this borrowing has been used to finance the 
accumulation of reserves that has taken place over this period as well 
as financing deficits.
Policies of Growth and Import Substitution
The influence of growth aspirations on these balance of payments
deficits is difficult to prove. However, if the developing countries 
wished to increase their rate of growth, particularly through
industrialisation, one would expect to see imports of capital goods 
increasing as a proportion of total imports. It may also be expected 
that exports of manufactured goods would form an increasing proportion 
of total exports as industrialisation proceeds. A policy of import 
substitution would also cause such trends in trade.
The following figures show the growth of total imports from the 
developed market economies by the developing economies. The growth of 
imports of machinery and the percentages of the total imports that 
machinery represents are also given.
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Table 1.4 Growth of developing country imports
Value of
Total
Imports
Quantum
Index
1970=100
Value of 
Imports of 
Machinery
Quantum
Index
1970=100
Value of
Machinery Imports 
as % of Total 
Imports
1968 33.75 88 13.63 88 40.39
1969 37.02 97 15.45 103 41.73
1970 41.91 100 17.26 100 41.18
1971 47.14 105 20.06 102 42.55
1972 53.46 109 23.66 108 44.26
1973 73.74 122 31. 36 123 42.52
1974 113.79 148 45.53 159 40.01
1975 138.31 160 63.96 184 46.24
1976 147.19 170 73.45 198 49.90
1977 172.93 189 83.68 206 48.38
1978 207.22 192 96.60 196 46.62
1979 235.23 196 103.98 195 44.20
1980 293.39 223 127.91 225 43.59
Source: 
Value:
United Nations Statistical 
Figures in billions US $
Yearbook 1981 p45 & p49
The growth in the value of machinery imports has been continuous
and the growth in the increase in the quantity of those imports was 
only interrupted in 1978 and 1979.
Similar classifications of figures given below show the behaviour 
of the exports of manufactured goods from the developing countries.
Table 1.5 Growth of developing country exports
Total Exports 
less Fuel
Manufactured
Exports
Quantum Index 
1970=100
% of 
Total
1968 26.37 8.81 75 33.41
1969 30.13 10.80 90 35.84
1970 33.74 12.61 100 37.37
1971 34.57 13.37 102 38.68
1972 41.74 16.72 128 40.06
1973 60.72 26.20 149 43.15
1974 80.71 35.46 169 43.94
1975 76.84 34.44 164 44.82
1976 85.90 41.79 206 48.65
1977 113.05 53.53 213 47.35
1978 131.12 67.79 238 51.70
1979 165.42 88.41 266 53.45
1980 193.06 106.74 272 55.29
Source: United Nations Yearbook 1981 p44 & p48 
Value : Figures in billions US $
The figures for fuel exports have been deducted from total exports 
in order to abstract from the post 1973 influence of oil prices on 
value of exports.
It can be seen that exports of manufactured goods have grown 
considerably over this period and have assumed a more important role in 
the export business of the developing countries, rising from 33.41% of 
total exports in 1970 to 55.29% in 1980.
A final set of figures, extracted from various issues of the World 
Bank Annual Report, show a continuous excess of gross investment over 
domestic saving as proportions of developing country GNP^
Table 1.6 Savings and investment as a percentage of developing 
country GNP
Save Invest Save Invest
% % % %
1968 15.8 18.6 1975 22.3 23.8
1969 17.3 19.9 1976 25.5 24.6
1970 17.9 19.9 1977 23.2 24.8
1971 17.9 2 0 . 1 1978 25.8 26.9
1972 18.1 20.6 1979 26.4 26.3
1973 22.2 21.7 1980 25.6 24.9
1974 23.5 22.6
Source: IBRD Annual Report, various issues
These figures show that investment has increased continuously during 
the period under study and that for most years investment exceeded 
domestic savings. Thus these countries, as a group, have experienced what 
may be a savings constraint in the form suggested by Chenery & Bruno 
(1962), McKinnon (1964), Chenery & Strout (1966); however, see Joshi 
(1970). This factor alone would necessitate external flows of finance.
Clearly these three sets of figures indicate the commitment to 
growth, particularly industrial growth, of the developing countries as a 
group. The inferences from the United Nations figures given above are 
reinforced by the IBRD figures. Furthermore, a study by Dell & Lawrence 
(1980) found that increased import quantities accounted for 41% of the 
cases of deterioration on the LDC trade account between 1962-1973. 
Increased import prices, on the other hand, accounted for 8% of such
cases. They conclude that these figures are consistent with 11.......  the
development process as well as .....  short run problems of demand
management" (pl2 ).
It is, therefore, reasonably clear that throughout this period the 
growth aspirations of the developing countries as a group were at least 
partially achieved particularly by export growth and import substitution
through industrialisation. Given the assumption of a positive marginal 
propensity to import and that many of the capital inputs to the 
industrialisation process have had to be imported, even partial 
achievement of the growth objective would, ceteris paribus, cause a
deterioration in the balance of payments on current account.
Impact of Increased Oil Prices
The change in the relative price of oil since 1973 has made it 
necessary, with any analysis of the developing countries, to divide the 
whole group into oil exporters and non oil exporters. The oil exporters 
have for the majority of years since 1973 been net exporters of 
financial capital, whereas the non oil exporters have needed to import 
such capital.
The following figures, again from United Nations sources, give the 
index of unit value, 1970 = 100, for energy exports by developing
countries to other developing countries. As all the OPEC countries are 
classified as developing, these indices reflect oil exporting
countries' exports to non oil exporting developing countries (NOLDCs). 
The value of such exports is given in parenthesis for each year.
Table 1.7 Index of oil exports to NOLDCs
1968 97 (3.15) 1975 603 (26.26)
1969 98 (3.21) 1976 643 (32.13)
1970 100 (3.92) 1977 701 (36.41)
1971 . 126 (4.98) 1978 703 (33.42)
1972 135 (5.49) 1979 990 (50.72)
1973 185 (8.67) 1980 1640 (75.09)
1974 571 (26.41)
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1981 p45 
Figures in parenthesis in billions US $
The increased price of oil after 1973 affected the developing 
countries' balance of payment not only through their energy imports but 
through all their imports because of the energy content. Nevertheless, 
the greatest price rises in non energy imports were to be seen in the 
manufactured imports which are energy intensive and most of. these are 
imported from the developed countries.
The Impact of Oil Induced Recession in OECD Countries
The oil price rises of 1973-74 and 1979 also affected the NOLDCs 
balance of payments in an indirect way by inducing a recession in the 
developed economies. This reduced the demand for NOLDCs exports by the 
developed countries.
The following United Nations figures show the value of total 
exports excluding fuel from the developing economies to the developed 
market economies.
-Table 1.8 LDC exports (less fuel) to developed market economies
1970 26.47 1975 54.86
1971 26.56 1976 70.26
1972 31.96 1977 81.45
1973 46.32 1978 93.46
1974 59.42 1979 115.04
1980 129.49
Source: United Nations Yearbook 1981 p44 
Figures in billions US $ FOB
These figures reflect the drop in exports from NOLDCs which 
coincides with the 1975 recession in the developed world if we accept 
the crude assumption that all non fuel exports of developing countries 
come from NOPEC countries.
We can now summarise this section by saying that the need for 
increased financial flows to the non oil exporting developing countries 
during the 1970's was caused by their balance of payments disequilibria. 
These in turn were caused by:
a) Aspirations of growth and a policy of import substitution 
throughout the period.
b) The increased price of oil, particularly after 1973, exacer­
bated the disequilibria. Given that the costs of adjustment 
would be so great, even larger flows of financial resources 
were required.
c) The oil induced recession in the developed economies during
1974-75 and after 1979 also contributed to the deterioration 
of the NOLDC balance of payments. Given their growth 
policies, these countries had to borrow the foreign exchange 
required to cover these deficits.
30
.4 Why did the Developing Countries turn to the Private Financial Markets?
The private financial markets did not suddenly find a new set of 
customers in 1970. These markets had been providing some finance to the 
developing countries on an increasing, though small, scale during the
1950's and 1960's. Many of the banking techniques had their genesis in
the 1960's. What was different in the '70's compared with earlier 
periods was the dominance of private sector debt creating flows over 
official flows and direct investment to the developing countries.
Given that the private markets and the techniques were in existence 
before 1970, it is reasonable to suggest that after 1970 these markets 
and techniques were a more desirable source of finance compared with 
the official sources because, of the .declining desirability and avail­
ability of the latter. We can therefore answer the question of why the 
developing countries turned so convincingly to the private markets by 
investigating the reasons for the declining desirability and relative 
availability of the official financial flows.
We will begin by analysing the role of the IMF and then look at the
role of the World Bank and of Bilateral Aid.
The International Monetary Fund
The aim of this institution is to provide temporary finance to 
members in order to finance their balance of payments disequilibria.
Each member of the Fund contributes its 'quota' , of which before
J
1976 25% was in gold or US dollars and 75% in its own currency. Since 
1975 the contributions can be completely in the member's own currency. 
The size of a member's quota has an influence over the amount of 
finance that can be obtained from the IMF because quantitative 
limitations on assistance are stated in terms of multiples of a 
member's quota.
Much debate about the availability of assistance from the Fund 
centres upon the conditionality attached to any such assistance, (Bird
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1979/ 1982, Pirzio-Birote 1983, Buira 1983). However, it is not
intended to discuss IMF conditionality in any detail in this thesis 
because, as will be shown below, the overwhelming constraint upon the 
maximum amount of assistance that the Fund could give to the LDCs has 
been the resources available to the Fund.
It is shown below that even if no conditions were attached to IMF 
assistance, save for the regulation regarding maximum quota multiples, 
and that NOLDCs drew their maximum entitlement, this entitlement would 
be an increasingly inadequate form of quantitative assistance as the 
1970's progressed.
The Quantity of Funds Available from the IMF
The resources which the Fund can make available come from members' 
subscriptions and from borrowed resources. Members' subscriptions are 
determined in accordance with the same quotas allocated to each member 
which in turn influence a member's access to Fund resources and voting 
power.
The Articles of Agreement of the Fund provide for a general review 
of quotas every five years. The fifth general review of quotas took 
place in 1969 and a 35.5% increase in all quotas was agreed for 1970. 
The total value of quotas for all members as at 30 April 1971 was SDR 
28478 million which represented 8.2% of the total value of 
international trade. The total value of quotas increased to SDR 39000 
million by April 1980 which represented 4% of international trade. The 
sixth general review of quotas in 1976 doubled the quota share of oil 
exporting countries from 4.98% to 9.88%, whilst keeping the collective 
share of developing countries to 20.92%. Bearing in mind that quotas 
influence the total amount of finance that can be obtained from the 
Fund, such action seems to be of little help to the NOLDCs, (IMF 1981
p80).
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The Fund grants facilities under four accounts; The General 
Account, The Subsidy Accpunt, The Trust Fund and The SDR Account.
Under the General Account for the period 1970-1980 the Fund made 
resources available under the following facilities 
- Ordinary drawings and standby arrangements 
The Extended Fund Facility 
The Supplementary Financing Facility 
The Compensatory Financing Facility 
The Buffer Stock Financing Facility 
The Oil Facilities of 1974 and 1975
Ordinary drawings are available up to 125% of a member's quota. 
This amount is available in five 25% tranches, the first being known as 
the reserve tranche, the second as the first credit tranche and the 
last three being known as the upper credit tranches.
The reserve tranche is made available unconditionally. The first 
credit tranche is made available to any member regarded as making 
'reasonable efforts' to solve its balance of payments problems, but in 
practice is virtually automatic (ODI 1980). The upper credit tranches 
are granted only after substantial justification; the higher the 
tranche, the more exacting are the criteria for justification. These 
funds have normally been granted under a one year (but recently three 
year) standby agreement in support of a stabilisation programme agreed 
with the Fund. Access to these funds is by instalments and can be 
withdrawn if the performance criteria are not met.
It is the agreement of the performance criteria and the compliance 
with the stabilisation programme agreed with the Fund that constitute 
the conditionality associated with the ordinary drawings from the Fund.
The Extended Fund Facility The aim of this facility, established in 
1974, is for the IMF to provide a facility whereby the developing 
countries could obtain resources but with longer repayment periods than
applied to normal drawings from the Fund.
The repayment period was originally up to eight years but in 1979 
was extended to ten years so this facility is very much one of medium 
term finance. Drawings may be made over a three year period and may 
reach a maximum of 140% of the member's quota with the proviso that 
ordinary drawings and Extended Fund drawings must not exceed 265% of a 
member's quota.
Again, there is a degree of conditionality attached to this 
facility that is comparable with facilities under the upper credit 
tranches. The member is expected to present an economic programme 
setting the policies and objectives for the duration of the facility. 
Drawings are by instalment so that the granting of instalments can 
depend upon satisfactory execution of stages of the agreed programme.
The Supplementary Financing Facility became operational in 
February 1979 and provides funds under standby or extended 
arrangements. These funds are made available from resources that the 
Fund obtains by borrowing from members specifically for supplementary 
financing. They are in addition to those provided under other 
facilities.
The Fund will grant the facility if:-
a) The member needs finance from the Fund that exceeds the 
four credit tranches, and its problems require a 
relatively long period of adjustment. The repurchase 
period is 3i-7 years.
b) The member will follow policies that are compatible with 
the Fund's policies on the use of resources in the upper 
credit tranches or extended fund facility.
Until June 1980 a member could draw 300% of its quota under this 
facility. At that date access was reduced to 200% of quota.
The Compensatory Financing Facility was established in 1963 to 
provide compensatory finance to members suffering temporary shortfall 
in export earnings.
The original terms of this facility were liberalised in 1965 when 
limits upon drawings were increased to 50% of a member's quota subject 
to the constraint that drawings should not exceed 25% of quota in any 
one year. The second 25% was only to be granted if the member was 
pursuing policies reasonably conducive to the development of its 
exports. Repayments were expected to be made within three to five 
years.
These arrangements were again liberalised in 1975 when the overall 
limit was increased to 75% (liberalised to 100% in 1979) of a member's 
quota with annual permitted drawings increasing to 50% - or even 75% in 
the case of a disaster (limit abolished in 1979).
The benefits which developing countries can obtain from this 
facility depend not only on the maximum amount available but also on 
the way in which the Fund calculates the export shortfall. The Fund 
considers a shortfall to exist when export earnings for a year fall 
below what they would have been if price and output were both normal in 
terms of a five year trend centred upon the shortfall year. However, 
the Fund retains considerable discretion in evaluating shortfalls. 
Therefore the bargaining strength of the member and its export 
performance in the two years prior to the shortfall year influence the 
benefits which the member may gain from this facility. As the trend 
calculation includes the shortfall year, the trend and thus the 
starting point for negotiation will be biased downwards. Until 1975 the 
trend was also biased downwards because assumed export growth was 
limited to 3% when in fact nominal export growth was far in excess of
that figure (Bird 1978).
Other criticisms of this facility centre upon its short term nature 
with repayments due within three to five years when there is little 
evidence to suggest the developing countries can cure their balance of 
payments problems within that time period since they are often 
structural in nature. Furthermore, the facility was originally only 
available to finance shortfalls in export earnings when in fact a major 
cause of a deficit on the balance of payments may be increased prices 
of imports and an inelastic demand for those goods. In 1981 the 
facility was extended to cover increased costs of cereal imports.
The Buffer Stock Financing Facility assists members having 
difficulty financing their share of agreed international buffer stock 
schemes. Credit up to 50% of quota is allowed but this facility has 
been little used since its inception in 1969.
This facility is subject to the following conditions
- Finance can only be provided to individual members 
participating in buffer stock schemes and not to the 
international bodies controlling such schemes.
- Finance is available only to members experiencing 
balance of payments difficulties due to their con­
tributions to the buffer stock scheme.
- Drawings must be repaid within three to five years.
The member country must agree to cooperate with the 
Fund to find solutions to its balance of payments 
difficulties.
- The buffer stock scheme must be of a form approved 
by the Fund.
The Oil Facilities of 1974 and 1975 were financed by means of 
borrowings from members. The aim of the 1974 facility was to provide
finance based upon the difference between the cost of net petroleum and
petroleum product imports in 1974 and 1972. Shch finance could not
exceed 75% of a member's quota.
The 1975 facility was limited to 125% of a member's quota, or 85% 
of the increased cost of petroleum and petroleum-based imports, whichever 
was the lower. The conditionality of the 1975 facility was stricter than 
for the 1974 facility in that balance of payments policies and energy 
conservation and substitution policies were formally assessed.
Funds had to be repaid within three to seven years under both 
facilities. A rate of interest of seven per cent for 1974 and seven and 
threequarter per cent for 1975 was applied.
The figures below show the use that has been made of the Oil 
Facilities:
1974 Oil Facility
All countries 2499.251
of which Developing Countries 1029.651
1975 Oil Facility
All countries 3966.237
of which Developing Countries 1334.977
Figures in millions SDRs
The Subsidy Account
In an attempt to reduce the debt burden of the interest rates on 
the Oil Facility, the Fund established a Subsidy Account. This was to be 
used to provide financial assistance to the poorest developing countries 
which had suffered most through increases in oil prices. Payments under 
this account began in May 1976. The'most needy developing countries were 
defined as those with a per capita income of less than US $400 per annum 
and who face severe balance of payments problems on the basis of 
projected import and export performance.
Table 1.9
The Subsidy Account
1976 13.82
1977 27.51
1978 24.95
1979 19.10
1980 13.79
Figures in millions SDR
It can be seen that the lion's share of the oil facilities went to 
the developed countries with Italy being the largest borrower under the
1974 facility, and the United Kingdom the biggest borrower under the
1975 facility. However, all benefits under the Subsidy Account have 
gone to the poorest developing countries.
The Trust Fund
The IMF announced in 1976 the establishment of a Trust Fund in 
order to provide certain eligible developing countries with balance of 
payments finance, which, although conditional, is granted at
concessionary rates.
Gold sales, loans and voluntary subscriptions are the sources of 
funds from which the finance will be made available to those countries 
eligible to receive it.
These funds are made available only to poorest developing
countries and only if the member has provided the Fund with an
acceptable economic programme in respect of another facility of the
Fund. The criteria for assessing the acceptability of such a programme 
are similar to a first credit tranche proposal and therefore not very 
severe. The interest rate on this facility is 0.5% per annum.
Repayments of Trust Fund loans have to be made no later than 6-10 
years after the date of disbursement.
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It can be seen that the advantages of the Trust Fund loans to the 
poorest countries lie in the concessionary rate of interest, long 
repayment period and the fact that these funds are additional to those 
available from other facilities of the Fund.
Up to June 1978 disbursements under the Trust Fund totalled SDR
840.968 million. From June 1978 to end 1980 disbursements totalled SDR
1257.191 million, making total disbursements of SDR 2098.159.
In addition to the Trust Fund, some of the developing countries have 
benefitted from the IMF's gold sales by a direct contribution of a
proportion of the profits. Profits from the 25 million ounces sold to the 
public amounted to US $4.6 billion, of which US $1.3 billion was
distributed directly to 104 developing countries. These distributions 
were made on the basis of each recipient's quota as at 31 December 1975. 
Some developing country members who would have been eligible to receive 
such distributions contributed their share to the Trust Fund. These 
members were mainly members of OPEC.
Special Drawing Rights
Special Drawing Rights are an international form of outside money 
being issued by the Fund and not being backed by debt. They were first 
issued in 1970 with subsequent issues in 1971, 1972 and 1980. About 9500 
million SDRs were issued to members in accordance with their quotas. The 
use of SDRs by members is unconditional save for a rule that their 
holdings should not drop below 30% (15% after 1.1.79) of allocation over 
a period of five years.
SDRs were primarily designed to meet balance of payments needs but 
other members need not accept SDRs in settlement of international 
indebtedness in excess of three times their cumulative allocation. 
Transfers between members take the form of book entries in the IMF's 
Special Account and do not result in the reduction in the number of SDRs 
in existence.
The developing countries, in common with other Fund members, 
derive benefits from the allocation of SDRs in the following ways:
1) By adding to reserves they save the opportunity cost 
of alternative forms of acquiring reserves.
2) They economise on foreign exchange reserves since they 
can be used to pay off debts with the IMF.
3) By exchanging SDRs for foreign currency, real goods and 
services may be acquired.
4) As a form of finance benefits may be derived from the 
greater economic activity which a more plentiful medium 
of exchange permits.
Given that SDRs are distributed in proportion to members' quotas, 
it is clear that the distribution of benefits derived from each initial 
allocation will have the same shortcomings as the quota system. In 
particular the gift of new unconditional reserves is received in 
greater proportion by the rich countries, who have the largest stocks 
of reserves and therefore need free gifts least. Furthermore, by 
granting largely unconditional SDRs in the same proportion to members' 
access to conditional' finance, the Fund has not altered the balance of 
conditionality in its facilities.
The following table shows the original total allocations of SDRs 
to all IMF members and to developing country members.
Table 1.10 The allocation of SDRs to IMF members
All members Developing country 
members
1970 3414.0 935.8
1971 2949.2 787.4
1972 2951.5 921.4
1973-
1979 Zero Zero
1980 4033.27 1551.97
SDRs billions
Bearing in mind that interest is paid by members to the Fund if they 
are net users of SDR, the potential real resource gain is equal to the 
allocation of SDRs minus the interest payable. Obviously the realised 
resource gain depends upon the extent to which the SDRs are utilised.
Below is a summary of the actual drawings made by NOLDCs from the 
various Fund facilities during the period 1970-1980. It does not take 
account of any repurchases that those members have made during the period 
nor the issue of SDRs.
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The table below shows the percentage of a member's quota that is 
available under each of the General Account facilities for the years 
1970 and 1974-80 inclusive. This table also gives the aggregate value of 
quotas of NOLDCs and the maximum amount of funds available to that group 
of developing countries in each year. This maximum amount available is 
the maximum multiple of a member's quota, all members being treated 
equally in this respect, multiplied by the aggregate quotas of the 
NOLDCs.
Table 1.12 Maximum availability of IMF funds
1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Ordinary Drawings:
% of Quota
Reserve Tranche 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Credit Tranches 100 100 100 145 145 145 100 100
Extended Fund
Facility - 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Supplementary
Finance Facility - - - - - -  300 300
Compensatory
Finance Facility 50 50 75 75 75 75 100 100
Buffer Stock
Finance Facility 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Oil Facility - ■ 75 125 - - -
225 440 515 435 435 435 715 715
Aggregate Quotas
of NOLDCs 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29
Total Assistance for 
NOLDCs Available
from General A/c 10.51 20.5 24.1 20.3 20.3 18.66 30.7 30.7
NOLDC BofP
Deficits in SDRs 8.6 30.12 39.2 28.36 23.6 28.8 43.6 64.6
Actual Amounts 
Drawn including
Trust Fund 0.43 1.94 2.4 3.8 1.19 1.90 2.30 5.01
Value Figures in billions SDRs
Clearly the maximum amount available from the General Account of 
the Fund for the NOLDCs has become increasingly inadequate. This is 
particularly so when it is realised that the maximum amounts quoted 
above overestimate the actual amount available to that group of members 
if any such members are not in deficit. This is because members not 
needing the Fund's assistance cannot transfer their quotas to other 
members.
Despite the fact that aggregate NOLDC deficits were greater than 
aggregate NOLDC quotas and despite the fact that the financial terms of 
Fund assistance were softer than those on market finance, actual 
drawings were below permitted drawings throughout this period. One 
reason for this is the non financial conditionality attached to most 
Fund assistance. However, it is abundantly clear that whatever the 
effects of conditionality may be on the demand for Fund assistance, the 
availability of finance must be the biggest constraint upon that 
assistance.
There is circumstantial evidence that conditionality has reduced 
the demand for Fund assistance from NOLDCs. This evidence comes from the 
considerably increased use of individual facilities when the 
conditionality attached to those facilities Is relaxed. Examples are the 
increased use of the Compensatory Finance Facility after its 
liberalisation in 1975 and again in 1979. A further example is increased 
use of the Extended Fund Facility in 1980 following the extension of the 
repayment period from eight to ten years in 1979.
The costs and benefits of IMF conditionality must be evaluated 
within the context of the quantity of funds available. Why should a 
member wish to suffer the costs of conditionality when the amount of 
Fund assistance is relatively small and there are other sources of 
unconditional finance available?
The willingness to accept conditionality during much of the 1970's 
and early 1980's must have been influenced by the availability of
relatively abundant unconditional finance. Thus, for some countries with 
access to bank finance, there was no need to accept conditional Fund 
assistance which, in any case, was by itself grossly inadequate 
(Financial Times 18.6.82). However, at the time of writing, much of this 
bank finance has become vicariously conditional in the sense that 
increasing proportions of new private finance are dependent upon the 
successful negotiation of, and compliance with, the terms of IMF 
facilities. Thus, at the time of writing (end 1983), Fund conditionality 
may be more acceptable to borrowers because the costs of not accepting 
conditionality are not those of foregoing a small amount of external 
finance but instead foregoing all or a major proportion of such finance.
To summarise this section, we may say that throughout the 1970's 
the resources available from the IMF were inadequate to finance NOLDC 
balance of payments deficits and these countries therefore turned to the 
private banks for assistance. The inadequacy of IMF funds was 
exacerbated by the conditionality attached to some of those funds.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Established as a sister institution of the IMF in 1944, the IBRD
has as its function the financing of economic development amongst its 
poorer members. The Bank obtains the finance for its operations from the 
sale of its debt obligations to private investors, governments and their 
instrumentalities. The Bank's capital, which is subscribed to by its 128 
member countries, its retained earnings, and the flow of repayments on 
its loans, substantially contribute to the Bank's resources (Cherniavsky 
1977). In fact, only 10% of authorised capital is subscribed, 90% being 
held as a guarantee of the Bank's operations.
A quantitative constraint is that. the total amount of loans or
guarantees must not exceed the Bank's capital and reserves.
The Bank generally provides project finance, that is, loans made in 
respect of particular projects, and can only be disbursed in relation to 
the approved project. Bank finance is usually limited to the foreign 
exchange content of a project and repayment must be guaranteed by the 
government of the country in which the project is located.
The rate of interest to be charged quarterly on Bank loans is 
calculated by adding 0.5% to the weighted average cost of the Bank's 
borrowed funds (weighted by amount and maturity) over the previous twelve 
months and then applied for the next quarter.
This method of calculating the interest charge meant that loans were 
made at commercial rates and therefore contained little, if any, aid. 
There was also criticism in that the requirement of a government 
guarantee has deterred private firms from seeking finance for development 
projects.
To counter these criticisms the IBRD established two subsidiary 
institutions.
In 1956 the International Finance Corporation was set up in order to 
provide finance for up to 50% of a private sector project. No government 
guarantee is required and the IFC will not invest in projects controlled 
or owned by governments. The aim is that the IFC sells off its stake when 
the project is viable in order to re-use its resources elsewhere.
In 1960 it established the International Development Association. 
The objective was to provide loans on softer terms than Bank loans to 
finance projects in the poorer developing countries.
Finance for the IDA and IFC comes from the reserves - retained past 
profits - of the IBRD as well as subscriptions by the 21 members who are 
industrialised and highly developed.
In 1975 the Bank established the Intermediate Financing Facility or 
The Third Window. This facility was to provide finance on terms 
intermediate between the Bank and the IDA. The idea was to subsidise the 
rate of interest of Bank loans by four per cent per annum, but only on
loans to the poorest members, ie those with a per capita income of less 
than US $375 in 1972. This -facility effectively only lasted for one year. 
The Third Window was expected to lend up to $1000 million in 1976 but 
much less was lent because the Bank could not raise sufficient funds from 
its members. Hurni (1980) attributes this to aid weariness amongst the 
Bank's creditor members.
In order to provide for the subsidy, a Subsidy Fund was 
established; its resources came from certain members of the Bank and 
Switzerland on a voluntary basis (IBRD 1976).
During the 1970's there was a shift of emphasis in World Bank 
lending. The traditional projects that the Bank supported were typically 
infra-structure projects with long gestation periods and only indirectly 
earning foreign exchange. The shift in emphasis was towards 
poverty-orientated projects. As an indication of the relative importance 
of this shift, whereas 22% of lending between 1969-73 went to 
agriculture, 52% of lending went to agriculture during 1974-78 and in 
1977 57% of agricultural lending went to 'poverty-orientated' projects.
The table below shows the total amounts lent by IBRD, IDA and IFC 
from 1970 to 1980.
Table 1.13 Annual lending of IBRD, IDA and IFC 1970-1980 
Of which
IBRD Third IDA IFC
Window
1970 1580 — (754) 606 (143) 112
1971 1921 - (915) 584 (235) 101
1972 1966 - (1182) 1000 (261) 116
1973 2051 - (1180) 1357 (493) 147
1974 3218 - (1533) 1095 (711) 203
1975 4320 - (1995) 1576 (1026) 212
1976 4977 478 (2470) 1655 (1252) 245
1.977 5759 - (2636) 1308 (1298) 259
1978 6098 - (2787) 2313 (1072) 338
1979 6989 - (3602) 3022 (1222) 425
1980 7644 — (4363) 3838 (1411) 681
Source: IBRD Annual Report, various issues 
Figures in million US $
Figures in parenthesis are the actual disbursements in each year
Criticism of the World Bank Group's facilities are related to the 
cost, the quantity available and the small size of any programme lending.
In relation to cost, the establishment of the IDA and the 
Intermediate Financing Facility goes some way to mitigate this problem.
With regard to programme lending, the Bank's Articles of Agreement 
state that "loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special 
circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction 
and development", (IBRD 1977). These special circumstances have changed 
several times during the Bank's existence. Since 1977 they have included 
the following:
1) Reconstruction and rehabilitation of the economy after 
a war or severe national calamity.
2) Demand for industrial raw materials or equipment to raise 
the use of existing industrial capacity.
3) A sudden fall in export earnings, where the economy 
is critically dependent on a single export item.
4) A sharp deterioration in the terms of trade as a 
result of a rapid rise in import prices.
Until 1970 the Bank and the IDA provided about 10% of their loans 
as programme loans. From 1971 to 1974 that figure fluctuated between 4% 
and 7%, increasing sharply in 1975 to 9% and declining again to 2.3% in 
1977. The 1977 Annual Report of the Bank suggested that a figure of 
7-10% was considered a reasonable commitment to programme lending in the 
future.
Turning now to the quantity of assistance available to members, 
this is not so much restricted by the members' contributions but by the 
overall quantity of funds available to the Bank. The Bank's loanable 
funds in any one year will depend in the main upon interest and 
amortization receipts and borrowings. However, the overriding legalistic 
constraint on the Bank's lending will be the regulation that total loans 
must not exceed the sum of the Bank's subscribed capital and its 
reserves. Nevertheless, figures below show that this regulation did not 
constrain the Bank's activities during the 1970's. There have been 
several replenishments of the capital stock during the Bank's existence 
but because these replenishments do not earn an income for the member 
governments such contributions are akin to aid. As such they are 
constrained by the political will of the members, particularly the 
developed country members, in granting additional aid.
The table below shows the extent to which Bank lending has been 
constrained by the level of capital and reserves.
Table 1.14 Capital & reserves and loans outstanding of IBRD 1970'
Total Capital 
& Reserves
Total loans 
granted
Disbursed
outstanding
Undisbursed
amounts
1970 24879 8889 5963 2926
1971 25315 9980 6586 3394
1972 28202 11952 785 4095
1973 32147 14628 967 4955
1974 32203 16632 10489 6143
1975 32723 19863 12188 7675
1976 32777 22741 13527 9214
1977 32895 27034 1572 11308
1978 35290 33065 19359 13706
1979 39927 39137 22874 16263
1980 42852 44804 26694 18110
Source: IBRD Annual Report, various issues
Figures in millions US $
It can be seen that at no time did the amount disbursed outstanding 
come close to being constrained by the Bank's lending capacity. Yet 
despite this unused capacity, demand for credit from private sources grew 
substantially.
This last point may give a clue as to why greater use has not been 
made of IBRD facilities. A considerable amount of borrowing by the non oil 
developing countries from the private sector has not been tied to projects 
but is in effect programme borrowing. In particular, some borrowing has 
been undertaken specifically to finance balance of payments deficits.
It may very well be, therefore, that the relatively small role played 
by the World Bank Group in providing finance to the developing countries 
results from the terms and conditions attached to such finance.
50
The fact that the Bank has limited the amount of programme finance 
it makes available means -that the supply of loans is likely to be 
channelled to those countries where project investment possibilities are 
greatest.
The following figures show outstanding loans as at 31 December 1980 
aggregated by income groups:
Upper Middle Income 1,068,635
Intermediate Middle Income 26,548,411
Lower Middle Income 14,379,381
Low 2,771,246
Source: calculated from IBRD prospectus 27.4.81 
Figures in thousands US $
It is notable that this distribution of loans is similar to that of 
eurocurrency syndicated loans where commercial criteria can be expected 
to apply. It may be therefore that the Bank's insistence on 
creditworthiness in the projects that it finances and its lack of 
interest in programme finance have combined to limit the attractiveness 
of World Bank finance to developing countries. It must be remembered 
that the above distribution relates to loans from IBRD; IDA loans, which 
are on softer terms, all go to the poorer members of the World Bank.
Bilateral Aid Flows
The major aid donors during the 1970's have been the DAC members of 
OECD and OPEC countries, with small contributions being made by the 
centrally planned economies of Europe and China.
During the 1970's there were two targets for aid flows donated by
members of the United Nations. The first target was embodied in the
Development Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade (1971-1980).
This called for Net Official Development Assistance to be at least 0.7%
of GNP at market prices of the donor country. The second target was that 
adopted by UNCTAD II in 1968 which calls for all financial flows, both 
private and official, to represent at least 1% of GNP.
The following figures show the net flows of aid from various groups 
of donors. In nominal terms these flows have increased by 350% in eleven 
years; bilateral aid growth being slightly slower than multilateral aid.
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However, the same source (page 52) shows that in real terms (1981 
prices) aid increased by only 75% over that same period.
Comparing these figures with those for balance of payments deficits 
on page 21 above it is clear that aid receipts by LDCs as a group 
became an increasingly inadequate source of finance as the decade 
progressed.
OECD figures given in Table 1.1 above show that 97.4% of ODA in 
1978 went to non OPEC LDCs. Thus, even if we make the assumption that 
OPEC countries therefore received very low ODA payments during the whole 
of the decade, ODA receipts by non OPEC LDCs were still unable to 
finance the balance of payments deficit.
Reasons for Increased Private Flows : A Summary
Having analysed the official sources of external finance, we can 
now summarise the reasons for the developing countries turning to the 
private financial markets as:
1) Inadequate rate of growth of funds from official 
sources.
2) Conditionality applied to funds from official 
sources. In particular, the terms attached to 
IMF facilities and the tying of aid made private 
unconditional credit preferable despite its 
higher cost.
3) The relative lack of flexibility of the facilities 
from official sources made the flexibility of the 
eurocurrency syndicated loans market particularly 
attractive. In this respect the small level of 
programme lending by the IBRD is to be noted.
1.5 The Impact of Increased Privatisation of Sources of Finance
The shift in emphasis towards private sources of finance may be 
expected to change the level of benefit which the developing countries 
receive from their aggregate financial flows. In particular, because 
private flows will be motivated by commercial criteria whereas official 
flows may be expected to be, to some extent, motivated by altruism, the 
shift towards private finance will mean harder financial terms. These 
terms will be manifested in a combination of higher interest rates, 
shorter grace periods and shorter maturities to loans.
In order to analyse the effects of the change in financial terms, 
it is first necessary to ascertain how the debt disbursement was 
distributed amongst recipients for each type of financial flow. With 
knowledge of this distribution and of the different financial terms 
attached to each, some indication of the changing financial costs to the 
developing countries will be possible.
One particularly important question in this regard is the extent to 
which the changing financial terms affect the developing countries' 
future growth by laying prior claim to future foreign exchange 
resources, these resources being used for debt servicing instead of 
investment.
The Distribution of Financial Flows by Source and Recipient
In what has been said so far the developing countries have been 
divided into two groups. One group is the oil exporting group which, 
because of their balance of payments surpluses, particularly since 1973, 
have also been net exporters of financial capital. The second group is 
the non oil exporting developing countries which, as a group, are net 
importers of financial capital. However, to treat this latter group as 
homogeneous obscures many interesting details about the benefits they 
gain from international financial flows.
In this section we follow the practice of the IBRD and divide all 
developing countries into the following groups:
Upper Middle Income ie countries with a per capita GNP
of US $3000-6999 in 1978.
Intermediate Middle Income ie countries with a per
capita GNP of US $700-2999 in 1978.
Lower Middle Income ie countries with a per capita 
GNP of US $300-699 in 1978.
Low Income countries ie those countries with a per
capita GNP of less than US $300 in 1978.
The following table shows the ratio of amortization payments to 
outstanding disbursed debt and the ratio of interest payments to 
outstanding disbursed debt. Values of both ratios are given for 1973 and 
1979 so that comparison can be made. These ratios were calculated from 
data extracted from the IBRD World Debt Tables.
The amortization ratio shows the proportion of total debt being 
amortized each year. If the ratio rises the residual maturities and grace 
periods on existing debt are shortening or those variables on new debt are
getting shorter. In the extreme, a bunching of maturities in a given time
period will lead to a dramatic rise in this ratio.
The interest ratio shows the relationship between interest payments 
and debt outstanding. If this ratio rises over time, then it indicates 
that interest rates on marginal loans, or in the case of floating rate 
loans intramarginal loans, are rising. Thus again the higher ratio means 
harder financial terms.
In effect these two ratios decompose the ratio of total debt service 
payments to debt outstanding. This is considered to be worthwhile because 
it enables the highlighting of the influence of changes in interest rates 
- often caused by money market conditions - and changes in grace periods 
and maturities which may be influenced by risk and competitive factors.
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These figures show that generally th<£* interest to debt ratio has 
increased over the period reflecting the secular increase in interest
rates during the 1970's. The greatest increase in the ratio is found in
loans from the financial institutions, the smallest increases coming from
bonds. However, this latter point may reflect the relatively small use
that has been made of the international bond markets by the developing 
countries.
One reason why the interest to debt ratio has risen for loans from 
financial institutions is that many of these loans are tied to floating 
rates of interest, therefore both marginal and intra-marginal loans 
reflect the secular increase in interest rates during the 1970's.
Although the interest burden has risen during the 1970's the change 
in the burden of amortization is less obvious. For loans from financial 
institutions the burden appears to have fallen for all groups except the 
intermediate middle income borrowers. However, although data in appendix 
II show amortization rising faster than disbursements during 1978 and 
1979, this is due to the considerable increase in debt refinancing that 
occurred during that period. This effectively extended the maturities and 
grace periods.
Clearly then, the increase in the relative share of private finance 
in total finance has raised the interest servicing burden but reduced the 
amortization burden. However, see chapter five, page 236 below re short 
term debt.
One interesting point is that although one may expect the interest 
and amortization commitments on official finance to be lower on low income 
- although high risk - borrowers compared with high income borrowers, we 
find that the same applies to the private sources except for bonds. We 
might expect such a situation on official finance because commercial - 
particularly risk - criteria may not be dominant in assessing loan 
applications. However, we would not expect such a situation with private 
credit because we expect risk criteria to be dominant in private 
assessment of loan applications.
One explanation of this may be that lower income countries have only 
recently gained access to the private sources of finance on any scale. 
Where loans are made^to these poorest borrowers official -export credit 
insurance with its attendant.subsidised fixed rate bank loans, will 'be 
proportionately more important.' Thus the impact of rising interest 
rates is reduced for these borrowers.
Turning now to data on the actual flows of funds to the developing 
countries given in Appendix II, we use the concept of net transfer to 
make comparisons between the sources of flows and between the 
destinations of flows. The concept of net transfer is calculated as 
follows, following IBRD practice:
Disbursements - Amortization = Net flow 
Net flow - Interest payments = Net transfer
This concept is used here in order to facilitate the comparison of 
flows from financial intermediaries with flows from other sources. 
However, below, under the section discussing recycling, we analyse the 
validity of this concept in relation to financial intermediaries.
These data on the net flow show the upper middle income group of 
countries receiving.a rising net transfer from government sources but a 
declining net transfer from all other sources. This is despite the fact 
that government transfers could be made on altruistic grounds and 
therefore concessionary, in which case the concessions may be more 
appropriate to the poorer nations.
Intermediate middle income countries, on the other hand, have 
received over the decade a declining net transfer from governments, and 
a rising net transfer from all • other sources. The financial 
institutions have been the most important source of these flows, being 
several times greater than the government and international 
organisations combined.
For the lower middle income countries, governments and
international institutions have been about equally important as sources 
of financial flows. The flow from the bond markets has been erratic and 
the flow from suppliers has declined since the mid 1970’s. Funds from 
financial institutions have grown to be the most important form of 
finance.
Features of the flows to the low income countries include the 
negative net flow from the bond market and the relatively low flow from 
the financial institutions. The first factor is due to the fact that 
these countries have not tapped this market during the 1970's. The 
reasons for the infrequent use of the bond markets by LDCs are 
discussed in chapter eight of this thesis. The relatively low flow to 
these countries from the financial institutions is due, firstly, to the 
higher perceived risk which these countries offer to the lending 
institutions. The second reason is that the higher costs of private 
finance to these countries - to balance the higher risk - means that 
these countries cannot afford to tap the private markets due to their 
lack of concessionality.
It must also be remembered that the poorest countries do receive 
large portions of their external financial flows in the form of ODA. 
According to OECD figures (Review Economic Development 1980, Table 
IV-IO) , the least developed countries receive 85.2% of their external 
financial flows in the form of ODA and the low income countries 
generally receive 71.1% of such flows as ODA. Given that the proportion 
of ODA received in grant form during 1979 by these groups of.countries 
is 94% and 90% respectively, the lack of access to private sources of 
credit for the poorest countries is to some extent mitigated (OECD 
Development Cooperation 1980, Table B2).
Note should be made of the erratic flows of supplier credit to all 
the developing countries. However, bank supplied buyer credit is highly 
substitutable for supplier credit. This is particularly so where such 
credit is supported by official export credit insurance. Such insurance
agencies have increasingly been used by western governments as 
instruments of export competition policy. This action could account for 
behaviour of supplier credit in that buyer credit supplied by banks in 
the supplier’s country has been substituted for supplier credit.
To summarise the effects upon the developing countries of greater 
access to private sources of finance, we must note that:
- firstly, the financial borrowing costs have 
risen;
secondly, the quantity of funds available has 
increased dramatically;
- thirdly, that the effective maturity structure 
of private debt has lengthened during the 1970's, 
particularly from financial institutions; 
fourthly, the distribution of access to private 
funds is not uniform across all developing countries.
However, as the better-off developing countries have, 
and can afford, access to private sources of finance 
this means that the finance available from official 
sources can be spread more thickly amongst the 
poorer countries. These countries are therefore 
benefitting from a greater share of concessionary 
finance;
- fifthly, having said that, it must be remembered 
that the credit from private sources, particularly 
from financial institutions and bonds, is not evenly 
distributed amongst those countries that have access 
to such sources. A few developing countries take the 
lion's share of both bank loans and bond issues;
- sixthly, the increased financial costs of borrowing 
may not necessarily be an increased burden for the
borrower. If correct financial and social criteria 
are taken into account, the higher interest rates 
may not be detrimental to the borrower. However, 
to the extent that the higher interest rates are 
associated with higher inflation rates in the 
developed world, but the loan is used to finance a 
project that does not generate additional foreign 
exchange earnings, then servicing that loan in 
foreign currency may prove difficult. Neverthe­
less, this problem is really one of debt manage­
ment and should not be attributed to the increased 
privatisation of debt per se.
The Recycling of Financial Flows
This topic has 'been much discussed in relation to the movement of 
funds from the oil exporting countries to the non oil exporting 
developing countries. However, as can be seen from the table on page .21 
above, the years 1970-73 and 1978 required the recycling from the 
industrialised surplus countries as well, because the OPEC surpluses 
were smaller than the NOPEC deficits.
This recycling process is simply the manifestation of the role of 
international financial intermediation. Financial intermediaries borrow 
from sectors with surplus funds and lend to sectors with a financial 
deficit. In the process a liquidity transformation often takes place.
There are three major types of financial intermediaries involved in 
the recycling process, the Development Banks, the IMF and, most 
importantly, the Commercial Banks.
In this section it is intended to analyse the role of each of these 
intermediaries against the criteria of providing funds for the most 
needy developing countries.
The development banks are included because it is contended here 
that an analysis of the role of the commercial banks can only be made 
with a knowledge of their contribution to the resources of the 
development banks.
The Role of the Development Banks
Data for this analysis are taken from the World Bank Debt Tables. 
These show disbursed debt outstanding to international organisations by 
developing countries for 1979, as follows:
Upper middle income countries 1229.7
Intermediate middle income countries 18493.2
Lower middle income countries 11792.2
Low income countries 11725.2
TOTAL 43240.3
Millions US $
The term 'international organisations' includes the World Bank 
Group, regional development banks and other multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies. However, the influence of the other 
multilateral and intergovernmental agencies was small eg World. Bank 
Group alone accounted for US $32539 million (June 1979).
It can be seen that most money has been lent to the intermediate
middle income group and least to the upper middle income group of
countries, the two low income groups getting roughly equal shares..
In order to see how these flows represent genuine recycling, it is
necessary to show the sources of funds to the international
organisations.
Again, taking the World Bank as representative of all the
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development banks, figures extracted from the Bank's annual reports for 
1976-79 show that oil exporting countries lent the Bank US $305.5 
million in 1976, US $179.5>million in 1977, US $40.1 million in 1978. 
The 1979 annual report does not specify any borrowings from oil 
exporters, although there are several borrowings from 'other' countries.
It can be seen that some, although modest, recycling from oil 
exporters to NOPEC developing countries has been achieved by the Bank. 
Nor must it be forgotten that in 1978 the oil exporters were actually in 
deficit, thus all developing countries as a group were in deficit to the 
developed countries. During the fiscal year 1979 the World Bank, 
according to its annual report, borrowed over 5 billion US $ equivalent 
of foreign currency, nearly all from the developed world. As disbursed 
loans increased by over US $3i billion, the Bank actively recycled from 
the industrial countries to the developed countries during that period.
The evidence of recycling OPEC surpluses is less impressive. The 
following figures taken from a World Bank loan prospectus dated 24 April 
1981 show Bank borrowings outstanding as at 30 June 1980.
Table 1.17 Currency classification of IBRD borrowings outstanding 30.6.80
Austrian Schillings 80.032
Belgian Francs 80.693
Canadian $ 59.865
Deutsche Mark 8,809.726
French Francs 29.354
Italian Lira 47.369
Japanese Yen 4,133.684
Kuwaiti Dinars 278.937
Netherlands Guilders 426.657
Pounds Sterling 9.898
Saudi Arabian Riyals 150.164
Swedish Kronar 30.139
Swiss Francs 5,489.652
United Arab Emirate Dirhans 72.953
US Dollars 9,819.392
Venezuelian Bolivors 109.470
29,729.319
Source: IBRD Prospectus dated 24.4.81
Figures US $ millions
Of the US $29,729,319 million equivalent only US $611,524 million was 
outstanding to oil exporting developing countries. These figures confirm 
the small role played by the World Bank in directly recycling surpluses 
from the oil exporters to the NOPEC countries. However, to the extent that 
financial institutions in the developed world subscribed to IBRD bonds 
with funds deposited by oil exporters, the World Bank is indirectly 
involved in recycling. These figures also obscure the subscription to IBRD 
bonds by financial institutions and individuals in the oil exporting 
countries which are made in the major currencies.
Considering the distribution of IBRD loans given above, it is
reasonable to conclude that the recycling that does take place via these
organisations is directed to the poorer two categories of developing 
countries.
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The Role of the IMF
This institution acts as a financial intermediary in so far as it 
provides by way of loan (purchases) funds deposited by other members, 
either by way of a member's quota or extra funds under special 
facilities.
The Oil Facilities, the Trust Fund and the Supplementary Financing 
Facility to the extent that they are financed by borrowing, are examples 
of financial intermediation by the IMF. The General Agreements to Borrow 
are concluded between the Fund and ten industrial members plus 
Switzerland and as such do not directly represent recycling between the 
OPEC and NOPEC countries.
However, the Oil Facility and the Supplementary Financing Facility 
were both partly funded by OPEC members. To this extent, given that 
NOPEC members benefitted under both schemes, the Fund has been directly 
involved in recycling the OPEC surpluses. Two reservations must 
nevertheless be made. Firstly, the major beneficiaries under the Oil 
Facility have been developed country members. Secondly, although the 
Fund had commitments by members to lend it SDR 7784 million to fund the 
Supplementary Financing Facility, as at 30 April 1980 the Fund had only 
borrowed SDR 502.4 million. Thus, this recycling role has been very 
limited.
In fact in the 1980 annual report, the Fund states that it has 
supplemented its resources, by borrowing, by only SDR 9.9 billion in the 
six years to 1980. Given that some of these resources would have come 
from developed members and lent to developed members, the actual amount 
directly recycled to NOPEC members by the IMF during this period must be 
relatively very small.
The Role of the Commercial Banks
In order to establish the role of these banks in the recycling 
process, we can remind ourselves of the net transfer made by them to the
non oil developing countries.
Table 1. 18 Net transfer by banks to developing countries 1973-79
. Upper 
Middle 
Income
Intermediate'
Middle
Income
Lower
Middle
Income
Low
Income
1973 207.8 3602.3 545.5 203.6
1974 1119.8 3914.6 1095.1 237.4
1975 1238.9 5925.4 2049.5 163.1
1976 1233.7 9123.8 1999.8 221.6
1977 1507.3 9396.7 1618.5 270.9
1978 -148.3 15073.0 1871.0 227.4
1979 -127.4 14390.5 2787.3 158.1
Calculated 
Figures in
from IBRD World 
millions US $
Debt Tables
When analysing the distribution of financial flows between income 
groups,' we noted that the concept of net transfer as calculated was not 
valid where the source of finance was both debtor and creditor to the 
group of borrowers. This situation occurs most obviously with the 
financial intermediaries.
These financial intermediaries/ in particular the commercial banks, 
are often holding deposits from, as well as making loans to, the same 
developing countries. These deposits may be held by the borrowing 
country for transactions purposes, or as part of their stock of foreign 
exchange reserves, or the deposits could.arise from loans being drawn 
down but not yet utilised.
One could go a stage further and adjust for the role of the Bank 
for International Settlements. This Bank takes deposits from other 
central banks and redeposits the funds in the eurocurrency market. To 
the extent that these two types of deposit are used by the banks in 
order to fund their loans to the developing countries, these countries 
are in effect financing their own loans. It would not, therefore, be
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correct to use the concept of the net transfer calculated as: 
Disbursements - (Amortization + Interest) 
when discussing the recycling of funds by these institutions.
The point is that recycling relates to the movement of funds from 
one sector of the world economy to another. To the extent that 
developing country deposits held with financial institutions help 
finance the portfolio of loans to the developing countries, these loans 
are not recycling funds from one sector to another.
In so far as the net transfer is an indicator of the new purchasing 
power which is made available to the borrower, then it is quite valid to 
use that indicator in relation to flows from financial institutions. 
However, as a comparative measure of the relative flows to different 
groups of developing countries from various sources, the relative 
deposit position of those countries vis-a-vis the financial institutions 
must also be taken into account. A more correct measure would offset 
deposits held by the borrower with the financial institution.
To the extent that the net transfer is representative of the new 
resources that have flowed to the recipient country, then the change in 
deposits held by that country with financial institutions should be 
deducted from the net transfer as calculated above.
In order to obtain some conceptually correct idea of the net 
transfer to the developing countries by the commercial banks, the 
following figures show the change in assets (loans) and liabilities 
(deposits) of banks in the BIS reporting area vis-a-vis developing 
countries. The balance of the flows of loans and deposits will be the 
net transfer. Because these flows are calculated from the change in 
stocks, of assets and liabilities between different time periods, 
amortization and interest flows will be captured in the net result.
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Table 1.19 Net transfer by banks to borrowers classified by income group
Upper
Middle
Income
Intermediate
Middle
Income
Lower
Middle
Income
Low
Income
1977 A 7523 19400 1108 257
L 4474 11414 3764 1113
Net Trans +3049 + 7986 -2656 -856
1978 A 8300 31778 8379 1445
L 9949 15595 2253 1966
Net Trans -1649 +16283 +6126 -521
1979 A 13043 39546 6756 756
L 5411 17317 4862 1394
Net Trans +8432 +22229 + 1894 -638
Source: Calculated from BIS figures reproduced in Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, eg Table 13 December 1980 
Figures in millions US $
L = liabilities A = assets
The figures highlight the differing degree of access to bank credit 
for the low income countries compared with the others in that at least 
for 1977-79 the former have received a negative net transfer from the 
commercial banks. Although, for 1977, the lower middle income countries 
received a negative net transfer, as did the upper middle income 
countries in 1978.
Having calculated the conceptually correct net transfer from the 
banks to the developing countries, we should also note that these 
financial institutions are also subscribers to the debt of the 
development banks such as the IBRD. Therefore, to get a complete 
appraisal of the role of the banks in recycling funds to the NOLDCs, it 
is necessary to determine what share of the bank's portfolio consists of 
development bank debt. This contribution to development bank debt should 
then be apportioned between different income groups of developing 
countries. This apportionment should be proportionate to the development 
bank's lending to each income group unless specific funds can be traced
from the investor to the borrower. However, unfortunately, it has not 
been possible to obtain any estimate of bank investment in development 
bank debt. For UK banks the Bank of England does not possess such 
information. Further, the development banks do not have reliable 
estimates because some of their debt is issued by way of bearer 
securities. Our conclusions from this section must therefore take 
account of this weakness, but one suspects that the magnitude of the 
financial institutions' holdings of such debt will have little influence 
on the conclusions.
To show the role of the UK banks in the lending to developing 
countries, the following figures show the external claims on and 
liabilities of such banks to developing country members of the IBRD. The 
figures are classified according to the income group of the developing 
country.
Table 1.20 External claims & liabilities of UK banks to developing 
countries classified by income group
Upper Middle Intermedi ate Lower Middle Low Incoi
Income Middle Income Income
L C L C L C L C
Dec 1971 1062 479 1438 1504 307 185 13 47
" 1972 2065 1075- 2169 2487 411 360 42 50
" 1973 3229 1938 3081 3546 767 809 123 110
" 1974 3637 3272 3678 4399 950 1132 145 126
" 1975 5013 5018 4493 5879 1090 1619 258 210
" 1976 5840 7377 6647. 8214 ' 1384 2231 402 209
« 1977 6115 8156 7166 - 8526 1657 1928 594 172
" 1978 7892 8838 8178 10861 1733 2394 893 163
Calculated from data supplied by Bank of England
Figures in millions sterling equivalent of foreign currency
C = claims (assets) L = liabilities
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It is notable that upper middle income countries began the decade 
as net depositors to UK banks but very soon after the 1973 oil price 
rise became net borrowers. The intermediate middle income countries have 
always been net borrowers during this period, while the lower middle 
income countries have behaved in a similar fashion to the upper middle 
income group. On the other hand, the low income countries who began the 
decade as modest net borrowers soon became net depositors and later in 
the decade were substantial net depositors. In fact, if we combine the 
figures for lower middle income and low income groups for 1978, we find 
that these groups have been net depositors with the UK banks. This means 
that for the year in question at least, the UK banks were only net 
lenders to the richer developing countries.
However, we must not let these figures belittle the role of UK 
banks in acting as financial intermediaries and facilitating the flow of 
funds between developing countries. Nevertheless, such a situation leads 
one to ask how these poorer developing countries are going to fare if 
official financial flows continue to decline in relative terms. This is 
particularly serious when it is considered that these poorer countries 
need to improve their lot most, and yet may be the group least able to 
generate internal finance for investment projects.
1.6 Why did the Commercial Banks become such important providers of
finance to LDCs during the 1970's?
In answering this question we must note two trends of the
internationalisation of banking. The first relates to the growing
provision of international financial intermediation services and other 
international banking services. This has a long history but has been 
hastened by advances in international communications since the late 
1950's. The second trend relates to the increased provision of
international banking services and loans to LDCs in particular.
The greater internationalisation of banking has gone hand in hand 
with the increased activities of multinational corporations. There is 
considerable evidence that post 1945 expansion of US Bank Offices abroad 
is associated with US direct investment and trading activities (Baker 
1978, Fielke 1977, Goldberg & Saunders 1980). The very large network of 
UK bank overseas branches is closely associated with Britain's trading 
and old colonial interests.
A recent influence of importance for the US banks was the 
imposition and later relaxation of controls on financial flows abroad 
imposed by the US government between 1964-74. These controls consisted 
of:
- The Interest Equalisation Tax which was levied on portfolio 
purchases of foreign securities by US residents from foreign 
residents;
- The Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraints Programme which 
limited US banks' loans to overseas borrowers; and
- The Foreign Direct Investment Programme, although voluntary 
at first, became compulsory in 1968 and limited financial 
outflows by US multinational corporations to overseas 
subsidiaries.
During their existence, these controls forced the US banks and 
their overseas (multinational) customers to transact business in the 
eurocurrency market with the US banks opening branches abroad for that 
purpose, particularly in London. The relaxation of these controls 
enabled US banks located in the United States to adjust the distribution 
of their loan portfolios between domestic and overseas assets.
This portfolio adjustment can be seen from the following figures 
which show the external claims of banks in the United States.
1. 21 External claims of US banks 1972-77
Claims
Total
Claims on 
Banks
Claims on 
Non Banks
1972 20.8 4.4 16.4
1973 26.7 6.7 20.0
1974 46.2 14.0 32.2
1975 59.7 21.5 38.2
1976 81.0 33.1 47.6
1977 89.6 36.6 53.0
Source: Llewellyn 1979, p48
These figures show a rise of over 100% during 1974 and 1975 and 
therefore give some support to the suggestion that the US banks were 
involved in a stock adjustment of their portfolios during this period.
Combined with this portfolio adjustment was the impact of slack 
domestic demand for loans in the USA and growing corporate liquidity in 
1975 and 1976. OPEC deposits were also growing at this time, while US 
domestic borrowers were using the bond market and commercial paper 
markets (Llewellyn 1979, p32,.Phalen 1977).
The US controls over capital flows acted as a filip to the 
eurodollar market, the major centre of which is in London. The 
imposition of Regulation Q by the Federal Reserve Board is also credited 
with an expansionary impact on the eurodollar market.
By 1970 the London section of the eurocurrency market had 
considerable experience of handling funds received from LDC depositors. 
Of particular importance, in addition to the US bank branches, were the 
London offices of LDC banks and the head offices of British Overseas 
Banks with branch networks in the developing countries. Thus, even 
before 1973, the developing countries had experienced the benefits of 
depositing funds in the eurocurrency market rather than national money 
markets. With the growing OPEC surpluses after 1973, the banks found
themselves increasingly liquid as these surplus countries were attracted 
by the interest rate advantage (discussed in chapter four) and their 
desire for short term liquid assets.
However, the growing internationalisation of US banks and the 
growing liquidity of the eurocurrency market do not, in themselves, 
explain why the banks increased their lending to LDCs as compared with 
other types of borrowers.
For an explanation of the willingness to lend to LDCs, the 
following factors are important:
1) Desire for assets growth
2) Profitability
3) Perceived risk of lending to LDC governments
The survey discussed in chapter seven suggests that asset growth 
has been an important objective of international banks during the 
1970's. The model of the supply of bank loans developed in chapter three 
suggests that this growth is not incompatible with growing profits. The 
greater inflow of funds to the euromarkets after 1973 enabled the banks 
to fund this objective at a faster rate. As the deposits were received 
in foreign currencies,• it was preferable to lend in the same currency so 
as to avoid exchange risk.
In addition, the increased liquidity of the eurocurrency market and 
the post 1974 portfolio adjustment of the US banks roughly coincided 
with a fall off in demand for bank loans by the corporate sector in the 
USA and Western Europe. It was therefore necessary to expand the already 
existing markets for LDC lending in order to achieve the growth and 
profits objectives.
The profitability of lending to LDCs depends upon the yield on the 
loan and the fees from any additional banking services that can be sold 
to the borrower. Many bankers see the lending process as merely a way of 
establishing new banker-customer relationships through which a whole 
variety of additional loan and non loan services can be sold to the 
customer.
The relative profitability of an individual loan may be
approximated by the spread or margin on that loan. However, as shown in
chapter four of this thesis, the spread or margin actually
underestimates the profitability because front end fees are charged by 
the lenders.
Given this caveat, the following data from OECD Financial Market 
Trends shows that at least the lending to two major LDC borrowers, 
Brazil and Mexico, was more profitable than lending to an OECD country, 
France.
Table 1.22
Best loan conditions available to selected public sector borrowers 
(maturity and spread)
Brazil Mexico France
MAT SPD MAT SPD MAT SPD
1974 12 S/8-3/4 10 1/2 10 3/8-S/8
12 1/2-3/4
1975 7 1 3/4 5 1 1/2 5 1 1/4
1976 7 1 7/8 5 1 1/2 7 1-1 1/8
7 1 3/4
1977 5 1 7/8 5 1 1/2 5 5/8
8 2 1/8 10 1 1/4-1 3/4 8 7/8-1
1978 10 1 8 3/4 10 1/2
12 1 1/4 10 7/8-1
15 1 1/2
1979 12 S/8-3/4 6 1/2 15 3/8-1/2
12 5/8
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends, February 1980, p98
Furthermore, the following data from the IBRD shows tha
borrowers paid higher spreads and received higher maturities than France 
during the third and fourth quarters of 1979.
Table 1.23 Average spreads and maturities of euroloans to selected 
developing countries
Average
1979
Spread Average
1979
Matu]
Countries III IV III IV
Algeria - 1.06 - 9.2
Argentina 0.78 0.76 11.6 10.4
Brazil 0.86 0.72 12.5 12.0
Chile 0.85 0.92 10.6 9.8
Colombia 0.73 1.25 10.0 10.0
Greece 0.55 0.51 10.0 10.2
Indonesia 0.68 - 10.0 -
Ivory Coast 1.63 1.50 10.0 7.6
Korea, Republic of 0.70 0.69 9.2 9.6
Malaysia 1.00 - 6.4 -
Mexico 0.73 0.69 9.3 8.8
Morocco 0.96 - 10.0 -
Nigeria 1.01 1.00 7.8 8.0
Philippines 1.01 0.92 12.9 10.9
Portugal 0.79 0.88 9.5 8.8
Romania O'. 66 - 10.0 -
Spain 0.78 0.75 . 9.5 9.6
Thailand 0.64 - 8.6 -
Venezuela 0.42 0.58 1.7 7.9
Yugoslavia 0.89 0.98 10.6 8.6
Source: IBRD Annual Report 1981, pl50
During the 1970's the loan loss record of loans to LDC governments 
was actually better than that on banks' OECD domestic lending. Even at 
the time of writing, with the recent increase in debt reschedulings, 
actual losses on LDC loans are small. Therefore, even if the larger 
spreads on LDC loans reflected greater perceived risk during the 1970's, 
this increased spread went straight to the profit and loss account as a 
credit item.
I b
Data on profits from non loan banking services are not available. 
However, responses to the survey analysed in chapter seven suggest that 
one of the objectives of lending to LDCs was the development of new 
banker-custoraer relationships where non loan services could be sold for a 
fee.
With regard to the perceived risk of lending to LDCs, some observers 
(Griffiths— Jones 1980, Mendelshon 1980) suggest that the increased 
commodity prices of the late 1960's and early 1970's enhanced the
creditworthiness of the developing countries in the eyes of the
international banks. This is difficult to prove given the subjectivity of 
the concept of creditworthiness, nevertheless figures below show an
increase in the purchasing power of exports of food products and raw
materials excluding fuel.
Table 1.24 Purchasing power of export revenue
Import Value of Exports Purchasing Power of Exports
Price Index Food Raw Materials (export rev-rimport price index) 
0-970=100) (ex fuel) Food Raw Materials (ex fuel)
1967 97 9.60 7.16 9.90 7.38
1969 93 10.52 8.59 11.31 9.23
1970 100 11.92 8.93 11.92 8.93
1971 108 12.12 8.78 11.22 8.12
1972 117 14.24 10.46 12.17 8.94
1973 146 18.96 14.96 12.98 10.25
*
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1981 p44 & 47
Figures in billions US $ FOB
With such increases in the purchasing power of export earnings by 
the developing countries, these countries would find it easier to service 
debt and therefore would be a better credit risk for the bankers.
The 1970 Annual Report of the World Bank noted on page 44 that much 
of the growth of the value of primary exports was due to higher prices. 
These higher prices were reflected in a continuation of improvement in 
the terms of trade for LDCs. This continuous improvement in the terms of
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trade would have had a favourable impact upon bankers' assessment of 
credit risk. The way was therefore open for the developing countries to 
gain access to bank credit some time before the impact of the 1973 oil 
price rise.
However, the increase in oil prices would, ceteris paribus, 
increase the risk of lending to those countries. Two other factors which 
have reduced the risk of such lending are the techniques of lending by 
way of loan syndication and the roll-over nature of the loans.
The technique of loan syndication, where a syndicate of banks join 
together to fund a particular loan, allows each individual bank to 
achieve greater diversification of a given loan portfolio. Thus the 
individual bank's loan portfolio exhibits less risk for a given level of 
income.
The roll-over nature of the loan passes the interest rate risk to 
the borrower, thus enabling the bank to lend for long maturities while 
being able to change the interest rate charged to reflect fluctuations 
in money market rates.
Both these techniques reduced the risks to individual banks of a 
portfolio of loans to LDCs and made it possible for the banks to provide 
loans of maturities which, it was hoped by all parties, would be long 
enough to finance the post 1973 adjustment and development of the 
borrowing countries. The progress of this development providing the 
wherewithal to service the debt.
A further factor in perception of risk has been the establishment 
of Consortium Banks in the 1960's and 70's. This spread the risk of 
lending amongst the members of the consortium and because some of the 
shareholders had specialist knowledge of lending to particular regions, 
they were better able to assess the risk of lending (Harwick 1974). A 
similar suggestion has been made by Fielke (op cit) in that US bank 
branching followed US direct investment abroad. The existence of bank 
branches in certain countries increased the information that the banks
received about those countries. It is therefore not surprising, given 
the dominance of US banks in the "early loan syndications, that countries 
with significant amounts of US direct investment received the lion's 
share of international bank loans.
The reasons for the willingness of banks to lend to the LDCs can 
therefore be explained by three factors:
1) The desire of the banks to expand during the 1970's, but at 
times, finding loan demand in OECD markets as relatively 
flat, but deposits, particularly OPEC surpluses, rising.
2) At least for most of the decade of the 1970's, an increasing 
number of LDCs were considered a good credit risk.
3) Lending to LDCs was more profitable than lending to OECD 
based borrowers. Even in today's financial climate, LDC 
loans may still turn out to be more profitable than OECD 
loans.
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1.7 Summary
This overview of the financial flows to the developing countries 
notes that the private financial institutions have become the most 
important source of external financial resources for these countries. 
The reasons for this state of affairs are linked to the inability of 
official sources of finance to be flexible enough to provide for the 
needs of the developing countries, the growth aspirations of the banks 
and the profitability of such business. The growing importance of 
private sources of finance over the decade to 1980 has been accompanied, 
as would be expected, by a hardening of the financial terms attached to 
such finance.
This state of affairs leads to the asking of a further four 
fundamental questions:
1) What factors influence the financial terms attached to 
such finance?
2) How does the increase in LDC debt affect bank balance 
sheets and profits? In particular, does it create any 
risks for the international financial system and the UK 
financial system in particular?
3) What factors will ensure the maintenance and indeed growth 
of development finance from financial institutions?
Furthermore, what factors will increase access to these 
private markets by poorer developing countries when 
appropri ate ?
4) Why has the bond market played such a small role in the 
external financing of LDCs?
These points are analysed in chapters four to eight of this thesis 
and follow upon an analysis in chapters two and three of the mechanics 
of the eurocurrency markets and eurobank lending.
Chapter 2
THE EUROCURRENCY MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
Chapter one of this thesis has shown the growing importance of bank 
credit in the total external financial flows to the developing 
countries. As the major part of that bank lending was carried out in the 
eurocurrency markets, a detailed discussion of the functioning of the 
eurocurrency market is required before analysis of the cost of funds, 
the future flows of funds and the impact of these flows upon the 
financial institutions can be undertaken.
The eurocurrency market is simultaneously an interbank market, a 
market where governments deposit and borrow funds, and a market where 
corporations and individuals lend and borrow. These markets differ from 
domestic markets by their relative lack of regulation. As a result of 
this lower degree of regulation there are no institutionalised 
privileges and therefore differences in transactions are based only upon 
economic factors such .as risk perception or size of transaction.
There are in fact several 'eurocurrency' markets in each of the 
major international currencies, each market dealing in a separate form 
of instrument or transaction. From the financial intermediary's view of 
the market, eurocurrency deposits come from non negotiable time 
deposits, certificates of deposit and interbank deposits. Eurocurrency 
loans on the other hand are interbank loans or loans to non bank 
customers.
2.2 Definition of the Eurocurrency Market
A eurocurrency deposit is simply a deposit with a bank in a 
currency other than that of the country in which the bank is located 
(Crocket 1977, pl09). Similarly, a eurocurrency loan is a loan in a 
currency other than that of the country in which the bank is located. 
Thus, eurocurrency bank business is the taking of deposits, and making 
loans in foreign currency eg banks in the United Kingdom taking deposits 
or making loans in, say, US dollars.
Clendenning (1969) defined a eurodollar transaction as any 
transaction in US dollars undertaken by a commercial bank outside the 
USA at eurodollar rates. This brings out a point particular to 
eurocurrency business, which is that, because of factors such as greater 
competition, lack of reserve requirements, fewer regulations and 
economies of scale in transactions, interest rates in the eurocurrency 
markets differ from those in the domestic markets of the same currency. 
The reasons for these differences are fully explained in chapter four of 
this thesis.
It is because of the distinct interest rate structure of the 
eurocurrency markets and the unique risks attached to dealing in 
eurocurrencies, discussed in chapter four, that the limited definition 
of eurobanking business by Dufey and Giddy (1978 p24) is rejected by 
this writer. They suggest that eurocurrency business should only include 
external financial intermediation. This term meant, for them, the 
matching of foreign currency deposits with foreign currency loans. Thus 
any deposits not matched by loans in a similar currency are not 
euroloans. However, it is contended here that it is the financial terms 
that are important. If a UK bank takes dollar deposits at eurodollar 
rates, those deposits are eurodollar deposits despite the fact that the 
bank may sell them for sterling in the foreign exchange market and lend 
the sterling, thus taking on the foreign exchange risk.
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The transactors of business in the eurocurrency market, be they 
corporations, individuals, banks including central banks, or 
governments, may be resident in the same country as the bank conducting 
the business. Alternatively they may be resident abroad, even resident 
in the country whose currency is being used.
2. 3 Measurement of the Eurocurrency Market
When measuring any market it is necessary to distinguish between 
the stocks and flows of the commodity traded. In respect of the
eurocurrency market Machlup (1970 p221) has defined the market aspects as 
"New offers of, and bids for, credit in eurocurrency, the new loans
contracted during the market day and the renegotiation of old loans. Non 
market features are defined as loans outstanding, assets held, deposit 
liabilities owed In effect the market is represented by the flows
and the stocks are, for Machlup, the non market features.
However, the statistics that are frequently used to show the size 
of the eurocurrency market in fact measure only the stocks of deposits 
or loans. Examples of these are:-
1) Bank for International Settlements figures for the external
positions of banks in the reporting area and certain off-shore 
branches of US banks. In fact the BIS also produce figures
showing flows of loans and deposits to and from the same group
of institutions covered by the external positions figures.
2) Morgan Guarantee Trust Company of New York provide figures 
in their publication ’World Financial Markets'. The same 
publication provides figures for new publicised eurocurrency 
loans.
3) The Bank of England figures relating to "External Liabilities 
and Claims of UK Monetary Sector and Certain Other Institutions 
in Foreign Currency". These cover the London section of the 
eurocurrency market only.
Apart from the conceptual weakness of measuring stocks instead of 
flows, these statistical sources have other shortcomings. However, it 
is not intended to enter into a deep conceptual analysis of the 
validity of these statistical sources. Instead it is considered 
appropriate just to mention those shortcomings that are particularly 
relevant to this thesis.
Weaknesses of the BIS figures
The BIS figures give two stock measures of the eurocurrency 
market; these are the gross measure and the net measure. The net
measure only covers deposits from original suppliers or loans to final 
users of eurocurrency funds. Thus it nets out the interbank 
transactions. Nevertheless, banks are considered as original suppliers 
or final users of funds, a) if they are outside the BIS reporting area
or b) if they switch domestic currency into foreign currency or vice
versa. However, the BIS receive very little information about the 
amount of this inward or outward switching. Thus the estimate of this 
component of original sources and uses is based to a large extent on 
guesswork (Meyer 1976)'.
The BIS figures for net and gross markets cover only the
eurobusiness of banks in the BIS reporting area. As at June 1982 this 
consisted of: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, France,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Republic of Ireland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany, 
together with branches of US banks in certain centres in the Caribbean 
and the Far East. Therefore the eurobusiness of non US banks in such 
centres as Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Caribbean is omitted from the 
BIS figures as well as all the eurobusiness of many other countries 
such as the OPEC states.
This weakness is considered particularly important because of the 
growing recycling role of financial intermediaries based in OPEC
countries. As these institutions become relatively more important in 
lending to developing countries, an increasingly important section of 
eurocurrency lending to the developing countries will not be captured 
by the BIS figures. A study by Jay (1980) suggests that in fact banks 
in 58 countries are active in eurobanking.
The reason for netting out the interbank market in the net market 
concept was to avoid the problem of double counting, ie where the same 
funds change hands between several banks on their journey from original 
supplier to the final user. This is considered necessary so that a 
measure of international capital available for financing trade and 
investment etc can be arrived at.
The validity of this net concept of the market can be criticised. 
Firstly, the main distinguishing feature of the eurocurrency markets is 
that a separate international system of interest rates has been 
developed. These rates are influenced by all eurocurrency flows, 
including interbank flows, and the results of all the flows during a 
given period will be the gross stock of assets and liabilities at the 
end of that period. It is therefore meaningless to relate the structure 
of eurocurrency interest rates to the net concept of the market.
Furthermore, we have already noted the limited geographical 
coverage of the BIS figures and that banks outside the BIS reporting 
area are treated as original suppliers or final users of funds. Yet it 
is in the international nature of eurocurrency markets that these banks 
will be carrying out interbank transactions. There is therefore some 
inconsistency in the treatment of interbank transactions.
The net concept can also be criticised in that as far as an 
operator in the market is concerned, he is only interested in the gross 
size when he wants to evaluate his own position in the market, the 
chances of obtaining funds or the risks of lending to one borrower 
because of that borrower's existing exposure to the market.
The net concept also ignores the fact that banks could be end 
users of eurocurrency funds just like any other borrower. These funds 
may be used for real investment in the national economy of the currency 
concerned.
Yet another weakness is that the gross estimate of the market size 
excludes liabilities to, or claims on, residents in the countries of 
the reporting banks. Although the net measure does include liabilities 
and claims related to resident non banks (Dufey & Giddy 1978, p31).
The fact that eurocurrency transactions with residents are not 
included in the BIS gross measure of the market will not reduce our 
understanding of banks' exposure to the developing countries. However, 
it does limit our understanding of the exposure of the banking system 
generally to foreign currency transactions.
Weaknesses of the Morgan Guaranty figures
Morgan Guaranty publish figures for the gross and the net size of
the eurocurrency market. These figures have a slightly wider
geographical coverage in that they cover Bahrain, though not other oil
exporting states, in addition to the countries in the BIS reporting
area. Furthermore, these figures include transactions with residents of 
the country in which the bank is located.
However, the most important weakness as far as this thesis is
concerned is the incomplete geographical coverage of the global
eurocurrency market.
Weaknesses of the Bank of England figures
The figures published by the Bank of England purport to relate 
only to the London section of the eurocurrency market. Covering only 
external claims and liabilities, they ignore transactions with UK
residents. As the following figures for deposits show, transactions 
with residents were substantial even before the abolition of UK
exchange controls in 1979; since then, however, they have grown 
considerably.
Table 2.1 Foreign currency deposits of UK residents with UK banks 1973-79
Bank Non Bank Bank Non B.
1973 13.75 1.3 1978 27.9 4.5
1974 15.5 2.3 1979 36.7 4.9
1975 19.0 2.7 1980 42.7 5.57
1976 23.3 3.8 1981 64.9 10.3
1977 24.4 3.9
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, various issues Table 3.1 
Figures in billions £ equivalent
London has always been the dominant centre for eurocurrency 
business, particularly eurodollar business. However, most major 
financial centres in Europe conduct eurocurrency business to some 
degree and a number of centres such as Bahrain, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, have grown rapidly in the last 
decade. The growth of these new centres has contributed to the relative 
decline of London from 40.2 per cent of world eurocurrency business in 
1973 (Ashby 1978) to 33.9 per cent in 1978 (Bankers Trust Co).
Size and Currency Composition of the Eurocurrency Market
From the above discussion it is clear that the measures discussed 
do not give a conceptually correct measurement of the eurocurrency 
market. Nevertheless, comparison of the statistics available is useful 
both in giving some order of magnitude to the overall market and some 
indication of the differences in size reported by the various sources.
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Table 2,2 Various measures of the eurocurrency market 1(
BIS
Gross Net
Morgan
Gross
Guaranty
Net
Bank of 
England
1971 124 71 145 85 18
1972 164 92 215 n o 25
1973 264 132 315 160 39
1974 322 77 395 220 47
1975 450 205 485 255 63
1976 539 247 595 320 87
1977 663 300 740 390 89
1978 845 375 950 495 104
1979 1068 475 1220 615 126
1980 1294 575 1515 755 145
Source: BIS: Johnston 1983 p38 & 39
Morgan Guaranty: 1971-80 World Financial Markets, 
various issues
Bank of England: Table entitled External Liabilities and
Claims of UK Monetary Sector & Certain Other 
Institutions in Foreign Currencies 
Figures in billions US $ except Bank of England which are billions 
£ equivalent
By far the most important currency used in the euromarkets is the US 
$. Table 2.3. below shows the relative importance of the eurodollar in 
London's eurocurrency business.
Table 2.3 Currency classification of the London eurocurrency market
$ DM SF Others
(Percentage shares)
1965 82.0 8.2 4.1 5.7
1970 82.8 9.3 6.0 1.9
1975 82.0 10.8 5.1 2.2
1976 81.6 10.2 5.0 3.2
1977 79.0 12.2 5.3 3.5
1978 77.4 12.3 5.8 4.5
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin
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For the global eurocurrency market, figures below from Morgan
Guaranty Trust show the relative importance of the US dollar to be
slightly less than that in the London section of the market.
Table 2.4 The importance of the US $ in the global eurocurrency 
market 1972-80
1972 78%
1973 74%
1974 76%
1975 78%
1976 80%
1977 76%
1978 74%
1979 72%
1980 74%
Source: World Financial Markets, September 1982
2.4 Statistical Sources of International Bank Lending
Apart from the sources that try to measure the size of the 
eurocurrency market,' there are several sources of statistics 
specifically relating to the lending to developing countries.
The IBRD produces its World Bank Debt Tables annually. These cover 
international borrowing by IBRD members, thus >excluding Comecon 
countries. The sources of finance by type of lender are given but the 
type of debt is generally limited to public and publicly guaranteed 
debt, although recently the non guaranteed private debt of 17 major 
borrowers has been included. They exclude debt under one year to 
maturity, some non guaranteed private debt, military debt and IMF 
lending except trust fund loans (Economist 20.3.82). These figures 
relate to stocks of loans although it is possible to calculate flows as 
amortisation payments are shown.
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The OECD Development Assistance Committee provides information on 
loans made to 150 developing countries by 17 DAC members and other 
lenders such as OPEC countries. The figures include official and private 
long term lending but exclude OPEC private lending. Otherwise it has the 
same exclusions as the World Bank Debt Tables discussed above.
The OECD DAC also produces figures for stocks of loans outstanding. 
The coverage and weaknesses are the same as for the flow figures of 
loans made.
The claims figures in the BIS eurocurrency market discussed above 
give stocks of short term and long term bank loans. This series has the 
benefit of including short term loans but otherwise suffers from the 
shortcomings discussed on page 83 above.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co produces monthly figures of publicised 
eurocurrency loans with a maturity in excess of one year. Thus the 
weaknesses here are that unpublicised loans are not covered, nor are 
short term loans, nor domestic currency loans.
2.5 The Use of Eurocurrency Market Statistics in this Thesis
Despite the shortcomings of each statistical source discussed 
above, various of those sources are used in this thesis. The criteria 
for choice are based upon suitability, timeliness and availability.
To measure the London section of the eurocurrency market, figures 
for external claims and liabilities of the UK monetary sector are used. 
However, for measures of the global market, BIS and Morgan Guaranty 
figures are used, often together to facilitate comparison.
To measure the amount of bank lending by banks to developing
countries, BIS figures are used if total exposure or maturity structure
is relevant. On the other hand, if only medium to long term loans are
relevant, then IBRD figures are used.
Given the shortcomings of these various sources of data, the
figures quoted should only be used as indications of orders of magnitude 
rather than highly accurate measures of absolute amounts.
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2.6 The Nature of Eurobank Lending
The flows of bank funds to LDCs can be classified under three broad 
headings: a) Trade Finance, b) Project Finance, c) Programme Lending.
Trade Finance
This type of finance is, in the main, relatively short term in 
nature and relates to flows of goods and services of a repetitive and 
consumable nature. Much of such finance is actually provided by banks to 
the suppliers (supplier credit) and generally the techniques of loans in 
favour of buyers (buyer credits) are more akin to project finance or 
programme lending. A substantial amount of trade finance provided by 
banks to LDCs is insured with official export credit insurance agencies.
Programme Lending
Lending for the purpose of letting the borrower disperse the funds 
virtually as he wishes is known as programme lending. The most widely 
publicised uses of programme loans have been to finance a balance of 
payments deficit and/or replenish stocks of foreign exchange reserves, 
to repay existing loans or to assist in the finance of economic
development. It must be remembered that where economic growth is 
hampered by an immediate shortage of foreign exchange, any external 
credits will help alleviate the problem at least temporarily.
All programme lending is made to the government of the borrowing
country and therefore entails sovereign risk and immunity "....  foreign
governments are sovereign and therefore cannot be sued without consent. 
Secondly, courts of one country ordinarily will not sit in judgement on 
the acts and omissions of another country within that country's
frontiers. Thirdly, the property of a government or its instrumentality
is immune. This makes judgements against sovereign governments
unenforceable", (Angelini, Eng & Lees, op cit, p77).
Some protection has been given to the bearers of sovereign risk by 
the inclusion of clauses in loan agreements waiving sovereign immunity. 
These clauses have statutory support in the USA under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act 1976. For the United Kingdom the State 
Immunities Act 1978 gives similar protection (Burn 1979).
Sovereign risk may be less dangerous than commercial risks because 
when a corporation is liquidated it ceases as a legal entity. However, a 
state cannot be removed in the same manner and unless it has no further 
use .for international finance, debt servicing will at worst be 
postponed. This is discussed in more detail in chapter six. Indeed the 
Bank for International Settlements has noted that the losses on loans to 
sovereign borrowers have been less than those from lending to domestic 
customers or private foreign borrowers.
Programme lending, like all external foreign currency lending, 
entails country risk, that is where the nation has insufficient foreign 
exchange resources to services its debts.
Project Finance
Project finance relates to finance where the only or main source of
repayment is the project being financed ....  (Donaldson 1979, p53).
Obviously this sort of finance is appropriate to many public and private 
investments in developing countries. For the banker the risks associated 
with this type of finance can be divided into pre-completion and 
post-completion risks. The former include, for example, failure of 
design and technology, failure of contractors and prolonged delays 
causing cost escalations. The lenders rarely take on any significant 
degree of pre-completion risk. Feasibility studies, performance 
guarantees from banks and proven expertise of contractors help remove 
such risks. The post-completion risks include the commercial operating 
risks, failure to generate sufficient cash flow to service the loan, 
failure to produce sufficient quantity or sell at a sufficient price to
break even. Furthermore, there may be political and force majeure risk. 
These post-completion risks can be covered by guarantees from central 
governments and sometimes from export credit insurance organisations. 
The signing of contracts to purchase the output of the project by users 
of the output also reduces post-completion risk.
One advantage of a project loan over programme lending is that the 
finance is only made available towards completion of an identifiable 
project. The banker can then make an assessment of the impact of the 
project upon the foreign currency earnings of the country, either by way 
of export revenue or import substitution.
Project finance does not obviate country risk. If the government 
controlling the project is short of foreign exchange, then the risk of 
the project debt not being serviced is as great as if the loan had been 
made on a programme basis. This risk prevails unless the lender can 
arrange for foreign currency revenues from the project to go direct to 
himself before being passed on to the borrower. This is possible for 
bank lenders.
Many project loans will be made to, or guaranteed by, governments 
in the country of the borrower. In such cases these loans will also be 
subject to sovereign risk.
In one way project finance gives greater security to the lending 
banker because of the existence of an identifiable financial flow of 
project revenues even to the extent of avoiding country risk as noted 
above. However, competitive pressures on project lending have served to 
increase the risk to the banker by engendering non recourse project 
finance. Nevertheless, in some cases detailed analysis of the risks can 
reduce them to the level of those associated with balance of payments 
financing but the spreads and fees will be higher (Sarmet 1981).
Syndicated Loans
Medium and long term lending to developing countries has been 
dominated by the floating rate syndicated loan. However, there have also 
been a number of fixed rate loans, some involving syndicates. These 
loans are generally in relation to officially insured or officially
subsidised export buyer credits.
Syndicated loans are of particular interest to this thesis due to 
their important role in development finance generally and the recycling 
of oil exporting surpluses in particular. For the period 1973-1980 
syndicated loans provided 85 per cent of the private medium and long 
term funds for developing countries (Goodman 1981). Furthermore, 
borrowing by non oil exporting LDCs accounted for 44 per cent of the 
syndicated loans market in the first half of 1981, rising from 21 per 
cent in 1972-73 (Goodman op cit).
Many loans for financing development or payments deficits are too 
large for one bank to finance on its own and still have a widely
diversified portfolio. This problem has been overcome by the use of 
syndicates of banks lending to one borrower on common terms. A borrower 
can expect to raise larger amounts through a syndicate than through a 
series of individual loans or from one bank.
Because the euromarkets are relatively new and because of the 
international nature of the market, many lending banks lend to borrowers 
with whom they have not previously been acquainted. Therefore 
considerable expense in providing information and duplication of effort
would be entailed if the borrower negotiated with all banks separately.
Accordingly, negotiations take place between the borrower and the lead 
managers. There are, therefore, considerable savings in legal fees and 
other expenses by this method.
There is also the advantage that the borrower only comes to the 
market once instead of continually being in the market for smaller 
amounts.
The loan syndicate will consist of a manager or group of managers 
known as co-managers, an agent and the banks providing the funds 
(participating banks). Where co-managers are involved there will usually 
be a lead manager or group of lead managers. It is usually the lead 
managers or co-managers that as a group have won the mandate from the 
borrower to raise the loan syndicate and negotiate the terms of the loan 
agreement.
The agent carries out certain duties such as administering the draw 
down of the loan, administering interest payments and repayments of 
principal as well as circulating certain information to syndicate 
members during the currency of the loan. He also administers any 
collateral and acts for the syndicate if any legal remedies are 
required. With respect to these remedies, including that of declaring a 
default, the loan agreement provides that the view of the majority of 
the syndicate shall prevail. The agent has less discretion in these 
matters today than in past years. For these duties he receives an annual 
fee.
From the point of view of the borrower, the important relationship 
is between himself and the lead manager. Originally the lead manager 
would have had a previously close commercial banking relationship with 
the borrower. However, after periods of strong competition amongst 
lending banks, the lead manager tends to be the bank or group of banks 
which offers the finest terms. The lead manager has to win the mandate 
from the borrower to raise the syndicate by offering the best terms and 
convincing the borrower that he can deliver the 'goods'.
Even if the syndication is only on a 'best efforts' basis, the 
bprrower expects a commitment from the lead manager. A bank's reputation 
will not withstand many failures to fulfil the terms of the mandate. In 
this respect the large commercial banks have an advantage in being 
syndicate managers because of their large deposit bases. The deposit 
base has to be in the currency of the loan, hence the US banks' early
leadership in eurodollar lending. The UK banks’ buying of US banks in 
the late 1970's was aimed at providing a US dollar deposit base.
From the point of view of the participating bank, the important 
relationship is between himself and the lead manager until the loan 
agreement is signed and then, during the currency of the loan, between 
the agent and himself. The participating bank may have no direct 
dealings with the borrower. Again, lead managers who are large 
commercial banks and are able to take a substantial portion of the loan 
on their own books are favoured by participating banks.
Participants look to the lead manager to ensure that the mechanics 
of the loan are correctly executed. Although no bank would admit that it 
does not analyse each loan carefully, it does get some comfort from its 
perception of the ability of the lead manager.
Loans can be syndicated on a broadcast basis whereby the manager 
informs many banks by telex about the terms and invites offers of
participation. This is best where the borrower is well known and the 
loan 'uncomplicated. Alternatively, if the loan is, say, a complicated 
project loan, or market conditions are uncertain, the lead manager and 
management group will fund the whole loan and not call upon outside 
participants. These loans are known as club loans. In either case the
banks invited to manage or participate will be determined by
correspondent relationships, reciprocity in terms of similar or other 
types of business, and the particular wishes of the borrower.
Participants will expect a front end participation fee progressively 
related to the size of their participation.
There are three major types of syndication technique. The loan may 
be fully underwritten. In this case the manager accepts the whole amount 
of the loan but usually wants to keep only a proportion on his books and 
hopes to 'sell down' the balance following the establishment of the 
syndicate. Alternatively, the loan may be partially underwritten. Here 
the manager undertakes to provide a substantial amount of the loan but
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the borrower only receives the remaining amount if a syndicate is 
successfully formed.
It may be that the managers are less certain about the terms of the 
loan and only undertake their 'best efforts' to raise a syndicate. If 
syndication is not successful the borrower does not get his money. When 
markets are liquid underwritten loans are the norm. However, when
liquidity is tighter 'best efforts' loans become more common. The aim in 
all cases is to make the terms fine enough so that the manager wins the 
mandate from the borrower but generous enough to make syndication
successful without renegotiation.
The overwhelming financial and economic advantage of the syndicated
loan is that it enables the risk associated with one large loan to be
spread amongst more than one lender. Put another way, a bank with a 
given size of loan portfolio can diversify that portfolio to a greater 
extent with syndicated loans than one-to-one loans.
The Roll-Over (Floating Rate) Feature of Eurocurrency Loans
The syndication technique was instrumental in allowing borrowers to 
obtain larger sums than previously possible. However, the developing 
countries amongst other borrowers, require funds not just in large 
amounts but also for relatively long periods commensurate with the 
gestation period of development projects or the economic adjustment 
process. The maturity required by borrowers was far greater than the 
maturity acceptable to depositors. If the banks were to engage in such 
substantial maturity transformation, they would expose themselves to 
interest rate risk, that is that short term rates paid upon deposits 
may, sometime in the future, exceed the rate on long term loans 
negotiated some years previously. The banks would then make revenue 
losses on their loan portfolios. Thus expectations of rising short term 
rates or even uncertainty over future short term rates will limit the
amount of medium and long term fixed interest rate finance available to 
any borrower.
The technique of the roll-over credit effectively passes this risk 
to the borrower. Under this technique, the interest costs of a loan 
consist of two elements, a reference money market rate and a spread or 
margin. The reference money market rate, the frequency of the review of 
that rate and the method of calculating that rate are clearly set out in 
the loan agreement. The reference rate most frequently used is the three 
month or six month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), although
sometimes other rates, notably the New York Prime Rate, are used (Medlar
1982).
Typically, the reference rate is an average of the LIBOR quotations 
from five banks, named for this purpose in the loan agreement, at 
11.00am on each review date. If that review date is every three months, 
the three month LIBOR is used. If the review is every six months, then
the six month LIBOR is the appropriate rate.
The length of time between reviews determines the risk of an 
unexpected change in interest rates and how that risk is apportioned 
between borrower and lender. This method means that the reference rate 
fluctuates with short term interest rates. Because the spread or margin 
is only a fraction of the reference rate, typically between and 2%, 
the borrowing costs fluctuate with short term interest rates. This means 
that banks can fund long term loans with short term deposits because 
fluctuations in the cost of short term finance are passed on to the 
borrower. . . . "
Clearly innovations in the eurocurrency market have facilitated the 
vast flow of external finance to the developing countries during the 
last decade. Whether those flows can be maintained depends upon three 
factors; firstly whether the existing stocks of debt and the future 
flows of debt can be serviced by the developing countries; secondly
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whether the lending banks perceive that the risk of lending to 
developing countries has become excessive; thirdly, whether the 
developing countries are being 'crowded out' of private financial 
markets by other borrowers.
The roll-over credit passes the cost of uncertainty regarding future 
interest rates to the borrower. Therefore, one of the major influences 
on the ability of a borrower to service its eurocurrency debt must be 
the interest rate costs involved. For reasons that are explained in 
chapter six of this thesis, the writer considers that, by the nature of 
financial intermediation via the euromarkets, it is the ability to meet 
interest payments rather than the ability to repay principal that is 
important in the case of sovereign borrowing. Therefore this study 
investigates the determinants of interest costs on eurocurrency 
syndicated loans in chapter four. However, before these interest costs 
are investigated, we must analyse the reasons for the growth of the 
eurocurrency market and the nature of the eurobank lending function. 
This is achieved in chapter three.
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Chapter 3
THE GROWTH OF THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET
3.1 The Literature
Figures on page 87 above suggest that the eurocurrency market has 
grown in gross terms from just over US $100 billion in 1971 to over US 
$1500 billion in 1980.
It is therefore instructive to look at the theoretical and empirical 
factors explaining this growth in order to determine whether it can 
continue into the 1980's. The future growth of the eurocurrency market 
will have a considerable influence on the availability of private 
financial flows to developing countries.
Theoretical analysis of the causes of the growth of the eurocurrency 
market began by treating eurobanks as analogous to domestic banks and 
applying traditional bank credit multiplier models.
Bell (1964) points out that the likelihood of euroloans being
redeposited in the euromarkets is lower than it is in domestic markets
thus implying that the multiplier is smaller than the domestic multiplier. 
Friedman (1969), on the other hand, concentrates on the low level of 
reserves held by eurobanks and suggests that the multiplier is large. 
Klopstock (1968) had already explained the small reserve holdings of
eurobanks in terms of no official reserve requirements, the matching of 
maturities on loans and deposits, and the existence of an interbank
market.
Swoboda (1968) incorporated the existence of considerable credit 
pyramiding in the interbank market. He arrived at a multiplier coefficient 
of:
1
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where b = the proportion of deposits onloaned by each bank 
m = number of intermediaries in the interbank market 
d = the redeposit ratio
This coefficient has been criticised by McKenzie (1976) on the 
grounds that not every chain of interbank pyramiding will consist of m 
intermediaries. In the absence of controls the reserve asset ratio may 
not be the same for all banks and, furthermore, the redeposit ratio may 
differ according to the portfolio preferences of each bank in the 
interbank market.
Klopstock (1970) incorporates the problem of a low redeposit ratio 
and therefore small multiplier where the financial institutions' 
liabilities exhibit less moneyness than bank liabilities. The redeposit 
ratio was considered to be small because:
1} The recipient of a dollar loan may convert it into local 
currency - or
2) The recipient may buy US goods or services.
Clendenning (1971) extended a comment made by Bell (op cit) and 
differentiates the role of central banks from other operators in the 
system. When central banks deposit their foreign exchange reserves in 
the euromarkets, the redeposit ratio will be higher and therefore the 
multiplier larger than when central banks refrain from so depositing 
their reserves. Ironically in 1971 G10 countries agreed to stop
depositing their reserves in the eurocurrency market, although 
developing country governments continue to do so.
Clendenning had hoped to reconcile the studies producing small 
multipliers with those producing large ones. However he was not 
successful. Later studies by Makin give a coefficient of 18.45 (Makin 
1972) and by Lee give a coefficient of 1.51 (Lee 1973). Both studies 
covered a similar time period and took account of central bank activity.
This difficulty in obtaining agreement on the size of the 
multiplier is hardly surprising. To begin with, multiplier models assume 
an easily identified reserve base and an accurately measured quantity of 
loans. Difficulties arise in measuring the reserve base of the 
eurobanks, not least because lines of credit are used to support lending
operations and the magnitude of these, lines is not published. The 
existence of unpublished lines of credit permits the reduction of 
published reserves. It should also be remembered that eurobanks are 
often only departments or branches of domestic banks with all the
financial power of the domestic institution in support.
Given the various measures of the eurocurrency market and the
international character of its business, it is doubtful whether all 
transactions are captured by the statistics, in which case measures of 
the multiplier will be spurious.
The traditional methodology of multiplier models took a 
predetermined reserve ratio and postulated an ex ante credit multiplier 
which gave an indication of the maximum amount of credit which could be 
created by the banking system. However, the study by Lee, as well as 
studies by FNCB (1974) and Fratiani & Savona (1971) try to identify a 
reserve base and divide this into the total size of the euromarket to 
arrive at a coefficient for the multiplier. This is an ex post
multiplier; it tells us nothing about whether the maximum size has been
reached nor what factors have inhibited, if any, the achievement of 
maximum credit creation.
Bearing this point in mind and given the economies in eurobank 
reserve holding over time which Makin notes in his 1973 paper, the 
concept of the bank credit multiplier in its traditional form does not 
seem to be a fruitful explanation of the growth of the eurocurrency 
markets.
A more meaningful approach is to examine those factors which 
influence depositors' and borrowers' preferences for eurocurrency over 
domestic currency transactions in their portfolios. This portfolio 
approach can then explain growth of the euromarkets in terms of 
transfers of funds from domestic to eurobanks and the redeposit of 
eurocurrency with eurobanks. Growth of the market is then explained in 
terms of outward shifts in eurocurrency supply and demand curves as pref-
erences shift in favour of the euromarkets.
The application of portfolio theory to eurobank behaviour follows 
the approach of Gurley and Shaw (1960) and Tobin (1963, 1967) to the 
domestic financial institutions.
The demand for reserves by a eurobank is a continuous function of 
the opportunity cost of those reserves and therefore the bank can expand 
its balance sheet, assuming traditional profit maximisation, until the 
marginal revenue on loans equals the marginal cost of deposits. As 
lending increases, ceteris paribus, the marginal revenue will fall and 
as deposits increase the marginal cost will rise. There is therefore a 
finite limit to the size of the banks' balance sheet.
Hewson and Sakakibara (1974) derive supply and demand functions for 
the eurocurrency markets in order to determine the constraints upon the 
size of thofee markets. They suggest, following Tobin, op cit, that an 
exogenous increase in eurocurrency deposits will cause a lowering of the 
eurocurrency interest rates. Such a fall will cause some depositors in 
the euromarkets to shift back to the domestic market because the 
differential between the two is reduced. This is shown in the following 
diagram.
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Figure 3.1 Impact of a shift in supply upon euromarket size
The outward shift in deposits is represented by 'a1 but the growth 
in the total euromarket is only Q2 - Ql. Thus, while the demand for 
loans is a negative function of the rate of interest, the initial impact 
on the size of the euromarket must be less than unity. Hewson and 
Sakakibara confusingly call this impact the multiplier (Hewson and 
Sakakibara op cit pl22). In fact if the redeposit ratio -is positive 
subsequent endogenous shifts in the supply function, caused by redeposit­
ing, will result in a long run multiplier greater than the impact multi­
plier. It can be seen therefore that yet again the redeposit ratio is 
important in determining the size of the eurocurrency market.
Hewson and Sakakibara also note on pl23-124 that there must be some 
shift parameters, eg income, wealth or level of transactions, which 
encourage investors to hold more deposits at a lower rate of interest. 
If portfolio preferences were determined solely by the rate of interest, 
depositors would not be in equilibrium at the new lower rate. The 
exception to this would be where there was an excess demand for deposits 
at the previous higher rate of interest. Given the degree of competition 
in the euromarkets they consider this to be unlikely.
One shift parameter not mentioned is tastes. These could be induced 
by advertising and marketing, both of which have played an increasing 
role in international banking during the 1970's. Advertising and 
marketing would be directed at both depositors and borrowers, resulting 
in outward shifts in both the supply and demand functions. This point is 
discussed in detail later in this paper.
The result of Hewson and Sakakibara1 s work is a multiplier of "not
significantly different from zero ......  and 1.61 if European central
banks had redeposited all the increases in their foreign exchange 
reserves in the eurodollar m a r k e t ....... " (pi36).
More recent literature has treated the eurobanks as analogous to 
non bank financial intermediaries ".... since their deposits do not 
serve as a medium of exchange and their reserves (if any) are held with
US commercial banks and not with the central bank ..... " (Niehans and
Hewson 1976). This begs fundamental questions regarding the validity of 
the division of financial intermediaries into banks on one hand and non 
banks on the other. Witness the roles of building societies and banks in 
the United Kingdom at the present!
Niehans and Hewson (1976) emphasise the role of the redeposit ratio 
(for them the marginal propensity to hold eurodollars) but abstract from 
this marginal propensity in order to arrive at a multiplier less than 
unity.
Their work continues by discussing the relevance of looking at the 
absolute size of the market. They particularly think that it is more 
important to look at the liquidity creating role of the euromarkets. 
They consider that, whereas domestic banks add to total liquidity by 
taking short term deposits and granting longer term loans, the eurobanks 
do not behave this way. They tend to match deposit maturities with loan 
maturities and therefore do not engage in significant maturity 
transformations. Therefore the eurobanks do not contribute significantly 
to total liquidity.
This view of the lack of maturity transformation by eurobanks is 
only valid if the roll-over period of the loan is considered to be the 
relevant maturity of that loan. However, from the borrowers1 point of 
view, if they negotiate a ten year loan rolled over, say, every six 
months, then ten years is the maturity of the commitment. What is more, 
the borrowers1 expenditures will be made in the expectation of ten years 
of credit. Taking this view the eurobanks engage in considerable 
maturity transformation and therefore add to total liquidity.
Data below compiled from the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin for 
January 1975 and June 1980 show the amount of maturity transformation 
that does take place in the London eurocurrency market.
Table 3.1
Maturity analysis of net position of UK banks and certain 
other institutions
20.8.75 21.5.80
Less than 8 days -7820 -21583
8 days to less than 1 month -3898 -14094
1 month to less than 3 months -7749 -20021
3 months to less than 6 months -5942 -14719
6 months to less than 1 year -1477 -1727
1 year to less than 3 years +6296 +14574
3 years and over +20703 +54829
Figures in US $ millions
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin
A negative net position indicates that bank deposits are greater
loans at that maturity, whereas a positive net position indicates
loans are in excess of deposits. Clearly therefore the banks in
London are net holders of deposits at short maturities and net lenders 
at long maturities. This runs counter to the suggestion of Niehans and 
Hewson, op cit, and indicates that the London eurocurrency market does 
add to their concept of world net liquidity. Given the international 
nature of the eurocurrency market, there is no reason to think that 
other eurocurrency centres have a maturity structure different from that 
of London.
The treatment of eurobanks as analogous to non bank financial 
intermediaries has resulted in at least one work suggesting that they 
cannot multiple credit create (Dufey & Giddy 1978 pl26). The difference 
between domestic banks and eurobanks, for Dufey and Giddy, is that 
domestic banks keep their reserves in the form of the monetary base 
while eurobanks keep their reserves with domestic banks. This is an 
erroneous distinction for most countries because the monetary base is 
not the only constituent of bank reserves eg in the UK domestic and 
eurobanks hold reserves with the discount houses.
Other recent work (Llewellyn 1979, 1980) treating eurobanks as
analogous to NBFI's suggests that they can only create credit if:
1) Through greater efficiency eurobanks can offer credit at 
lower rates of interest, and demand is interest elastic.
2) Domestic banks are unwilling or unable to compete in the
markets of the eurobanks.
3) Domestic banks ration credit and the resulting excess
demand is accommodated by the eurobanks.
4) Domestic banks require a wider margin between deposit
and loan rates than eurobanks either through collusion
to achieve larger profits or because of officially 
imposed reserve requirements.
These points do not preclude multiple credit creation. Whether or 
not eurobanks fund their increased lending from a fractional reserve 
base or by attracting new reserves depends upon the redeposit ratio. 
This ratio is determined by the portfolio preferences of borrowers and 
lenders. Multiple credit creation is therefore determined by the same 
factors that influence the portfolio preferences of eurobanks and their 
customers.
Theoretically there is no reason why any financial intermediary 
should not multiple credit create. To do so it has to ensure that its 
liabilities are preferable to those of its competitors. Domestic banks 
have an advantage in that their liabilities are the traditional store of 
purchasing power and therefore exhibit greater moneyness than do those 
of eurobanks. Other intermediaries, therefore, will have to incur 
greater costs in order to make their liabilities more attractive. This 
rising cost of attracting deposits, given loan revenue, will limit the 
size of the eurobanks' balance sheet at a smaller level than if these 
costs did not have to be incurred.
Again this is no different from domestic banks. Even without 
reserve requirements they would not multiple credit create to infinity
since, even with a constant cost of funds function, a negatively sloped 
demand for loans function would ensure that at some stage the revenue 
from the marginal loan would be below the marginal cost of funds.
This may explain the low multipliers in ' the euromarkets. Their
liabilities have less moneyness than domestic deposits therefore 
leakages are greater, the cost of reducing those leakages to an 
acceptable level is perceived as too high in this new market.
It is clear, therefore, that the difference between bank and non 
bank financial intermediaries and, in the context of this study, banks 
and eurobanks is not one of kind but one of degree.
The limitations upon the eurobanks' ability to increase total
credit suggested by Llewellyn, op cit, ignore the influence and 
possibility of endogenous shifts in the demand for total credit
resulting from increased income. This increase in income may be caused 
by expansion of eurobank credit within the constraints that he has 
suggested. If the eurobanks were to expand credit, because the domestic 
banks rationed it at the current rate of interest, total income would 
rise as would the total level of deposits. This rise in income would 
lead to an increased demand for total credit. If domestic banks continue 
to ration credit, the increased demand would have to be met in the 
euromarkets. We therefore have income induced shifts in the supply of 
deposits and the supply of loans. Given portfolio preferences, these 
shifts result in a greater level of credit creation by the eurobanks. 
This throws into doubt the validity of treating the supply and demand 
functions as independent of each other. The validity of this
independence is investigated below when analysing the influence of 
marketing.
An example of the way in which a redistribution and growth of 
income may influence the size of the euromarkets is the depositing of 
balance of payments surpluses in the eurocurrency markets. The oil 
exporters have shown a marked preference for short term eurocurrency
deposits compared with domestic deposits.
A recent paper (Heller 1979) considered that the size of the 
eurocurrency market is determined by the demand for eurocurrency loans. 
This is easily incorporated into the portfolio theory as follows. As the 
portfolio preferences of borrowers shift in favour of eurocurrency 
loans, the banks will find it profitable to encourage portfolio changes 
in depositors. Thus a shift in the demand for loans can cause the market 
to grow within the constraints of the portfolio preferences of the 
market participants. This is shown in the following diagram:
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As the demand for loans
curve shifts from Dl to
D2 the size of the market
grows from Ql to Q2. This 
ignores any induced shift 
in the supply curve.
o
Figure 3.2 Impact of a shift in demand upon 
euromarket size
3.2 The Role of Marketing in the Growth of the Eurocurrency Market
It has already been noted that, given the low and maybe declining 
reserve holdings of eurobanks, the redeposit ratio is an important 
determinant of the size of the eurocurrency market. This ratio is 
influenced by factors that cause the preferences of depositors and 
borrowers to change, as well as factors which cause the global level of 
deposits to change. Amongst the latter, increased income due to 
increased eurocurrency lending has been suggested above.
Preferences of depositors and of borrowers are influenced by:~
1) Factors inherent in the nature of the market such as 
higher deposit rates, lower loan rates and the nature 
of the market instruments eg floating rate syndicated 
loans.
2) A learning process over time.
3) Induced changes in tastes which result from the 
marketing efforts of the banks. This role of marketing 
may enhance the learning process in 2 ) above.
It is feasible that any change in the nature of the market or its 
instruments could be influenced by marketing policy eg price 
differentials or the development of new deposit or loan instruments. 
Therefore marketing is seen as having an important influence over the 
growth of the eurocurrency market.
An example of the influence of marketing and the nature of the 
instrument directing borrowers’ preferences to the euromarkets has been 
the heavy borrowing during the 1970's by developing countries. The 
instrument, the roll-over syndicated loan, much more common in the 
euromarkets than domestic markets, was ideal for the long term loans 
required by developing countries. The sheer salesmanship employed by 
many banks in this field has led to accusations that the banks have lent 
more money to some sovereign borrowers than those borrowers really 
needed.
Analysing the role of marketing on the size of the balance sheets 
of financial intermediaries is very interesting since, unlike many types 
of industry, the marketing effort is undertaken to attract the inputs to 
the production process, ie deposits, as well as to sell the output, ie 
loans.
Marketing aimed at depositors will shift the supply of deposits 
function to the right. The degree of response can be considered to be a 
marketing elasticity of supply of deposits. Marketing aimed at borrowers 
will likewise shift the loan function to the right and a marketing 
elasticity of demand for loans can be derived.
In practice, the marketing aimed at depositors will both increase 
the redeposit ratio (endogenous shift) and attract new depositors 
(exogenous shift) to euromarkets, though it will be impossible to 
distinguish between the two.
Similarly, marketing directed towards borrowers will increase the 
volume of transactions in the financial system and thus increase income. 
This will result in an endogenous shift in the supply of deposits 
assuming that the supply of deposits is positively related to the level 
of income.
Thus the introduction of marketing throws into doubt the validity 
of treating the supply and demand curves, and particularly shifts in 
those curves, as independent. In particular, shifts in loan functions 
will result in shifts in deposit functions.
This impact of marketing is illustrated in the following diagram. 
Assume first an exogenous increase in deposits shifting the supply curve 
from SI to S2. The banks then market their loan services, shifting the 
demand curve to the right to Dl. This reduces the fall in the rate of 
interest and thus reduces the leakage back to the domestic market 
suggested by Tobin, op cit. The interest elasticity of supply of 
deposits will influence the change in interest rates and the marketing 
elasticity of demand for loans will determine the size of the shift in
the loan function.
If we assume, only for explanatory purposes, a previously zero 
redeposit ratio, marketing aimed at depositors will increase the 
redeposit ratio and shift the supply function to S3. The marketing 
elasticity of supply of deposits and the interest elasticity of demand 
for loans determine the interest rate and size of bank balance sheet, ie 
Q3.
If the marketing were only 
aimed at borrowers, the 
demand for loans will shift 
to Dl. Then the marketing 
elasticity of demand for 
loans and the interest 
elasticity of supply of 
deposits will determine 
the size of the balance 
sheet.
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Figure 3.3 The impact of marketing upon euromarket size
It can be seen therefore that when marketing is directed at both 
borrowers and lenders, the size of the banks' balance sheet is 
determined by the marketing elasticity and interest elasticity of demand 
for loans and by the marketing elasticity and interest elasticity of 
supply of deposits.
Strictly speaking, the idea that the supply of deposits and demand 
for loanable funds are equal is unrealistic. The financial markets 
dominated by financial intermediaries show a spread between bid rates 
and offer rates. In the eurocurrency interbank market this may be only 
one eighth of one per cent. However, between original depositors and 
final borrowers, it may be in excess of three per cent. This spread 
represents the gross profit of the intermediating function from which 
the non interest rate costs will be met.
If the bank engages in a marketing campaign, its costs will rise 
and if it wishes to maintain its level of profitability, it will have 
to restrain the size of its balance sheet. This is shown in the
following diagram:
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Figure 3.4 The impact of marketing upon the spread between 
bid and offer rates
Without any costs associated with financial intermediation, the bank’s
balance sheet would initially be Ql with the rate of interest 'b' .
Where costs of financial intermediation are proxied by the spread 
between deposit and loans rates 'a', the balance sheet is reduced to 
Q2. However, where the demand for bank services (eg deposits and loans) 
is marketing elastic, the spread "a1" is increased but the resulting 
outward shift in the supply and demand functions actually increases the 
balance sheet to Q3. •
Obviously the smaller the gross margin required, the larger will 
be the bank's balance sheet. Although marketing may increase the size 
of gross margin required, there are several features of eurobanking 
which work to reduce the size of that margin. These factors include
- smaller reserve asset requirements
the fact that eurobanks do not run a cash transmission 
'service
- economies of scale in eurobank transactions
- lack of cartel agreements between banks
lack of regulatory expenses such as deposit insurance 
premiums
It is clear from what has been said that the growth of the 
eurocurrency market depends upon that market being more attractive than 
the domestic currency market. The cost advantages of eurobanking over 
domestic banking give the euromarkets certain advantages in terms of 
being able to offer higher explicit yields on deposits and lower 
explicit costs of loans. However, a number of other factors have 
operated during the 1960's and 1970's to shift the preferences of 
depositors and borrowers in favour of the euromarkets. The marketing of 
eurobank services is considered in this chapter to be important. Various 
previous studies have considered the influence of governmental 
controls. No doubt these controls had a considerable influence during 
their existence but the euromarkets continued to grow when the controls 
were relaxed or abolished. One influence compatible with the role of 
marketing as described above is that banks' corporate objectives may 
include balance sheet growth as a strong element.
Indeed, it is suggested in this thesis that growth of balance 
sheets has been a major objective of eurobanks during the 1970's. This 
growth may be in its pure form of growth per se, subject to say, a 
minimum profits constraint, or a short term manifestation of the 
objective of long run profit maximisation. The next section of this 
chapter, by developing a model of the eurobank lending function, shows 
that because of the highly elastic demand curve for eurobank loans and 
the indivisibilities of certain inputs, the eurobanking firm is 
unlikely to be constrained by the maximisation of profit; the major 
constraints being the minimum acceptable return on capital and/or the 
maximum acceptable level of risk.
J J H
3.3 A Theory of the Eurobank Lending Function 
Financial Intermediation
The welfare implications of the existence of financial markets are 
well documented in textbooks covering financial economics (eg Bain 
1981, Coghlan 1980, Goodhart 1975, Furness 1972). Although not 
necessary for the existence of such markets, it is nevertheless true 
that these markets are characterised by the existence either of 
brokers, acting as agents, or of intermediaries acting as principals. 
Some markets have both types of operators eg the interbank markets.
This study is concerned with the operations of financial
intermediaries and, in particular, the operations of those in the
eurocurrency market. The differences between euromarket intermediaries
and domestic bank type intermediaries are highlighted in order to 
explain the objectives of eurobanks in their lending to developing 
countries.
Goodhart (1975 ch6 ) suggests three functions of financial
intermediaries
1) to exploit economies of scale in financial markets, 
information gathering and portfolio management.
2 ) the provision of insurance services based upon 
actuarial expectation of their contingent 
liabilities and economies of scale in portfolio 
diversification.
3) asset transformation providing liabilities which
are preferred by lenders and issuing assets preferred 
by borrowers.
On closer inspection these functions are all more profitable for 
financial intermediaries than individual market participants because 
the intermediary enjoys economies of scale. These economies of scale 
are particularly noticeable in portfolio diversification of both assets 
and liabilities and in the provision of information to lenders and
gathering of information and analysis about borrowers.
Some types of financial intermediary find their reward by simply 
exploiting these economies of scale but matching the risks on their 
liabilities with the risks on their assets. Examples of this are unit 
trusts and insurance companies. Banks on the other hand are rewarded 
for transforming the risks. For example, the archetypal bank provides 
depositors with liquid low risk deposits while it provides borrowers 
with longer term maturity certain loans. The bank is providing a 
preferred liability to the depositor and therefore at low cost and 
providing a preferred asset to the borrower and therefore at a higher 
price; the differences between the prices is the banker's reward.
The banker therefore fulfills the role of asset transformation, it 
provides its liability to the depositor and uses the funds to acquire 
assets of different characteristics, the liability of the borrower. 
This transformation takes place at three levels:
1) Transformation by maturity ie taking short-term deposits 
and providing longer term loans.
2) Transformation by risk ie providing deposits with low 
risk and acquiring assets of a higher risk.
3) Transformation by currency ie taking deposits in one 
currency and providing loans in another. This is really 
a special case of example 2 ) because the bank is simply 
taking on currency exposure risk.
This transformation process is common to all banks in varying 
combinations of the three types of transformation suggested above. 
Therefore it is not the transformation function that isolates eurobanks 
or the eurobanking departments of domestic banks from the domestic 
banks themselves. Instead the writer believes that the difference 
between eurobanks and other banks is not to be found in the 
fundamentals of the transformation process but in the mechanics of the 
techniques of transformation. Because these mechanics differ between
eurobanks and other banks, eurobanks have different cost structures and 
a different industrial structure.
International and Domestic Financial Intermediaries Compared
Domestic banks provide three basic groups of services. Firstly 
there is the safe custody of the medium of exchange, secondly there is 
the cash transmission service provided by the debit and credit clearing 
systems. Lastly there is the provision of intermediation between
financial deficit and financial surplus sectors of the economy.
Although the money transmission system and the safe custody function 
are both very important for the efficient operation of the economy, the 
raison d'etre of the bank is the function of financial intermediation. 
Indeed the great variety of services which banks offer, including the 
various types of accounts, the debit and credit clearing, the safe 
custody service, as well as many ancillary advisory services, are aimed 
at expanding depositors or borrowers and thus the intermediating 
function.
The banks' major contribution to profits comes from the difference 
between the costs of attracting deposits and the interest earned from 
lending those funds. The major distinction between domestic and 
international banks in this respect is in the nature of the costs 
incurred in the intermediating process. Domestic banks provide the 
money transmission system, a branch and/or correspondent network system 
and a host of services priced at various degrees of loss to attract
funds as well as using the interbank market to attract funds.
Eurobank financial intermediaries on the other hand do not provide 
a money transmission service and what services they do offer are either 
earning fees that cover costs or aimed at attracting borrowers; these 
services are not aimed at attracting deposits.'Deposits are attracted 
by offering a competitive explicit rate of return either in the 
interbank market or to various non bank sources.
Because eurobanks do not provide the small 'retail1 banking 
services of domestic banks and do not maintain such large branch 
networks, the short run variable costs of eurobanking do not exhibit 
diminishing marginal productivity. It may be thought that if a bank has 
to be more aggressive in attracting funds in order to expand, the
marginal costs of funds will rise. However, as is explained below, the 
explicit interest cost of funds is not considered a cost of production 
of the eurobanking firm because of the technique of pricing 
eurocurrency loans. In fact, Grubel (1977) suggests that eurobanks are 
acting as brokers rather than banks. However, the writer considers this 
to be an erroneous interpretation as it is based upon the 
interpretation of degree of eurobank maturity transformation by Hewson 
(1975). However Hewson1s work, perpetuated in Niehans & Hewson (1976) 
was wrong in this respect and is shown to be so bn page 105 above.
On the lending side, a marked difference between domestic and
international lending is the distance between the bank and the 
borrower. Because of the competitiveness of the international loan 
markets, lenders may provide funds to borrowers with whom they have had 
no previous banking relationship. This is less likely to occur in
domestic banking. Accordingly, the knowledge that the international 
borrower has regarding his debtor will be less and therefore the risks 
higher than those attendant upon domestic lending, although the 
syndication system diversifies away some of this risk. Being
international in nature, it is more likely that international lending 
will result in exchange risk for the bank and the borrower. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the lending is in a currency foreign to 
the borrower, it will entail country risk for the lending bank.
One feature of international financial intermediation that is more 
pronounced than in domestic markets, is the substantial chain of 
interbank transactions. Dematte (1981) suggests that the size of the 
chain is associated with the distance between original suppliers of
funds, surplus units, and final users of funds, deficit units, this 
distance being greater because of the international nature of the 
market. An alternative explanation is that the establishment of an 
interbank market and the resulting chains stem from the competition for 
deposits in currencies in which the banks do not have a natural deposit 
base eg non US banks bidding for dollar deposits. Once the banks use 
the interbank market for funds they provide a two way business of 
bidding and offering funds even if they are net bidders. The result is 
that banks engage in interbank dealings for their own sake thus 
increasing the length of any 'chain1.
Because of the length of the interbank chain there are 
opportunities for banks to specialise in various functions ( Dematte , 
op cit), notes three distinct functions
1) the collecting of deposits from non bank sources
2 ) the final lending to non bank borrowers
3) intermediating between banks
In practice, it is more probable that banks specialise in each of 
these functions at different times. However, the location of some banks 
eg OPEC, US and the branches of some British Overseas Banks, make them 
well placed to attract funds, while the expertise of such banks as UK 
merchant banks, consortium banks and US banks enables them to dominate 
the management of loans to final users.
This specialisation within the market by constituent banks 
increases the perceived distance between borrowers and lenders. This in 
turn increases the competition between lenders and therefore the 
variety of sources of funds to borrowers compared with that available 
to the customers of domestic banks. As a result the demand curve for 
eurocurrency loans from any individual bank will be more price elastic 
than such a curve of a domestic bank.
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3.3.1 A Theory of the Eurobanking Firm
One fundamental difference in the application of the theory of the 
firm to international banking compared with domestic banking is that 
international banking more closely resembles a one product production 
system. This is because international banks use relatively more 
resources lending money and relatively less resources in attracting 
deposits compared with domestic banks.
The growing literature regarding the theory of the banking firm 
explains a bank's behaviour from several angles.
Baltenspergen (1980) divides the literature on the banking firm 
into two groups. One group he refers to as partial models, where the 
total size of the bank's portfolio is given, therefore the question at 
issue is the optimal allocation of this portfolio. The second group
consist of "....  Complete models of the banking firm, ie models which
attempt to explain the joint determination of not only the structure of 
assets and liabilities and their interaction, but also the total scale 
of the bank's operation and portfolio", (Baltenspergen, op cit, p3). It 
seems that from casual observation of the aggressive marketing policies 
of the eurobanks, both in relation to deposits and loans, that a theory 
of the banking firm which assumes the portfolio size to be exogenously 
given is inappropriate.
Of the complete models, Baltenspergen identifies three groups. 
Group one models assume that banks are monopolistic price setters in 
deposits and/or credit markets. These models are clearly inappropriate 
for the competitive euromarkets. Group two models assume banks are risk 
averse and that instead of maximising profits only, the utility 
function to be maximised has profits as a positive element, and risk, 
usually incorporated as variability in profits or income, as a negative 
element. The group three models emphasise the importance of the real 
resource or production aspects of banking. These models essentially 
represent pure production cost models of banking ie they explain size
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and structure of bank liabilities and assets purely in terms of the 
flows of real resource costs of generating those stocks (emphasising in 
particular the cost of deposit production). This production cost 
approach has been emphasised by Pesek (1970), Saving (1977), Towey
(1974) and Sealey & Lindley (1977).
Although such an approach seems a plausible starting point from 
which to describe eurobanking, they have two weaknesses. Firstly, they 
assume profit maximisation is the dominant element of the bank's 
utility function. Secondly, stemming directly from the profit
maximising function, the deposit attracting function is assumed to 
exhibit rising marginal cost while revenue shows falling marginal 
revenue.
The literature cited above relates to the behaviour of "banks"
taken to mean domestic banks. These banks differ from eurobanks in the
view of the writer simply because the deposit attracting function of 
domestic banks exhibits rising marginal cost whereas that of eurobanks 
does not.
The suggestion that domestic banking exhibits rising marginal cost 
is supported, at least for US banks, by Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey 
(1982). They consider their work to be an improvement upon such work as 
Bell and Murphy (1968), and Benston (1965), because these earlier 
studies which generally found decreasing or constant marginal cost, 
related to the provision of one type of bank service, whereas the later 
work includes the total provision of all banking services by the firm.
Benston, Hanweck & Humphrey (op cit) use an output measure which 
incorporates deposit taking services and loan making services. This is 
only valid if the bank's objective function incorporates numbers of 
deposits or value of deposits positively in the function. This may be 
correct for a commercial bank that generates business from very 
intimate banker-customer relationships. However, it is considered 
h e r e ,  that such relationships are not a common feature of
eurobanking. As such, eurobanks do not get any benefit from deposits
except that they fund earning assets. Therefore, deposits are not
considered to be an output of the eurobank but simply an input to the 
production process.
Frazer (1982) would suggest falling marginal costs even in
domestic banking. Osborne (1982) also suggests falling marginal costs 
in attracting domestic deposits for banks situated in the USA. These 
last two studies have again concentrated on one product of the banking 
firm - cash transmission in the Frazer paper and deposits in the one by 
Osborne.
However, in eurobanking deposits are attracted not by a variety of 
labour intensive services but by the explicit interest rate paid on 
deposits. If eurobanks offer additional non loan services, these are 
generally fee earning services contributing to the total revenue of the 
bank and not conducted basically to attract deposits. Moreover, the 
eurobanks do not operate a cash transmission system.
It is important to note a distinction between the behaviour of 
average and marginal costs due to changes in the number of transactions 
and the changes in costs due to the size of each transaction. This 
distinction is important in the analysis of financial intermediation 
because in the production of, say a sparking plug, a given level of non 
raw material inputs is required to transform a given quantity of raw 
materials into a plug. In financial intermediation no such rigidity 
exists; the same quantity of non deposit resources can be used for a 
$100 loan or a $10,000 loan. As the loan size increases, so the 
transaction may become more complex, say a $1 million loan requiring 
more non deposit resources than the $10,000 loan but within each degree 
of complexity there will be a great range of loan sizes that can
result from the same input of non deposit resources. This point is 
returned to below when we discuss the short and the long run in 
relation to the costs of intermediation.
One price which might rise as banks strive to increase the total 
value of their lending business is the cost of deposits, particularly 
from the interbank market. However, by the terms of the eurocurrency 
loan agreements, the interest rate costs of funding the loans are 
passed on to the borrower by charging a reference rate, eg LIBOR, plus 
a spread. Therefore the funding costs do not reckon as a cost of 
production to the eurobank although these costs do influence the price 
which the borrower pays for the service.
This analysis therefore proceeds to investigate the non deposit 
interest resource costs of financial intermediation.
Short-run Cost Functions
A bank's costs are assumed in this analysis to be dominated by 
fixed costs because the major constituents are the costs of maintaining 
premises, information technology systems and a highly trained
professional labour force. By the nature of the conditions of 
employment and expenses of training, the professional labour force 
exhibits considerable embodied capital and therefore the size of this 
labour force is not varied with short term fluctuations in output ie 
lending.
The variable costs consist of labour costs attributable to 
clerical staff, some of which, at least in London, will be of a
temporary nature. There will also be the costs of the clerical systems
of the bank. These clerical costs are assumed to be a constant function
of the quantity of total staff employed.
An important feature of this analysis is that the fixed factors 
and the variable labour factor exhibit considerable indivisibility. 
Amongst the fixed factors, indivisibilities are found in the
information technology systems and in the labour force. The variable 
labour factor also exhibits indivisibility because of the discrete
nature of the labour input. In this latter case the result is that
marginal cost is discontinuous and, in fact, zero for most of the 
quantity of output.
At this stage, it is important to define marginal product. In this 
analysis it is assumed to be only one loan ie the marginal loan and not 
a number of loans, say an additional ten or twenty. The reason for 
adopting such a definition here is that the output of one loan could be 
a simple process ie using little labour time, or a more complex process 
using more labour time. it is therefore difficult to determine how
many loans an additional unit of labour will process or how many 
currency units are involved with each loan (ref pl21 above) .
Furthermore, if the management took the view that an additional 
worker could process 100 loans within a given time, the marginal cost 
of labour would be the wage divided by 100; if 101 loans were 
processed, the marginal cost of the last loan would be zero. If, on the 
other hand, the management had a rule that workers only processed 100 
loans, then the marginal cost of the one hundred and first loan would 
be equal to the wage of the additional worker. It is therefore 
considered that it is only valid to define marginal product as a group 
of units of output if • production is in discrete batches of a uniform 
size and that those batches are less than the full capacity of the 
worker.
The cost functions of the eurobank can thus be depicted as shown 
below:
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Figure 3.5 Fixed and variable cost functions of a eurobank
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Figure 3.6 Short run average total cost and marginal cost 
functions of a eurobank
The fixed costs function is of the traditional form. The average 
variable cost function exhibits indivisibilities but assumes constant 
cost of variable factors. The average total cost function shows the 
indivisibilities of the variable factor. The marginal cost function 
shows such cost being equal to the cost of the variable factor for the 
first unit produced and zero thereafter until the variable factor is 
fully utilised and a new unit of that factor is employed.
Long-run Cost Functions
Traditionally the long-run in economic analysis relates to the 
time period when all factors, particularly fixed factors, are variable. 
Again, traditionally, fixed factors include plant and buildings. In 
this analysis it is considered that buildings, information technology 
systems and professional staff, although treated as fixed assets, are 
not the major constraint on the size of the banking function. Here we 
ignore external constraints such as prudential regulation. The major 
constraint becomes the bank's standing in the market. This standing 
should be considered from two angles; one is the bank's standing as a 
taker of deposits. This in turn will be related to its financial 
condition. The second angle is the bank's standing as a lender. This
latter point has a considerable impact upon the economies of scale in 
lending which the bank can enjoy.
To explain this we must consider the economies of scale associated 
with a single loan transaction. The larger the loan, the lower will be 
the average total cost per currency unit loaned. However, a bank can 
only make large loans or take large participations in syndicated 
loans, and maintain the required degree of portfolio diversification, 
if it has a large balance sheet.
Furthermore, it is known that interest rate tiering exists in the 
interbank market (Ellis 1981). If large size means lower perceived 
risk, large banks will incur lower funding costs than small banks. 
Moreover, borrowers prefer to issue loan mandates to the larger banks 
because the borrower is more confident that a larger bank can 
underwrite the transaction. The members of the syndicate management 
group are well placed to take large shares of each loan, enjoying 
greater economies of scale in each transaction.
In addition, the larger the loan participation, the higher the 
proportion of front end fees (ref ch4 pi71),thus a bank making large 
loans will not only enjoy lower average costs per transaction but also 
higher average revenue. This results in higher profitability, a better 
capital assets ratio and a better reputation in the market.
Clearly the ability of the bank to increase its scale of operation 
and the size of average transaction, assuming a constant degree of 
portfolio diversification, depends upon the market's perception of the 
bank. This perception in turn depends upon the bank's past 
performance.
It is considered by the writer that changing this perception has a 
longer time scale than changing any of the tangible fixed assets such 
as buildings, information technology systems or staff.
In order to increase the standing of the bank and thereby enjoy 
the economies of scale associated with large transactions, it is neces-
sary for the bank to grow and, in practice, to grow steadily and 
continuously. Thus the flow of new loans from a bank and their average 
size is positively related to that bank's existing stock of loans.
Therefore, although in the long run the banks may enjoy economies 
of scale associated with larger information technology systems, and a 
higher calibre of staff attracted to larger, and therefore assumed 
more prestigious institutions, they also enjoy substantial economies 
of scale due to increased transaction size. This increased transaction 
size is possible as the bank's balance sheet and reputation increase; 
this reputation itself being positively related to balance sheet size.
The result of this hypothesis is depicted in the following diagram 
of the long run cost functions:
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Figure 3.7 Long run costs functions of a eurobank
The falling long run average cost results from economies of scale 
due to increasing average transaction size. As total balance sheet 
increases, the bank can supply more loans in larger average 
transactions and thus operate at successively lower sets of short run 
cost functions. Thus each successive scale of balance sheet results in 
a larger scale of transaction, each having a lower average cost per 
currency unit loaned. This includes lower marginal cost at the point
of hiring an additional indivisible unit of the variable factor. 
Moreover, although marginal cost is often z e r o ,  the positive point of 
marginal cost falls as average transaction size rises. Thus growth of 
the bank's balance sheet by allowing the bank to operate at lower 
average transactions cost allows the bank to operate at a point nearer 
to where MC = MR = 0.
Furthermore, where increased transaction size results in greater 
fee income or even higher spread, the bank's average and marginal 
revenue will shift to the right, again enhancing balance sheet size 
through retention of larger profits.
On page 109 above the importance of marketing in the growth of the 
eurocurrency market was noted. If we extend the role of marketing to 
the individual bank, we can see that the revenue curves are shifted to 
the right thus enhancing the growth of the bank. If marketing costs 
exhibit diminishing marginal productivity, they will militate against 
the falling positive marginal cost point. However, for cost per 
currency unit loaned to rise as a result of marketing effort, 
marketing costs per currency unit must outweigh the economies of scale 
in transactions costs resulting from larger average size of 
transactions possible from the increased size of the total banking 
operation.
Therefore, balance sheet growth and its attendant marketing and 
public relations exercises are important in the bank's utility 
function in that they allow for growing profits without the bank 
reaching the profit maximising condition which any way may be close to 
MC-MR—0. Incremental profits are important because these supplement 
the bank's capital base. A growing capital base is required in order 
to avoid being under-capitalised as the balance sheet grows.
This analysis of the short and long run cost functions does not by 
itself explain the quantity of loans supplied. For that it is 
necessary to analyse the bank's revenue functions as well.
The Revenue Functions
Because - each eurocurrency loan is individually negotiated, often 
with a considerable degree of confidentiality, and because the loan 
will incorporate some non price factors in its terms, each bank or 
syndicate of banks can differentiate its product. As such it will face 
a negatively sloped demand curve for its product. However, this 
differentiation may only be slight and therefore the substitution 
between different banks' products is considerable.
This ability to choose between banks according to the terms of the 
loan is enhanced by the fact that the market is uncartelised. 
Moreover, because eurobanks, unlike domestic banks, often do not 
require an established banking relationship with the prospective 
borrower before lending, it is possible to approach many banks 
separately and compare the terms of loans. Therefore the price 
elasticity of demand for loans from any one syndicate will be highly 
elastic.
Accordingly, the revenue curves of a eurobank are characterised by 
the diagram below:
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Figure 3.8 The revenue functions of a eurobank
The Complete Model
The barriers to entry into eurobanking are very low (as distinct 
from the barriers into banking generally) for institutions already engaged 
in domestic banking. In effect such a change requires only the 
establishment of a foreign currency bookkeeping system. Accordingly, the 
ability of firms to enter and leave the industry is considerable. It is 
therefore considered by the writer that the eurobanking can be 
characterised by an adaptation of the monopolistically competitive model 
suggested by Chamberlin (1950).
Chamberlin suggested that super profits would be competed away by 
firms entering the industry, thus shifting the demand curve downwards 
until the demand curve is tangential to the long run average cost curve. 
In the process the demand curve may become more elastic. In Chamberlin's 
model a unique profit maximising solution was possible because of the use 
of linear revenue curves and 'u' shape cost curves.
In the current analysis competition in the short run will shift the 
average revenue curve until it is tangential to the short run average cost 
curve. In the long run competition will ensure that the average revenue 
curve is tangential to. the cost curve of whichever scale of lending 
function is chosen. Thus the dashed line marked AR in figure 3.9 below 
represents a locus of points of long run equilibrium average revenue. The 
solid line marked LATC represents a locus of points of equilibrium long 
run average total cost. In both cases long run equilibrium is defined as 
tangency between average revenue and average total cost for whatever scale 
of lending function is chosen. The relevant marginal revenue curve will be 
that associated with the average revenue curve tangential to the chosen 
cost function.
Because each loan is individually negotiated, the terms can be 
related to the resource costs of producing that loan. If the price charged 
were above average cost, super profits would arise and be competed away 
(maybe instantaneously through competitive tendering for loan mandates). 
If a price less than average cost is charged, a loss
will ensue which the bank can avoid by not making the loan. Therefore, 
provided that the bank is aware of its cost functions when they 
negotiate the terms of loans, they do not need to enter the market for 
any individual loan that will result in a loss. In effect the lending
banker exhibits perfect mobility of resources in respect to any one
loan analogous to that hypothesised in the perfect competition model.
Thus, with competition for loan mandates removing super profits 
and the ability to avoid losses by not entering into lending on 
unfavourable terms, the banks will be able to achieve an average
revenue equal to average cost.
If one bank had resource costs significantly above its 
competitors, it would be unable to lend competitively and would leave 
the market altogether. The deposit funds would then flow to the more 
efficient banks that can make a normal profit from loans priced at the 
then existing average revenue.
With the behaviour of the marginal cost function being a positive 
but declining series of points, or zero, due to the indivisibility of the variable 
labour input, it is always optimal for the banker to operate at a 
point where marginal cost is zero. Given the highly elastic demand 
function for the individual bank as postulated above, and the ability 
of marketing to shift the revenue functions to the right, the profit 
maximising criterion of MC = MR will not be an effective constraint 
upon bank operations even where profit growth is important in the 
bank1s utility function provided that there is an additional positive 
constraint. The effective constraints upon bank balance sheet growth 
are the minimum acceptable return on total assets and a maximum
acceptable perception of risk. The greatest of these two becomes the 
binding constraint.
The relationships between the revenue functions, marginal cost and 
long run average cost on one hand and the return on total assets and 
risk constraints on the other are shown below:
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Figure 3.9 The long run equilibrium of a eurobank
Of the two constraints suggested, it is considered by the writer 
that the risk constraint will be the most volatile in that perception of 
risk will depend upon the degree of diversification of the loan 
portfolio and the variability of the income stream from that portfolio. 
As the bank's portfolio increases, greater concentration of that 
portfolio may result, particularly if new lending is taken up by one 
particular group of borrowers, as happened with bank lending to 
developing countries during the 1970's. Alternatively, systematic 
elements of risk may affect all borrowers. Macro economic phenomena 
could be particularly influential in this respect.
On the other hand, the perception of depositors, shareholders and 
regulatory authorities of what is the minimum acceptable return on total 
assets is likely to change only slowly; at least in relation to the 
changing circumstances of certain groups of the bank's borrowers.
It can be seen from the diagram above that if perceived riskiness 
rises, then the quantity of loans provided will be reduced, while a 
reduction in perceived riskiness will result in increased lending. The
return on total assets constraint operates in an analogous manner. This 
reaction may be considered as credit rationing but it must be stressed 
that this analysis relates to a single bank. For credit rationing 
to be imposed by a whole market all banks will have to have similar per­
ception of risk and similar degrees of risk aversity.
It may very well be that the perceived risk constraint as 
hypothesised here explains the slowdown in the growth of bank lending to 
developing countries observed in the last two years.
If banks do indeed behave as suggested in this chapter, it is more 
appropriate to consider growth to be the major factor in the bank's 
utility function.
The suggestion that the maximisation of profits may not be the only 
or even dominant element of a eurobank is supported by anecdotal 
evidence (Euromoney 1978, 1982) and responses to the writer's survey 
discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. This evidence suggests that 
market share or balance sheet size were important objectives in the late 
1970's. Davis (1981) suggests that the balance sheet growth was only 
just giving way to profits as an important objective at the time that he 
was writing.
Further evidence that balance sheet size is an important corporate 
objective comes from the continued publication of rankings of banks by 
the quantity of eurocurrency loans written. These rankings are published 
in Euromoney and Institutional Investor. As these publications rely upon 
popular demand for their existence, the continued publication of these 
rankings indicates that they provide a form of knowledge required by 
readers - mostly practising bankers.
The importance of market share and balance sheet size may also be 
explained by the work of Marris (1964) and Baumol (1959) suggesting that 
executives' salaries are related to growth of the firm or sales revenue. 
For a bank,sales growth and balance sheet growth are identical.
Furthermore, balance sheet size may be an important determinant of 
depositor confidence, not least because a large portfolio allows greater 
diversification of the unsystematic element of risk. Moreover, balance 
sheet size may give borrowers confidence that loan requirements can be 
provided by the bank. This is important where the borrower may be 
wishing to expand its market share.
The bank's objectives need not be of equal dominance, indeed the 
dominant objective may change during the life of the organisation, but 
the market behaviour will be similar; this is suggested by Davis (1981) 
and Euromoney (1982b). It is in fact quite reasonable to expect new banks 
to concentrate on balance sheet growth until their presence is felt in 
the market and then to give profits more priority. This is particularly 
so given the advantages of depositor and borrower confidence that a 
large balance sheet confers upon a bank. Responses to the survey 
reported in chapter seven suggest that bank corporate objectives have 
indeed changed during the 1970's and early 1980's.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is considered that the growth of the eurocurrency 
market is influenced by the portfolio preferences of depositors, 
borrowers and lenders. These preferences are influenced 'by several 
factors including price advantages of eurobank transactions, government 
controls on domestic markets, tastes and a learning process both 
enhanced by marketing efforts and the corporate objectives of the 
eurobanks. These corporate objectives manifest themselves in the 
portfolio preferences of the lenders.
The fixed coefficient multiplier approach is inappropriate to 
explain euromarket growth because of flexibility of the reserve base and 
the redeposit ratio, as well as inadequate measures of the reserve base 
and total euromarket lending. The fact that the multiplier approach is 
inappropriate does not of itself preclude multiple credit creation by
the eurobanks. In fact, the theoretical analysis of the influence of 
marketing and relative prices upon portfolio preferences suggests that, 
as the market matures, the redeposit ratio and thus multiple credit 
creation could increase. The existence or otherwise of government 
controls will also influence the growth of the euromarkets.
This chapter has also shown that the corporate objectives of growth 
maximisation or long run profit maximisation are compatible with the 
cost and revenue functions of eurobank lending. Responses to a survey 
reported in more detail in chapter seven of this thesis confirm that asset 
growth was an important corporate objective of eurobanks during the 
1970's. The fulfilment of this objective would have a considerable 
influence upon the growth rates of the euromarkets during that period.
The growth of the eurocurrency markets is of crucial importance to 
the developing countries because these markets have become such an 
important source of external finance. However, continued growth of the 
euromarkets does not guarantee an adequate supply of eurobank credit to 
developing countries. The portfolio preferences of the banks are of 
utmost importance. These preferences will be influenced by the expected 
rate of return and the perceived risk attached to such loans compared to 
those available on alternative assets. The ability to manifest these 
preferences will depend upon the constraints bearing upon the eurobanks 
at any point in time.
The next chapter analyses the financial terms attached to 
eurocurrency loans and eurobonds in order to ascertain the determinants 
of the expected rate of return on such assets.
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Chapter 4
THE FINANCIAL TERMS OF BANK FINANCE TO LDC1S 
4. 1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the determinants of the interest rate related 
costs of eurocurrency bank loans to, and eurobond issues by, LDCs. These 
interest rate costs are determined by factors that influence the level of 
interest rates generally and by factors that influence the interest rates 
on bank loans or bond issues specifically. Therefore the structure of this 
chapter is in three parts.
Section 4.2 analyses those factors that influence eurocurrency 
interest rates generally. In particular:
Inflation and government economic policy of the country 
whose currency is being loaned;
The currency of the loan;
The term structure of interest rates;
The relationship between eurocurrency and eurobond 
interest rates.
Section 4.3 analyses those factors that influence interest rate costs 
specific to eurocurrency loans, in particular:
Spread and fees.
Section 4.4 analyses those factors that influence interest rate costs 
specific to eurobond issues, particularly:
The risk premium;
Marketability.
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4.2 Factors Influencing the Level of Eurocurrency Interest Rates Generally
There is a very extensive literature on the determination of 
interest rates generally. One view is that interest rates are determined 
by the supply and demand for existing securities (Keynes 1936, Metzler 
1951). Because the stock of existing securities is very large relative 
to the flows of new securities to each market, the supply and demand for 
new securities will not affect interest rates directly (Metzler, op 
cit) .
In contrast with this view, Horwich (1964) and Moore (1968) 
consider that interest rates are influenced directly by the supply and 
demand for new securities. The analysis by Moore noted the importance of 
the speed with which existing securities holders can make portfolio 
changes once they perceive themselves to be in disequilibrium. Van 
Horne (1970) makes the point that it is not the stock of existing
securities that is important but the level of transactions in those
securities (p37). This point is of direct relevance to the eurobond
market where there is an active secondary market in most issues; 
investors therefore have the choice of investing in existing securities 
or new securities and therefore the yields on existing securities and 
new securities will converge. On the other hand, the limited secondary 
market in syndicated loans would suggest that the yield on new loans 
need bear little relation to that on existing loans.
It is clear, therefore, that yields on marketable securities,
whether existing or new issues, will depend upon the interaction of the 
supply and demand for both types of security. The degree of interaction 
will depend upon the relative size of the primary market compared with 
that of the secondary market and on the elasticity of the arbitrage 
schedules between the two markets. On the other hand, the inability to 
arbitrage out of existing holdings on non marketable debt of syndicated 
loans means that the yield on new debt will be more strongly influenced
by the supply and demand for new debt rather than the existing stock of 
debt.
Given that interest rates equate the supply and demand for credit 
in markets free of restriction, it follows that arbitrage and 
speculation across the whole spectrum of credit instruments equilibrates 
the level of interest rates between markets. If we make the assumptions 
of perfect competition in all credit markets and a riskless society, the 
rate of interest would be determined by the interaction of society's 
positive rate of time preference and the marginal efficiency of capital. 
Savers' rate of time preference would influence the supply of credit, 
and borrowers' marginal efficiency of capital would influence the demand 
for credit.
If we assume that economic agents are utility maximisers, then it 
is possible to postulate that agents will demand assets and supply 
liabilities such that the ratio of marginal utility to price on each 
asset and liability is equal. It is, of course, necessary to ignore the 
change in the sign between assets and liabilities.
The marginal utility of holding real assets is related to the 
physical services they perform, whether it be in consumption or
production. Financial assets on the other hand do not provide any 
consumption or production services. Instead they provide a positive 
financial flow in the form of a rate of return. The utility of this 
return can be analysed by way of the popular Tobin-Markowitz 
two-parameter utility function, where utility is positively related to 
the rate of return and negatively related to the risk associated with 
acquiring the financial asset. (This model will be discussed in more 
detail in the section covering spreads on syndicated loans.) In
particular, the greater the risk attached to such an investment, the
greater must be the rate of return required by the investor.
The utility of issuing liabilities can also be considered in terms 
of a two-parameter utility function. The variance of the probability
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distribution is related to the market prices of the financial liability. 
However, for a fixed interest liability, the borrower is not concerned 
with this variance as he is certain as to coupon payments and repayment 
of principal. In such a case the utility function has only one 
parameter, ie the yield or coupon payable.
In the case of floating rate liabilities, such as floating rate 
notes and the majority of bank loans, the appropriate utility function 
will have two parameters because of the risk of fluctuations in the 
coupon costs.
Although an investor will be able to reduce the risk for a given 
income by diversifying the portfolio of assets, the ability to diversify 
liabilities is limited because of the lumpiness of the costs of issuing 
liabilities and because the financial risk of the issuer stays the same. 
Nevertheless, if the utility of assets is greater than that of issuing 
liabilities, the economic unit can maximise its utility by increasing 
its liabilities and acquiring assets.
The equating of marginal utilities between assets and liabilities 
by equating the rate of time preference with the marginal efficiency of 
capital will not be possible once we relax the assumption of perfect
credit markets.
Of the many imperfections actually found in credit markets, those 
that segment markets are particularly important to this study. Perceived 
differences due to different currencies of denomination or regulatory 
differences mean that the real rate of interest may differ between 
markets which are thus segmented. Nevertheless, conceptually at least, a 
real rate of interest can be calculated for each credit market. However, 
this real rate is not observed in credit markets because in reality 
these markets are not riskless.
4.2.1 Inflation
The one risk which will influence all investors in all credit 
markets denominated in a particular currency is the risk of loss of
purchasing power of capital resulting from inflation. It does not matter 
whether one hypothesises that expectations are developed rationally or 
adaptively; provided investors perceive the risk of inflation, they will 
require to be compensated for bearing that risk.
The inflation rate that is important in this study is the rate 
applicable to the currency in which a eurocurrency loan or eurobond 
issue is denominated.
The following chart, supplied by Bankers Trust Company, London, 
shows the close correlation between eurodollar interest rates and the US 
inflation rate.
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Figure 4.1 Relationship between US inflation rates and eurodollar 
interest rates
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This chart also shows the influence of domestic monetary policy 
upon interest rates. The use of monetary policy to directly influence 
inflation or the exchange rate can cause interest rates to deviate from 
their relationship with the rate of inflation.
The upwards movements of the interest rate at the end of 1978 and 
again in the autumn of 1979 are good examples of the influence of 
monetary policy. The first was a package to support the US dollar, and 
the second followed a general tightening of monetary policy following 
the appointment of Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 
July 1979.
Clearly the information provided in this diagram would support the 
suggestion that investors demand higher interest rates as inflation 
rises and that in such circumstances borrowers are willing to concede 
higher rates.
4.2.2 The Influence of the Currency of Denomination
It is to be expected that in any two markets whose goods are close 
substitutes for each other, the absence of market imperfections will 
ensure that arbitrage will keep the price of each good close to that of 
the other. Such is the situation between the domestic markets and the 
euromarkets for assets and liabilities denominated in the same currency. 
In effect the euromarkets are extensions of the similar domestic markets, 
the rates in the two markets being influenced by the activities of 
arbitragers and the market imperfections that impede arbitrage.
Thus, the rate of interest on bank loans or bonds to the same 
borrower in the same currency and with the same maturity etc, but 
differing only by being in the domestic market or the euromarket, will 
be the same unless arbitrage is inhibited by market imperfections. Thus, 
eurodollar rates are likely to be the same as domestic dollar rates in 
the absence of market imperfections and eurosterling rates will be close
to domestic sterling rates in similar circumstances.
Furthermore, it is to be expected that the currency structure of 
euromarket interest rates will reflect differences in the cost of 
obviating foreign exchange risk through the forward exchange market as 
hypothesised by the Interest Parity Theorem. Therefore, to the extent 
that forward exchange rates reflect expectations of exchange rate 
changes, the currency structure of euromarket interest rates will 
reflect those expectations.
However, in discussing the influence of currency on the level of 
euromarket interest rates, we must concentrate on one currency at a time 
and concern ourselves with the level of interest rates on assets and 
liabilities denominated in that currency. As such, we are not concerned, 
in this section, with the currency structure of interest rates and the 
interest, parity theorem. VJe are, instead, concerned with domestic and 
euro interest rates in the same currency and the market imperfections 
between these two sectors of the market.
4.2.3 The Relationship between Euro Interest Rates and Domestic Money 
Market Interest Rates
There is already a considerable literature on this topic including 
Aliber (1978), Clendenning (1970), Dufey and Giddy (1978), Johnston (1979) and 
Lutz (1974) .
The currency backing of a eurocurrency market is held with banks in 
the national money market of the currency concerned. Accordingly, if 
there were no impediments to the international movement of funds and if 
the assets and liabilities of the eurocurrency market were similar in 
nature to those in the national money market, depositors and borrowers 
would be indifferent between the two markets and interest rates would be 
the same in each due to the activities of arbitragers. Differences could 
be due to:-
1) Differences in the liquidity of each market as represented
by the size of each market.
2) Differences in jurisdictional risk.
3) Controls on the international flows of 
financial capital.
4) Differing degrees of market imperfections 
in each market.
Liquidity
Liquidity in this context is related to market size because market 
size influences the marketability of the securities in question. Table
4.1 compares the gross size of the eurodollar market with the total of
bank deposit liabilities in the USA. It can be seen from the size and
rate of growth of the eurodollar market that liquidity is unlikely to be 
an important influence upon differences in interest rates.
Table 4.1 Size of US $ domestic and eurobank deposit markets
Time & demands. deps Gross size of euromarket „
1974
1975 
1975
1977
1978
all US banks' 
747.9
786.3 
838.2
939.4 
956.0
Morgan Guarantee estimate
395
485
595
740
950
Sources 1. Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues 
Table A16 All Commercial Banks
Last Wednesday of month series
2. Morgan Guarantee Trust 'World Financial Markets'
The Impact of Jurisdictional (Political) Risk
Jurisdictional risk is the non-zero probability that restrictions or 
controls in a sovereign area will frustrate the completion of a financial 
transaction.
A transaction in an international money market is subject
to at least two sovereign powers. There is, therefore, additional 
jurisdictional risk associated with euromarket transactions because a 
second authority can frustrate the transaction. In particular, in the 
eurodeposit market the risk is that exchange controls will be introduced 
removing non-resident convertability in the jurisdiction where payment 
is to be made. Secondly, a eurobank's assets may be seized for political 
reasons and thirdly there are no lender of last resort facilities in the
euromarkets. In the euroloan market there is the risk that the currency
in which the loan is denominated may become politically unacceptable as 
a means of payment.
The concern over the imposition of non-resident convertability may 
be exaggerated. A country that imposed such controls would adversely 
affect its international credit rating. Further, financial markets get 
ample warning of such dramatic action because it is usually preceded by 
controls on residents' international transactions, imports and capital 
flows (Dufey & Giddy 1978, pi87).
It is unlikely that a government will be able to take over the
assets of a eurobank because a eurobank will operate in several 
financial centres. The repayments of loans and payments of interest 
could be redirected to a branch that is not subject to the controls.
The concern for depositors' safety may be unfounded because, 
although there is no official lender of last resort to the euromarkets, 
bank head offices would have to support their eurobranches if they want 
to maintain confidence in their domestic banking business.
A further point which reduces the expected incidence of 
jurisdictional risk from this factor is that the Bank of England has
'....  intimated on various occasions that it would, in a crisis
situation, bale out an individual bank in difficulties rather than 
expose the standing and integrity of the City as a whole to doubt', 
(Shaw 1978, pl24).
This writer therefore considers that additional jurisdictional risk
is an insignificant influence upon the differences between euromarket 
and domestic market interest rates.
Controls on the Movement of Capital
Capital controls tend to have one of two aims, either to restrict 
the flow of financial capital from national financial markets to 
foreign, including euro, financial markets or to restrict the inflow of 
financial capital from abroad. The USA instituted the former type of 
control from 1965 to 1974. Germany and Switzerland, on the other hand, 
have experimented with the second type of control.
Capital controls have the effect of segregating the national money 
market from the euromarket. Therefore, the interest rates prevailing in 
the two markets will be to some degree independent of each other. In 
particular, the activities of arbitragers will be restricted and their 
equilibrating influence on the markets will be lost.
If the controls aim at stopping funds leaving the national money 
market then, ceteris paribus, interest rates in the national market will 
fall and rates in the euromarket will rise. Conversely, if the controls 
aim at restricting the inflow of funds to the national money market, 
ceteris paribus, the rates in the euromarket will fall while rates in 
the domestic market will rise.
Table 4.2 shows the differences between New York loan rates and 
eurodollar loan rates for two periods, January 1972-December 1973 and 
January 1977-December 1978. Capital controls were in existence limiting 
flows of funds from the national to the euromarket during the first 
period but not for the second period.
When considering interest rates, it is the effective rate and not 
the nominal rate that is important.
The New York loan rate has been adjusted to take account of the 
fact that it is custom for borrowers to have to maintain part of the 
loan proceeds in a compensating current account balance which does not 
earn interest. The amount of compensating balances held is assumed to be 
15% of the loan proceeds (Dufey & Giddy 1978, p51).
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There is a break in the data for the years 1974 and 1975. This is 
because a crisis of confidence occurred in the euromarkets following the 
failure of the Cologne-based bank, I D Herstatt, on 26 June 1974. Such a 
crisis would have influenced the differential between national and 
euromarket rates. Accordingly, data covering this period has been 
omitted from our analyis of the impact of capital controls.
The figures in table 4. 2 show that the differences between the New 
York dollar and eurodollar loan rates were smaller in the former period 
when capital controls were in operation than in the latter when they 
were not. Indeed, during the first period eurodollar loan rates often 
exceeded New York rates. The statistical significance of the differences 
in interest rates is confirmed by the analysis of variance test also 
reported in table 4.2. We may therefore conclude that controls on the 
international movement of financial capital will influence eurocurrency 
interest rates.
Market Imperfections
Money markets display market imperfections due to:-
1) Regulatory constraints such as interest ceilings, taxes 
and reserve requirements.
2) Institutional factors such as credit rationing, lack of 
cash transmission mechanism, economies of scale in 
transactions.
3) Oligopolistic market structure due to barriers to entry.
4) Imperfect knowledge on the part of the operatives in the 
market.
To the extent that eurocurrency markets have fewer market 
imperfections than domestic money markets of the same currency, we would 
expect to see eurodeposit rates higher and euroloan rates lower than 
their domestic equivalents.
In particular, the reserve requirements imposed upon domestic 
banking but non existent in eurobanking restrict the profitability of 
domestic business. Accordingly, eurobanks can offer higher deposit rates 
and lower loan rates while maintaining their level of profitability.
The lack of cartelisation will allow eurobanks to be more 
competitive. In order that they compete with domestic banks, they must 
offer higher deposit rates and lower loan rates on similar transactions.
The existence of credit rationing systems in domestic banking 
rather than price adjustment, as is prevalent in euromarkets, will lead 
to differences in interest rates between the markets.
There are unlikely to be differences in interest rates between 
markets due to differing degrees of knowledge because the major 
operatives in each market are the same viz the banks and large 
corporations.
There are economies of scale in the eurobanking due to the fact 
that the average size of transactions is greater in the eurocurrency 
market than in the domestic banking market. The impact of economies of
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scale on the costs of lending has been discussed in chapter three of 
this thesis.
The figures given in table 4.3 show the impact of certain market 
imperfections found in US domestic markets. One of these is the 
requirement to hold compensating balances already alluded to on page 145 
above. Two others include the holdings of reserve assets and the payment 
of insurance premiums on domestic deposits; neither of these 
requirements are found in the eurocurrency markets.
Column 8 of table 4.3 shows how small the differential between 
domestic and eurodeposit rates is when the domestic rate is adjusted for 
the impact of the market imperfections mentioned above. Indeed, the 
differential is not significantly different from zero at the one per 
cent level as the results of a t test given below indicate.
Mean of differences Standard Standard T value
between domestic & deviation error of
euro deposit rates mean
Column 8 Table 4.3
-0.055 0.172 0.026 -2.6
Probability of T value
0.036 > 0.01 result not significant at 1%
< 0.05 result significant at 5%
What is particularly interesting about table 4.3 is the size of the 
difference between euro and domestic loan rates compared with that of 
the deposit rates. The difference in loan rates is much greater than 
that of the deposit rates. This is compatible with the suggestion made 
in chapter three that banks are producers of loans and deposits are the 
raw material of the loan output. Thus, we would expect the competitive 
differences to show up more in the loan market than in the deposit 
market as the banks strive to market their loan products.
Summary of Relationship between Eurocurrency and National Markets
Thus we see that differences exist between rates of interest on 
similar transactions in national money markets and eurocurrency markets. 
Even when capital controls do not exist, these differences occur, 
therefore other factors cause the arbitrage schedule between the 
national and the eurocurrency market to be less than perfectly elastic.
We have discounted the effects of differing degrees of liquidity at 
least for the eurodollar market. We consider additional jurisdictional 
risk associated with the London eurodollar market to be very small or 
non existent.
The conclusion must be that market imperfections are the main 
determinant of the differential between euro and domestic deposit rates. 
On the other hand, the even larger negative differential in favour of 
the euroloan market is partly explained by market imperfections. 
However, this result is also compatible with greater competition in the 
euroloan market and the suggestion that the output of a eurobank is more 
concentrated in loans than the loan/deposit combination of domestic 
banks.
4.2.4 The Term Structure of Interest Rates
The theory of the term structure of interest rates attempts to 
explain the relationship between yield and maturity on securities that 
differ only by the length of time to maturity. However, it must be noted 
that the manifestation of the term structure will be different in the 
euroloan and floating rate loan markets from that in the eurobond 
market. The vast majority of the literature on this subject relates to 
fixed interest bond markets and therefore the methodology can be 
directly transferred to any studies of the fixed interest eurobond 
market. However, the pricing techniques of the other two markets and the 
relatively small secondary market in bank loans makes such methodology
inappropriate in studies of these markets.
Pricing of eurocurrency syndicated loans and floating rate notes 
consists of a reference rate eg LIBOR to which is added a spread or margin 
and fees. Thus, the term structure of this interest rate related price 
depends upon the term structure of the reference rate and the term 
structure of the spread.
Moreover, the term structure of the interbank rate will, through 
arbitrage, be strongly influenced by the term structure in the domestic 
interbank market of the same currency. Comments by bankers to the writer 
suggest that the term structure of the spread manifests default risk and 
not expectations of interest rate changes, Hicksian liquidity premiums, 
etc.
Indeed, for many loans the spread is not altered during the life of 
the loan. For others there is a contractual agreement to raise the spread 
during the later years of a loan's life. Even then the spread is usually 
only altered once or twice. Discussions with lending bankers suggest that 
this is to compensate for the bankers' greater uncertainty due to the loan 
being outstanding for a longer period.
The floating rate nature of most bank loans and of floating rate 
notes will preclude a term structure in these markets exhibiting Hicksian 
liquidity premium ie compensation for declining secondary market prices 
due to rising interest rates. Such a premium is also absent from the 
interbank market where there is no secondary market in deposits because, 
by definition, there can be no fall in the secondary market value. This 
point is discussed in more detail on page 160 below.
Because the term structure does not apply uniquely to the
euromarkets, it is not intended to test the applicability of any term
structure hypothesis to any particular market. Instead, the competing
hypotheses will be set out and a short descriptive review of the
literature covering the empirical studies to date will be made. It should
be noted at the outset that there is still considerable conflict as to 
which hypothesis or combination of hypotheses have most explana­
tory power. There are also considerable differences of opinion as to the 
most appropriate methodology to be used and to the validity of the 
empirical results obtained.
There are four main hypotheses of the term structure of interest 
rates. They are;-
1) The pure expectations hypothesis
2) The expectations hypothesis augmented by a liquidity premium
3) The hedging or market segmentation hypothesis
4) The preferred habitat hypothesis
Each hypothesis will now be set out individually.
The Pure Expectations Hypothesis
This theory suggests that investors hold confident expectations of 
future interest rates. Long rates are modified geometric averages of 
current and expected future short rates. Thus, if investors expect short 
rates to rise in the future, long rates will be above short rates. The 
investor has three alternatives; one is to invest in an instrument with 
a maturity equal to his anticipated holding period. Secondly, he may 
invest in a shorter term security and reinvest the proceeds. Thirdly, he 
may invest in a longer term security, seli at the end of the holding 
period and incur a capital gain or loss.
The pure expectations hypothesis postulates that the expected 
return to the investor will be the same for each alternative form of 
investment. If long rates were, say, below expected future short rates, 
investors would sell long securities, driving down their price and 
therefore raising their yield. They would also buy short securities, 
raising their price and driving down their yield. If there is a 
sufficiently large body of investors acting in accordance with their 
confidently held expectations, their expectations will be fulfilled.
Given the expected similarity of outcomes for investing in various
maturities, securities of differing maturities become perfect 
substitutes for one another. Therefore one ten year loan is similar to 
ten one year loans.
According to this hypothesis, a positively sloped yield curve 
implies that investors expect short term yields to rise in the future, 
while a negatively sloped yield curve implies that expected short rates 
will fall. This theory was first articulated by Fisher (1896). It was 
refined by Lutz (1940) and Hicks (1946).
The Liquidity Premium Hypothesis
This hypothesis differs from the pure expectations hypothesis in 
that it assumes that markets are dominated by risk averse investors. The 
risk to which they are assumed to be averse is loss of capital due to 
fluctuating secondary market values of investments with maturities 
longer than the anticipated holding period. The return on holding a one 
period bond for one period is certain, but holding a longer maturity 
bond for that period will be uncertain as to outcome due to uncertainty 
of secondary market value at the end of the holding period. This 
uncertainty stems directly from uncertainty regarding future interest 
rates.
Thus, while accepting that long rates are influenced by 
expectations of future short rates, investors require a premium above 
the geometric mean of expected future short rates to compensate for the 
risk of capital loss. Because changes in. interest rates have a greater 
effect on the secondary market value of bonds the longer the maturity of 
those bonds, it is to be expected that the premium will be larger the 
longer the period to maturity. This theory was first put forward by 
Hicks (1946).
Extending Keynes' work on regressive expectations of bond holders 
in the speculative demand for money theory (Keynes 1936), it would be 
expected that the risk of adverse movements in secondary market prices
would depend upon the level of interest rates. If rates were low 
compared with historical experience (relative to the normal rate), 
investors would expect rates to rise, thus causing falls in secondary 
market prices. A larger risk premium would be required than when, say, 
interest rates were higher and not expected to rise much further. If 
rates were high by historical standards, they may be expected to fall, 
secondary market prices will be expected to rise and there may even be a 
negative risk premium.
Clearly then, at least on theoretical grounds, the liquidity 
premium could be expected to vary with the level of interest rates.
The Market Segmentation Hypothesis
This hypothesis also assumes that investors are risk averse and 
avoid risk by hedging, that is matching their assets with liabilities of 
equal maturity. Therefore, both lenders and borrowers have definite 
preferences for assets or liabilities of specific maturities. These 
preferences may be induced by institutional or regulatory constraints 
but the result is that each maturity can be treated as a separate 
market. The yield on securities of any particular maturity is dependent 
upon the separate supply and demand functions for those particular
securities. The desire to avoid risk, together with institutional or
regulatory constraints precludes borrowers and lenders shifting from one 
maturity habitat to another unless, presumably, the differentials 
(benefits) from so doing are extremely large. Thus, a premium has to be 
paid to induce an investor to change habitat but this premium does not
have to be only at the long end.
This hypothesis assumes investors to be averse to two types of 
risk. Firstly, there is the risk of fluctuating secondary market values 
due to fluctuations in future interest rates, as covered by the Hicksian 
liquidity premium model. However, there is also income risk. This is 
where there is a risk of loss of income due to interest rates falling
during the holding period of, say, a liability which is used to fund an 
asset of shorter maturity. Upon reinvestment of the asset's sales 
proceeds a lower rate of interest will be earned. This may fall below 
the rate payable on the liability, and thus a loss ensues. Financial 
intermediaries are clearly open to this risk.
It has been suggested that the wish to avoid these risks is so 
great as to preclude the influence of expectations on the term structure 
(Culbertson 1957).
However, Meiselman (1961) has pointed out that, even if 
institutional preferences are very strong, there are many parts of the 
term structure which are overlapped by different types of institutions, 
thereby providing continuity in the yield curve.
Further, provided that there are sufficient "floating investors" 
which are free to move between maturities, expectations will influence 
the term structure.
The Preferred Habitat Hypothesis
This hypothesis, which was originally suggested by Modigliani and 
Sutch (1966), is an amalgam of the previous three theories. It accepts 
the basic idea that the term structure is influenced by expectations 
augmented by a risk premium of the Hicksian type However, they note that 
the Hicksian liquidity premium assumes that all investors wish to 
convert their portfolio into cash at the end of the short period, ie 
that the investor has a short habitat (pi83).
To overcome this weakness, they draw upon the segmentation model 
and suggest that different transactors will prefer different habitats. 
The preference for habitats is because investors are assumed to be 
averse to the risks of loss of income and loss of capital as discussed 
above. That being so, Modigliani and Sutch note that the combined 
influence of the compensation for the two risks could result in either 
positive or negative "risk premiums" depending on the supply and demand
for securities in each habitat.
The role of arbitrage and speculation as well as transactions costs 
is also recognised in this model. As differences between supply and 
demand in each habitat change the relative yield in each habitat, 
speculators may be encouraged to take the risk of moving out of their 
preferred habitat. Also arbitragers, by borrowing in one habitat and 
lending in another, will encourage equality of yields between habitats. 
Lastly the transactions costs are less if investments are repaid at the 
end of the desired holding period than if securities have to be sold 
during or at the end of that period.
Thus, this theory postulates that the term structure of interest 
rates will differ from that suggested by the pure expectations theory by 
the amount of discount or premium caused by the interaction of supply 
and demand in each preferred habitat. However, the size of this discount 
or premium will be mitigated by speculative and arbitrage activity 
between habitats and comparative transactions costs.
Empirical Investigation of the Term Structure
For a body of literature dating back to at least 1896, eg Fisher op 
cit, the empirical studies of the term structure of interest rates must 
be noted for the continuing if not increasing controversy regarding the 
factors that determine the term structure.
Prior to the work of Meiselman (1961) there had been two approaches 
to the testing of the expectations theory. One method characterised by 
Woodward, cited in Hickman (1943), used questionnaires directed at 
market experts to determine their expectations of future short rates and 
compared these expectations with the current yield curve.
An alternative approach was to use the perfect foresight method. 
Macaulay (1938) used this technique in which he substitutes the actually 
prevailing rate in period t + n for the expected short rate in t 
applicable n periods later. If the long rate is a geometric mean of the
current and correctly expected future short rates, then the expectations 
hypothesis is substantiated.
However, Macaulay concluded that the results of his study did not 
support the expectations hypothesis. Later work by Hickman (1943) and 
Culbertson (1957) supported Macaulay's results.
These studies suffered one common weakness. That was that they 
provided no rigorous theory of how expectations were formed. Meiselman, 
op cit, rectifies this weakness by postulating that expectations are 
formed by continuously changing current expectations in the light of the 
forecasting error of previous expectations - an error learning model.
Meiselman interpreted his econometric results as supporting the 
expectations model augmented by an error learning model. However, the 
explanatory power of this model declines as maturity increases. Thus, 
investors have more confident expectations of the near future than the 
more distant future, and therefore near future expectations are acted 
upon more definitely than more distant ones. As more distant 
expectations are held with less confidence, they have a lower weighting 
in the error learning process and this is consistent with the long rates 
being a geometric mean of expected short rates.
Meiselman also spends considerable time testing the Hicksian 
liquidity premium model and market segmentation hypothesis.
A distinction is made between the risk indifferent pure 
expectations model on the basis of the constant term. A positive 
constant term implies a liquidity premium. However, Meiselman found the 
constant term to be equal to zero and thus he rejects the Hicksian 
liquidity premium model. Wood (1963), on the other hand, shows that a 
zero constant is compatible with the existence of liquidity premia
"....  A constant term equal to zero, although necessary to the
expectations hypothesis under Meiselman1s assumptions, is also 
consistent with the liquidity premium theory under the same 
assumptions", (pi66).
Meiselman tests for the market segmentation model by investigating 
the influence upon the term structure of changes in the maturity 
structure of outstanding debt. He found little association between these 
two variables and therefore refutes the market segmentation hypothesis.
Wood (op cit) has criticised these tests on the basis that the 
supply and demand for securities of different maturities will be 
dependent upon, among other things, the relationship between relative 
prices and therefore yields.
Meiselman* s work has also been criticised because of the nature of 
the data used. The data was in fact hand fitted yield curves derived 
from Durand (1942 and 1958). Grant (1964) criticised Meiselman's 
results, contending that the Durand data was constructed in such a 
manner as to favour Meiselman’s results. Buse (1967) reinforces this 
point by showing that similar results can be obtained by using the data 
in reversed, or random, order. 1965 saw a paper by Van Horne supporting 
Meiselman's results, but this in turn was criticised by Santomero (1975) 
for having the same sort of data weaknesses as Meiselman's original 
work.
Santomero, op cit, overcame the data weaknesses suggested above by 
using the yield curve associated with eurocurrency deposits. The 
advantages of this type of data are their homogeneity, their continuity, 
and the absence of the need to interpolate for missing data sets. 
Furthermore, this study is applying an error learning model in a 
relatively new market. It was considered that his results supported 
Meiselman's hypothesis.
Santomero also tested for the existence of liquidity premiums 
following the methodology of Cagan (1969). According to Cagan, if the 
pure expectations hypothesis holds, the return on a one period issue 
should equal the return on holding a longer maturity issue and selling 
at the end of one period at the market price. The difference between the 
one period realised return on longer maturities and the explicit one
period return on one period securities indicates the size of the 
liquidity premium associated with longer maturities.
To test for liquidity premiums in this way in the eurocurrency 
deposit market for non negotiable deposits is invalid. The Hicksian 
liquidity premium assumes that investors are averse to the risk of loss 
of capital due to fluctuating secondary market prices due to 
unanticipated fluctuations in future interest rates. In the eurocurrency 
market for non negotiable deposits, such a risk does not occur because 
the deposit is always repaid at par. There may in fact be an income risk 
as premature withdrawal may result in forfeiture of accrued interest. It 
should be noted that Santomero's results would only be valid provided 
the data related exclusively to marketable negotiable certificates of 
deposit which can be subject to fluctuations in secondary market prices.
Santomero considers that his results support the expectations 
hypothesis, albeit with risk premiums, but that the coefficients of 
determination are smaller than in previous studies. He suggests that 
fluctuations in exchange rates may be one reason for this.
In fact, one should go much further. The eurocurrency deposit for 
most holders is a foreign currency asset (81% according to Johnston 
1982). Thus, the expected yield on a foreign currency investment must 
either include the cost of avoiding exchange risk, ie forward market 
hedging, or it must take into account both expectations of future 
interest rates and expectations of future exchange rates. Thus, the term 
structure of yields on eurocurrency deposits should take account of the 
term structure of exchange rate expectations as developed by Porter
(1971), and of the term structure of the costs of forward cover, this 
latter because transactions costs change with maturity in the forward 
exchange market.
At the same time as the work of Santomero was published, Cargil 
(1975) published the results of his study into the pure expectations 
theory within the context of an efficient markets model. He concluded
that the results reject the expectations hypothesis - at least for the 
British bond market. However, it should be noted that he used data 
supplied by Grant (1964) and Fisher (1966) and that these two studies 
disagreed between themselves in their support for Meiselman's results.
Turning now to the studies of the preferred habitat hypothesis, 
Modigliani and Sutch developed their theory in order to evaluate the US 
financial policy introduced in 1961 known as Operation Twist whereby the 
government tried to reduce long rates by selling long maturities and 
raising short rates. The high short rates were aimed at attracting short
term international capital while low long rates were aimed at
encouraging domestic investment. The results, of this study which are 
relevant to the analysis of the term structure are that expectations 
have an important influence but that neither the maturity structure nor 
changes in that structure exert a significant lasting or transient 
influence on the relation between the long and the short rates.
Modigliani and Sutch also consider that long rates involve a 
blending of one, extrapolated expectations of very recent changes in 
short rates, and two, regressive expectations towards a long term normal 
rate. This follows a combination of the work by Duesenberry (1958) and 
de Leeuw in Duesenberry et al (1965) . The Alman lag structure 
constrained to sixteen quarters was also considered significant in their 
results. The significance of this lag structure was criticised by 
Hamburger (1971) and in fact modified by Modigliani and Sutch in their 
1969 paper.
Karakitsos (1977) considers that ".....  the results for both the US
and UK indicate that no one has yet succeeded in developing a reliable 
statistical model relating past interest rates to expected future
rates", (pl41). He then proceeds to develop a model confirming the
interaction of regressive and extrapolatory expectations. He notes that 
the peak impact of expectations in the UK market is four months and 
thereafter regresses rapidly to- the long run historical expectation in
something less than three months (pi49).
His study therefore supports the preferred habitat hypothesis and 
the role of expectations.
During the late 1960's a body of literature developed which ran 
counter to that emphasising the role of expectations in determining the 
term structure. This literature postulated that capital markets were 
efficient and that interest rates follow a random walk. That is that 
movements of interest rates in a current period are independent of 
movements in previous periods (Granger & Rees 1968, Roll 1970, Bierwag & 
Grove 1971, Pippenger 1974). If it is true that interest rates follow 
this random walk, long rates will not be dependent upon a distributed 
lag of expected short rate as suggested by Modigliani and Sutch, op cit, 
and other literature cited above.
Phillips and Pippenger (1976) develop a simplified efficient 
markets model to compare with the preferred habitat hypothesis. They 
found that the long rate was equally well explained in their model by 
the long rate lagged one quarter and the current change in the short 
rate. This supports the notion of market efficiency and contradicts the 
distributed lag model of the influence of expectations. They also 
suggest that the shape of the lag structure found by Modigliani and 
Sutch results from using a low degree Alman polynomial rather than the 
result of extrapolative and regressive expectations (pi7).
A paper by Fildes & Fitzgerald (1980) develops a model of 
expectations formation and liquidity premium with which to test the 
efficiency of thet London Interbank market. The model for the liquidity 
premium follows the arguments of Hamburger & Platt (1975), Nelson
(1972), and Kessel (1965). They conclude that their results give strong 
support for the suggestion that rates follow a random walk in this market.
The paper by Kessel relates to liquidity premia of the Hicksian 
type ie due to risk of capital loss when selling a long bond due to 
fluctuations in interest rates (chapter 3). However, such a premium is
not relevant to securities where there is no fluctuation in capital 
value due to fluctuation in interest rates as is the case with bank 
deposits. In fact, this is similar to the criticism made of the paper by 
Santomero (op cit).
It is interesting to note that a premium on long, compared with 
short, yields is often found in a variety of securities, some having the 
Hicksian risk and others, such as bank deposits, which cannot have such 
a risk. The simultaneous existence of a premium in securities with and 
without such a risk must throw into doubt the concept of the Hicksian 
risk premium.
This is not to deny the existence of a premium, for it clearly 
exists whenever the yield curve is positively sloped. However, the size 
of any premium should not be explained only by the risk of capital loss. 
Income loss is also important but only applies to maturities shorter 
than the desired holding period. The lack of income risk on longer 
maturities will reduce the overall risk associated with holding long 
dated securities. If we treat the influence of a certain income on 
longer maturities as analogous to a risk discount, it must be working to 
reduce the observed risk premium. Therefore, the true 'risk' premium 
considered in previous studies to be of the Hicksian form must in any 
case be larger than that observed in the market.
Of course, some of the premium observed with bank deposits may 
represent credit risk because the majority of these institutions are 
private and therefore exhibit greater default risk than government 
institutions. However, the premium observed by Fildes and Fitzgerald (op 
cit) can only somewhat implausibly be explained by credit risk seeing 
that they were investigating the very short end of the interbank market.
There may be an income risk from investing in long term bank 
deposits which is analogous to the Hicksian risk. That is that if 
interest rates rise before the repayment of the deposit, and the 
depositor has to borrow, he may have to pay a rate of interest on his
borrowing that is greater than he is earning on the deposit he owns. 
This risk of incurring additional interest costs given uncertainty over 
future rates of interest and expenditure flows must be compensated for 
with a risk premium.
A further influence over the observed premium on long rates may be 
the possibility of arbitrage between bank deposits and capital market 
securities. This is particularly pertinent to the eurocurrency deposit 
rates where arbitrage between eurobonds and eurocurrency deposits is 
frequent. Further, eurobond portfolios are often financed by 
eurocurrency deposits. Thus, the costs which the market makers are 
willing to incur in attracting deposits will be influenced by the return 
on the eurobond portfolio. This portfolio will consist of, inter alia, 
long term bonds which pay a Hicksian liquidity premium.
Transactions costs will have an influence upon the term structure 
if these costs differ between maturity. These costs can be divided into 
brokerage type costs including any stamp taxes on one hand and the 
spread between bid and offer prices on the other. The influence of 
brokerage type expenses will depend upon their relation to maturity and 
the distribution of holding periods relative to the distribution of 
maturities. If brokerage costs rise with maturity and holding periods 
are shorter than maturities, a yield premium will be required to 
compensate for the higher costs incurred.
Where the bid and offer spread widens with maturity, the costs to 
investors rise and therefore a premium to cover these costs will have to 
rise with maturity.
One reason for bid-offer spreads widening in the bond market as 
maturity increases is the greater fluctuation in the value of the market 
makers' portfolio following interest rate fluctuations. However, as is 
explained in the section on marketability, maturity, at least in the 
eurobond market, does not seem to influence the bid-offer spread. 
Furthermore, generally eurobond transactions between market makers do
not attract brokerage costs.
It seems, therefore, that transactions costs can have little 
influence over the term structure of eurobond yields and such costs are 
very low in the interbank market.
In a recent article Schaefer (1981) shows that because individual 
bond issues have different degrees of tax efficiency, it is not valid to 
talk of a term structure common to all, say, default free bonds. The 
term structure becomes specific to each of the separate tax efficient 
groups.
This question of tax specificity of the term structure is important 
because of the international nature of the eurobond market. With 
investors in many markets but the bonds issued in an international 
market, the tax laws of the investors' residences will have the dominant 
influence. Given the variety of tax laws around the world, the tax 
specificity of the term structure becomes a very variable concept.
Discussion of the term structure so far has ignored expectations of 
future exchange rates. Porter (1971) developed a framework for analysing 
the term structure of exchange rate expectations. Froewiss (1977) shows 
that in a risk averse world, differences in interest rates on term 
structures of securities in different currencies are a combination of 
interest rate risk and exchange risk premia. Beenstock and Longbottom 
(1981) develop a model that shows the influence of a world term 
structure upon a domestic term structure given expectations of future 
exchange rates. It seems obvious that where investors are able to choose 
between investments in different currencies and maturities, the choice 
will be influenced not only by the compensation available to cover 
interest rate risk but also by the compensation for exchange rate risk. 
Thus, if the term structure is influenced by expectations then 
expectations of future interest rate and exchange rate changes will 
influence the domestic and world term structures. However, if the market 
segmentation hypothesis holds, then investors may have preferred
habitats not only as to maturities but also as to currencies. If this 
latter case holds, the influence of the world term structure upon the 
domestic term structure will be reduced (Beenstock & Longbottom, p47) .
There is plenty of evidence of periodic shifts in demand for 
eurobonds denominated in certain currencies as investors develop 
expectations of those currencies weakening. However, there is less 
evidence of banks shifting their tastes in loans due, no doubt, to their 
intermediating function and balancing their currency exposure. There is 
therefore prima facie evidence that eurobond investors do have preferred 
habitats with respect to the currency of their investments. However, the 
currency habitat may be influenced by expectations of exchange rate 
movements as suggested by Kern (1973) as well as institutional factors.
It is clear from this brief review of the literature that there is 
far from unanimous opinion as to the determinants of the term structure 
of interest rates. There may be some question as to the validity of 
extrapolating the results of the various studies discussed to markets 
other than those tested. The reason for this view is that not only may 
there be preferred habitats as to maturities but also as to currencies 
and types of instruments. This could be particularly important when one 
takes into account the tax specific term structure suggested by 
Schaefer, above, and also the influence of expected future exchange rate 
changes upon the preferences of investors and borrowers.
The term structure literature can be more easily identified as 
applicable to the eurobond market than the euroloan market. Its 
applicability to this latter market is further reduced when it is 
realised that the roll-over dates of syndicated loans are, in the 
majority of cases, either three months or six months. Thus, although a 
yield curve will exist in the interbank market, the borrower will, by 
convention, be limited to two points along that curve and, at times 
depending upon the competitive environment, may not enjoy even that 
choice.
We now proceed to analyse those factors that influence the yield on 
syndicated loans, specifically the spread or the margin.
4.3 Factors Influencing Interest Costs Specific to Eurocurrency Loans
As floating rate syndicated loans account for the majority of 
eurocurrency loans to LDCs this section concentrates on the pricing of 
those loans.
The total interest rate will consist of a reference rate, typically 
LIBOR, and a spread or margin added to the reference rate. This spread 
and any additional front end fees which the bank may receive constitute 
the yield on the syndicated loan. It is the determination of this yield 
and particularly the spread element that is the subject of this section.
OECD figures show that from 1975 to 1983 average spreads on loans to 
LDCs fell to 0.87% in the second quarter of 1979 and rose to 2.02% in the 
first quarter of 1983 (Financial Market Trends, various issues). Clearly 
such fluctuations, which only influence new loans, can have a 
considerable influence on borrowers' debt servicing costs and the yield 
which the banks receive on their loan portfolios.
The yield represents the price at which the bank is willing to 
supply a loan to the borrower. The planned yield will depend upon the 
bank's pricing policy; the actual yield will depend upon the extent to 
which competitive market forces cause the bank to deviate from its plan.
Although the yield may be analogous to the supply price of 
syndicated loans, because the cost of funds to the bank is passed to the 
borrower within the terms of the loan agreement, it is not analogous to 
the demand price. The demand price, or cost to the borrower, consists of 
the total cost of the borrowed funds. The two major components of these 
costs are the yield and the money market rate, usually LIBOR, to which 
the yield is added.
Immediately, we can notice a methodological problem in developing 
supply and demand functions for these loans. Supply will be a function of 
yield, among other things, while demand will be dependent upon total 
cost. One answer to this problem may be to assume that, due to the
arbitrage activities in the wholesale money markets, all forms of credit 
that are substitutes for eurocurrency loans will have similar basic 
interest rates. Therefore the price influences upon demand are limited to 
the mark-up above the reference rate. We also need to assume that credit 
on preferential terms from such bodies as the IMF and World Bank is not a 
close substitute for eurocurrency syndicated loans. Given the 
conditionality associated with official preferential credit these two 
assumptions are not too unrealistic and are made in the following 
analysis.
This section develops a simultaneous equation model to isolate those 
factors that influence yield on syndicated loans where that yield is 
assumed to result from the interaction of the supply and demand for that 
type of loan.
4 .3.1 Specification of the Yield Variable
Of the work carried out into the determinants of the yield or supply 
of syndicated loans, generally the yield has been specified as the spread 
or margin above the reference rate of interest (Feder & Just 1977, Kapur 
1977, Sargen 1976). These studies mis-specify the yield variable by 
ignoring the incidence of fees. It may further be argued that the yield 
is mis-specified because it is not adjusted for differences in size of 
loan, maturity, grace periods and the tax spare elements of some loans.
Fees are important in determining the yield which the lending banker 
gets for a particular risk. With regard to eurocurrency syndicated loans, 
fees are of four types: a) the commitment fee, b) the management fee, c) 
the participation fee and d) the agency fee.
These fees are difficult to take account of in this study for 
several reasons. Firstly, the data on fees are irregularly published and 
when published the details are inconsistent between loans. The managers 
of banks' syndication departments consider that the fees are to be kept
strictly confidential. One reason for this is that fees are often 
manipulated in relation to the published spread in order to achieve a 
confidential yield to the lender. Borrowers are often willing to pay 
higher than normal confidential fees in order to achieve a lower 
publicised spread (ref Financial Times 15.4.81, p25). This lower spread 
will be interpreted by some as indicating that lenders perceive the 
borrower as a lower credit risk than is actually the case. This would 
obviously be beneficial to the borrower should further funds be required 
from the market.
The second problem is that it is difficult, again due to lack of 
information, to determine the actual amount paid in fees to each member 
of the syndicate and therefore to what extent the yield required by each 
lender is made up of spread or fees. Each type of fee exhibits different 
difficulties in this respect.
The Commitment Fee: This is charged for the duration of the period 
of drawdown ie from the date of the signing of the loan agreement to the 
date when the borrower takes the funds. Data are not available on the ex 
post duration of the drawdown period. Further, data on the maximum 
permitted period of drawdown are published only occasionally. Accordingly 
it is not possible here to determine the amount payable in such fees.
The Management Fee: This fee is divided amongst the managers and
sometimes co-managers pro rata to their contribution of funds. As it is 
an agreed percentage of the total loan the amount of this fee is known 
when details are published. However, not all members of the syndicate 
will enjoy this form of fee income because they will not all be 
classified as managers. Further, data are not always available for this 
type of fee although provision in invariably made for it in the loan 
agreement. Therefore to include the data for some loans and not for 
others will introduce bias into the data.
The Participation Fee: This fee is paid to each bank participating 
in the syndicate in proportion to the contribution made by each bank to
the loan. However, it is usual for the proportion paid in fee to be 
higher the larger the amount lent by any individual bank. Usually several 
sizes of participation are allowed for say $1-3 million, $4-5 million, 
$5+ million, being associated with several fee sizes, say three-eighths 
per cent, half per cent and five-eighths per cent respectively. There­
fore the influence of the participation fee upon the yield depends upon 
the size of the individual participations. Because data are not available 
relating to the size of these participations, it is not possible to 
determine how this fee influences the yield to each individual lender.
The Agency Fee: This is paid to the agent bank at regular intervals 
during the life of the loan. The agent bank carries out a number of 
clerical and administrative functions during the life of the loan. This 
study, therefore, assumes that the agency fee only compensates the agent 
bank for these extra duties and does not contribute to the yield on the 
loan.
Due to the inadequate provision of data relating to fees it is felt 
that it is not possible to include fees to give the correct specification 
of the yield variable and unfortunately published data on spreads must be 
used as a proxy for the yield.
It must be remembered that the impact of front ended fees upon 
annual yield will be reduced the longer the maturity of the loan. To this 
extent the ability of bankers to manipulate yields is limited. Further, 
Ellis (1979) has shown that fees and spread are positively, correlated 
over time. However, he did not carry out a cross section study of the 
relationship between fees and spreads. Anecdotal evidence collected by 
the current writer suggests that fees and spreads are negatively 
correlated on some loans. Therefore the published level of spreads in any 
one time period would be influenced by the number of borrowers that trade 
off fees for spreads and this number may not be stable from one time 
period to the next.
A further variable that influences the yield to the lender and cost
to the borrower is the grace period covering repayment of principal, or 
of principal and interest. Grace periods will reduce the' effective cost 
to the borrower if the funds that would have been used for paying the 
principal or interest can be reinvested at a positive rate of return. It 
follows that grace periods reduce the effective yield to the lender if 
the foregone payments could have been reinvested at a rate of return 
different to that of the original loan.
It is not possible to determine the influence that grace periods 
have on effective yield or effective cost because the effect depends upon 
the opportunity cost of funds during the period of grace. Suitable data 
on the opportunity cost of funds is not currently available and is 
unlikely to be in the future. One reason for this is that a knowledge of 
such opportunity costs requires a knowledge of the subjective judgements 
of yields on alternative uses of funds.
Accordingly grace periods have not been taken account of in the 
specification of the yield variable.
Maturity of the loan will also influence the bankers' perceived risk 
and therefore the spread should be adjusted to take account of the 
different maturities. A problem arises in deciding the weighting to be 
given to the maturity. Johnston (1983) found no systematic relationship 
between spreads and maturities on a cross section basis. It is therefore 
not possible to arrive at a trade off between those variables that has
any rigorous basis. The reason for Johnston's findings may be that the
spread is an individually negotiated element of the yield and will 
therefore be influenced by the relative negotiating strengths of the 
partners. As such it may be an inefficient indicator of risk, 
particularly in the light of the discussion of fees above. Accordingly 
this study does not weight the spread by the maturity of the loan and
therefore uses, extremely reluctantly, the published spread as a proxy
for the yield to the lending banker and the cost above LIBOR to the 
borrower.
4.3.2 The Supply Price
Following the analysis of the bank lending function in chapter 
three, this section postulates .that bank management have a utility 
function where market share and profitability enter positively and risk 
enters negatively.
Formally the utility function is given as:
u = f ( i t ,  R, M) 
where tt = profit
R = risk
M = market share
3uand 7^  > 0 thus profits enter the utility function positively
< 0 risk detracts from utilityoR
8u
7^  > 0 market share positively influences utility
The bank management is assumed to manipulate the following 
syndicated loan variables yr,a2E(r),m, in order to maximise the above 
utility function subject to the constraints tt > Trmin, R < R max 
where yr = the average expected yield on the syndicated loan portfolio
0 2E(r) = the variance of the expected yield on the loan portfolio
m = share of the syndicated loans market measured either by the
number of loan mandates won or by relative size of loan port­
folio. This distinction is important because some banks aim
to be lead managers of loans and then sell down their commit­
ment under the mandate thus earning only fees; other banks 
aim to build up loan portfolios and earn interest as well as 
fees.
We have thus extended the utility function found in Tobin (1958) 
where profit is represented by the mean of the expected return on assets 
and risk is represented by the variance of the expected rate of return on 
the assets. However, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that profit 
maximisation, an assumption made by Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1959), 
may not be an appropriate assumption for a model describing the behaviour
of a modern international bank. In particular the banks are concerned
r/4
about market share and size of loan portfolio, Davis (1976, p32) ,
Euromoney (February 1978, p21) and chapter seven page 337 of this thesis.
Because modern banking uses sophisticated marketing techniques and 
allocates resources to the marketing function, market share must feature 
prominently in the bank's utility function. This view is supported by the 
analysis in chapter three above and by evidence that large banks are keen 
to become lead managers of syndicated loans in order to enjoy the 
attendant fees but then sell down as much of the loan as possible, thus 
not taking upon its books any of the risk. To some extent such behaviour 
is circular in that a bank can only be sure of winning mandates to manage 
syndicates when it is known to be prominent in the market. Thus market 
share is an important prerequisite for this type of behaviour.
There is also evidence that the banks engage in loss leader 
marketing policies on loan pricing in order to get themselves established 
in the international market (Economist March 31 1979).
During 1979 there was considerable anecdotal evidence in such 
journals as Euromoney that the low spreads of that period were below the 
marginal cost of financial intermediation. However, it is not possible to 
determine whether or not the comments were aimed at trying to 'talk up1 
the level of spreads at the time. Further, no mention was made of the 
role of fees in the marginal revenue. We should also question the 
measurement of marginal cost in eurobanking.
The analysis in chapter three shows that the marginal cost of 
eurobank lending could be very low if not zero. Given the considerable 
indivisibilities in the fixed capital of a modern bank, particularly 
computers, modern offices and communication systems, the marginal cost of 
supplying syndicated loans may be below average gost. Thus the statement 
by banks that spreads are not sufficient to cover the costs of 
intermediation (Maynard & Davies 1980) could mean that marginal revenue 
is below marginal cost because the desire for a larger market share is 
strong in the utility function. Alternatively, it could mean that the
banks consider their marginal revenue to be below average cost. This does 
not mean that the banks will be making losses; because marginal revenue 
could still be above the very low marginal cost suggested in chapter three, 
page 124 .
The model of eurobank lending developed in chapter three suggests 
that banks will lend provided they have the resources to do so or can 
acquire those resources without unduly reducing profits, and also that 
the risk reward ratio is acceptable. With regard to risk, the traditional 
models of portfolio behaviour following Markowitz (1959) and Tobin (1958) 
and discussed in detail in chapter five of this thesis, show that where 
the rates of return on alternative investments are less than perfectly 
correlated, the default risk can be reduced by diversifying the asset 
portfolio. Further, Grubel (1968) has shown that there are welfare gains 
from portfolio diversification as the total size of the portfolio gets 
larger.
Accordingly, the diversification of the bank's lending portfolio 
into syndicated loans may be seen as a policy aimed at reducing the risk 
element in the utility function of the banking system. This view is 
strengthened when it is realised that one advantage of the syndicated 
loan system is that lenders need only take small participations in the 
loan, thus achieving greater diversification of a given portfolio size. 
Moreover, the floating rate nature of syndicated loans reduces the 
funding risks that the banks would face with flat rate loans.
However, it must be remembered that only the unsystematic element of 
risk can be diversified away and all loans will be subject to substantial 
systematic risk (refer page 242 below).
The reward required will be related to risk in eurobank lending and 
the rewards for similar degrees of risk bearing in alternative lending 
markets. It is shown below, page 224 , that syndicated loans to LDCs 
attract higher spreads than loans to OECD borrowers. Thus the move into 
syndicated lending to LDCs during the 1970's can also be seen as
enhancing the profit element of the banks' utility functions.
From the above discussion it is possible to postulate an equation 
for the supply price as follows:
Spd - f(L P R Q)
where Spd = Spread
L = Loanable funds available. This variable is proxied
by the level of deposits in the euromarkets and
represents the resources required by the banks in 
their lending process.
P - The profitability of euroloans relative to 
alternative lending opportunities
R = Risk
Q = Quantity
In order to test this proposition it is necessary to specify the 
data sets which represent the variables included in the above function. 
This empirical work was concentrated on the eurodollar loans because
they are by far the most important group.
The Spread
The spread data was obtained from eurodollar syndicated loans of 
five countries: Brazil, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Mexico and the
Philippines. Between them these countries account for over 47 per cent 
of the loans outstanding to financial markets in both 1974 and 1980 
(calculated from IBRD 1983).
Supply of Loanable Funds
Banks take deposits from the interbank markets or from non bank 
customers. In the interbank market the bank will offer and bid for 
deposits in order to develop a two way business and to maintain its 
image in the market. Nevertheless, there will be an emphasis on
borrowing or lending to this market as the bank adjusts its need for
liquid funds at the margin. Rates of interest paid and received on 
deposits of this nature fluctuate in accordance with the marginal 
adjustments of the banking system as a whole and these fluctuations are 
volatile.
In contrast, the banks' behaviour in relation to non bank customers 
is that they do not turn deposits away. Whether these are time deposits 
or demand deposits, they are accepted by the banks, although the rate of 
interest paid will be adjusted so as to equate supply with demand. As a 
result, if liquidity increases in the financial system, then it must end 
up with the banks or other financial intermediaries.
The only constraint upon the banks in attracting deposits is that 
the funds must be employed profitably. The greater the liquidity of the 
banking system, the greater will be the competition within that system to 
diversify the asset portfolio. It is clear then that the willingness of 
the banks to diversify into international lending will not be constant 
over time. The relative demand for bank liabilities, ie supply of funds 
to the banks, will influence the need for the banks to diversify. The 
demand for bank loans will be important because it will influence the 
amount of diversification that the banks find possible and the yield that 
is attainable upon such diversification.
Competition in the diversification process will be particularly 
important in that it will also influence the yields which the banks can 
get on their portfolios. The greater the competition, the lower will be 
the yield that the banks will have to accept for a given degree of risk.
It is therefore considered that the willingness of the banking 
system to provide eurocurrency syndicated loans is positively influenced 
by its liquidity. The yield which the' banks require on these loans will 
be influenced by the degree of competition in this market, this 
competition being positively related to liquidity. It is therefore 
postulated that yields will be negatively related to the liquidity of the 
banking system, in particular to the flows of funds to the eurocurrency 
market.
Taking the eurodollar market as an example, three main factors are 
seen to influence this flow of eurocurrency deposits. Firstly, there is 
the US balance of payments disequilibrium. Secondly, there are the 
balance of payments surpluses of the oil exporting countries. Thirdly, 
there is the interest differential in favour of eurodollar deposits 
against domestic deposits.
There has been considerable debate as to the influence of the US 
balance of payments deficits upon the supply of eurodollar deposits, eg 
Friedman (1969) and Klopstock (1970). Friedman suggests that a US deficit 
is not a sufficient condition for growth of the eurodollar market. He 
agrees that a deficit will give foreign holders a supply of dollars but 
it does not ensure that they continue to hold those dollars. If the 
dollar ceases to be attractive, holders can sell dollar denominated 
assets and buy assets denominated in other currencies. However, we must 
remember that the US dollar is the major unit of account in international 
trade and will therefore be held for transactions purposes. Furthermore, 
the higher interest rates available on eurodeposits make these deposits 
more attractive than domestic dollar deposits to those investors who are 
otherwise indifferent between the two types of investment.
Given the transactions demand for eurodeposits, it is considered 
that US balance of payments deficits will influence the supply of 
eurodollar deposits. The effect of the interest rate premium which 
eurodeposits have over domestic deposits is discussed below.
The influence of the oil exporting countries' balance of payments 
surpluses on euromarket liquidity stems directly from the US dollar being 
used for transactions purposes in the international oil trade and the 
willingness of the oil exporters to hold their reserves in the eurodollar 
market. This propensity to hold reserves in the form of eurodollar 
deposits was influenced by the transactions and investment demand for 
dollars. The depth of the eurodollar market and variety of instruments 
available to investors are also influential.
To the extent that oi'l exporting countries do not transform their 
net oil revenues into other currencies but simply hold them as 
eurodollars there will be no flow of funds out of the US banking system 
but simply a change of ownership of the deposits held within the USA.
It must not be thought that the US deficit and the oil exporters' 
surpluses cancel each other out. The US deficit will cause a flow of 
dollars to non oil exporting countries, some of these dollars being held 
in the euromarkets.
It has already been noted that there must be some incentive for the 
owner of dollars to hold them in the eurodollar market rather than in the 
domestic market. The most easily measured incentive is the interest 
differential between domestic dollar deposits and eurodollar deposits. 
The reasons for the differential have been discussed on page 141 above. 
Changes in the differential between these two rates will, ceteris 
paribus, cause arbitrage flows between the two markets. Therefore flows 
of funds into the euromarkets will be positively related to the interest 
differential.
As the spread on syndicated loans is hypothesised to be negatively 
related to euromarket liquidity, it is expected that the spread will be 
negatively related to each of the three influences upon liquidity 
discussed above.
The Profitability of Alternative Lending Opportunities
Although increased liquidity within the banking system will cause 
the banks to engage in competitive diversification of their portfolios, 
it does not follow that the diversification has to be directed into 
eurocurrency syndicated loans. Nevertheless there are several reasons for 
expecting such diversification to be directed at the loans market.
Firstly, although the banks may experience increased liquidity 
generally, the rate of change of liquidity in the separate constituent
currencies of the banks' portfolios may differ. Furthermore, as the banks 
experience increased liquidity in say US dollars they will prefer to 
diversify their portfolios by using the newly acquired funds to purchase 
US dollar denominated assets. One reason for this is that by avoiding any 
currency transformation the banks are avoiding currency risk. This is 
particularly so where the maturity transformation resulting from 
diversification causes the banks to seek hedging operations in thin 
markets eg seeking forward cover for more than one year hence.
Secondly, banks are skilled in the basic lending operations and 
therefore it is natural for them to seek to diversify their portfolios 
into assets that are as similar in nature as possible to existing assets, 
yet consistent with reducing unsystematic risk. This may be seen as an 
attempt to reduce the marginal administrative cost of diversification by 
avoiding the need to acquire completely new skills and preferring to 
build upon the skills which the banks already possess. The banks, having 
a better knowledge of loan markets than the markets for other services, 
reduce their costs (administrative and risk) by diversifying into a 
different type of loan.
Thirdly, there may be government controls limiting the type of 
non-loan assets into which the banks can diversify.
Fourthly, where the banks are subject to reserve asset requirements 
in their domestic banking operations, their holding of permissible 
non-loan assets may have reached saturation point.
Lastly, diversification by way of loans enables the banks to 
maintain their traditional marketing image in the market place. They 
continue to be perceived by existing as well as potential customers as 
lenders.
These five reasons for suggesting that banks will diversify into 
loans rather than non-loan types of assets do not in themselves explain 
why they diversify into eurocurrency syndicated loans to LDCs. Such an 
explanation must indicate why the banks did not diversify into domestic
lending in the same currency as their euroleriding. One reason could be 
that the profitability of eurolending is greater than domestic lending.
When one type of lending becomes relatively more profitable than 
others, funds will be switched to the more profitable use. If it is 
assumed that banks wish to avoid exchange risk, they will deploy dollar 
funds in the domestic dollar or eurodollar markets depending upon which 
is the most profitable.
Two alternative measures of profitability were tested in the supply 
function. These were:
1) The difference between Prime Rate (adjusted for 15% 
compensating balances) and the rate on domestic CDs 
compared with the spread on euroloans to OECD based 
borrowers. Data for Prime Rate and the CD rate were 
extracted from World Financial Markets published by 
Morgan Guarantee Trust Co of New York. The data for 
spreads were extracted from Financial Market Trends 
published by OECD.
This measure of profit relates to banks with a 
domestic US dollar deposit base having the choice of 
lending domestically or in the euromarkets.
2) The difference between Prime Rate (again adjusted 
for 15% compensating balances) and LIBOR compared 
with spreads to OECD borrowers. LIBOR was extracted 
from World Financial Markets. This measure of profit 
relates to banks using eurodollars to lend to US 
domestic borrowers or to borrowers via the euromarkets.
As prime rate is the rate at which US domestic banks lend to their 
best credit risks, the spread used as comparison is that of OECD based 
borrowers and not LDCs.
When the profitability of domestic loans rises relative to the 
spread on euroloans it is expected that bankers would lend to domestic
borrowers rather than euro borrowers. This would reduce the relative 
supply of loans in the euromarket, thus pushing up the spread. It is 
therefore to be expected that spreads are positively related to the 
difference between the profitability of domestic loans and spreads on 
euroloans.
Risk
The third element to influence the banks' diversification decisions 
will be the risk involved. Banks face two types of risk in this respect. 
The first type is associated with default of the investment; for 
syndicated loans this manifests itself in non payment of principal and/or 
interest. The second type of risk is associated with the degree of 
maturity transformation or currency transformation which the banks 
undertake in order to finance their syndicated lending. This risk would 
manifest itself in an inability of the banks to attract new funds or to 
roll over existing deposits in appropriate currencies at a cost that can 
be passed on to the borrower.
The risk of default by the borrower is considered here to be the 
greater risk because the risk of not being able to fund a loan on its 
roll-over date is allowed for in the loan agreement. In particular the 
loan agreement will state that if the lender cannot obtain the funds at 
an agreeable cost the loan does not have to be renewed. Nevertheless, 
having to refuse to roll over a loan because of inability to fund would 
seriously reduce a bank's ability to take part in future business. There 
is therefore some risk but this risk will be less important the more 
liquid is the banking system. The influence of liquidity upon the 
willingness to diversify has been discussed separately. It is therefore 
only necessary to include borrower default risk as the third influence on 
diversification. This is hypothesised to be positively related to the 
spread.
The banks use many variables in combination to derive some 
indication of the risk attached to a loan, therefore it is difficult to 
postulate the applicability of just one variable that represents risk.
The model was run with four alternative measures of risk. These
were:
1) The ratio of interest payments to exports. This is based
upon the argument in chapter six, page 272 below that 
receipts of interest have a higher ranking in the banks' 
utility function than amortization payments do.
2) The ratio of interest payments to reserves. The rationale
for this ratio is similar to that in 1) above.
3) The ratio of total debt service to total export earnings.
This ratio is included because of its frequent use by 
practising bankers.
4) The ratio of total debt service payments to GNP. Again 
this is included for the same reason as is 3) above.
The data for these measures of risk were extracted from the IBRD
World Debt Tables 1982/83. The figures extracted were annual so quarterly
data ware derived by interpolation.
The supply price equation can now be set out formally as:
Spd = a - a USBP - a Oil rev - a (RE-RD) + a R tf + a RISK 
1 2 2 3 4 5
where: Spd = Spread
USBP = The autonomous balance of payments disequilibrium 
of the USA
Oil rev = Oil exporting countries' revenues
(RE-RD) = Interest rate differential in favour of eurodollar
deposits
Rir = Relative profitability of euro to domestic lending
RISK = One of the four measures discussed above
Detailed definitions and sources of data are given on page 191 below.
4.3.3 The Demand Price
Demand theory suggests that the price of a good is, ceteris paribus,
influenced by the quantity of that good demanded, the price of
substitutes, income, wealth, and tastes.
The demand price for syndicated loans, ignoring fees, is the spread 
plus LIBOR. Thus the equation specifying price as a function of
quantity and other variables can be formally set out as:
Spd + LIBOR = f(P2 , Y, W, T, Q)
where: Spd = Spread
LIBOR = London Interbank Offer Rate
P2 = Price of substitutes
Y - Income; in this case foreign exchange income
represented by the autonomous balance of payments
W = Wealth; particularly foreign exchange wealth,
represented by the nation’s stock of gold and 
foreign exchange reserves
T = Tastes
Q = Quantity demanded
However, as this section is aimed at determining the influences upon 
the spread it is therefore necessary to rearrange the function so 
that LIBOR appears on the right hand side of the equation, thus:
Spd = f(LIBOR, P2 , Y, W, T, Q)
LIBOR is expected, a priori, to be negatively related to spread 
because, being so much larger than the spread, it will have a much 
greater influence over the total cost of syndicated loans. As LIBOR rises 
the spread must fall in order to maintain the total price in relation to 
quantity demanded and the other variables in the demand function. 
Quantity demanded will be negatively related to the spread because spread 
is part of price.
Looking next at the financial flows that may be considered as 
substitutes for syndicated loans( aid flows, loans from the IMF and 
various development banks and eurobond finance might seem appropriate. 
However, chapter one above has shown how quantitatively inadequate aid 
flows from IMF and development bank funds have been during the 1970's. 
Chapter eight below shows that the eurobond market has never been an 
alternative source of finance for LDCs in the quantities required during 
the 1970's.
Foreign exchange reserves are substitutes for borrowed funds in that 
because of imperfections in financial markets, it is generally cheaper to 
use ones own funds than to borrow. There are exceptions to this rule, for 
example a minimum stock of reserves may be considered to be strategically 
necessary. Moreover, accumulating reserves may increase the country's 
credit rating in the financial markets.
Nevertheless, it is a reasonable generalisation that the larger the 
stock of foreign exchange reserves, the less will be the need to borrow 
in the eurocurrency markets, thus spreads are postulated to be negatively 
related to the level of foreign exchange reserves.
Wealth would generally be included in a demand function as a 
positive influence upon demand. However, highly liquid forms of wealth 
would not be considered a positive influence on the demand for credit 
where the expected rate of return on the liquid wealth is less than the 
expected cost of the credit. Therefore, although foreign exchange 
reserves may be considered as a proxy for the foreign currency wealth of 
the borrower, it is not appropriate to include them as a wealth variable 
in this model. It is also considered inappropriate to include any measure 
of physical wealth in this model due to the informational problems 
surrounding such a concept at the national level.
Turning now to the income factor in the demand function, we would 
expect the demand for a commodity to be greater the larger is the 
consumer's income. It is true that the developing countries with the
higher per capita incomes have tended to get the lion's share of 
international bank lending. However, this does not indicate the role of 
income in determining the cost of these loans.
Where the marginal propensity to import is positive, an increase in 
income will lead to an increase in the value of imports. Moreover, the 
increased import bill will manifest itself before increased exports due 
to the time lag between purchasing imports such as energy and capital 
goods on one hand and the sale of output on the other.
If we take the income variable in the demand function not as ex post 
income but some desired (ex ante) level of income appropriate to the 
government's welfare function, it is clear that an increase in this 
desired level of income will manifest itself in a deterioration of the 
current account of the balance of payments. The current account would 
have to be financed and one method would be by borrowing in the 
syndicated loan market. It is therefore felt that the current account of 
the balance of payments is a determinant of demand. The spread on 
syndicated loans is postulated to be positively related to the current 
account deficit.
The inclusion of tastes in the neoclassical demand function is 
particularly difficult to handle in the context of borrowing by 
developing countries. In particular, it is difficult to develop an 
explanation as to how the decision makers of developing countries develop 
their tastes. It could be considered that tastes for syndicated loans are' 
influenced by the marketing efforts of the lending bankers and the terms 
and conditions attached to other forms of credit, as well as those 
factors influencing the need for credit. That being so, the factors 
underlying the marketing efforts are included in the supply function, 
while the other influences are accounted for in the demand function. It 
has therefore been decided not to include a variable for tastes in the 
equation to be tested.
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The demand price equation can now be set out formally as:
Spd = bl - b2 LIBOR - b3FXRS + b4B0PS
where: Spd Spread
LIBOR London Interbank Offer Rate on 3 month loans
FXRS The level of foreign exchange reserves held by LDCs
BOPS The balance of payments deficits of LDCs
Qd Quantity demanded
.3.4 The Simultaneous Equation Model
Specifying the model in a simultaneous equation format, the 
structural equations are as follows:
SPDs = f {- USBP - OIL REV - (RE-RD) + RISK + REL 77 + Q)
SPDd = f (- LIBOR - FXRS + BOPS - Q)
SPDs = SPDd
From these, the following reduced form equations are derived:
SPDs = al - a2 USBP - a3 OIL REV - a4 (RE-RD) + a5 RISK
These equations were solved for eight separate combinations of the 
two relative profit measures and four risk measures given on pages 181 
and 183 above. The model itself is over-identified and therefore Two 
Stage Least Squares Regression is used to solve the structural equations. 
The Time Series Processor computer package was used for this purpose.
The initial runs to solve these equations using absolute values of 
data gave the following results:
+ a6 REL 77 - a7 LIBOR - a8 FXRS + a9 BOPS
Q = bl - b2 USBP b3 OIL REV - b4 (RE-RD) + b.5 RISK 
+ bS REL TT - b7 LIBOR - b.8 FXRS + b9 BOPS
The Supply Price
SPDs = C - USBP - OIL REV - (RE-RD) + RISK 2+ REL 7t2+ Q
2.85- 0.018+ 0.007 + 0.056 - 0.048 - 0.199 - 0.0001
(3.1) (-2.89) (0.9) (0.4) (-0.69) (-2.3) (-3.8)
R2 0.913 
DW 2.10
The Demand Price
SPDd = C - LIBOR - FXRS + BOPS - Q
2 .11- 0.16 + 0.000002 - 0.0812 - 0.00006 
(6 .6 ) (-2.7) (0.20) (-1.72) (-1.69)
R2 0.83 
DW 2.1
These results were not acceptable because of certain variables being 
insignificant and having the wrong sign. It was thought that these
results may have been influenced by multicolinearity between certain 
variables. Inspection of the correlation matrix of all the variables
shows the following correlations between pairs of variables:
The Supply Price
Risk: 2 Risk 2
Rel tt 1 -0.78 Q 0.87
The Demand Price
FXRS BOPS
LIBOR +0.93 -0.93
BOPS Q
FXRS - 0.86 0.85
Given the degree of multicolinearity between variables it was decided 
to use the first derivatives of LIBOR, Foreign Exchange Reserves, Balance 
of payments, Quantity of Loans and all the profit and risk variables. The 
results are given below:
The Supply Price
SPDs = C - USBP - OIL REV - (RE-RD) + RISK2 + RELirl + Q
1.82-0.026 - 0.015 - 0.66 + 0.48 - 0.25 ' - 0.00008
(.11.4) (-2.0) (-0.9) (-2.6) (+2.2) (-1.2) (-1.3)
R2 0.72 R2 0.59 DW 0.85
The Demand Price
SPDd = C - LIBOR - FXRS + BOPS - Q
1.38- 0.13 - 0.92 - 0.39 + 0.97
(12.4) (-0.8) (-0.14) (-0.30) (+0.09)
R2 -0.02 R2 -0.26 DW 0.33
The coefficients of the supply price show the importance of the US 
balance of payments, interest rate differentials and risk in determining 
the level of spreads. They also indicate that oil revenue, relative profit 
and quantity are not significant. Indeed, both relative profit measures 
discussed on page 181 proved to be negatively related to spreads. This 
would suggest some segmentation between the eurodollar and domestic dollar 
loan markets. In particular non US banks may not have free access to the 
US domestic loan market and regional US banks may not consider euroloans 
as close substitutes for loans to their domestic customers. Apart from 
quantity and relative profit all coefficients in this equation have the 
correct sign. As a further test on the profit variable the equations were 
re-run using the level of profit on domestic loans as the profit variable 
ie adjusted Prime Rate minus the CD rate or minus LIBOR. The results were 
inferior to the ones given above.
The risk 2 variable (ratio of debt interest to reserves) was the only- 
one of the four risk variables to be positively related to spreads both in 
the tests using absolute data and in those using first derivatives. This 
result corroborates suggestions made in chapter six, page 272 of the 
importance bankers place on ability to service interest payments compared 
with amortization payments.
With respect to the demand price, the fact that the constant is the 
only significant variable is at first sight disappointing. However, the 
implication that demand factors are not important in the determination of 
spread is compatible with the suggested importance of bank marketing and 
the low marginal cost of loans suggested in chapter three of this thesis.
The poor explanatory power of the variables included in the demand 
function was similar for all eight combinations of equations incorporating 
first derivatives. Moreover, in the equation using absolute values of data 
only LIBOR had significant explanatory power.
The existence of first order autocorrelation in the results using 
first derivatives is disappointing but is a common problem where 
derivatives are used as data.
A test for first order autocorrelation as suggested by Theil and 
Nagar (1961) indicates the presence of autocorrelation in both functions. 
Checks of the data showed no evidence of nonlinearity and a data 
transformation suggested by Beach and Mackinnon (1978) failed to remove 
the autocorrelation. The problem is therefore thought to be due to the 
misspecification of the spread variable as suggested on page ,169 above or 
the interpolation of annual data required to obtain quarterly data for the 
risk variables. Improved results will therefore have to await improved 
data.
Nevertheless these results emphasise the importance of the 
competitive supply of funds to the developing countries. This indicates 
that at periods when euromarket liquidity increases, the spreads on 
eurocurrency loans can be expected to fall.
Definitions of variables and sources of data used in model of spreads
SPREAD
USBP
OIL REV
RE-RD
RELATIVE
PROFIT
RISK
The average spread weighted by quantity. Data up to end 1978 
represents the spread paid by each of five countries: Brazil, 
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and the Philippines and calculated 
from IBRD Borrowing in International Capital Markets. From 
1979 the figures represent the spread paid by all LDCs as 
shown in table 9 of various issues of the same publication. 
Sections A through D of IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook, 
various issues (not seasonally adjusted).
Taken from the Financial Review section of the Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin. In particular the table 1 'Estimated
/
Deployment of Oil Exporters Surpluses including:
UK Sterling Deposits
Other Sterling Investments inc equities and property 
Foreign Currency Deposits 
US Bank Deposits 
Other 
Other countries
RE = Bid rate on 3 month deposits for prime bank in London. RD 
= 3 month negotiable CD issued by Morgan Guarantee
Trust Company. Sources for RE and RD: Morgan Guarantee Trust 
Company of New York.
The relative profit measure number 1 as specified on page 181 
above.
The ratio of interest payments to reserves as mentioned on 
page 183 above. The data source was the IBRD World Debt Tables 
annual data interpolated between annual points to achieve 
quarterly data.
LIBOR
FXRS
BOPS
London Interbank Offer Rate on US dollar loans. Source: cal­
culated from Morgan Guarantee Trust World Financial Markets, 
various issues.
Foreign exchange reserves of all non oil exporting LDCs.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Imports - Exports of all non oil exporting LDCs. Source: IMF
International Financial Statistics.
Quantity of syndicated loans to all LDCs. Source: IBRD
Borrowing in International Capital Markets, various issues.
.4.4 Factors Influencing the Rate of Interest specifically in the
•Eurobond Market
4 ,4.1 Introduction
There have been very few studies which aim to explain interest 
rates in the eurobond market. Park (1974) and Solnik and Grail (1975) 
develop models to explain "the yield" on eurobonds. Both of these works 
cover US corporate eurobonds during periods of fixed exchange rates and 
US capital controls. Finnerty, Schneeweis and Hedge (1980) cover the 
period of floating exchange rates but still cover US corporate eurobonds 
and investigate "the" eurobond yield.
The objectives of this section differ from previous work in that it 
does not treat eurobonds as a homogeneous group of instruments. It is 
intended to explain the reasons for the great variety of yields to be 
found in the eurobond market. It is also intended to isolate, where data 
will permit, the reasons for differences between yields on LDC eurobonds 
and the yields on eurobonds issued by other types of borrowers.
The cost of funds from the eurobond market, as with other financial 
markets, depends upon:
a) market conditions at the time of issue
b) the standing of the borrower, and
c) the terms and conditions of the instrument being issued 
Subsumed within market conditions are the general level of interest
rates, the currency structure and the term structure of interest rates. 
These have been discussed in section one of this chapter.
The standing of the borrower determines the risk structure of 
interest rates and, because of differing investment attitudes of banks 
and bond investors explained in chapter eight below, this risk structure 
will be different in the eurobond market compared with the eurocurrency 
loan market.
The terms and conditions of the instrument will include
marketability, callability and fiscal considerations. Marketability, or 
its lack of, is important in the analysis of LDC bond yields and is 
therefore discussed in this section. However, the relatively small 
amount of information about call provisions, sinking funds, etc 
precludes an analysis of these influences. Fiscal considerations are not 
considered to be important in this section because these will be com­
mon to all eurobonds and not just those issued by LDCs.
4.4.2 Definition of Yield
However, before proceeding to discuss the risk structure and terms 
and conditions of eurobonds, it is necessary to briefly review the 
concept of the yield as it pertains to eurobonds.
The yield to maturity
This is the rate which discounts all future receipts including 
repayment of principal at maturity such that the Net Present Value of 
the flow of receipts equals the current price of the bond. Yield to 
maturity is the relevant measure of yield where sinking funds do not 
operate.
The yield to average life
Some bonds allow for the maturity for some bondholders to be 
shortened by the use of sinking funds, purchase funds or call options. 
Where the terms for the retirement of bonds are known and compulsory, eg 
a sinking fund, it is possible to calculate the average life of the bond 
issue. The yield to average life discounts the flows due until average 
life and equates the resulting Net Present Value of those flows to the 
current price of the bond.
The determinants of the yield given are common to all financial 
liabilities, only the relative magnitude of each influence differs
between instruments issued. While this section has as its objective the 
determination of yields on eurobonds issued by developing countries, 
much of what is said is common to bonds and other liabilities issued by 
other types of borrowers. What does differentiate LDC bonds from those 
of other issuers is the risk structure of the yields and the 
marketability of the bonds. The yields are significantly higher and 
marketability considerably less than found on, say, bonds issued by OECD 
governments.
4.4.3 The Risk Structure of Interest Rates
It has already been noted that the yield on a financial asset 
compensates for various risks suffered with such an investment. This 
section is concerned only with the risk of default in payment of
principal or interest. It may be caused by the insolvency of the
borrower, including default by governmental borrowers as a result of a 
shortage of foreign exchange. However, default may also be due to a 
governmental borrower defaulting for ideological reasons, such as 
repudiating a previous administration's debt commitments.
In the case of syndicated loans, the reward for bearing such risk 
was subsumed in the fees-spread combination agreed in the loan 
agreement. However, in the case of eurobond issues, this reward will be 
subsumed in the overall yield, with higher risk bonds showing higher 
yields, ie a risk premium.
There is very little literature related to the determination of 
default risk premia in the bond markets. Examples that do exist eg
Fisher (1959), Johnson (1967) and Merton (1974) relate to corporate
bonds. The present writer knows of no literature specifically relating 
to risk premia in the eurobond market, nor relating specifically to 
developing countries.
Given the emphasis upon the perceived riskiness of LDC bonds 
which respondents to the survey of the euro-
bond market reported in chapter eight below placed upon developing
country bonds it is to be expected that the yields on such bonds 
incorporate considerable risk premiums. With this assumption in mind, 
this section has four objectives:
1) to determine the absolute size of the risk premium 
paid by developing countries on their eurobond issues;
2 ) to establish whether or not this premium differs 
between groups of developing countries;
3) to determine whether or not the premium differs with 
the maturity of the bonds;
4) to establish whether or not the premium differs in 
relative size between bonds denominated in different 
currencies.
Merton (1974) and Bierman and Hass (1975) develop methods of 
pricing corporate bonds. Neither of these approaches is considered 
relevant to the pricing of sovereign borrower bonds because of the 
importance of political factors in the credit rating of a sovereign 
borrower. Furthermore, the concept of financial leverage (the debt to 
equity ratio) used by Bierman and Hass has no relevance to sovereign 
borrowing.
In this study is is intended to account for differences in the 
yield only by differences in the probabilities attached to the expected 
future receipts. By way of illustration, the yield to maturity on a risk 
free bond can be calculated by solving for r in the following equation:-
cl cn DB — —— — . + ... +   . n + ■  n
(1+r) (1+r) (1+r)
where: B = price
c = interest receipts
(assumed to be received once a year at the end of each year)
D = repayment of principal
The yield to maturity on a risky bond can be calculated as follows;
R = d P 1 . . cnpn Dpn
(1+r) ---  (T+TT1 (1+r)
where p = the probability of actually receiving that 
particular payment
Clearly with p<l B will be lower for a risky bond with a given c and 
r than for a riskless bond.
The probability value will be influenced by four types of risk. For 
the purposes of this section, it is necessary to isolate the default 
risk. To achieve this, data was filtered by the following process:
- to avoid interest rate risk yield curves with similar 
maturity spans were selected;
- to avoid exchange risks all bonds were denominated in 
the same currency;
- to avoid the risk of a call provision bonds with such 
a provision were omitted from the data;
- the risk of unforeseen changes in tax regulations is 
assumed to affect the riskless bond and the risky 
bond in the same way.
Yield curves on a riskless borrower's bonds can then be compared 
with the yield curves constructed from LDC bonds. The difference between 
the yield curves should indicate the default risk premium paid by 
developing countries.
Due to limitations of data it is only possible, at this point in 
time, to determine the absolute size of the risk premium paid by some 
developing countries and whether the relative size of that premium 
differs between currencies. In addition, it is only possible to 
determine whether or not the risk premium changes with the maturity of 
the bonds for two countries, Mexico and Brazil, because only these
V
countries give sufficient data observations.
To assess the magnitude of the default risk premium, yield curves
have been constructed for IBRD bonds, representing a riskless security, 
and for certain developing countries' bonds. Curves have been 
constructed for bonds denominated in US dollars and for bonds 
denominated in Deutschmarks. It is clear from casual observation of the 
constructed yield curves that not only do the developing countries 
concerned pay substantial premiums compared with the IBRD but that the 
size of the premium differs between countries.
Works by Macaulay (1938), Hayes (1956) and Robinson (1960) suggest 
that as there is more chance of unforeseen occurrences the longer the 
term to maturity, the default risk premium should be positively related 
to maturity. On the other hand, Graham, Dodd and Cottle (1962) note that 
at maturity the existing debt is repaid out of the proceeds of new debt. 
Therefore, the probability of repayment will be influenced by market 
conditions at the time of repayment. Under such circumstances, closeness 
of maturity may not mean less risk of default. There may, in fact, be a 
'crisis at maturity'. As a potential crisis at maturity requires a 
difficulty in refinancing debt, it can be expected to apply only to the 
lesser quality risks in any particular market.
Therefore this concept may be particularly relevant to developing 
country bonds because they are lesser quality risks in the eurobond 
market. Noting the responses to the questionnaire on the eurobond market 
about crowding out of LDC bond issues, it may be that a crisis at 
maturity could occur for an LDC borrower even when general market 
conditions are good.
Looking at the yield curves for US dollar eurobonds, the curve for 
IBRD bonds is positively sloped along its whole length. This slope would 
preclude a crisis at maturity as is to be expected of an institution 
such as the World Bank. However, the yield curves for all the developing 
countries show a strong negatively sloped section relating to early 
maturities; the yield curves taking on a positive slope for later 
maturities. This cannot be caused by currency expectations because the
IBRD yield curve is in the same currency. However, a puzzling point is 
that the DM yield curves do not exhibit a negative slope for short 
maturities. Further analysis is required before a crisis at maturity can 
be considered to influence the risk premium of LDC eurobonds. This point 
is analysed again under the section on marketability.
The crisis at maturity concept will be less important where sinking 
funds and purchase funds are in operation. But it will be more important 
where the bonds are only repayable at maturity. All the developing 
countries and the IBRD have sinking funds or purchase funds operating 
for at least some DM issues. Similarly only Algeria and Argentina (total 
of 4 bond issues) did not have such funds operating on at least some US 
dollar bond issues. It would therefore seem that there is no a priori 
reason to think that the existence or otherwise of sinking funds or 
purchase funds is influencing the slope of the yield curves.
Turning now to the positively sloped section of the yield curve, 
there are examples of the risk premium rising as the term to maturity 
lengthens but this is not uniform between countries. However, such a 
situation is again not discernible for DM eurobonds. The reason may be 
the term structure of exchange rate expectations. Investors may be 
willing to take lower yields to maturity on medium term bonds because 
they expect the DM to appreciate substantially during their medium term 
holding period.
Comparing the yield curves in US dollars and Deutschmarks could 
indicate whether or not the risk premium differs between currencies. 
Indeed, looking at the yield curves constructed, it would appear that 
the DM curves for Brazil and Mexico are relatively closer to the IBRD 
curve than the same curves in US dollars.
Comparison of yield curves only gives an indication of the risk 
premiums that LDCs have to pay. A more exact measure is the weighted 
average yield on bonds outstanding. This indicator, calculated from 
secondary market yields, measures the risk premium paid per unit of
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currency borrowed in the eurobond market. For reasons explained in the 
section on marketability, data relating to bonds with less than one year 
to maturity has been omitted from the calculations.
The risk premium is calculated as follows
^ QiMi . QjMj
Pm = Yi - * .  Yn
EQrMr IQjMD
where: Qi = amount outstanding of the i.th LDC bond issue
Mi = the term to maturity of that bond issue
Yi = the yield to maturity or yield to average life 
as appropriate
The j th variables relate to the default-risk-free 
bond issue. In this case it consists of the IBRD issues.
The following table shows the risk premium for the various LDCs 
calculated from the above equation:- 
Eurodollar bonds
IBRD
Brazil
Mexico
Venezuela
Weighted average 
yield
15.54
18.84
17.72
17.06
Risk premium as % 
of IBRD yield
22.12 
14.0 
9.8
Euro DM bonds*
IBRD
Brazil
Mexico
Venezuela
8.88
11.02
10.36
10.87
22.15
16.7
22.5
Source: calculated from data in Financial Times 12.5.82
*owing to lack of data regarding amount of individual issues 
outstanding the DM rates are arithmetic means
It seems that, at least for Brazil and Mexico, the risk premium 
does not differ between the two currencies studied. However, the results 
should be treated with caution. Whereas the US dollar yields are
weighted averages calculated as described above, the DM yields are 
simple arithmetic means because data on quantities outstanding were not 
available at the time of writing.
Despite these reservations, the risk premium paid by an oil
importing country, Brazil, is clearly higher than that paid by oil 
exporters, Mexico and Venezuela. The notable point is the large 
difference in the risk premium for Venezuela between the currencies. 
This is partly due to the different methods of calculation since 
calculating the US $ premium as a simple arithmetic mean gives a risk 
premium of 12.5. However, the yield curve on Venezuela's DM bonds is 
more positively sloped than that of the IBRD and a larger proportion of 
Venezuela's bonds have longer maturities. This is clearly shown in 
f igure 4.3.
Nevertheless this section does illustrate the substantial risk 
premiums which some LDCs have to pay in the eurobond market.
Furthermore, the limited number of countries from which data are
available bears witness to the limited access which LDCs have to the 
eurobond market, and to the fact that only the richer LDCs have this 
privilege.
In fact there is reason to believe that the risk premium paid by 
developing countries is actually greater than that indicated. This is 
because the IBRD is a more frequent borrower and also borrows by way of 
larger issues than any developing country. Because borrowing is 
relatively frequent, and because issues are large, a premium must be 
paid. If the IBRD borrowed at the frequency and issue size of developing 
countries, it could borrow at even finer terms.
As evidence to support this suggestion, one has only to compare
yields on IBRD bonds with those of UK corporations which individually 
are a higher credit risk and are infrequent borrowers. Yet one finds 
corporate bonds of similar maturity, with a large number of secondary 
market makers but with smaller and fewer issues offering lower yields 
than IBRD bonds. Examples are given in appendix 3 to this paper.
Clearly marketability is important and this is dealt with in the 
following section.
4.4.4 Marketability
The role of a secondary market is to provide an element of 
liquidity to what would otherwise be an illiquid asset. Few investors 
would be willing to commit funds for between five and fifteen years if 
there were no possibility of reselling to recover capital. The capital 
may be required to meet unforeseen financial commitments. However,
resale may be . desired because new, more attractive, investment
opportunities may become available. Alternatively, the investors' 
perception of the current investment may deteriorate due to changing 
expectations of interest rates, exchange rates or default probabilities.
Clearly the marketability of the security influences its 
attractiveness to investors. The higher the marketability, the greater 
the attractiveness of the investment, not only for the reasons suggested 
above but because, in an established secondary market, transactions 
costs, implicit and explicit, will be lower.
As marketability is desired by investors who do not have perfect 
foresight but are risk averse, and if we make the widely held assumption 
that financial markets are dominated by risk averse investors, then 
reduced marketability must be compensated for in some way. The most
obvious way is through a premium on the yield to maturity. Thus less
marketable securities will command a yield premium over more marketable 
equivalent securities.
In the euromarkets, this premium is most noticeable between
non-negotiable (non-marketable) eurocurrency deposits and negotiable
certificates of deposits. There is considerable evidence that the
interest rate paid on the non-- negotiable deposits is higher than that
paid on CDs. This is shown in the following data provided by Morgan
Guarantee Trust Company in London.
Table 4.4
Eurodollar rates of interest in London
CD Interbank
June 1980 3 months 9.10 9.11/16
6 months 9.05 9.3/4
Sept 1980 3 months 13.60 14.1/8
6 months 13.65 14-
Dec 1980 3 months 17.80 17.15/16
6 months 15.85 16.1/8
Mar 1981 3 months 14.20 14.7/8
6 months 14.20 14.7/8
June 1981 3 months 17.20 17.7/8
6 months 16.55 17.3/8
Sept 1981 3 months 17.35 17.7/8
6 months 17.55 18.1/8
Dec 1981 3 months 13.55 13.7/8
6 months 14.20 14.7/8
Mar 1982 3 months 14.80 15.3/16
6 months 14.80 15.3/16
NB These rates are quoted in the same format as quoted in correspondence 
with Morgan Guarantee
The survey of the eurobond market reported in chapter eight noted 
the thinness of the secondary market in developing country eurobonds, 
therefore one would expect developing country eurobonds to pay a premium 
over and above that paid on bonds with a deeper secondary market.
The size of the issue and the amount outstanding may influence the 
secondary market yield because the amount outstanding must influence the 
size of the secondary market in that particular issue and therefore its 
marketability. This point has been discussed at the end of the section 
dealing with risk premiums and tentative evidence is given in appendix 3 
of this paper.
It will be recalled that, when analysing the default risk premium, 
it was noted that the short end of the yield curves of eurodollar bonds 
exhibited a negative slope as hypothesised in the literature, thus 
suggesting the concept of the crisis at maturity. This feature was 
particularly noticeable for bonds issued by Mexico. This point was taken 
up with the London market makers of the Mexican bonds.
In the discussions the following points were made in explanation:-
1) With bonds of such short maturity there is not a two way
market (bid and offer quotes) but only bid quotes are 
given. This would give an upward bias to the calculated 
yields.
2) The IBRD bonds are more frequently traded. There are many
more market makers and bid and offer prices for short
maturities are more easily available.
3) Most trading is conducted in bonds up to two years from 
syndication. After that time investors have finished 
swapping between portfolios and the bonds are held as 
investments. The price quoted is only an ’indication1 
price. Actual trading would be at a different price.
It therefore seems that some of the negative slope of the short end 
of the yield curves may be due to the lack of marketability and data 
inadequacies. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the influence of a 
crisis at maturity, but it does obscure its influence on the default 
risk premium.
The marketability of the bond may also be thought to influence the 
spread between bid and offer prices. The spread is a transactions cost 
and it was suggested under the section on the term structure that 
transactions costs may differ between maturities and thus influence the 
term structure.
This point was also discussed with the market makers of Mexican 
bonds. They suggested that the spread was influenced by the
marketability of the bond and not by the term to maturity. Thus a widely 
syndicated issue with a long period to maturity will trade at a narrower 
spread than a less popular issue with a shorter maturity.
Summary of this section
Although the interest rate costs of eurobonds are influenced by 
such general factors as inflation, currency of denomination and term to 
maturity, the interest rate costs to LDC bond issuers are specifically 
influenced by the risk premium required by investors.
This section shows that the few LDCs that have issued eurobonds 
have had to pay substantial risk premiums for such finance. The premium 
attached to LDC bonds compared with IBRD bonds includes compensation for 
reduced marketability of LDC bonds.
Although the data suggest, at least for US dollar eurobonds, that 
investors may perceive a crisis at maturity, it is possible that such 
data reflects lack of marketability of such bonds rather than any lack 
of confidence.
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Chapter 5
THE IMPACT OF THE INCREASED PRIVATE FINANCIAL FLOWS 
TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UPON THE QUALITY OF 
BANKS' BALANCE SHEETS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the impact of past bank lending to developing 
countries upon the banking markets in order to determine to what extent 
opportunities for future lending are already constrained. The analysis 
covers global eurocurrency lending to the developing countries and, 
where possible, isolates the lending by UK banks to those countries in 
order to highlight the situation of the UK banks.
The following have been suggested as constraints upon future bank 
lending to the developing countries
1) The inability of those countries to service a larger stock 
of debt because of deteriorating terms of trade, high real 
rates of interest and recession in the industrialised 
economies.
2) Unsustainable competitive pressure reducing bank profita­
bility and therefore the ability to maintain adequate 
capital.
3) Capital adequacy in the light of the inflationary 
environment.
4) The portfolio preferences of the banks influenced, inter 
alia, by risk and profitability and manifested through 
the exposure limits that the banks set.
5) Prudential regulations which constrain maturity trans­
formation, exchange transformation, exposure to individual 
countries and impose capital requirements.
(Ossola 1980, Llewellyn 1982, Spaventa 1982)
Accordingly this chapter proceeds to:-
1) Investigate the growth of worldwide eurocurrency lending 
to the developing countries in relation to the growth
of their GNP and growth of export revenues.
2) Analyse the growth of lending to the developing countries 
by UK registered banks in relation to those banks' 
capital bases.
3) Compare the growth of UK bank lending to the developing 
countries with the growth of those banks' overall 
balance sheets.
4) Analyse the debt servicing commitment on bank loans 
to the developing countries and, in particular, the 
influence of inflation on that commitment.
5) Investigate the degree of diversification in the 
banks' portfolios of loans to developing countries 
and the maturity structure of those portfolios.
Throughout this chapter emphasis is placed not on the absolute 
magnitudes but on the trend of those magnitudes over time. This is 
because the direction of change in the banking system is more important 
than the condition of that system at one point in time.
This study differs from many other studies of developing country 
debt (eg Dhonte 1975, Hope 1982, Maynard 1982) in that this study tries 
to incorporate where appropriate data are available, the influences of 
short term debt on the banks' balance sheets. It has been noted in 
chapter two, page 88 that IBRD, IMF and OECD statistics omit short term 
debt. Yet short term debt is important to the banks because it still 
ranks as exposure to a particular borrower and still has a claim on the 
borrower's means of debt repayment. Short term debt is important in the 
development process in a number of ways. It is used to finance imports 
of the inputs to the development process and it helps alleviate an
immediate foreign exchange or savings shortage. To the extent that short 
term debt is trade-related, it is generally thought to be 
self-liquidating, that means that when the goods, purchased with short 
term credit, are processed and sold the means of payment is automatically 
at hand. However, when considering external short term debt it is only 
self-financing if the processed goods are sold as exports and earn export 
revenues in currencies available for repaying the short term debt.
There is growing concern for the size of the short term debt owed by 
some borrowers (Calverly 1982, FT 27.4.82, Amex Bank 1982). This concern 
has become more important because many of the traditional country risk 
indicators relate only to medium and long term debt. Yet short term debt 
has to be serviced and competes with other debt for the nation's stock of 
foreign exchange.
Figures from the Bank for International Settlements show that short 
term debt owed to banks by developing countries, excluding off-shore 
banking centres, rose from US $39 billion in 1976 (quoted by Calverly 
1982) to US $162.5 billion in 1981 (BIS 1982). In 1981 the short term 
debt accounted for 49.7% of all LDC debt owed to banks in the BIS 
reporting area (BIS 1982).
Clearly when evaluating country risk the use of the indicators 
relating only to medium and long term debts is inadequate. The most 
appropriate indication of financial wealth is total cash flow. This has 
the advantage of covering all debt payments and avoids distortions due to 
borrowers shifting from well-publicised medium and long term debt into 
short term debt.
This distortion is made yet worse when it is realised that much 
short term debt also comes from suppliers. The banks and suppliers have 
little idea of the total amount of short term credit that has been 
extended and therefore there is an urgent need to improve the quality of 
information in this respect.
Cash flow management becomes very important for the attainment of
economic policy objectives but it must be doubted whether many 
developing governments have the appropriate information of sufficient 
quality. This assumption is reinforced when the diversity and quantity 
of supplier credits is recognised. To rectify this weakness at least in 
terms of bank credit, some use is made in this chapter of the BIS 
figures relating to external claims and liabilities of banks in the BIS 
reporting area. As this data reflects the total external positions of 
the banks in that area both short term and medium/long term debt are 
covered. The weaknesses of the BIS coverage of the eurocurrency market 
has been recognised in chapter two. However, it is considered that for 
the purposes of this chapter the advantages of covering short term debt 
outweigh the disadvantages of using this data.
5.2 Growth of worldwide international bank lending to developing countries
BIS figures show that loans by banks in the BIS reporting area to 
developing countries grew from US $99.4 billion in 1976 to US $325.1 
billion in 1980, an overall growth rate of 327%. IBRD figures show that 
total medium and long term debt grew from US $77.9 billion in 1971 to US 
$426 billion in 1980, while such debt from financial institutions grew 
from US $11.5 billion to US $162.5 billion, an increase of 1439% over 
the same period (World Debt Tables 1981) . The OECD figures give US $16.6 
billion and US $180 billion as coming from capital markets during this 
period, with US $9.4 billion and US $149 billion coming from banks. In 
fact, these figures for banks underestimate the true position because 
they exclude export credits. The magnitude reported by OECD reflects the 
larger number of countries covered by that organisation compared with 
the IBRD.
For the purposes of analysis, the borrowers are divided into the 
same four income groups as used in chapter one, ie:
212
Upper middle income countries 
Middle income countries 
Low middle income countries 
Low income countries
The writer has taken the BIS figures and aggregated the amounts due 
to or from the 91 developing countries used in the IBRD classification of 
income groups given above.
Table 5.1 Comparison of growth of loans, GNP and exports
Income Group 1976 1980 Growth
loans
Growth
GNP
Growl
expoj
Upper Middle Income Group 23,240 75,412 324% 185% 219%
Intermediate Middle 
Income Group 55,495 203,182 342% 183% 228%
Lower Middle Income Group 15,145 41,030 271% 190% 220%
Low Income Group 1,500 5,513 368% 187% 170%
Total 99,380 325,137
Figures in millions US $
*This analysis begins with 1976 data because the BIS did not 
publish sufficiently detailed data before that date
These figures show growth rates of loans well in excess of those of 
GNP and exports but this does not necessarily mean that the risk of 
default is greater in 1980 than it was in 1976. It may be that the loans 
were used for investment in imported capital components of investment 
projects that have a long gestation period. Indeed, it would be expected 
that loans would be used for such purposes if economic development were a 
major policy objective of these countries. On the other hand, if these 
loans have been used to finance consumption so that there is no potential 
increase in output the sales of which will service the debts, then there 
is prima facie cause for concern.
Even with the loans being used for investment, the external nature 
of these loans requires that they must generate or save foreign exchange
in order to be serviced. If the additional foreign exchange resources are 
not made available for debt servicing, default may occur.
The figures given in table 5.1 are expressed in nominal terms 
despite the fact that inflation does erode the real value of debt and may 
result in a net transfer of resources to the debtor as the real value of 
amortisation payment at the time of payment is less than the real value 
of the loan when originally drawn down. However, inflation will only 
cause a net transfer of resources from the creditor to the debtor if the 
interest rate charged is below the rate of inflation. If the rate of 
interest is above that of inflation, the net transfer will be from the 
debtor to the creditor.
A notable feature of much debt contracted on commercial terms has 
been that it bears a floating rate of interest. To the extent that these 
rates keep pace with or are higher than inflation, any net transfer from 
creditor to debtor is cancelled out and where they result in a positive 
real rate of interest, the net transfer will be from the debtor to the 
creditor.
Therefore, although inflation may reduce the burden of amortising 
debt, it is necessary to analyse the influence of interest rates upon the 
resource transfer. This analysis is made in the section covering debt 
servicing on page 225 below.
It is not possible to conclude whether the growth of bank lending 
has been 'good1 or 'bad' from the banks' point of view without any 
indication of • the change in quality of bank debt assets that has 
resulted. This quality is dependent upon ability of the borrowers to 
service those debts; this is discussed below (refer page 225).
5.3 Growth of net bank exposure to developing country borrowers
As the BIS figures are aggregated to the single country level, it 
would appear that countries are depositors and borrowers at the same 
instance. Indeed this is so as the governments keep some of their foreign
exchange reserves and external working balances with banks in the BIS 
reporting area. Moreover, it has already been shown that the poorer 
developing countries are net depositors with the banking system.
Figures in table 5.2 show the level of deposits held by the 15 major 
borrowers as at 31 December 1981. The ratios of loans to deposits ranges 
from highs of 552% and 1013% for Korea and Brazil respectively, down to 
96% and 97% for Indonesia and Taiwan.
Table 5.2
Net bank exposure to developing country borrowers
Africa
Algeria
Nigeria
Deposits
3.7
1.7
Loans
8.3
6.0
Loans as a % 
of deposits
224
352
Asia
Indonesia
Korea
Philippines
Taiwan
Thailand
Malaysia
7.5
3.6
3.6 
6.8
1.7 
3.2
7.2
19.9
10.2
6.6
5.1
4.4
96 
552 
283
97 
300 
137
Latin America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Venezuela
Ecuador
6.7
5.2 
4.1
4.3 
12.3 
19.6
.84
24.8 
52.7 
10.5
5.4
56.9 
26.2
4.4
370
1013
256
125
462
133
523
Source: Bank for International Settlements
Maturity Distribution of International Bank Lending July 1983
Amounts: Billions US $
It is tempting to net out the deposits with the loans to
arrive at a figure for net bank exposure to a particular country. 
However, at this level of aggregation the writer considers that such 
action is invalid. The reasons are: firstly, a borrower considering
default would either have run down its deposits in order to avoid
defaulting or removed its deposits from any banks to which it owed money.
Providing the deposits were removed before the loans are due, such action
cannot be prevented. Secondly, the banks' right of set-off is strictly 
governed by law. Therefore, a. bank can only set-off deposits against 
loans if the legal beneficiary of the deposits is the same legal
personality as the borrower. The figures given by the BIS do not indicate 
to what degree the depositors and the borrowers are the same personality. 
In many cases it is reasonable to assume that they are not. Thus, the 
banks will not be able to net out deposits with loans. Indeed in many 
cases the deposits will be held in different banks from those that 
extended the loans.
It is likely that only in the case of a gross political act of 
repudiation would the deposits be totally off-set with the loans. This 
will result from a freeze on assets of the repudiating country in the 
banks' host country. However, as mentioned above, the repudiating country 
is unlikely to leave funds upon deposit where it is contemplating 
repudiating debt.
Therefore the writer considers the concept of net exposure is 
invalid as a means of representing the banks' risk of lending to 
developing countries.
• 4 Growth of UK bank lending to developing countries in relation to the 
banking system's capital base
An inadequate capital base can constrain bank lending in the 
following ways:-
1) Bank supervisors, or the banks themselves, may set 
minimum capital assets ratios.
2) There may be a minimum acceptable or permissable level
of exposure to a single borrower set in terms of capital.
3) If depositors consider capital to be inadequate, the
banks will have difficulty attracting funds.
Accordingly, this section analyses the relationship between bank 
capital on one hand and total lending to non residents and to the 15 
major borrowers on the other. The analysis covers three dates: January 
1978 ie before the second oil shock, December 1980 ie the end of the
decade and August 1982 ie the most recent figures at the time of writing. 
Unfortunately, comparable data for 1973 ie just before the first oil 
shock are not available.
UK banking statistics exhibit considerable shortcomings when 
required for separate analysis of capital in relation to domestic and 
international business. In particular Capital and Other Funds in Tables 
3.1 to 3.10 of The Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (BEQB) includes 
items 'in suspense and transmission' for the individual groups of banks 
covered. In order to arrive at a proxy for capital and other funds a 
rather crude calculation has had to be made as described below.
The concept of capital gives rise to problems in the context of the 
UK banking statistics because these cover the capital of UK branches of 
foreign banks. Clearly the major capital stock of those branches is that 
of the parent organisation in the headquarters country. Therefore, this 
section analyses the advances to non residents in relation to the capital 
stock of UK registered banks as given in Table 3 of the Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin.
The method of calculating the figures for capital stock from the 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Table 3 is as follows. The summary 
table 3.1 gives figures for capital and for transit and suspense items. 
Tables 3.2 to 3.6 inclusive and Table 3.10 give a combined figure for
capital items, suspense items and transit items for various groups of UK 
registered banks.
The proportion of suspense and transit items in total capital 
suspense and transit items is calculated for all banks from Table 3.1. 
Then the combined capital, suspense and transit figure for each banking 
group is deflated by the proportion calculated from Table 3.1 in order to 
arrive at an approximation for capital for each of the banking groups 
registered in the UK. These groups cover
1) London Clearing Banks
2) Scottish Clearing Banks
3) Northern Ireland Banks
4) Accepting Houses
5) British Banks: Other
6) Consortium Banks
This methodology for isolating the influence of suspense and transit 
items from the Bank of England figures is considered to be acceptable 
because these items are mostly associated with the cash transmission 
system. This system is dominated by the UK registered banks. The figures 
are given in table 5.3 below.
Having derived figures for the UK registered banks' capital stock, 
figures for those banks' share of total non resident lending must also be 
calculated. This latter set of figures includes sterling and foreign 
currency lending to non residents and also comes from Tables 3.2-3.6 and
3.10 of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin and are given in table 5.4
below.
The figures in this table show a declining ratio of capital to non
resident advances from 40% to 28% in just four and a half years. The
absolute size of the ratio is misleading because this capital is also the 
capital associated with the banking business conducted with UK residents 
which is not analysed here. Nevertheless, the trend should alert us to a 
potential constraint on future lending to non residents.
Table 5.3 Ratio of capital to non resident loans
Capital of UK registered banks
UK registered banks' E & FC 
loans to non residents
Capital as % of loans to 
non residents
January 1 
1978
9341
22648
41.2
January 2 
1980
12409
32795
37.8
August 3
1982
17906
63924
28.0
Table 5.4 Proportion of total UK banks' non resident loans accounted 
for by UK registered banks
Capital
Total non resident advances
Foreign banks' non resident 
advances
J anuary 1 
1978
9341
84946
62316
UK banks' non resident advances 22648
26.6% of non resident advances due 
to UK registered banks
% of London non resident advances 
due to foreign banks
73.4
January 2 
1980
12409
123551
90756
32795
26.5
73.3
August 3 
1982
17906
250021
186097
63924
25.6
74.4
Amounts: £ millions
Sources: 1 From Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin March 1979
2 " " " " 1980
3 " " " December 1982
Table 5.5
UK registered banks' exposure to 15 major LDC borrowers
Jan 1978 Jan 1980 Aug 1982 
Argentina 227 632 895
Brazil 1,340 1,957 '2/702
Chile 63 210 506
Colombia 46 74 177
Mexico 1,153 1,880 3,092
Venezuela 234 934 1,082
Ecuador 51 108 184
Algeria 303 376 350
Nigeria 85 259 487
Indonesia 130 102 134
Korea S 161 458 896
Philippines 115 311 532
Taiwan
Thailand 36 92 145
Malaysia 85 114 409
TOTAL 4,029 7,507 11,591
Amounts US $ millions ==================================
Loans as % of capital 43 60 65
5 largest borrowers as
% of capital $3,257 5,861 8,663
% 34.8 47.2 48.4'
Largest borrower as
% of capital 14.3 15.7 17.8
Source: Calculated from 
BEQB
Table 22 Table 12 Table 12
June 1978 March 1980 Sept 1982
The banks' capital stock is used as a cushion to meet unexpected 
losses from lending. It is therefore constructive to analyse the impact 
of an assumed total repudiation by individual major developing country 
borrowers given the trend of declining capital to loan ratios.
To make this analysis we must assume that the distribution of 
advances by the UK registered banks to these major borrowers is the same 
as that of all non resident advances by those banks.
We take the UK banks' exposure to the 15 major borrowers and deflate 
this exposure by the proportion of non resident advances of foreign banks 
in the UK to all UK banks' non resident advances given in table 5.4 
above. The result will be the proportion of total exposure to these 15 
major borrowers that is attributable to UK registered banks. The figures 
are given in table 5.5 above. No account has been taken of any deposits 
held because of the difficulties of applying the right of set-off as 
explained on page 214 above. The features to note are: firstly, loans to 
these borrowers as a proportion of capital have increased by over 50% in 
just over four and a half years but still are less than threeguarters of 
the banks' capital. Secondly, the proportion of lending to the five 
biggest borrowers has increased during this period to 48% of the banks' 
capital. The largest borrower accounts for 14.3% of capital in 1978 and 
this rises to 17.8% in August 1982.
We cannot say, from the absolute size of the figures, that the UK 
banks have excessive exposure to these major borrowers. However, the 
trends of greater concentration and lower capital/asset ratios are both 
moving in the direction of greater risk to the banks.
Having said that, three caveats are in order. Firstly, the figures 
aggregate.across all UK registered banks when in fact it is reasonable to 
expect that different banks have differing geographical concentrations of 
external business. Therefore it is probable that some banks are more 
exposed than others to the higher risk LDC borrowers. This may be 
particularly so where the banks through their branch or subsidiary
network are deeply involved in certain Latin American or African states. 
Nevertheless it is felt that the above analysis is legitimate because it 
is the strength and stability of the UK banks as a whole which is 
important. One bank may get into financial difficulties but past 
experience has shown that a healthy financial system will come to the aid 
of the weak institution.
The second caveat is that many of these loans will represent buyer 
credits ie loans made by the banks to non residents specifically to 
finance UK exports. Many of these credits will be covered by Export 
Credit Guarantee Department Buyer Credit Guarantees. These guarantee the 
banks for the full principal and interest outstanding. Furthermore, given 
the nature of syndicated loans, many participations in syndicates managed 
by foreign banks outside London will be buyer credits insured by the 
various official export credit insurance agencies of other countries. As 
these loans are insured by a government agency of an OECD country, they 
do not represent exposure to a developing country borrower.
The third caveat is that advances outstanding do not represent the 
whole of the risk that these banks have outstanding to non residents. 
There will be considerable contingent liabilities in terms of letters of 
credit and various types of guarantees. However again many of these will 
be supported by ECGD guarantees.
Having noted these caveats, there are three areas pertaining to the 
growing bank exposure to developing countries that are worthy of further 
analysis. These are:-
1) The growth of lending to LDCs compared with the 
growth of the banks' balance sheets overall
2) The maturity structure of this bank lending
3) The degree of portfolio diversification of 
bank lending
The first area is analysed here and the other two are discussed in 
subsequent sections of this paper.
5.5 Growth of bank lending to LDCs compared with growth of 
banks1 balance sheets
Again, we use data applicable to the UK registered banks because LDC
lending should be compared with total balance sheets including domestic
business and with total lending to non residents. If the foreign banks
were included it would not be possible to measure their total balance
sheet using Bank of England data for the London market.
Table 5.6 Growth of UK bank lending in relation to growth of 
UK bank balance sheets
Total balance sheet size of 
UK registered banks
Total non resident advances 
UK registered banks
Non resident advances as % of 
total balance sheet
Advances to 15 major LDCs
Advances to 15 major LDCs as 
% of total balance sheet
Advances to 15 major LDCs as 
% of total non resident advances
January
1978
87715
22648
25.8%
4029 
4.6%
17.8%
January
1980
113884
32795
28.8%
7507
6.6%
22.9%
August
1982
211711
63924
30.0%
11591
5.4%
18.1%
Amounts in £ millions
These figures show that between 1978 and 1982 loans to non residents 
grew in absolute terms, and as a proportion of the UK registered banks' 
balance sheets. However, the proportions of the banks' total assets and 
the' proportion of non resident loans accounted for by the 15 major LDC 
borrowers rose between 1978 and 1980 but declined between 1980 and 1982. 
Thus, on balance, lending to these major borrowers has grown less rapidly 
than total asset growth.
Although this state of affairs indicates no substantial 
deterioration of the ratios one should not be complacent because the 
absolute amounts of exposure are much greater and have grown at a faster 
rate than the banks' capital base (ref page 215 above) . Moreover the
caveats noted on page 221 above also apply to this analysis.
Furthermore, although the proportion of the banks' balance sheet
accounted for by loans to developing countries has been almost constant, 
if the quality of those loans has declined then the quality of the banks' 
overall balance sheets would have declined.
The quality of a loan portfolio is determined by the rate of return 
in relation to the risk involved. As risk is a subjective concept, the 
quality of the portfolio must be judged by objective criteria such as 
loan loss ratios and the earnings from portfolios. In this respect UK 
statistics again exhibit shortcomings because it is not possible to
differentiate loan losses and earnings on loans to developing countries
from all domestic and non resident loans.
Fortunately, figures for US banks' loan loss ratios are quoted by
Davis (1977) and reproduced here. These figures may be used as a guide to
the loan loss ratios experienced by UK banks because of the syndicated 
nature of many loans and because a large proportion of loans made by UK 
banks were in fact made by UK-based branches or subsidiaries of banks 
headquartered in the USA.
1975 for 6 major US banks
Ave 1971-75 for 7 banks with most 
overseas business
International 
loan loss
0.06%
0. 12%
Domestic 
loan loss
0.18%
0.37%
1975 for above 7 banks 0.19% 0.74% (for overall 
loan port­
folio)
Source: Davis 1977, pl39
These clearly show that the loan loss experience of US banks on 
loans to mainly sovereign developing country borrowers has been much less 
than on loans to domestic ie North American borrowers.
Furthermore, the figures in table 5.4 below, taken from an IMF study 
(IMF 1981, p42) , show that the spreads on eurocurrency loans to non OECD 
countries were consistently above the spreads on loans to OECD based 
borrowers. Thus, we can conclude that loans to developing countries
provide a higher return than loans to the industrialised countries. If
loans to developing countries do provide higher profits to the banks,
this will strengthen the banking system by allowing larger additions to
the banks' capital base through higher retained earnings.
Table 5.7
Spreads over LIBOR 1977-1980
OECD countries Non OECD countries
(excludes CMEA countries)
1977
1978
1979
1980
I
II
III
IV 0.84 1.46
I 0.82 1.22
II 0.80 1.26
III 0.72 1.15
IV 0.69 1.03
I 0.65 0.95
II 0.62 0.87
III 0.67 0.76
IV 0.49 0.74
I 0.56 0.78
II 0.57 0.84
III 0.54 0.82
IV 0.56 1.03
Source: Appendix 1, p42
International Capital Markets IMF 1981
The outcome of many of the loans to developing countries will not be 
known for some years to come, but one feature that has become 
increasingly noticeable is the frequency of debt rescheduling. This topic 
is covered in detail in chapter six, including an analysis of the risks 
involved, but at this stage it is worth noting that the terms attached to 
rescheduled debt often make such loans more profitable than loans to 
alternative lenders. It could be suggested that, the higher yield is 
required to compensate for the higher risks that are associated with 
rescheduled debt. However, in chapter six it is argued that debt 
rescheduling actually reduces the risks associated with that debt.
5 .6 The servicing of the growing developing country debt
It was stated on page 212 above that, although growth of debt has 
been faster than that of GNP and of exports, that does not of itself 
indicate that the risk of default has increased and therefore the quality 
of the banks' assets reduced.
What really does influence the quality of these assets is the 
ability of the debtor to service the debt. In order to be able to service 
an external loan that debt must be used in a way that:-
1) generates a return greater than the debt service payments;
2 ) that return can be converted into the means of making debt
service payments. This will generally mean earning 
foreign exchange or saving foreign exchange.
Point 1) is the efficiency criteria and point 2) is the 
transferability criteria.
It would therefore seem that a logical start to an analysis of debt 
service problems would be to carry out numerous micro economic studies of 
the use of external debt. However, there are informational difficulties 
in that the efficiency criteria may involve the use of shadow prices and, 
given the fungibility of financial capital and of loans for programme 
financing, it is difficult to identify the projects being financed 
(Gutowski & Holthus 1982).
Furthermore, where this debt is incurred by governments, the return 
may be in social as well as private benefits. As such those social
benefits may not directly generate the means of payment for debt
servicing purposes. Therefore the servicing needs will have to come from 
the nations' savings. Thus, not only must the investment project be
efficient, but unless it makes an explicit financial return, national
savings must rise to service that debt. What is more, not only must the
savings rise, but it must be convertible into the means of debt service
payments. Therefore the use of the external financial capital must result 
in new foreign exchange resources being generated or released from
alternative uses to service the foreign debt.
Clearly, unless one is analysing the fortunes of a clearly
*
identifiable project with independent control over its foreign exchange 
revenues, the analysis of the debt service capacity of developing 
countries has to be carried out at the macro economic level.
There is a considerable body of literature developing macro economic 
models relating the optimum debt burden to growth rates; for example 
Domar (1957), Avromovic (1964), Hayes (1964), Dhonte (1975), Soloman 
(1977), IMF (1981). These models assign crucial importance to the real 
rate of interest, the growth rate of world demand, the savings ratio and 
the terms of trade. However, these models do not take account of the
floating rate nature of a growing number of the loans to developing
countries. Thus, the interest rates on these loans are determined by the 
financial market conditions in the industrialised world. Accordingly, the
i
real rate of interest on these loans influences not only the cost of 
servicing the debt but also the ability to transform domestic savings 
into foreign exchange via exports by influencing aggregate demand in the 
industrialised world.
We thus are able to define three types of problem situations for 
debtor countries relating to the use of the funds
1) The project or use of funds is not efficient ie the rate 
of return does not cover the cost of the loan. The more 
the country borrows the worse its predicament will get.
2) Although the project is technically efficient, the country 
is unable to transform the proceeds or sufficient domestic 
savings into foreign exchange.
3) The projects are technically efficient but the rate of
.return includes a 'social1 element and the government is 
unable to mobilize sufficient domestic savings to service 
the debt.
There is a certain irony about debt servicing. To the extent that 
interest and amortization payments are in some doubt, the lending banks 
will require to receive both types of payment. However, the lower the 
perceived risk of default on these payments, particularly interest
payments, the less the bank will seek repayment. Indeed the banks will be 
more willing to roll over such debt. This action itself reduces the risk 
of default by reducing the claim on the borrowers1 cash flow to that of 
interest payments only.
Clearly the amortization schedule, as well as the rate of interest, 
influence the "efficiency" of the project. Therefore, efficiency should 
not only be considered in terms of the "performance" of the investment 
but also in terms of the appropriateness of the "financial package" 
negotiated. In this respect the amortization schedule is important
because the relationship of amortization (outflow) to cash (foreign 
currency) inflow will have a considerable bearing upon the
transferability problem. Where the amortization schedule (maturity 
structure) of the loan is too short given the timing of the cash flow of 
the borrower, the financial package is as "inefficient" as it would be if 
the rate of interest charged were higher than the rate of return of the 
project.
The figures given below show how total amortization and financial 
market amortization have changed relative to GNP and exports between 1976 
and 1980 for each of the- four income groups of developing countries. The 
data relates to publicised medium and long term loans and therefore 
excludes short term loans. To the extent that these figures show both
total and financial market amortization increasing relative to GNP and to 
exports, then the financial packages made available to developing 
countries would seem to be inefficient. The fact that the proportion of 
GNP or exports absorbed by financial market amortization has grown 
fastest would suggest that these financial packages could improve their 
efficiency for the benefit of both parties. Maybe the growing use of
reschedulings is partly to be explained by this financial inefficiency.
Table 5.8 The changing burden of amortization 1976 and 1980 
Amortization
Upper Inter Lower Low
middle middle middle income
income income income
Total amort f GNP 1976 0.64 1.19 1.22 0.74
1980 0.85 2.04 1.52 0.64
Total amort -j- exports 1976 2.18 6.66 5.0 6.7
1980 2.47 9. 16 5.45 6 . 38
Financial market amort
as % of total 1976 46.1 46. 3 19.2 6.6
1980 57.9 63.4 38.1 11.2
Financial market amort
■f GNP 1976 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.05
1980 0.5 1.3 0.6 0.07
Financial market amort
•f exports 1976 1.0 3. 1 0.9 0.4
1980 1.4 5.8 2.1 0.7
Source: Calculated from IBRD World Debt Tables 1981
The efficiency and transferability problems are also influenced by 
interest rates and, to the extent that interest rates are floating rates, 
by inflation.
Taking transferability first, it has already been noted that if 
inflation causes interest rates to rise in the borrower's export markets, 
and these higher interest rates have a dampening effect upon aggregate 
demand, exports to those markets will be adversely affected. Thus, the 
transferability problem will be exacerbated. Of course, inflation may 
cause product prices to rise in these markets thus mitigating the 
transferability problem.
Turning to efficiency, interest rates and their relationship to the 
rate of return on the investment project influence the efficiency of that 
project. Moreover, inflation influences this efficiency when loans 
attract floating rates of interest. When these floating rates rise in
response to inflation, the nominal interest cost rises reducing the 
efficiency of the financial package. In fact what actually happens is 
that the real amortization schedule is shortened relative to the actual 
gestation period of the investment, thus reducing financial efficiency. 
The effects of inflation upon the real amortization of a loan are clearly 
shown in the following table taken from Kincaid (1981).
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This table shows with a constant real rate of interest (here assumed 
to be zero), inflation reduces the real amortization. However, where the 
floating interest rates keep pace with inflation, the real amortization 
is not reduced, it is in fact accelerated but the total real amortization 
is not increased. Thus, in the examples given above, the average period 
that a 5 year loan is outstanding, assuming no inflation and equal 
amortization, is 3 years; with 10% inflation that period is reduced to 
2.66 periods. Indeed the influence of inflation in reducing the real 
maturity is greater the longer the maturity of the loan.
The following figures show the influence of rising interest rates
upon the debt service costs of the developing countries.
Table 5.10 Impact of interest rates on debt service burden 1976-1980
Upper
middle
income
Inter
middle
income
Lower
middle
income
Low
incomt
Total interest as % of GNP 1976 0.43 0. 84 0.64 0.41
1980 0.7 1.84 1.22 0.41
Total interest as % of 
exports
1976
1980
1.46
2.03
4.7
8.25
2.63
4.35
3.69
4.1
Financial market interest 1976 55.9 62.1 42.2 8.0
as % of total interest
1980 66.8 76.9 53. 9 18.34
Financial market interest 1976 0.24 0.52 0.27 0.03
as % of GNP
1980 0.47 1.4 0.6 0.07
Financial market interest 1976 0.8 2.9 1.1 0.3
as % of exports
1980 1.3 6 . 3 2.3 0.7
Source: Calculated from IBRD World Debt Tablesi 1983
These figures show that the total interest element of SI
public medium and long term debt has roughly doubled between 1976 and 
1980 except for the low income group of countries where there has been no 
change. Furthermore, the total interest burden has risen relative to 
exports but at a slower rate than relative to GNP.
Regarding the figures for financial market interest, we note first 
of all, the growing proportion of this form of interest in the total 
interest burden. It is also noted that the burden of financial market 
interest payments has grown faster in relation to GNP and exports than 
has total interest.
Both the trends for total interest and financial market interest 
payments are alarming. They indicate that not all the additional external 
finance obtained between 1976 and 1980 is earning sufficient external 
resources to meet the interest servicing requirements. This suggests that 
debt has either been incurred to finance consumption or that the 
financial package has become inefficient.
Two areas of inefficiency will be examined. Firstly, rising interest 
rates on floating rate debt. Secondly, inadequate grace periods on loans 
particularly in relation to interest payments.
The impact upon interest rates of inflation and the results on the 
real maturity of the loan have already been noted. However, this does not 
fully explain the deteriorating interest payments to exports ratio. One 
further factor is the increasing importance of floating rate debt from 
commercial sources. This is clearly shown in the following figures 
showing this trend on a regional basis.
Table 5.11 The changing importance of floating rate loans
% of floating rate loans in total loans 
1971 1980
Africa South of Sahara 2.7 21.1
East Asia & Pacific 2.2 26.1
Latin America & Caribbean 7.4 58.5
North Africa & Middle East 2.2 19.2
South Asia - 0.9
More developed Mediterranean 4.2 29.0
Source: IBRD World Debt Tables 1983
A second factor is that the 'inflation rate1 that influences money 
market rates in financial centres may not be the same rate that 
influences export prices. A comparison of any country's import price
index and retail price will confirm this.
A third factor is that interest rates may be influenced by domestic 
monetary policy in the industrialised countries. Thus, once again, rising 
interest rates may not be compensated by rising prices of developing 
country exports. The recent monetary history of the USA and UK, whereby 
real rates of interest are high in historic terms, confirms this.
Clearly the increased interest rates do increase the risk of 
default, not only by making a greater claim in nominal terms on the 
nation's foreign exchange reserves, but also by shortening the real 
maturity of the loans and affecting the financial efficiency of the
project and the financial package. This necessitates the borrowers'
refinancing or rescheduling their debts so that the real maturity of the 
loan matches the gestation period of the project for which the loan is 
required.
However, to the extent that interest rates rise faster than export 
revenues, the debt service ratio deteriorates. As this ratio is used by 
bankers in evaluating country risk, this deterioration makes it more
difficult for the sovereign borrowers to obtain the finance they require. 
The influence of rising interest payments on the debt service ratio is 
reinforced by the influence of those payments upon the current account of 
the balance of payments. The higher interest payments cause the current 
account to deteriorate when in fact, as part of those payments are
amortization, they should be recorded in the capital account. Thus, the 
balance of payments/GNP ratio deteriorates which is another country risk 
indicator used by the lending banks.
If the increased risk due to the shortened real maturity of the loan 
is to be avoided, refinancing or rescheduling is required and yet while 
the banks maintain exposure limits and capital adequacy measures in 
nominal terms, these will act as constraints to further lending. 
Furthermore, as inflation adjusted interest rates mean a shortening of 
the real maturity, they reduce the risk to the financial intermediary.
This is because the eurobanking financial intermediary attracts its 
deposits by way of floating rates of interest. Thus as deposit interest 
rates compensate for inflation, the real maturity of the deposits also 
falls. However, as noted above, the proportionate reduction in the real 
maturity of a loan increases with maturity. Therefore, given the degree 
of maturity transformation by the eurobanks, the real reduction in loan 
maturity will be more than proportionate to that of deposits. Thus one 
risk, that of maturity mismatch, is reduced, at least in real terms. This 
in itself should be recognised by the banks when considering requests for 
refinancing and rescheduling.
The problem of inadequate grace periods on loans divides itself into 
two areas: one the grace period on principal, the other the grace period 
on interest payments. The grace period on principal creates less of a 
problem. The solvency of the borrower will be enhanced, and therefore 
risk of default reduced, if commencement of amortization payments 
coincides with the cash flow from the project (including increased 
foreign exchange resources resulting indirectly from social projects). 
Such terms are a common feature of financial packages and easily adjusted 
by the lending banks to coincide with the expected cash flow from the 
project.
However, a grace period regarding interest payments is much less 
common. It will be argued in chapter six in this thesis (page 272) that 
banks may not require that principal is repaid but that it is essential 
that interest receipts remain current. Consequently, granting a grace 
period on interest payments causes an immediate deterioration of the 
bank's profitability. Given the high growth rate of bank lending to 
developing countries during the late 1970's, if the granting of such 
grace periods was to become common practice, the banks' internal finances 
would be under severe pressure. As a result of the infrequent use of 
grace periods on interest payments, a deterioration of the interest 
payments to GNP and interest payments to exports ratios is to be expected
when there is new borrowing and projects have gestation periods that 
extend beyond the current accounting period.
To give some indication of the average of grace periods on 
amortization, the following figures have been extracted from the IBRD 
World Debt Tables, 1981:
Table 5.12 Average grace periods on loans 1971 and 1980
1971 1980
Africa South of Sahara
Private creditors 2.4 3.1
Official creditors 8.2 6.6
East Asia & Pacific
Private creditors 2.6 3.1
Official creditors 6.9 6.1
Latin America & Caribbean
Private creditors 2.5 3.7
Official creditors 5.3 4.4
North Africa & Middle East
Private creditors 2.5 1.6
Official creditors 5.6 6.3
South Asia
Private creditors 2.2 2.1
Official creditors 7.3 8.1
More Developed Mediterranean
Private creditors 5.5 4.7
Official creditors 7.9 6.4
These figures present a picture of inadequate grace periods 
particularly from private creditors and for some regions grace periods 
have been falling over time. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, 
figures for periods of grace on interest payments are not available.
The amortisation schedule of the debt is also influenced by the 
willingness of the borrowers and lenders to increase short term debt 
relative to long term debt. The current concern about the growth of short 
term debt has already been noted. The increased growth of short term debt 
appears to be due to two main factors. Firstly, as interest rates
generally have reached historically high levels, borrowers have shifted 
into short term debt in order to reduce interest costs. As the banks 
perceive the growing debt of the developing countries as constituting a
higher level of risk, those banks have shortened the maturities available
in order to reduce the time period of their exposure to a particular 
borrower. Both these actions ignore the influence of shorter maturities 
upon the cash flow of the borrower. The result has been a considerable 
increase in debt service payments. This greater debt service burden has 
in fact increased the risks of default which the lenders sought to avoid 
and has increased the burden upon cash flow which the borrowers sought to
avoid. These actions by the borrowers and the lenders increase the risks
of default because short term debt has the wrong maturity structure for 
economic development and macro economic adjustment.
The following table shows the impact upon debt servicing of 
including short term debt, assuming that debt due within one year will 
have to be repaid in that year, by comparing the servicing commitment of 
debt reported by the BIS and that reported by the IBRD. It may be argued 
that short term debt will be rolled over at maturity but this is by no 
means certain and, if confidence wanes, such renewal of debt will become 
unlikely.
Table 5.13 Impact of short term debt upon total debt service
Debt to banks reported by BIS 1978 1981
Total debt to banks1 155.3 326.7
% of total debt' due within 1 year 46.3 49.8
/. Total debt due within 1 year 71.9 162.7
Interest burden on debt due (assumed to be 15.5 52.27
average rate for 1 year ie 10% for 1978,
16% for 1981)---------------------------------------------^------ _ _
Total servicing cost of all bank debt 87.4 214.97
Debt to financial markets reported by IBRD
Amortization due to financial markets2 13.85 17.57
Interest due on such debt2 6.29 20.96
Total debt service medium term debt only2 20.14 38.53
1 BIS Maturity Distribution of International Bank Lending July 1983
2 IBRD World Debt Tables 1882/83
These figures show the magnitude of the shortcomings of analysing 
only medium term debt. Adding short term debt and a notional figure for 
interest (taken here as averaged LIBOR for the year in question) on that 
debt has increased the debt service burden by over fourfold for 1978 and 
by over fivefold in 1981. Even if we take the view that the debt will be 
rolled over, the interest on that debt more than doubles the interest 
servicing costs of total debt.
These figures will not be totally accurate because of different 
country coverage and because we do not know the actual interest bill on 
the short term debt. However, they do give some indication of the 
importance of including short term bank debt in the servicing costs of 
total bank debt.
5.7 The net transfer of funds
The concept of the net transfer is used by some analysts to measure 
the net flow of resources from medium and long term international
lending. Figures produced by the IBRD of the net transfer omit short 
term debt. However, changes in the short term debt from year to year 
will influence this net transfer. In particular, if short term debt 
decreases over time, the net transfer will be less than that suggested 
by the IBRD figures and if short term debt rises, the net transfer will 
be higher than the IBRD figures suggest.
Yet again total cash flow in relation to a country's debt should be 
considered. When that cash flow becomes negative, the borrower is 
repaying more than it is receiving in each time period. Given the
scarcity of external financial resources to some developing countries,
and that a negative cash flow in relation to external debt makes that
scarcity greater, the borrower may consider repudiating the debt.
For such a policy to be rational, the borrower must be certain that 
there will be no further need for external finance and, in the case of 
bank finance, no further need for the banks' services generally. Given
the-continuous need for development finance, balance of payments finance 
and the need for banking services associated with international trade, 
it would not be rational for borrowers to repudiate bank debt.
As the following figures show, some of the major debtor countries 
have experienced negative net transfer in recent years. Indeed, it was 
shown in chapter one that the poorer developing countries have a 
continuous negative net transfer in relation to bond issues. Yet they do 
not repudiate those issues because it would reduce their chances of 
gaining private and official finance in the future.
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5.8 The degree of diversification in bank loan portfolios
The degree of concentration of bank loan portfolios was discussed 
on page 220 above. This section applies the mean-variance model of 
portfolio selection as developed by Markowitz (1952, 1959) and extended 
by Tobin (1958) and Sharpe (1964). The aim is to determine whether or 
not the banks do have fully diversified loan portfolios.
The mean-variance model aims to explain the selection of efficient 
portfolios. Efficiency is defined as not being able to increase the 
expected rate of return without increasing the risk or not being able 
to lower the risk without lowering the expected rate of return.
This model assumes that the characteristics of a portfolio can be 
summarised by two measures. One, the return on the portfolio, and the 
other, the risk attached to that portfolio. The rate of return is 
measured by the average expected return on each of the securities in 
the portfolio weighted by the proportion of each constituent security; 
the mean. The risk is measured by the square root of the variance; the 
standard deviation, of the probability distribution of the expected 
rates of return.
The expected return on the portfolio is therefore given as:
NE (R port) = WiRi
i=l
where: E (R port) = expected return on portfolio
Wi = the proportion of security i in
the total portfolio
Ri = the expected return on security i
Although the expected return on a portfolio is the weighted 
average of the expected return on each security, the risk of the 
portfolio cannot be measured by the weighted average of the standard 
deviations of each security. The reason is that, in measuring the risk 
of the portfolio, we are not only concerned with the variance of the 
returns but the degree in which the returns of individual securities
fluctuate together. Clearly therefore the degree of correlation between 
the variance of expected returns of pairs of assets is required. 
Markowitz therefore incorporated the covariance of returns between pairs 
of assets in the portfolio standard deviation as follows:
n n n
a port = / 2 Wi2 ai2 + 2 2  E Wi Wj Covij
i=l i-1 j=l
where: a port = the standard deviation of the portfolio
Wi2 = the weights of the individual assets where these
weights are the squared proportions of individual 
assets in the portfolio
ai2 = the variance of asset i
Covij = the covariance between the expected returns for
assets i and j
The importance of the correlation of the returns between pairs of 
assets can be explained by the fact that if the expected returns always
moved together, there would be no benefit to be derived from
diversification. Where the returns are perfectly positively correlated 
the standard deviation is the weighted average standard deviation of the 
individual assets. However, where the expected returns are less than 
perfectly correlated, the standard deviation of the portfolio will be 
less than the weighted average of the standard deviations of the 
individual assets. Moreover, the portfolio standard deviation declines as 
the degree of correlation declines so that the portfolio standard 
deviation is least when the expected returns on each pair of assets is 
perfectly negatively correlated.
Thus, effective diversification does not just mean adding assets to 
the'portfolio, but adding assets whose returns are least correlated with 
the existing assets in the portfolio. This would be computationally 
onerous and Sharpe (op cit) reduced the computational requirements by 
comparing the correlation between individual assets and an index of all 
similar assets.
We can therefore see that if the riskiness of a security is less 
when that security is held in portfolio, that is that the riskiness of 
an individual security overstates the riskiness of holding that security 
in portfolio, then some of the individual security's risk can be removed 
by diversification. However, some part of that individual security's 
risk will remain as a factor in the overall portfolio risk. This implies 
that total risk comprises two parts: 1) that which can be diversified
away (an unsystematic element), and 2) that which cannot be diversified 
away (a systematic element). The unsystematic risk is uncorrelated with 
the risks of the portfolio but the systematic risk is so correlated.
Thus, Total Risk = Systematic Risk + Unsystematic Risk. This 
classification will be used later to classify the risks associated with 
bank lending as those risks common to all loans and those risks which 
are loan specific.
The choice of efficient portfolio
To illustrate the choice of an efficient portfolio assume two 
securities whose returns are not perfectly correlated. If the relative 
combinations of each security are changed, a variety of portfolios is 
possible each with different security weightings but a constant degree 
of correlation between returns. A locus of the possible trade-offs 
between risk and return is depicted in figure 5.1.
£ C
Figure 5.1 Efficient portfolios: Fig 5.2 Efficient portfolios:
two assets many pairs of assets
If we carry out similar calculations for a variety of combinations 
of different pairs of assets, we get a series of plots as shown in figure 5.2. The 
envelope curve in figure 5.2(EC) is the frontier of efficient portfolios.
The analysis above assumes that all assets are risky and that there 
is no facility to borrow. However, if a risk-free asset and borrowing at 
the risk - free rate are introduced, the efficient combination of 
portfolios becomes the straight line marked CML in figure 5.3 below.
Figure 5.3 Choice of efficient portfolios with risk free asset 
and borrowing
Anywhere along the line between RFR and M investors will invest in 
combinations of the risk-free assetpusually considered to be a short term 
government bond^and the portfolio M. Beyond M investors borrow at the 
risk-free rate and invest in the risky portfolio M.
Anywhere along the line between RFR and M investors will allocate 
their wealth between the risk-free asset and the portfolio M depending 
upon the amount of risk they are willing to bear. Beyond M investors will 
be willing to borrow (assumed to be possible at the risk-free rate) and 
invest in multiples of the portfolio M, again depending upon the amount 
of risk they are willing to bear.
The actual choice of portfolio will depend not only upon what 
portfolios are efficient, but also upon the utility function of the 
investor. The bank investor is assumed to be risk averse and therefore 
like all risk averse investors requires more return to compensate for a 
greater risk (Tobin, op cit). There is therefore a utility function where
return enters positively and risk enters negatively. This function can be 
depicted by way of indifference curves as in figure 5.4 below:
Figure 5.4 Choice of optimum portfolio
As each indifference curve exhibits constant utility and, assuming 
investors prefer more income to less income, ID3 will be a more desirable 
indifference curve to ID2 which in turn is superior to XD1. The optimum 
choice of portfolio is given by the tangency of the indifference curve 
and the efficiency frontier, depicted as point M in figure 5.4 above. This 
is the efficient portfolio that provides the highest utility.
This model assumes that the expected returns have a normal 
distribution or that the investors have a quadratic utility function. 
This is particularly important when applying this model to banks. This is 
because bank loans never yield more than contracted rate of return, 
therefore the distribution of expected returns must be skewed. We 
therefore have to assume a quadratic utility function for the banks.
Furthermore, this model assumes that investments are infinitely 
divisible and therefore diversification can proceed along a continuous 
choice of portfolios. However, in international banking^loans are large 
discrete investments and the secondary market in loan participations is 
very thin. Therefore, diversification of a loan portfolio proceeds in 
discrete jumps.
Moreover, the assumption that investors can both borrow and invest 
at the same (risk-free) rate of interest is unrealistic.
Figure 5.5 below shows the effect of being able to borrow at a 
rate, BR, above the risk-free rate while being able to invest in both 
risky and risk-free assets.
Figure 5.5 Choice of optimum portfolio with a different rate 
of interest for borrowing and lending
Owners of investable funds will be able to invest in combinations 
of RFR and M along the line RFR-M or individual portfolios of various 
mixes of securities between M and MB. Investors willing to borrow will 
have to invest in individual portfolios along the line MB to MB' or 
multiples of MB' between MB'and CML*.
A financial intermediary will only invest its borrowed funds to the 
right of MB because to invest in any of the portfolios between RFR and 
MB will result in losses as the cost of borrowed funds exceeds the rate 
of return on the portfolios.
Thus, financial intermediaries must invest borrowed funds in a 
portfolio exhibiting at least a degree of risk equal to a1 in figure 5.5 
in order to earn a rate of return that covers the cost of funds.
Clearly the discontinuity of CML1 without additional constraints 
upon the indifference map of the investor creates methodological 
problems for this model which are beyond the scope of this thesis to 
solve. Nevertheless, this model does show the usefulness to banks of 
developing a portfolio of loans, the expected returns of which are 
uncorrelated.
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Therefore, a more useful aspect of this model is the division of risk 
into systematic and unsystematic risk. Thus, if a banker is able to 
identify the unsystematic risks in his loan portfolio, the banker will be 
able to reduce the overall risk of his portfolio by taking on loans where 
the unsystematic risk has a low correlation with such risks in the 
existing loan portfolio.
Unfortunately, lack of data does not allow the variance of returns, 
which is in any case likely to be skewed as noted above, to be measured. 
It should, however, be possible to isolate causes of risk that are common 
to a whole portfolio of loans and those causes which are not necessarily 
common to the whole portfolio. This section therefore proceeds to 
determine those causes of risk that are common to the whole portfolio. It 
then analyses the extent to which causes of risk that are not common to 
the whole portfolio are in fact common to many of the loans in that 
portfolio. Thus, if we find that many loans share these common causes of 
risk, which need not be common to the whole portfolio, we will conclude 
that the banks have not sufficiently diversified their portfolios.
The data for this analysis is that relating to external claims of 
banks in the BIS reporting area. The analysis makes the assumption that 
each country has borrowed on one loan equal to the total outstanding to 
the banks. We are therefore only determining the degree of diversification 
in respect to country risk. In reality some of the loans will be to
private borrowers; we therefore implicitly assume that sub-portfolio of 
loans within a particular country is adequately diversified. This
assumption must be made in this study because of data limitations.
However, it is considered by the writer to be an area where
further research would be very beneficial both to the banks and the 
regulatory authorities.
Causes of risk common to all loans
The most notable cause of systematic risk on euroloans is the 
system of linking interest costs to fluctuations in LIBOR or a similar 
reference rate. Thus, where money market conditions in the major 
financial centres cause rates of interest to rise, all eurocurrency 
loans in a particular currency will respond accordingly. Given that 
unanticipated increases in debt servicing costs increase the risk of 
default, the linking of loans to q common fluctuating interest rate is a 
source of systematic risk.
Another source of systematic risk will result from exchange rate 
fluctuations. To the extent that most loans are denominated in US 
dollars and the trade weighted exchange rate of the dollar rises, the 
servicing costs of the loan rise, ceteris paribus. However, the 
borrowing countries' dollar export earning may also rise; this is 
discussed in more detail below.
A third cause of systematic risk is that in order to earn external 
funds for servicing the debt, export sales are required. Therefore, to 
the extent that a world recession reduces international trade globally, 
there will be a systematic element of risk as all borrowers will 
experience a deterioration of their export earnings.
Influences upon unsystematic risk
At the country level the most notable influences are the country 
specific sources of export revenue. To determine to what extent 
diversification is providing uncorrelated sources of export revenue 
between countries, it is necessary to analyse the export markets of each 
debtor country and the commodities that constitute its exports.
Although sources of export revenues could be country specific,
evidence from appendices IV to VI suggests that there are some common 
elements. To the extent that export revenues of the borrowers a xe  
dependent upon common sources, they will represent a less than fully
diversified element of unsystematic risk.
All the data for the appendices IV to VI were extracted from the 
United Nations Year Book 1979-80. Appendix IV shows the proportions of 
primary product exports and secondary product exports as a proportion of 
the total exports of the fifteen major borrowers. If Korea is excluded 
because primary products account for only 10.7% of its exports, the 
average proportion is 76.1%. Thus, this group of borrowers depend
heavily on the export of primary products, the demand for which 
generally has a lower price and income elasticity of demand than
manufactured goods or services. Therefore, these countries would be 
particularly vulnerable to changes in the level of the economic activity 
of their trading partners.
Appendix V shows the degree of concentration of the export markets 
of these major borrowers. On average 62% of these borrowers' export
markets were accounted for by only five countries. Moreover, the USA was 
a major market for all these borrowers, accounting for an average of 36% 
of each borrower's total export market and other OECD countries provided 
dominant export markets for all the borrowers except for Ecuador. 
Clearly a portfolio of loans to these major borrowers would be exposed 
to unsystematic risk because of the lack of diversification of the 
export markets.
Appendix VIshows (by SITC code) the commodities exported by each of 
the major borrowers where the amounts exported account for more than 10% 
of the borrower's export or 10% of world exports. The number of types of 
commodities exported by each borrower is also given. Although the group 
as a whole has 20 products in this export category, there are 
considerable degrees of concentration amongst Mexico, Venezuela, 
Algeria, Indonesia, Ecuador, all oil exporters and Chile (copper) and
Colombia (coffee). What is more, no country had more than 20 export 
product groups and the average was 11.
It has been suggested (Evans 1968) that a portfolio of 20 
securities is adequately diversified when the securities are included in 
the portfolio in equal proportions. With unequal proportions as found in 
a bank's loan portfolio, a greater number of investments is required to 
get the full benefits of diversification. This could be extended to the 
diversification of the sources of export revenue. Accordingly, from the 
information provided by appendix VI,the sources of export earnings are 
not sufficiently diversified. Therefore the sources of the means of 
repayment are not sufficiently diversified and it must be concluded that 
the banks have not sufficiently diversified this aspect of their loan 
risks.
However, it should be emphasised that these conclusions are 
tentative because, to determine the full effect of loan diversification 
on the banks' portfolio risk, a covariance matrix of all loans would 
have to be drawn up. This requires a considerable computational effort 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis. The establishment of such a 
matrix by bank management would not only establish the level of risk of 
the portfolio but also indicate the impact upon portfolio risk of 
extending new loans to various borrowers. This would be very valuable 
management information and should be the subject of further research.
Furthermore, these conclusions are only valid if the banks treat a 
portfolio of loans to developing countries as separate from other 
portfolios of assets. There are reasons for believing that loans to 
developing countries do constitute a separate portfolio in that the 
degree of risk due to informational inadequacies differentiates such 
loans from loans to OECD based borrowers. As such it is beneficial for 
the banks to achieve maximum diversification of that portfolio.
5.9 Maturity transformation
One reason why commercial banks are able to recycle funds from 
surplus sectors of the world economy to the deficit sectors is that they 
are willing to bear the risks associated with maturity transformation.
It is therefore argued that the greater the degree of maturity 
transformation, the greater is the risk of bank failure if large 
depositors wish to withdraw their funds. Indeed the increasing degree of 
maturity transformation may engender such reduced confidence as to 
initiate such a withdrawal. The risks to the banking system are 
therefore closely intertwined with those associated with concentration 
of depositors.
There has been some debate about measuring the degree of maturity 
transformation by way of ratios (Ashby 1973, 1982) or by absolute
amounts (Duncan 1981). Here we cut across that debate by showing both 
ratios and absolute amounts. Absolute amounts become more important as 
inflation increases the amounts transformed in relation to the capital 
base of the banking system.
The following figures show the net liabilities {-) or net assets
( + ) of UK banks at three dates, end of December 1973 , and 1978, and
November 1981.
Table 5.15 Maturity distribution of net assets or net liabilities of
UK banks
Maturity 197 3 % 1978 % 18.11.81 %
Less than 8 days -2073 -5.1 -13696 -4.9 -24055 4.3
8 days to less than 1 mth -308 -0.7 -9971 -3.6 -19351 3.5
1 mth to less than 3 mths -658 - 1.6 -15779 -5.7 -33867 6.1
 ^ H 1* H 6 " -11 -0.03 -8752 -3.1 -16810 3.0
6 " " 1 yr -306 -0.7 -314 -0.1 -1787 0.3
1 yr " " 3 " +1162 +2.9 . +13458 + 4.8 +20201 +3.6
3 years and over +2304 +5.7 +35453 + 12. 7 +66042 +11.8
Quantities: millions US $
Source: calculated from BEQB March 1974, p44, March 197 9 Table 13 
and September 1982 Table 14.2
Firstly, taking the absolute amount of mismatch in each maturity, 
the amounts of excess liabilities over assets in the shorter maturity 
bands has grown much faster than, say, the capital funds of the banks. 
However, this growth has been during a time when the interbank market 
has grown considerably in depth.
Looking at the percentage columns which show the percentage of each 
net position to total claims, there does appear to be an increase in the 
degree of maturity transformation between 1973 and 1978. The figures for 
1981, however, show that the degree of transformation has been fairly 
stable (it has actually declined slightly). This would support the 
suggestion that the bankers went through a learning process with regard 
to financial intermediation between 1973 and 1978 and subsequently have 
consolidated that learning; indeed, the situation in November 1981 was 
slightly improved since December 1978. Thus the degree of risk to the UK 
banks at least has been stable since the time of the second oil shock. 
Unfortunately data showing the degree of maturity transformation of the 
whole eurocurrency market or even of banks within the BIS reporting area 
is not publicly available. Therefore comparison of the London market 
with the whole market cannot be made in this respect.
While the degree of maturity transformation for the market as a 
whole is an indication of the transformation risk which that market 
runs, the same cannot be said for the figures of individual banks. The 
reason for this is the deep interbank market which now exists. This 
market enables funds to pass through several banks between the initial 
non-bank depositor and final non-bank user. As a result the degree of 
maturity transformation for any individual bank will be less than that 
of the market as a whole.
Unfortunately, data are not available that allow the changes in the 
degree of maturity transformation due specifically to lending to 
developing countries to be determined. However, the writer has no reason 
to believe that this lending has had a significant influence on the 
degree of maturity transformation.
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5.io The maturity profile of developing country debt
Although the degree of maturity transformation in the eurocurrency 
market stabilised between 1978 and 1981, the movement in the maturity 
profile of the debt towards the short term (up to one year) continued
until mid 1982. The figures in table 5.16 summarise the trend between mid
\
1978 to mid 1983 for various geographical distributions of borrowers. 
The main exception to the trend is 'Other Asia1 where the trend has been 
steadily declining. These figures also show the regional differences in 
the proportion of short term debt. For the Middle East short term debt 
has accounted for as much as 80% of total debt, while for Other Africa 
the comparative figure is 30%.
These summary figures obscure substantial differences between 
countries within regions. For example, within Latin America in 1982 
Brazil and Mexico had 60% or more of total debt due within one year 
whereas Chile had around 11% and Colombia as little as 6%. For Other 
Africa in 1983 Nigeria had 39% of its debt due within one year whereas 
Algeria had only 17% of such debt due. For Other Asia in 1983 Indonesia 
had 35% of its debt due within one year while the Philippines had nearly 
60% of such debt due.
This trend is caused both by existing debt nearing maturity and by 
increasing amounts of new debt being negotiated with short maturities. 
This latter trend is the most worrying in terms of development finance 
because of the added servicing burden in the current financial period. 
BIS (1982) report that over 66% of new money going to Latin America in 
the second half of 1981 had a maturity of less than one year and that 
other geographical regions were experiencing similar maturity profiles on 
new debt.
Figures below give the maturity profile of external debt of the UK 
banks as at June 1982. As is to be expected they also show the bunching 
of maturities at the short end of the spectrum but they also highlight 
how much debt was due within six months of that date.
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Again this summary obscures extremes within regions. In Asia as at 
June 1982 the Philippines had 73.4% of its debt to UK banks due within 
six months whereas Indonesia had only 17% of its debt so due. In Latin 
America Brazil had 15% of its debt due within six months but Mexico had 
33%, Argentina 34% and Venezuela had 37% of their debt so due.
It should be noted that generally there are unused credit 
facilities available to borrowers. However, there is an unknown 
proportion of these facilities which is informal and revocable. 
Therefore some of these facilities can be withdrawn at short notice. 
Because of this, unused credit facilities have not been included in this 
analysis.
Whereas chapter one, page 56 shows that average maturities of 
medium term bank debt increased during the 1970's, making such finance 
more suitable for development purposes, the impending maturity of some 
debt and the increasing use of short term debt is threatening the debt 
servicing ability of the borrowers.
The question of the maturity structure of a loan portfolio is 
associated with the diversifiable element of risk. To the extent that 
factors which hinder the making of debt amortization payments occur at 
intervals over time, a well-diversified maturity structure will reduce 
portfolio risk. As such there is prima facie evidence that bank loan 
portfolios to developing countries are inadequately diversified in this 
respect.
Unless the banks and the borrowers take a more realistic view of 
debt management by the borrowers, the successive debt crises will erode 
depositor confidence to the detriment of all the parties concerned. The 
problems of restructuring external debt are discussed in detail in the 
following chapter.
5.11 Conclusions
From the above analysis, the writer draws the following conclgsions 
about the impact of increased bank lending to developing countries upon 
the banks themselves:
1) It is not possible to determine whether the growth of bank 
debt has been excessive without detailed analysis of each 
of the borrowers.
2) The debt service burden has increased because of higher 
interest rates, increasing use of floating rate debt, and 
shorter maturities on new debt. The real maturity of 
floating rate debt has been shortened by inflation.
3) Lending by UK banks has grown much faster than their 
capital base. If this fact reflects the position of all 
banks in the eurocurrency market, this will constitute a 
potential constraint on future lending. However, to the 
extent that the market has experienced an almost continuous 
influx of new lenders, any continuation of this trend will 
partly relieve this constraint. The continuation of this 
influx will depend upon profitability and financial 
stability in these markets. It is therefore crucial that 
the regulatory authorities place no artificial constraints 
upon profitability and that the authorities strive for 
financial stability in these markets if future financial 
flows are to be guaranteed.
4) To the extent that growth of loans to developing countries 
has been a stable proportion of total loans over the last 
five years, the capital constraint is as likely to apply 
to all external lending including OECD business. This 
implies growing competition between OECD based borrowers 
and LDC borrowers for refinancing facilities.
5) The degree of concentration of loans to the 15 major 
borrowers, the elements of systematic risk in their 
total loan portfolios and the lack of diversification 
of unsystematic risk in the developing country loan 
portfolios suggest that the banks should pay more 
attention to portfolio diversification.
6) The impact of borrower concentration and lack of 
portfolio diversification is exacerbated by the 
concentration (bunching) of maturities in the very 
near future. This problem must be overcome by a 
realistic policy towards the restructuring of the 
maturity profile of developing country debt*
Chapter 6
INCREASING THE ACCESS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
TO THE PRIVATE FINANCIAL MARKETS
6 .1 Introduction
Chapter five noted that total bank debt of LDCs rose faster than 
their collective GNP and exports. Moreover, the debt servicing burden 
rose, particularly at the end of the 1970's, because of the temporal rise 
in interest rates, the movement towards floating rate loans and the 
movement towards shorter maturities. For UK registered banks, at least, 
there was a tendency towards greater concentration of loans and lower 
capital to asset ratios.
These various factors may be seen as constraints upon further bank 
lending to LDCs either because they increase the bankers' perceived risk 
or because institutional constraints impinge upon the bankers' behaviour.
Factors that will potentially restrict the flow of new private 
credit to the developing countries can be classified into two groups.
The first group of factors consists of those that increase the 
lending bankers' perception of the risk of default. These include:
a) high real rates of interest
b) recession in the export markets for LDC products
c) increased LDC imports
d) poor economic management including debt management
e) political and social instability
The second group of factors consists of those that impede the 
process of international financial intermediation. These include:
f) the impact of borrower default upon bank balance sheets
g) liquidity crises and loss of depositor confidence
h) capital adequacy
i) the impact of foreign exchange crises upon bank balance sheets 
j) profitability
Clearly, many of those factors that contribute to the bankers' 
perception of the risk of default are largely outside the control of the 
international banking system itself. Therefore, as this thesis is 
concerned with the role of financial institutions in providing external 
finance, such factors will generally not be analysed in detail, although 
something will be said about interest rates and debt management policy.
Those factors which potentially impede the process of financial 
intermediation are to a greater extent under the control of the financial 
institutions, albeit the official ones. This section of the thesis, 
therefore, analyses various ways in which the bankers and the official 
financial institutions may:
a) reduce the bankers' perceived risk of default by 
developing country borrowers
b) mitigate the impediments to international financial 
intermediation.
It should not be thought that risk of default only applies to 
developing country borrowers. With the high nominal interest rates of 
recent years, much corporate borrowing in the industrialised economies 
has been via bank lending. Thus, a major default by an unsecured 
corporate borrower would have a similar impact upon the banking system as 
a similar sized default by a sovereign borrower.
Therefore, increased access of the developing countries to private 
financial markets requires policies that reduce not only the actual and 
perceived risks of lending to those countries in particular, but also 
reduce those risks which are associated with international banking 
generally.
This chapter first discusses the risks associated with international 
bank lending and then analyses six suggestions for reducing the banker's 
perceived risk of lending to developing countries in particular, and then 
three suggestions for reducing the risks of international financial 
intermediation generally. These nine suggestions are the result of an
Z b U
extensive search, by the writer, of the relevant literature.
The results of a survey conducted by the writer amongst two hundred 
banks in London regarding their attitudes to these suggestions are 
reported and analysed in chapter seven. This survey was conducted because 
unless the lending bankers accepted,that the above nine suggestions would 
reduce the risks involved, increased access to the private markets by 
developing countries would not be achieved.
6 .2 The risks associated with international bank lending
There have been considerable developments in the realms of banks' 
techniques of country risk analysis. The term 'country risk analysis' was 
used in much of the literature to describe a technique for determining 
whether a country could meet its private and public commitments on 
external debt. However, much of the literature fails to differentiate the 
type of risks associated with lending to different types of borrowers in 
a particular country. Furthermore, it is felt that the term 'country 
risk' is used in too wide a sense. The definitions given below of the 
types of risk involved may not be in agreement with those used in the 
literature but, being tighter definitions, classify the risks in a more 
meaningful way.
Sovereign risk
This risk is incurred when lending to a sovereign borrower who does 
not relinquish his right to sovereign immunity. Thus, this risk entails 
the inability to enforce the terms of the loan agreement. To the extent 
that the terms of the loan are unenforceable, the banks suffer sovereign 
risk. This risk will hold for any loan to a sovereign borrower or one 
guaranteed, or in some other way secured, by a sovereign power. In effect 
sovereign risk is the risk of repudiation. I have chosen to differentiate 
sovereign risk from country risk because sovereign risk relates to the
purposeful act of repudiation which only a sovereign can do with some 
degree of impunity. This impunity is not however total, for one sanction
held by the international financial community is to withhold future
credit (see page 211 below). Clearly outright repudiation is only likely 
if the borrowing sovereign power is planning to change its political 
allegiances.
Country risk
This risk relates to a country not having sufficient foreign 
exchange resources to meet its commitments on its external credits. The 
cause may be political or economic and it may lead to default. However 
the difference between country risk and sovereign risk is that country 
risk defaults are not so clearly intentional and indeed may not be
intentional at all. Political causes may include wars or civil unrest. 
The economic causes may, among others, be insufficient savings or the 
inability to convert domestic savings into foreign exchange.
Country risk can affect loans both to public and to private
borrowers. Private borrowers are affected to the extent that they do not 
have private control over sufficient foreign exchange resources to 
service their debts and have to rely upon the adequacy of national stocks 
of reserves. In such cases the private borrower competes with the public 
borrower for foreign exchange reserves. If the nation is short of 
reserves the private debtor cannot service his external debt despite his 
domestic finances being sound.
Credit risk
This risk relates to a private borrower failing to generate 
sufficient financial resources to service the loan. In the extreme, this 
may lead to the bankruptcy of personal borrowers and the liquidation of 
corporate borrowers. In either case the duty to repay is extinguished by 
the courts in whose jurisdiction the bankruptcy or liquidation is
determined.
Thus credit risk may lead to default because the borrower cannot 
obtain sufficient foreign exchange even though the nation had excess 
reserves. Clearly credit risk is incurred in lending to borrowers in any 
country.
The important point that differentiates credit risk of a private 
borrower and country risk of a sovereign borrower is that default under 
credit risk may result in extinguishing the responsibility to repay, and 
therefore the bankers' asset - the debt - is also extinguished. The same 
does not happen for a sovereign loan if the sovereign has insufficient 
resources because the sovereign's existence and debts are not 
extinguishable in the courts. Default may occur but the debt does not 
cease to exist. Only if the sovereign borrower repudiates its liability 
is the bankers' asset de facto extinguished.
Project risk
This risk in its pure form only relates to lending which is entirely 
dependent upon the project for repayment. In pure non-recourse project 
lending the lenders have no recourse to the borrowers (Shaw et al 1980) . 
It was pointed out in an earlier description of project finance that 
there are pre-completion and post-completion risks (ref page .91 above). 
These risks apply equally to loans to the public and the private sectors. 
The extent to which project risk dominates the risk attached to a loan 
depends upon the terms of the loan agreement. For example, if the loan 
agreement allows for repayments to be guaranteed by a corporation, then 
credit risk will also be involved.
Portfolio risk
There are four elements to portfolio risk:-
a) risk due to concentration of lending or deposits
b) liquidity risk
c) currency risk
d) interest rate risk (Shaw et al 1980)
Risk due to concentration of lending operates at two levels. One, 
that of the individual bank which has an excessive exposure to one 
country. The second, excessive exposure of the whole market to a 
particular country. At both levels the greater the degree of 
concentration, the greater the risk to the bank because the benefits of 
diversification are reduced.
It should be noted in this respect that although banks may have an 
adequate degree of diversification over, say, a number of private and 
parastatal borrowers of one country, those borrowers are effectively 
concentrated into one in terms of country risk.
Concentration of deposits does not hold quite the same risks to the 
banks because even if one set of national depositors withdrew their funds 
from the euromarkets, it is unlikely that these funds would be lost to 
that market completely because of the existence of the interbank market. 
Through this interbank market the banks that lost deposits would be able 
to attract them back. Only if the depositor held the withdrawn proceeds 
of the deposit in cash or paid it to the central bank issuing the 
currency of the deposit would that deposit be lost completely to the 
banking system. Nevertheless a well-diversified deposit base will add 
stability to the banks' funding operation.
Liquidity risk, currency risk and interest rate risk
All three of these risks are associated with the mismatch between 
assets and liabilities. Liquidity risk is associated with the degree of 
maturity mismatch; currency risk is associated with the currency mismatch 
between total assets and total liabilities ie foreign exchange exposure; 
and interest rate risk is associated with the mismatch between the 
maturity of deposits and the roll-over periods on loans.
Clearly all three types of risk can be reduced by reducing the 
degree of mismatch.
Reducing the actual or perceived risk of lending to developing countries 
Of the risks discussed above, four, sovereign, country, credit and 
project risks result from the uncertain outcome of the borrower's 
behaviour during the term of the loan. The component risks of portfolio 
risk result from the uncertainty regarding the banker's behaviour during 
the term of the loan. In particular, the environment within which the 
process of financial intermediation takes place is uncertain and 
therefore the banker's behavioural reaction to that environment is 
uncertain.
Therefore, the proposals for reducing the risks to the lending 
banker are divided into two groups. The first group aims to reduce the 
risk to the banker by making the outcome for the bank of the borrower's 
behaviour more certain. These proposals are:
1) Reducing the interest element of the debt service burden; 
in particular a new facility from the IMF to help LDC 
borrowers to spread the impact of upward variations in 
floating rates of interest during the term of the loan.
2) A formal procedure for debt rescheduling and advisory 
facilities for the banks and the LDCs in debt management 
policy so that debt can be rescheduled to make the debt 
profile more appropriate to the developmental and adjust­
ment needs of the borrowers.
3) Improved information flow with the help of the IMF and
IBRD to assist the LDCs in debt management policy and 
to the banks to enable improvements in the quality of 
risk analysis.
4) Co-financing with IMF, IBRD and other official institutions.
5) Bank credit insurance and loan guarantees.
6 ) A secondary market in syndicated loans and the use of
floating spreads in the pricing of loans.
The second group of proposals is aimed at ensuring that the 
environment within which the banks carry out the process of financial 
intermediation is at least fully understood by the bankers. These 
proposals are:
7) Improved prudential supervision and regulation by 
banking authorities so as to ensure that all banks 
have acceptable levels of foreign exchange exposure, 
liquidity, capital, credit exposure, and high quality 
management. The regulatory authorities by gaining a 
global view of the markets will be able to advise 
individual banks when they are not adequately 
diversified or are out of line with market trends.
8) International lender of last resort.
9) Bank deposit insurance schemes.
6 .4 Reducing the interest element of the debt service burden
A recent paper (Williams 1982) suggested that for every 1% increase 
in LIBOR, the cost of servicing the interest payments on LDC debt rose by 
$2 billion. Although many LDCs also benefit from increased interest 
income on their holdings of foreign exchange reserves, clearly increased 
money market interest rates put at risk the debt servicing capacity of 
the developing countries. The impact of the rise in interest rates is not 
uniform amongst developing country borrowers. Those countries with the 
highest proportions of their external debt in the form of floating rate 
debt have been hit hardest. This is because all floating rate debt and 
not just new loans attract the higher rates of interest. It has been 
shown in chapter one of this thesis that only the richer developing 
countries have access to bank finance. Therefore it is these countries 
that have suffered most from rising interest rates; the poorer countries 
being sheltered by their reliance on official subsidised credit.
It is shown later in this chapter (page 272) that the receipt of
interest payments on loans is of more crucial importance than repayment 
of principal. Provided that the banks' assets earn sufficient income to 
ensure adequate profits and cover the cost of attracting deposits, 
repayment of loan principal is not essential for the continuous operation 
of a eurobanking financial intermediary. Furthermore, the lower the 
interest payments, ceteris paribus, the lower will be the risk of 
default. Clearly then any measure that reduces the interest costs to LDC 
borrowers must lower the risk of default, and any measures that increase 
the certainty of interest receipts must increase the attractiveness of 
LDC debt for the banker.
A number of suggestions have been made to reduce the interest burden 
to developing country borrowers. These include subsidising interest 
costs, guaranteeing interest payments and indexing interest payments. 
Alternatively, the writer suggests that a facility should be made 
available by the IMF specifically to finance upward fluctuations in 
interest costs of loans.
Direct subsidy of the interest costs of loans by, say, OECD 
governments as a form of aid may distort the use of capital causing 
relatively unproductive projects to be financed. Moreover, it may permit 
weak management of projects resulting in a lower rate of return, where 
tighter management could have produced a higher rate of return.
One way of extending access to the poorer developing countries would 
be to combine a guarantee of interest payments and a subsidy of interest 
payments on bank loans to these countries. This could be achieved by 
making the subsidy payments direct to the lending banks.
The criticism that relatively unproductive investments are financed 
with subsidised funds can be overcome by ensuring that the subsidy does 
not make the subsidised bank loans cheaper than the IMF or IDA loans. 
Thus, if the bank loans are say 2% above IMF/IDA money for similar uses 
respectively and subject to conditionality, the efficiency of the 
investment should be maintained. The exact degree of subsidy that is
possible will depend upon the returns from the investment to be financed. 
However it is not necessary that the subsidy be based upon market rates 
because the average cost of funds to the banks may be a suitable rate to 
be subsidised.
One problem with this system is that many bank loans are at floating 
rates thus there will be an open-ended liability for the subsidising 
agency.
Guarantees may make the bankers less prudent in their lending to 
LDCs. Consequently, should the guarantees not be continued, the banks 
would be left with a poor quality portfolio. This weakness could be 
overcome by guaranteeing only a proportion of the current interest costs 
in excess of those effective at the time of signing the loan agreement.
Recently the suggestion of indexing the interest costs or the 
principal has been commented on (Amexbank 1981, Nowzad 1982, Financial 
Times 1982). Under an indexed system borrowers would be charged a 
constant real rate of interest and the principal would be increased in 
line with an agreed index eg retail prices in the creditor's country.
For financial intermediaries such a system would only operate 
successfully if the banks could index their liabilities. Otherwise 
financial losses would ensue in each time period as the interest rates on 
deposits (including compensation for inflation) would be above that of 
loans. Moreover, paying a fixed real rate of interest may not benefit the 
borrowers. Taking the last decade as an example, real rates of interest 
have often been close to zero and even negative.
Given the need to change fiscal systems and the attitudes of 
depositors, together with the benefits borrowers have enjoyed in the past 
of negative real rates of interest, this writer does not consider the 
indexation of bank loans to be a viable solution to the problems of 
developing country borrowers in the near future.
It is suggested here, however, that the burden of rising interest 
rates could be eased if the developing country borrowers had access to
short term official finance to cover increases in interest rates that 
caused balance of payments difficulties. Such a facility would stabilise 
the influence of interest payments upon cash flow over successive time 
periods.
A scheme whereby a multilateral official agency provides such 
accommodation is in line with some facilities available from the IMF but 
for other causes of balance of payments problems eg deficiencies in 
export earnings and increased costs of cereal imports.
The aim of such a scheme would be to enable LDCs to meet the higher 
debt service costs caused by upward movements in LIBOR and using periods 
when LIBOR falls to provide resources to repay the facility to the 
multilateral organisation. The use of temporary facilities of this nature 
seems well suited to a period of increasing volatility of short term 
interest rates as was experienced during the 1970's. Given the volatile 
nature of interest rates, periods when debtors borrowed from this 
proposed facility would be followed by periods when rates were falling 
and debtors repaid that facility.
The period for which each amount of assistance would be made 
available should be related to the financial circumstances of the 
borrower and expectations of the future trend in interest rates.
This facility would have to be combined with some degree of 
conditionality associated with debt management policy. In particular the 
attitude towards debt rescheduling, the mix of long and short term debt, 
as well as future borrowing aspirations would have to be agreed before 
this facility is made available. This conditionality is necessary 
otherwise some borrowers may see advantages in excessive borrowing when 
interest rates are low and effectively capitalising some of the increased 
servicing costs. However, this capitalisation will be relatively short 
term and therefore yet another crisis will ensue when the capitalisation 
has to be repaid.
An additional spin-off would be improved quality of information
flowing to the banks. One condition of the facility should be that
information flowing to the IMF relating to debt and debt management
including the terms of conditionality, would be passed on to the lending 
bankers. This in itself would reduce the uncertainty associated with 
lending to LDCs (ref page 287 below) . The discipline upon the LDC
government having to monitor its debt more efficiently to benefit from
this facility would improve the quality of information flowing to the LDC 
government itself with its attendant benefits for policy formulation.
For countries to be eligible for this facility it would be necessary 
for them to show that they:
a) have balance of payments difficulties due to the 
increased interest charges on external debt. This 
ensures that facilities to cover interest charges 
do not release resources for non essential imports.
b) that these increased interest charges are due to 
increases in the levels of interest rates on that 
debt and not the increased size of that debt.
c) the balance of payments problems are making it 
difficult for the debtor to service its debt and 
maintain previously agreed economic growth 
objectives.
The amount of assistance to be given would be calculated quarterly 
on a loan by loan basis. Unless current interest rates were at an 
all-time peak or new loans have not been negotiated for some time, some 
loans would be attracting rates of interest below those that applied at 
the time of negotiation. The interest savings on these loans would be 
offset against the assistance paid on account of other loans.
In order to gauge bankers' opinions about this suggestion and other 
points made in this section, four questions (numbers 6-9) were included 
in the survey. The results are reported fully in chapter seven, page 338 
below.
6 . 5 Restructuring Debt
If a borrower has difficulty servicing its current debt, it is often 
possible to reduce the debt service burden by extending the maturity 
profile of the debt. For such a scheme to work it is necessary that 
interest payments can be met and that by reducing the size of or delaying 
the individual amortization payments, the periodic debt service payments 
are reduced to a sustainable level.
The maturity profile of the debt can be extended in two ways. One is 
to refinance the debt, ie repay existing loans with the proceeds of new 
loans. This extends the maturity of the debt by the difference between 
the period to maturity remaining on the old loan and the maturity on the 
new loan. This scheme has the benefit of being able to take advantage of 
any improvement in market conditions at the time of negotiating the new 
loan.
However, to use refinancing it is generally necessary for the
borrower to have the market's confidence and therefore good debt 
management is required to ensure that any refinancing is instituted 
before a crisis is imminent. Refinancing is a very flexible system suited 
to a competitive market such as the euromarkets. In particular if some of 
the members of the loan syndicates do not wish to continue their
exposure, new lenders can join the syndicates for the new loan. Because 
refinancing generally goes smoothly, it is little publicised, yet it is 
suggested that 27% of euroloans were used to refinance debt in 1978 and 
this figure will rise to 65% in 1985 (Cohen & Basagni 1980, pl06).
The second way to restructure the maturity profile of debt is by
rescheduling that debt. This is the negotiation of extensions to the 
maturity of existing debts. This requires the agreement of all the 
parties to the existing debt which is cumbersome given the nature of 
syndicated loans, and technically is a default upon the original loan 
agreement. Rescheduling is therefore a more complicated process and this 
may explain why it is only carried out when a crisis has descended upon
the debtor. Like refinancing, rescheduling aims to reduce the debt 
service burden by reducing the amortization payments in each future 
financial period.
The current popular debate about the growing likelihood of 
developing countries having to reschedule their debt is couched in terms 
that imply that rescheduling is a bad thing and arises as an unhealthy 
consequence of excessive international bank lending. The need to 
reschedule this "unhealthily excessive" lending is assumed to have dire 
consequences for the international financial system. Yet, when in 
1978-79, there was a public debate about the refinancing of developing 
country debt to take advantage of better financial market conditions, 
there was no such concern despite' its impact on the banks' profitability 
and capital adequacy.
There is no doubt that rescheduling of developing country external 
debt has become more frequent in recent years; one suggestion is that the 
number has risen from 3 in 1973 to an estimated 14 in 1981 (Euromoney 
August 1982).
Bank liability management and debt repayment
The reduced moneyness of eurobank deposits, due to the lack of a 
cash transmission mechanism, and the greater competition between 
eurobanks means that eurobanks have to be very active liability managers 
in order to attract deposits. The eurobanks are therefore continually 
active in the markets, positively trying to attract deposits from both 
bank and non-bank sources. Banks will actually take deposits in excess of 
their immediate requirement and reinvest in the interbank market. They 
engage in this two-way business, provided they at least break even, in 
order to maintain their presence in the market and to avoid turning away 
non-bank depositors. The eurobanks' liability management also extends to 
maintaining a network of credit lines with other banks.
This continuous and often aggressive liability management is
necessary to ensure the continuity of funding for the banks' asset 
portfolio and to ensure that funds are available for liquid reserves and 
to maintain the ability to take on new lending business.
On the asset side of the eurobanks' balance sheet, loans have a less 
than 100 per cent probability of being repaid. Accordingly when the bank 
is considering its cash flow over time, the cash outflow in terms of 
repaying deposits or meeting previously agreed loan commitments is more 
certain than the cash inflow o^ repayments of principal. Thus, there is a 
further incentive for continuous liability management by the eurobank in 
order to avoid cash flow problems associated with late payment by
debtors.
It was shown in chapter three the importance of balance sheet growth 
in the banks' utility function. Given the assumption of portfolio size 
maximisation, banks will relend any repayments of principal. However, 
this relending process entails costs, either high search costs when 
trying to find new non-bank borrowers, or reduced earnings if principal 
is temporarily placed in the interbank market. It is therefore postulated 
that the banks would prefer not to be repaid, given their funding
ability, but would prefer to roll-over existing debt on current market 
terms, provided that the costs of rolling-over are less than the costs of 
searching out new business.
It should be pointed out that the desire to roll-over debt only 
arises provided that future payments of interest are certain. The reason 
for this Is that a large proportion of the interest receipts, the LIBOR 
element, from a loan is committed to meeting the interest payments on the 
bank's liabilities eg the bid rate for funds. Traditionally this bid rate 
is high relative to the mark-up on eurocurrency loans. Thus, the
proportion of interest income that covers costs of deposits is much 
greater than the element that goes towards profit. If interest income 
were in arrears, the bank would have to meet its interest commitments
from its profitst reserves and capital in order to maintain depositor 
confidence and its level of funding. Given the small contribution to 
profits made by the gross interest revenue of any one loan and given the 
continued need to fund a loan and therefore the continued funding costs, 
loss of interest income on one loan will make a relatively large impact 
upon current profits. Therefore it is clear that although banks may not 
look for repayment of principal, the maintenance of current interest 
payments is crucial.
This hypothesis explains the behaviour of many banks in helping to 
reduce the current debt service commitments of borrowers. They can do 
this by rolling over maturities so that interest payments are met but 
total debt service payments are reduced by delaying any repayment of 
principal.
There are risks associated with rolling-over debt. In particular, as 
the bank extends the period of its exposure to the debtor, the greater
the likelihood is of the debtor defaulting on its commitments. At the
same time any restructuring of debt which reduces current amortization 
payments reduces the risk of default by reducing the periodic demands
upon the borrower for debt service payments.
The impact of rescheduling on a bank
For debt rescheduling to cause a breakdown of international 
financial intermediation, the private costs to the banks must exceed the 
private benefits to those institutions. Furthermore, this excess of 
private costs must be large enough to have an adverse effect upon the 
viability of the banking function. This will probably occur through the 
excess cost eroding the banks' profits and therefore its capital base, 
causing insolvency and a loss of confidence by depositors. However, there 
may be other ways in which rescheduling influences depositor confidence 
and these are discussed on page 280 below.
The private costs to the banks could be in the form of losses on 
rescheduled business ie costs of funding not matched by the terms of 
rescheduled debt. Alternatively, there may be an opportunity cost in that 
rescheduled debt may not earn as much as would be earned if the principal 
were reloaned to alternative borrowers.
To what extent is rescheduling per se likely to impose an 
opportunity cost upon the banks? To answer that question let us imagine a 
bank that has a loan outstanding where principal is to be repaid in one 
lump sum at maturity. Interest payments have been made on time but 
principal cannot be repaid on due date. Current and predicted future cash 
flow of the debtor allows interest payments to be continued but the 
principal cannot be repaid until the seventh year hence. Also assume that 
seven years is the average maturity of euroloans at the present moment. 
The banks can choose between:
a) trying to recover its loan by instituting legal proceedings 
against the borrower, which may result in bankruptcy or 
liquidation. Whatever happens, the bank will lose a customer 
and may not recover its debt in full. The opportunity cost 
in this case would be the loss on recovery. This may be 
substantial if the borrower is technically insolvent.
b) granting a new loan with a seven year maturity at current 
market terms ie the same terms as the bank would get for 
lending to a different customer. The opportunity cost
in this case would be zero.
c) rolling over ie extending the maturity on the current 
loan for seven years but adjusting the interest rates 
(spread and fees) to reflect current market conditions 
including any change in perceived risk. Again in this 
case the opportunity cost is zero. This is an example 
of rescheduling.
Clearly, providing that the interest terms, maturity and grace 
period of the rescheduling are in line with those of new loans, 
rescheduling need not create an opportunity cost for the bank and may be 
financially and politically superior to seeking legal redress.
The important points to note are that the banker perceives that the 
principal will be repaid and that interest payments are made when due. 
This last point, as explained on page 272 above, is crucial because 
eurobanks are active liability managers paying an explicit yield on 
deposits. Bank loans must earn current interest sufficient to cover the 
costs of attracting deposits otherwise the bank will make losses which, 
if unchecked, will lead to insolvency.
Therefore, if the borrower's financial circumstances do not permit 
even payment of interest, then the loans will be making losses and should 
be written off by the bank. In general, bankers do not agree to the 
postponement of interest payments nor to the capitalisation of interest 
arrears (Economist 20.3.82 p28). One of the problems with the 1980 Polish 
debt rescheduling was that interest payments were in arrears and the 
Polish negotiators wanted to capitalise those arrears. The bankers were 
unanimous in refusing such a request (Economist 20.3.82 p22). However, 
there have been recent exceptions for Braniff Airways and Nicaragua 
(Economist 20.3.82 op cit).
If assets - loans - are not earning then the bank's action is clear: 
attempt to recover principal and arrears of interest by whatever legal 
means is possible. However, if the asset is potentially earning interest 
but repayment of the principal is uncertain, the decision is more 
complicated and depends upon the legal status of the borrower.
The private borrower
In the case of a private borrower even though the banker is 
confident and decides to roll-over the existing debt, the ability to pay 
interest and repay principal in the future may be terminated at a future
date by legal action for liquidation or bankruptcy initiated by an 
existing or subsequent creditor. This creditor may be, for example, a 
bondholder or a supplier and this creditor's right of action would stem 
from the debtor's future default on his debt to that creditor. In such a 
situation the bank's asset will be destroyed if the legal action is 
successful and the bank will have to rely on any security held or its 
share of the residual assets of the borrower, if any.
Therefore, when a defaulting private borrower can meet future 
interest payments but payment of principal is uncertain, the bank has 
two alternative courses of action. It may call in the loan and may at 
the same time institute legal proceedings. Alternatively, it may 
reschedule the loan knowing that if the borrower defaults on other 
creditors' loans in the future those creditors may institute liquidation 
or bankruptcy proceedings that destroy the rescheduled assets. Clearly, 
the bank's decision will be influenced by the quality of any security 
and its view as to the degree of improvement in the borrower's financial 
health between now and the future. If the borrower's financial health is 
expected only to deteriorate in the future, the bank may expect to 
recover less in a future liquidation than in a current liquidation. 
Strictly speaking such a decision should be taken after comparing the 
net present value of the two alternative sets of ejected financial 
flows. One set from the current liquidation, the other set from a 
current earning asset and future liquidation.
The sovereign borrower
In the case of a sovereign borrower or a private borrower 
guaranteed by a sovereign power, the situation is different. It is 
worthwhile rolling over the principal even though its actual repayment 
is unlikely - provided of course that the willingness and ability to 
make interest payments are certain and do not impose an opportunity cost 
upon the bank. This is because the sovereign borrower cannot lose its
legal personality nor can the bank's asset be destroyed through legal 
proceedings instituted by third parties. The bank's asset will only 
cease to exist if the sovereign borrower repudiates the loan.
Thus, given the assumed objective of the bank to maximise the size 
of its earning portfolio, together with the postulated behaviour of 
aggressive and continuously active liability management making repayment 
of loans unnecessary for bank cash flow purposes, it is always 
preferable for a bank to roll-over sovereign debt where expectations of 
interest receipts are high and expectations of repudiation low.
Given the need for developing countries to have access to private 
sources of development finance in the foreseeable future, the writer 
considers the risk of repudiation to be very low. Furthermore, the 
banking system is at the heart of trade financing. Therefore even if a 
developing country no longer required medium term development finance, 
it will require access to the world's banks in order to settle its 
trading debts. No country, therefore, is in a position to repudiate its 
debts to banks. However, for an alternative view, see Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981).
Thus, from the above analysis, it is clear that at least as far as 
sovereign debt is concerned rescheduling per se is not detrimental to 
the international financial system, providing the risk of repudiation is 
low, interest payments are maintained and there is no opportunity cost 
to the banking system.
It is necessary therefore to investigate each rescheduling 
separately to determine the opportunity cost to the banking system 
before we can determine whether it is a cause for concern. One 
rescheduling with a positive opportunity cost may have no adverse 
effects upon the banking system, but the cumulative effects of many, 
each with an opportunity cost, would be a cause for concern.
One element of the opportunity cost that may change in the future 
is the way in which the international banking regulatory authorities,
tax authorities and the accounting profession treat rescheduled loans in 
the banks' balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. If these 
authorities were to require rescheduled debts to be written down in 
value in the banks1 accounts, this would almost certainly create a 
positive opportunity cost of rescheduling and influence the solvency of 
those banks involved and the stability of the international banking 
system. Much thought should go into such matters before the authorities 
take any action. In particular why should international loans be treated 
differently from domestic loans and why should banks be treated 
differently from other institutions such as building societies in this 
respect? Clearly, the consequences of treating rescheduled debt as an 
inferior form of asset requiring some writing down of its value are 
widespread indeed.
In general the financial terms attached to rescheduling bank debt 
do not seem to detract from the banks' profitability (Goodman 1982,
p28) . The 1977 rescheduling of Turkey's debt was at an interest rate of 
one and threequarter per cent over LIBOR paid monthly. Principal was 
repaid in monthly instalments over four years after a three year grace 
period. Disbursements of the new money loan were tied to disbursements 
under an IMF standby facility (Van de Bey 1982).
Poland's rescheduling of its 1981 debt covered 95% of principal to
be repaid over 1 \ years with four years grace. The interest rate was one
and threequarter per cent over LIBOR with a two and threequarter per 
cent penalty for late payments. There was also a 1% renegotiation fee 
(The Economist International Banking Survey 20.3.82, pl6 ).
Clearly where reschedulings are at preferential terms to the
borrower there are serious implications for bank profitability and 
capital adequacy. An example is Nicaragua's 1980 rescheduling which 
included a 7% fixed interest rate on capitalised arrears of interest and 
a 12 year loan at 1% over LIBOR and a 5 year grace period (Shaw et al 
1981).
One cost of recent reschedulings which would not be incurred if new 
loans were made to alternative borrowers is that of protracted 
negotiation. A recent case of Costa Rica's rescheduling in 1981 took one 
year for negotiation to be completed. The time taken to complete the 
Turkish rescheduling increased the uncertainty in financial markets such 
that no new credit from banks or suppliers was made available during 
negotiations. Export credit insurance agencies stopped covering trade 
with Turkey. This lack of short term credit exacerbated the country's 
plight.
An important factor influencing the negotiating costs is that many 
countries which reschedule once do so again. One reason is that private 
lenders base their negotiations on the desire to achieve a return to 
normality in the shortest possible time (Davis 1980). Normality here 
refers to the resumption of service payments that are overdue. 
Furthermore, only the current year's debt is renegotiated instead of 
looking at debt due in future years.
The Paris club and the private banks insist on rescheduling one 
year's debt at a time. When negotiations on one year's debt are 
completed, it is time to start on the next year's (Economist 20.3.82, 
p28) . Each negotiation is taken ad hoc, the banks considering that 
guidelines cannot be laid down because each country is unique. Although 
the larger banks manifest themselves in each rescheduling, it may not be 
until the rescheduling is under way that all bank creditors are known 
(Economist op cit).
Clearly the duration and frequency of rescheduling negotiations 
imposes explicit costs upon the international banking system. 
Furthermore, policies of the bank regulatory authorities and accounting 
profession that require rescheduled sovereign debt to be treated as an 
inferior asset and written down in value, by reason only of it being 
rescheduled, may cause exactly those problems which the regulatory 
authorities are charged with avoiding.
There may also be implicit costs to a debt rescheduling. If 
depositors perceive rescheduled sovereign debt as being an inferior 
asset, depositors may have less confidence in the banking system after a 
spate of reschedulings. This problem will probably manifest itself in 
the interbank market. It may be that banks which find that a large 
proportion of their loan portfolio consists of rescheduled debt will 
find their credit rating lowered and therefore find it more difficult 
and costly to attract deposits. In reality, this will probably apply to 
non G10 country banks where the international lender of last resort 
responsibilities of central banks are less clear (Bell 1982). However, 
this is a risk for individual banks rather than the market as a whole 
because if funds are to be removed altogether from the system, they must 
be held in cash - an unlikely event. Nevertheless, such a lowering of 
individual bank credit ratings and the attendant rise in interest rates 
may impose a positive cost of rescheduling for some banks.
Because of the need for new development finance and the tendency 
for maturities on banks' debt to be shorter than the gestation period of 
economic adjustment, there is a growing need to reduce the costs of what 
may be the increased frequency of debt rescheduling. Indeed it is 
considered desirable to reduce these costs to the point where debt 
rescheduling can become a legitimate instrument of debt management 
policy for borrowers and accepted as such by lenders. When debt 
rescheduling for sovereign borrowers becomes accepted as a legitimate 
practice, the costs associated with lack of depositor confidence, the 
attitudes of the accounting profession and the regulatory authorities 
will be removed. This action will further enhance the usefulness of debt 
rescheduling as an instrument of debt management.
There is clearly a need for all the parties to the international 
banking system to understand and implement ways of reducing the costs of 
debt rescheduling. Two methods are suggested and discussed below. One is 
to encourage greater understanding by the managers of developing country
debt of the techniques and policies of debt management including the 
benefits of efficient accounting and information systems relating to the 
debt. The second is to establish an internationally recognised code of 
conduct for rescheduling.
In a competitive market such as the euromarkets, there is no 
cartelisation, no common view, little exchange of information and 
frequently little common interest. Therefore a code of conduct is 
important if protracted wrangling is to be avoided. Furthermore, the 
sheer numbers of participants make ad hoc negotiation cumbersome. 
According to Goodman, most reschedulings of syndicated loans have 
involved more than 100 banks (Goodman 1982, p25) .
There are precedents for such a code of conduct in documents 
published by the International Chamber of Commerce relating to Letters 
of Credit, Commercial Bills and Guarantees. These documents constitute 
part of the contract between banker and customer because agreement to 
such conditions is included in the documents signed by banker and 
customer. It would be equally possible to include an agreement on 
rescheduling in the loan documentation.
The writer considers that a procedure for rescheduling, which would 
be established under the auspices of some multinational official 
institution such as the IBRD, would have the following advantages:
1) Political factors are most important in rescheduling 
negotiations (Van der Bey 1982). Therefore having an 
internationally agreed set of rules may ease the 
politicians' difficulties.
2) Rescheduling may be given a more respectable place
in the debt management policy of the borrower and the 
asset management of the creditors.
\
3) ■’ Time will be saved by avoiding disagreements between
creditors as to the terms of the rescheduling by 
establishing the relationship between the terms of
the rescheduling and current market terms at the 
negotiations for the original loan.
4) The more enlightened attitude to rescheduling may 
encourage debtors and creditors to reschedule debt 
before the crisis arises, thus avoiding crisis 
publicity and its attendant influence upon confidence.
5) A formal procedure may make it possible to renegotiate 
not only debt currently due but debt due in the future 
as well.
6) Provided the rules have the support of the developed 
as well as developing governments, official debts and 
non bank debts could probably be handled at the same 
negotiations. Two important areas here would be 
export credits, often officially guaranteed by 
developed country government agencies, and bond issues.
The trouble with setting up a set of rules is that some
respectability is seen to be given to reneging on debt.
At present, three major difficulties are envisaged in establishing
such a set of rules. They are:
1) Finding an institution which can consistently be 
perceived as being neutral between borrowers and 
lenders.
2) Negotiating the detailed clauses that are acceptable 
to official, bank, bond and other creditors given the 
political interest of LDCs of obtaining the greatest 
net transfer of resources.
3) The time taken for the learning process to be com­
pleted by both borrowers and lenders about the benefits 
of reschedulings, together with the time taken to 
negotiate the code of conduct may be too long to avoid 
crises which may develop in the short term. Because
these crises are therefore exacerbated, the time when 
costs of rescheduling are substantially reduced and 
rescheduling itself is viewed in a more enlightened 
vein will be delayed even longer.
Nevertheless, these difficulties should not hinder active 
discussion of ways to improve sovereign debt management policy. There is 
evidence that the banks themselves consider that the current ad hoc 
arrangements for rescheduling are less than satisfactory. Some 
suggestions noted by Bell, op cit, include:
i) A group to advise the banks on rescheduling similar 
to the groups of merchant bankers advising LDCs. 
ii) Greater liaison between banks and international 
institutions. The IMF could then exert pressure 
to improve economic performance so as to enhance 
the ability to service debt, 
iii) The regulating authorities must take a more 
flexible approach to capital adequacy in the 
light of substantial rescheduling in the future.
These suggestions by Bell do not cope with negotiating differences 
between the banks, between the banks and the debtor, nor between the 
banks and other types of creditor. The recent case of Costa Rica 
highlighted animosity between the banks and bondholders.
The rescheduling of official debt is usually carried out at 
separate negotiations and on different terms than private debt. Maybe 
all debt could be dealt with at the same negotiations. This may seem a 
cumbersome operation but if procedures were standardised, this may 
simplify the process dramatically. This system would also cope with the 
recalcitrant bank which decides to sue and enforce a judgement rather 
than help the debtor for the mutual benefit of all concerned.
One suggestion noted by Bell, op cit, was to use the IMF as a 
lender. However, the IMF has never been a major supplier of funds to 
LDCs (refer chapter one). The IMF's sum of quotas has shrunk in real 
terms from 12% of world exports in 1960 to 4% in 1980. The ability of 
the IMF to enable a member country to avoid rescheduling is severely 
limited. For example, the maximum amount available to Mexico is $1.3 
billion in one year compared with a 1982 deficit of $14 billion 
(Euromoney 1982a)and debt currently thought to total US $80 billion.
However, there may be a role for the IMF in the rescheduling 
process. It could liaise with the body enforcing the code of conduct and 
all the parties, lending a small amount of money and acting as an 
economic adviser to the developing countries much as it does already. If 
in a rescheduling, new bank money or extensions of bank credit were only 
to be made available if IMF finance bearing high degrees of 
conditionality was made available concurrently, the confidence of the 
bankers in rescheduling may be increased. The 1979 rescheduling for Peru 
provided for such a scheme (Goodman 1982) as did the 1981 scheme for 
Bolivia (Economist 20.3.82 p42).
One problem of making commercial bank rescheduling dependent on 
some other financial event, say IMF parallel finance, is that if the 
country does not meet the conditions of that other finance, eg the terms 
of IMF conditionality, the bank rescheduling fails and the financial 
condition of the borrower may be exacerbated. This appears to have 
happened with Jamaica in 1980 (Economist 20.3.82).
The suggestion that the IMF should cooperate with the IBRD and the 
commercial banks in rescheduling and that IMF conditionality should be 
part of the rescheduling does not imply that the writer is unaware of 
the political criticisms of the scheme, particularly that two western 
'capitalist' institutions are combining to minimise the benefits 
accruing to developing countries. To some extent this criticism can be
mitigated as the number of banks outside the OECD countries join the 
syndicated loan market and agree to comply with the code of conduct on 
rescheduling.
However, it is for this political reason that it is suggested here 
that the IBRD should administer the rescheduling agreement. The IMF 
should cooperate so that the conditionality of IMF money is compatible 
with the debt management policy that is optimal for the developing 
country. It is also thought that the IBRD is more acceptable to the 
developing countries because it does not have a history of animosity 
caused by conditionality. Moreover, the Bank would have considerable 
professional respect from the private bankers because of its expertise 
in development banking. However, it would be necessary for the IBRD to 
soften its approach to rescheduling its own debt.
If the IMF or IBRD were to act as convenors of creditors' meetings, 
the loan agreement could specify the banks in the negotiations which 
will represent all the banks in the loan agreements. This may be a new 
duty for the agent bank.
As the Bank and the Fund have annual meetings with members they 
could make suggestions about debt management to reduce debt servicing 
problems and also advise to seek a rescheduling early on, before 
payments are in arrears. The use of parallel financing will enable funds 
from the private sector to be combined with some IMF or IBRD resources 
to refinance maturing debt and help reduce the costs to the developing 
countries without reducing the profitability of the banks.
The establishment of this code of conduct may be seen as an 
admission by the banks that some of the original terms of the lending 
may not be complied with - in effect that their lending policy and risk 
analysis are less than perfect. However, two things make modern 
syndicated lending to developing countries different from other forms of 
bank lending. Firstly, these loans are frequently programme loans. Their 
aim is to finance the adjustment process of a whole economy. The time
span of this adjustment, difficult to forecast at any time, will be 
uncertain at the time the loan agreement is signed. Given that what is 
long term in bank lending is short term for macroeconomic adjustment, it 
is to be expected that the maturity date of the loan will have to be 
extended.
Secondly, the loans have floating interest rates and are generally 
in foreign currency at least from the borrower's point of view. 
Furthermore, much of what is to be purchased with the loan proceeds - 
capital goods - is also priced in foreign currency. The 1970's has been 
a period of fluctuating interest rates and exchange rates unprecedented 
in recent history. These factors make it very difficult to forecast the 
ability to service the debt and keep to those forecasts. The debt 
servicing costs have generally risen over the 1970's and early 1980 as 
LIBOR has risen and fluctuations in exchange rates make t-he value of 
interest and principal in terms of domestic currency uncertain until 
payments are due.
Therefore in many respects floating rate foreign currency loans 
create greater uncertainty for both the borrower and the lender. It 
seems obvious, therefore, that there should be periodic reviews of the 
debtor's ability to service each debt. When the debtor's financial 
circumstances change it seems reasonable to change the conditions of the 
loan so as to avoid a crisis which only damages both debtor and 
creditor. One problem with bank lending to developing countries is that
because of the large number of banks associated with each loan, such
periodic reviews are difficult to carry out. Therefore, consensus for 
change is difficult to arrive at without some framework like that
suggested in this section. As a result reviews and changes in loan 
conditions resulting from changed financial circumstances only come
about when there is a financial crisis.
In the survey of banks seven questions were asked about the 
restructuring of debt, in particular about bankers' attitudes to greater
flexibility in maturity structure, the major costs of debt rescheduling, 
the treatment of rescheduled debts in balance sheets and bankers’ 
attitudes to a code of conduct similar to that suggested in this 
section. The responses are reported in chapter seven, pages 341-344.
6.6 Improved information flows for country risk analysis
Bank sources of information can be classified at three levels: 1.
Sources within the bank such as economic analysis, information from 
branch offices and from visits by bank executives to the country 
concerned; 2. Purchased sources of specialist information eg consultancy 
studies, official statistics from the LDC or such bodies as the IMF; 3. 
Day to day snippets of information from the 'News' (Hagen 1981, p22) . 
Theoretically the bank will continue to collect and analyse information 
until the marginal cost of collection equals the marginal benefit of 
using that information.
One difference between lending to OECD based corporations and 
governments on one hand and LDCs on the other is that the cost of 
gaining information on LDC risks is so much greater. In many cases the 
cost of gaining information of a similar quality (ie accuracy, currency 
and disaggregation) is infinite because such information is not 
available to the lending banker. Indeed it may not be available to the 
government of the developing country.
Thus it is reasonable to assume that lending bankers often analyse 
LDC credit proposals with less information than a similar proposal from 
an OECD based borrower. Accordingly the banker will perceive the loan as 
having greater risk because of the greater uncertainty involved. 
Consequently this lack of information reduces the banker's loan 
portfolio for a given level of income because of the higher risk 
associated with that level of income.
It is clear therefore that any system that increases the quality
and reduces the cost of information required by bankers to make valid 
credit decisions, will assist in providing the appropriate flow of funds 
to the developing countries. Furthermore, to the extent that that 
information is not available to the developing countries themselves, 
making it available will assist those countries in their general 
macroeconomic policy formulation, and in their debt management policy in 
particular. In this respect the example of Zaire is quoted by Donaldson 
(1979) where it took several months just to determine the extent of 
Zaire's debts before credit proposals could be negotiated.
Improvement in the quality of financial management of the 
developing countries was found by Lees & Eng (1979) to be significant in 
increasing access of those countries to international capital markets. 
While Hope (1982) notes that the developing countries can benefit from 
improved information regarding their debts in the following ways:
1) Improved information ensures more appropriate borrowing 
decisions.
2) Improved information enables better debt management.
There may be direct financial gains here because of 
avoiding penalties for late payment of interest and 
principal.
3) Improved information allows the borrowers to have 
advanced warning of the needs to refinance or renegotiate 
debt in order to avoid debt service difficulties.
Clearly therefore both borrowers and lenders will benefit from 
improved financial information about the less developed economies.
It is often considered that the IMF, IBRD and similar institutions 
have superior information to that of the private banks and that the 
banks should try to share in that information. However, for this to be 
done in a formal and consistent manner may risk undermining the 
confidential relationship between the IMF or IBRD etc with their 
members.
The IMF is currently considering how to reconcile its confidential 
relationship with member countries and the need for better information 
by private banks. Three suggestions are being considered:
1) To give more background information about the debt 
position of developing countries.
2) To increase the Fund's influence when engaged in 
parallel financing with the private banks.
3) For Fund officials to attend meetings between the 
banks and the borrower even when the Fund is not 
directly involved in lending (Financial Times
4. 10.82 pl5).
It may be possible to include in a loan agreement a provision that 
the borrower will instruct the IMF or similar institution to transfer 
information to the lending bank. However, given the competition to lend, 
this may only be enforceable in a period of tight credit. Furthermore
such a move may be resisted by the international body lest it result in
reducing the quality of the information flowing to that body.
The system of co-financing, to be discussed below, does enable the 
private banks to share in the knowledge and expertise of supranational 
institutions because in the terms of the co-financing the borrower gives 
permission for the IBRD to transfer information to the banks.
There would seem to be substantial social and private economies to 
be derived from an organised central source of information. Being 
staffed by experts, this organisation could investigate the LDCs* 
sources of data, giving advice and assistance to the LDCs on improving 
quality. This information would be such as to fulfil the requirements of 
best banking practice. It may also be possible to provide 'off the 
shelf' country risk analysis for the smaller banks. The output of such 
an organisation would also be of benefit to the authorities charged with 
regulating the world's banking systems and the eurobanking system in 
particular.
The improvement of the quality of currently produced official 
statistics should also be continued. Wider statistical coverage of the 
euromarkets is required, while statistics on bank lending should be 
expanded to include short term credits. Currently, the measurement of 
short term finance (under one year) to LDCs is of very poor quality yet, 
although it is onerous to record these debts because of their numbers, 
they represent collectively a substantial claim upon the nation's 
foreign exchange resources (ref chapter five, page 236).
It is not only information flows from developing countries of 
monetary agencies that need improving. In order to evaluate the banks' 
risk of lending to developing countries, each bank must be aware of its 
total exposure to each borrower. Therefore the internal accounting 
information systems of each bank must be able to provide all the 
required information. Yet in a recent Financial Times World Survey of 
Bank Annual Reports, only 24 out of the world's top 100 banks published 
fully consolidated accounts (Lafferty 1982). Although the banks may have 
unpublished consolidated data this cannot be taken for granted. 
Moreover, it is the published accounts which other banks use when 
assessing the credit standing of banks with regard to interbank lending.
Six questions regarding the quality of information were included in 
the banking survey. These asked about the quality for the banks' risk 
analysis and for the government's macroeconomic policy formulation. 
Questions were asked about the desirability of a credit rating agency 
and about the establishment of a central organisation for collection and 
dissemination of information. The results are reported in chapter seven, 
pages 344-346.
6 .7 Co-financing with multilateral lenders eg IMF and IBRD
Co-financing is an arrangement whereby funds from various lenders 
are combined with funds from a multi lateral official agency to finance
a project. The World Bank provides the major part of its co-financing in 
association with official bilateral loans and official export credit 
agencies but there is growing scope for co-financing with private 
lenders. An alternative approach to co-financing is for the World Bank 
to sell off participations in loans it is currently negotiating (Eng et 
al, op cit).
The technique of co-financing can either be in the form of joint
financing ie a common set of goods and services are purchased, or there
can be parallel financing where separate parts of the project are 
financed by different sources of funds. This latter often provides more 
flexible financial arrangements and is favoured by official
co-financiers.
Since 1975 it has been the policy of the IBRD to increase the 
private involvement in co-financing. This financial technique could also 
be used by the IMF in a formal way in order to increase the flow of 
funds to LDCs. The IBRD has found that its portion of the financing acts 
as a catalyst in attracting other funds and the IMF has noted the 
informal arrangements whereby sometimes private bankers only lend if an 
IMF facility is made available and IMF conditionality is complied with.
For the private banks co-financing adds status to the loan and
reduces the risk associated with that loan. The risk is reduced because 
the banks are given vicarious access to confidential IBRD data about the 
borrower and the greater political clout of this multilateral 
institution. This clout is derived from the high priority that borrowers 
give to servicing IBRD debt (Eng et al, op cit). This is because the 
IBRD is a source of funds for countries who have not as yet progressed 
to be eligible for private finance. The IBRD is therefore a first line 
of finance. If the first line commitments are defaulted upon, the 
borrower will be reducing considerably its chances of ever being able to 
raise private finance. This political strength is also passed to the 
banks via cross default clauses in the co-financing agreements. With
such a clause if a default is declared by the private lender, then the 
IBRD loan would also be in default. Because developing countries are 
anxious to maintain good relations with such official institutions, the 
private banks' position is that much safer. The access to confidential 
data comes directly from the conditions of the co-financing agreement 
where the borrower agrees that the IBRD may pass on confidential 
information to the private banks.
The IBRD is thought to have superior information of, and ability to 
analyse, projects and thus will be expected to provide the information 
and administration of the loan. This superiority stems from the greater 
use made by the IBRD of specialists such as engineers, economists and 
others in a painstaking analysis. Furthermore, the private bank's 
analysis is made in a more competitive environment where there is 
pressure to complete many analyses. Thus the banks are pleased to be 
able to take advantage of the 'in depth' IBRD studies (Leeds 1980).
The commercial banks enjoy the advantages of ' reduced loan 
administration, improved information, access to a broader range of loan 
opportunities and reduced overall risk in portfolio. There may also be a 
learning function for smaller banks as they learn about the analysis and 
administration of large project loans.
Co-financing would therefore seem to be an ideal vehicle for
increasing the access of developing countries to private capital markets 
where this access is constrained not by the cost of private funds but by 
the lender's perception of risk. Yet to date co-financing does not seem 
to have caught on. The Economist notes that up to 1981 187 banks linked 
up with the World Bank and that of the 1.8 billion supplied by private 
banks to June 1981, 24% came from American banks, 22% from Japanese
banks and 33% from British and European banks (Economist 20.3.82 p47).
The following data show that most of the finance for individual
projects usually comes from the World Bank and that most of the
co-financings have been for countries that already have considerable
access to the private capital markets.
Table 6.1
Signed co-financing agreements between the World Bank and 
private banks, December 1975-July 1979*
Date Loan amount provided by:
Country Industrial agreement World Private
sector signed Bank bank
($ millions)
Brazil Steel 12/1975 95 55
Brazil Steel 12/1976 60 50
Ecuador Port construction 3/1977 33.5 10
Argentina Electric power 8/1977 115 50
Malaysia Electric power 8/1977 22 30
Thailand Hydro power 9/1977 50 20
Argentina Industrial finance 10/1977 100 100
Brazil Fertilizer 11/1977 82 20
Brazil Electric power 12/1977 82 54
Brazil Fertilizer 2/1978 50 25
Paraguay Highway construction 6/1978 35 5
Brazil Electric power 7/1978 52 20
Brazil Fertilizer 8/1978 ** 30
Mexico Tourism (hotel 
construction)
12/1978 50 25
Brazil Fertilizer 1/1979 64 25
Yugoslavia Agricultural finance 2/1979 55 20
Brazil Aluminium smelter 4/1979 98 90
Draguay Highway rehabili­
tation
6/1979 26.5 7
Paraguay Highway construction 7/1979 39 5
Romania Livestock 9/1979 75 100
Dominican
Republic
Republic tourism 11/1979 25 10
Brazil Electric power 11/1979 109 60
Yugoslavia Hydro power 11/1979 73 35
* This list includes only co-financing transactions conducted by the World 
Bank in which there was formal collaboration with a group of private 
commercial or merchant banks. It should be noted that if the broader 
definition of co-financing were used - Bank funding or a project in which 
funds from any source outside the borrowing country are involved - of 
course, the list would be considerably longer.
** Second co-financing complementary to November 1977 project.
Source: The World Bank. Quoted in Leeds 1980.
One reason why co-financing may not be as popular with the private 
banks is that the spreads and fees tend to be lower than on other loans. 
Despite the reduced perceived risk by many bankers, they still require a 
reasonable return on their total assets (Buchanan 1982). Furthermore, 
some, particularly US, bankers have been concerned that bank 
shareholders may not perceive co-financed loans as bearing reduced risk. 
In such a situation the banks' stock market ratings will fall.
The role of co-financing in extending the number of countries 
having access to private markets has been slight, yet it is precisely 
here that the private banks will benefit most from the IBRD expertise 
and the cross default clause. Firstly, because the private banks are not 
major lenders to these countries, they would get even greater benefits 
from the World Bank's relatively greater knowledge. Secondly, the cross 
default clause will be an even greater sanction to countries who need 
greater reliance upon IBRD funds.
Leeds (op cit) has suggested that co-financing could be extended 
beyond bank syndicated loans to insurance companies, pension funds and 
even bond holders. However, to the extent that regulations preclude 
these institutions from lending to LDCs, co-financing seems to have 
little to offer. Where risk is the main constraint, provided that 
lenders perceive co-financing as reducing the risk to the private
lender, it should facilitate access to new sections of the private 
capital markets. However, there seems little point in bond holders
taking on the greater risk of co-financing projects when they can invest 
directly in the IBRD. A further benefit for the financial institutions 
may be the gaining of other business from a wider range of developing 
country borrowers.
An extension of co-financing is parallel-financing, where the 
bankers make their loan drawdown conditional upon implementation of the 
IMF's stabilisation programme. Unfortunately such a system seems
unlikely to operate except as a result of a crisis since the
conditionality attached to IMF loans means that members approach the IMF 
only as a crisis looms.
Three questions about co-financing were included in the survey. 
They related to the bankers' perception of the advantages and 
disadvantages of co-financing, whether increased co-financing will 
increase the flow of funds to LDCs that do not already have access to 
bank finance or only increase the flow of funds to those that already 
have bank finance. The results are reported on pages 346-8 of chapter 
seven.
6.8 Bank credit insurance and loan guarantees
Bank credit insurance is organised on an official basis in most 
industrialised countries but is generally limited to export related 
credits. Much of this credit consists of medium and long term loans, 
many funded through the euromarkets and many at subsidised rates of 
interest. The minimum rate of interest to be charged by EEC members, and 
thus the maximum subsidy from those members is determined by the 
'Consensus', which meets under the auspices of the Berne Convention.
However, much of the new bank lending to LDCs has been in the form 
of programme loans. As such there are no identifiable exports which can 
be the basis of export credit insurance. Because of this, either a new 
institution would have to be established or existing institutions would 
have to change their policies. Unless the insurance institution was 
supranational, the problems of non-uniformity of behaviour by national 
agencies would provide similar problems to non-uniformity in supervisory 
functions.
Any sort of loan insurance must impose private costs either on the 
borrower or the lender. Furthermore, the premiums should be related to 
risk in order to deter imprudent banking practice. Thus, the private 
loan insurance organisation should increase the premiums on loans to
countries of high risk thereby encouraging those countries to put their 
houses in order. But in markets as competitive as the euromarkets, it is 
possible that banks will undercut competitors by not insisting on loan 
insurance. This weakness can be overcome by the supervisory authorities 
developing a common and advantageous attitude to insured assets compared 
with uninsured ones. Secondly, the policy of advertising the proportion 
of a bank's assets that are insured may influence depositors, 
particularly those in the interbank market, to favour banks with a high 
proportion of insured loans. Thus competition for deposits may force all 
banks to insure their loans.
Furthermore, although there are many banks involved in the 
euromarkets, some are relatively small participants in syndicates. The
number of large banks which are major leaders of syndicates is
relatively small and most of these are in the GlO countries. Accordingly 
if the major banks are persuaded to join the loan insurance scheme, it 
is unlikely that any smaller banks avoiding the insurance scheme could 
establish syndicates to lend at such a magnitude as to put the 
international banking system in jeopardy.
The point has been made (Dorrance 1981) that insurance is similar 
to a guarantee and that when a banker receives a guarantee he looks to 
the guarantor for repayment. Therefore guarantees should be avoided 
because they will encourage banks not to carry out adequate risk 
analysis. This in turn will increase the risks to the international 
banking system.
The Dorrance thesis assumes that the costs of relying upon the
guarantee are less than relying upon repayment from the original
creditor. This, however, confuses the real nature of a guarantee. A 
guarantor is only secondarily liable to the creditor. Therefore, the 
creditor must first seek payment from the original debtor and the debtor 
must fail to pay before the guarantor is liable under the guarantee. The 
crucial question therefore is:- what costs does the creditor have to
incur in trying to recover from the debtor before he can claim from the 
guarantor or insurance fund?
Consequently, when analysing any loan guarantee or insurance 
scheme, it is important to ensure that the costs to the creditor are 
sufficiently high to make rigorous credit analysis necessary but not so 
high as to negate the advantages of the guarantee or insurance scheme.
Here we are concerned with explicit guarantees. The assumed or 
hoped for guarantees such as those thought to be available from the USSR 
regarding Polish debt are not real guarantees. They are no more than 
political events, their likelihood of actually existing being part of 
political risk analysis.
We must also distinguish between guarantees from financially 
independent and sound third parties and guarantees from financially 
related guarantors. The country risk of lending to a corporation located 
in one country or to the government of that country is similar. If the 
bank is concerned with country risk then a government guarantee is not 
much help. If, on the other hand, the bank is only concerned with 
corporate credit risk, then a government guarantee is useful. Therefore, 
a guarantee or insurance scheme whereby the guarantor is financially 
independent of the borrower is beneficial because the credit or country 
risk is genuinely diversified.
Dorrance fop cit) makes the point that either the insurance
premiums will increase the cost of capital to the developing countries 
or if these premiums are reimbursed as a part of aid, then other aid 
will be reduced. This may be so but there is clearly some concern that 
the markets will, in the future, impose further credit rationing; if the 
insurance scheme avoids such credit •rationing, the social benefits of 
increased credit availability may exceed the social costs of the 
insurance scheme. We already see the costs of credit rising as 
individual countries demand more credit. Insuring the loan may reduce 
the risk premium required by the bank thereby providing additional
finance at no higher explicit cost to the LDC borrower.
Clearly it is possible for credit insurance or guarantees to be 
beneficial to both borrowers and lenders but to be socially beneficial 
it must place costs on imprudent banking practice.
A scheme suggested by Zolotas (1978, 1979, 1980) does impose such a 
cost in the majority of cases. The proposed International Loans 
Insurance Scheme only insures a proportion of each of the loans insured. 
As, according to this scheme, the loans are guaranteed by the IMF, IBRD, 
OPEC and the industrialised countries or alternatively a cooperative of 
private financial institutions, these loans are from the lenders' point 
of view prime risks. Therefore the banks should expect only a prime risk 
return on such loans. Zolotas therefore suggests that the difference to 
the borrower between the return on an insured and an uninsured loan will 
be paid to the insurance fund. The borrower therefore pays the spread 
and fees combination as if the loan were uninsured. This suggestion has 
the merit of not increasing the costs to the developing country 
borrower.
However, there are two weaknesses: one is the use of the IBRD as 
guarantor; the other is the attempt to make the scheme self-financing on 
an insurance basis. With respect to the IBRD as a guarantor, if this 
institution issues substantial contingent liabilities, it may be 
compromising its credit rating. Such compromising would reduce its 
ability to raise development finance, at least at the finest rates, and 
would therefore jeopardise its major function, or at least make IBRD 
funds more expensive. Thus, the poorer developing countries who rely on 
IBRD funds may be financing the richer borrowers from private markets. 
This same problem may occur with the IMF if it should wish to raise 
finance from the capital markets in the future.
The second point stems from the fact that the fees-spread return on 
bank loans tends to be squeezed at periods of high liquidity and these 
are generally associated with global payments imbalance. This squeezing
narrows the differentials between prime borrowers and more risky ones. 
Thus the revenue going to the insurance scheme will frequently be very 
small and may not provide a large enough insurance fund.
Furthermore, if this fund is not sufficient, the individual
guarantors of the funds will be supporting the activities of banks over 
which they have no control and countries over which they have no 
political influence. There may therefore be a conflict of interests 
between the guarantors eg loans to Argentina being insured and the
guarantors being UK and USA.
The problem of supporting banks over which the individual 
guarantors have no control is similar to the problem o f the 
international lender of last resort, and indeed a similar amount of 
regulatory power may have to be transferred to the insurance scheme (see 
page 325 below). Indeed if the insurance fund is inadequate, the 
guarantors will collectively be lenders of last resort.
It is important to determine which risks the insurance fund would 
pay out on. From the discussion on rescheduling above, it would seem 
that the only costs to the banks, as far as sovereign loans are 
concerned, would be upon a repudiation by the borrower, or a 
rescheduling on subsidised terms. Given the infrequency of such 
occurrences in recent years, is it necessary to establish a new 
institution to cover such a risk? Moreover, as loans to corporate or 
individual borrowers can be more easily associated with exports, 
projects, etc the existing export credit insurance agencies may be 
sufficient for the task.
Any proposed international insurance fund may facilitate better 
information flows from LDCs. The fund would be able to carry out country
risk analysis and thus save the efforts of the banks. This may avoid the
problem of confidential information being transmitted to the banks 
themselves.
There may be an additional advantage to insured loans, that is that
borrowers may be less willing to default on such loans because of the 
political influence of that default upon the guarantors. Furthermore, 
the insurance fund may easily stop the flow of new credit to defaulters 
or irresponsible debtor countries by refusing to insure their 
borrowings.
Haschek (1980 & 1982) suggests that the system of insured buyer 
credits should be expanded so as to reduce the risks to the bankers in 
international lending. He also suggests that the official export credit 
agencies should expand their functions by borrowing in the euromarkets. 
In effect they will be engaged in recycling.
With respect to increasing bank lending to developing countries, 
the increased use of buyer credit insurance has the merits of being 
speedy to implement; because such systems already exist there is no need 
to use resources to establish a new institution. However, the existing 
official export credit insurance institutions are used as aids to export 
competition policy. It would be unfortunate if their work was hindered 
because of the multinational nature of the syndicates.
The increased use of such schemes does not obviate the constraints 
on future bank lending of capital adequacy and profitability. For such a 
constraint to be removed, the regulatory authorities would have to treat 
insured loans more favourably when analysing capital adequacy, 
liquidity, loan concentration and total exposure.
Haschek's suggestion that the official export financing agencies 
should expand their function will only transfer the current problems 
from one set of financial intermediaries, generally private, to another 
set, official intermediaries.
Six questions on credit insurance and loan guarantee schemes were 
included in the writer's survey. The questions asked about bankers' 
attitudes to guarantee schemes, whether they would result in less 
prudent lending decisions and whether ECGD or similar institutions 
should cover programme loans. Questions were also asked about the impact 
of loan insurance upon
loan costs, whether availability will lead to tiering in the interbank 
market and whether insured loans should be treated preferentially in 
bank balance sheets. The responses are reported on pages 348-51 of chapter 
seven.
6 .9 Prudential monitoring and regulation of bank lending 
There are three types of banking regulation:
1) those designed to implement monetary policy, such as 
open market operations and reserve requirements
2) those designed to preserve the safe and stable 
functioning of the monetary system
3) those designed to achieve non monetary goals such as 
the redistribution of credit.
(Dean & Giddey 1981)
In this section we concentrate upon the regulations of type 2) 
above.
A strong argument for bank regulation to safeguard the financial 
system arises from the externalities associated with the banking 
function of providing the medium of exchange and the function of 
intermediating between borrowers and lenders. If the moneyness of bank 
liabilities is to be maintained, they must be acceptable. It is 
therefore crucial that the financial viability of the banks is 
undoubted. To this end it is necessary that the banks are seen to behave 
within prudential limits. The social benefits of the function of 
financial intermediation are to be found in the bridging of an 
information gap between the financial surplus and financial deficit 
units in the economy (Furness 1969). If the process of intermediation is 
broken, many units of production relying on credit will be forced to 
cease production with detrimental effects upon economic welfare. In 
other words the role of supervision is to provide the public good of
financial stability. The act of financial intermediation is a fair 
weather activity in that the intermediary's liquid reserves are a small 
proportion of its assets. If the financial climate deteriorates, the 
reserves of a bank are quickly exhausted, assets must be sold; they fall 
in value and thereby threaten the bank's solvency (de Vries 1982). 
Supervision aims at minimising unwarranted risks and providing liquidity 
in times of stress.
Official control of domestic banking operations by domestic 
governments of OECD and many other countries is well established. 
However, those same countries generally have a looser form of control, 
if any, over the foreign currency lending of banks within their borders 
including branches of foreign banks. Moreover, there is no supra 
national mechanism for control of international banking and therefore 
what international control there is, results from the inter-relationship 
of the various national controls of individual governments. Yet the 
banks engaged in international banking are often also engaged in 
domestic banking. Accordingly loss of confidence or a deterioration in 
the bank's financial health could as easily be generated from the bank's 
domestic activities as from its international activities. It is 
therefore invalid to separate the domestic and international supervision 
and regulation of banking. Yet this is exactly what governments do. For 
example, there are reserve asset ratios in domestic banking, but they 
are often non-existent in eurobanking. There are lender of last resort 
schemes and deposit insurance schemes for banks' domestic operations but 
not for their international operations.
Supervision in the context of both the domestic and the 
international banking systems is related to ensuring an adequate minimum 
quality of management and balance sheet. This immediately raises the 
question of whether officials are better able to judge the quality of 
bank management and financial health than the bankers themselves. The 
answer lies in the degree to which the officials can be more objective
and have a more complete picture of the global situation.
Officials are likely to have a more objective approach because they 
will be free of the competitive pressures between banks, and even 
between the functions within a single bank. Where competition manifests 
itself in high weightings being given to the growth of balance sheets 
and earnings in the banks' utility function, the quality of the banks' 
balance sheet may decline. Likewise if the growth of business is 
important in assessing the performance of individual functions, any 
prudence suggested by the risk analysts may be ignored by those 
responsible for marketing the banks' services. This is particularly 
pertinent when it is considered that bank staff move between jobs for 
career development and the current incumbent of a position may not 
expect to be in that position when problems arise.
The central bank officials will also be able to use confidential 
information supplied by the whole market when assessing the performance 
of an individual bank. Furthermore, those officials could be 
instrumental in desseminating details of the best techniques of banking 
from the most advanced members of the system to the less advanced. A 
good example of such techniques would be those used in country risk 
analysis where there may be economies in the provision of information if 
it comes from the central bank rather than being researched separately 
by the individual banks.
It was seen in chapter three of this thesis that some writers 
consider that growth of the euromarkets is associated with an asymmetry 
in banking regulations. This means that the eurobanking carried out in a 
particular banking centre is relatively less controlled than in domestic 
banking in the same centre. It has been shown in chapter four of this 
thesis that this lack of regulation gives rise to interest rate 
differentials in favour of the euromarkets, and that these differentials 
are the main reason for continued separation of euro from domestic 
banking.
A good example of this asymmetry explains the growth of London as 
the major euromarket centre. London imposed few regulations on
eurobanking whilst maintaining controls over domestic banks. Other
European centres, in contrast, imposed more regulations over the 
eurobanking as well as domestic banking (Cohen & Basagni op cit, pi54). 
It is clear therefore that national differences in attitudes to bank 
regulation have a profound influence upon the competitiveness of banks 
in different countries and therefore the growth and stability of 
eurobanking in those countries.
The following sections analyse four areas of supervision that are 
directly related to the risks associated with international bank 
lending. These areas are:-
1) The use of consolidated accounting information
2) Capital adequacy
3) Liquidity
4) International cooperation in supervision and regulations
Consolidated accounts
Clearly prudential supervision should cover a bank's domestic and 
foreign operations because failure of an overseas branch or subsidiary 
is likely to affect the parent organisation. The degree of effect will 
depend on the size of the participation of the parent bank. At one 
extreme will be a branch trading under the same name as the parent bank. 
Here a loss of confidence or insolvency in the branch will strongly 
influence confidence in the parent. At the other extreme is the case 
where the bank only has a minority interest in an overseas operation. 
If the bank is not responsible for policy, weaknesses in the 
operation's business are unlikely to affect the depositor's confidence 
in the parent bank.
The use of consolidated accounts stops head offices from directing
bank business to lesser regulated jurisdictions because the prudential 
regulation is in the light of the whole of the bank's global business.
In 1979 the President of the BIS wrote to member central banks 
asking them to cooperate in the introduction of bank supervision on the 
basis of consolidated accounts. Furthermore, there is an EEC Directive 
which makes banking supervision based on consolidated accounts 
obligatory for EEC members (Thring & Jones 1981).
Consolidated accounts are the most appropriate form of accounts in 
the supervision of:
- capital adequacy
- loan concentration
- country risk
- open foreign exchange positions
- liquidity (Colje 1980)
Where bank supervisors place limits upon the level of exposure to 
one borrower either in terms of quantity or degree of concentration, 
clearly it is the exposure of the bank's global business to that 
borrower which is important. Thus consolidated accounts are essential.
Where supervisors monitor country risk exposure then, again, they 
are concerned with the degree of exposure of the bank's global 
activities and therefore need consolidated accounts.
Foreign exchange exposure and liquidity should also be monitored by 
the bank's parent authority to ensure the overall health of the bank. 
However, these aspects of bank business must also be monitored in each 
national market by the national authorities since local market 
conditions and regulations affect liquidity and the stability of foreign 
exchange markets.
However, it is not sufficient that there be international agreement 
to use consolidated accounts. There must be agreed uniformity regarding 
the format of the accounts, definitions and interpretation, and the 
parameters of supervision. This need for international cooperation is
discussed in more detail below (see page 313) .
Capital adequacy
The role of capital in a financial intermediary differs from that 
in other types of organisation. In these other organisations the capital 
provides the initial injection of resources with which to start 
business. During the life of that business increases in capital provide 
increased resources for investment. However, for a financial 
intermediary, the resources for continuing business come from deposits, 
which result from depositors having confidence in the intermediary. True 
this confidence may be influenced by the existence of the capital stock 
but other factors will also be influential. Therefore the role of 
capital for a financial intermediary is seen as a cushion or insurance 
fund to absorb losses that may occur (Reed 1964). This insurance role is 
emphasised when it is remembered that it was traditional for UK banks to 
issue partly paid shares or uncalled capital so that the callability 
acts as an insurance against capital inadequacy.
Nevertheless, both financial and non-financial companies typically 
secure the bulk of their capital resources from their retained earnings. 
Reveil (1975) noted that retained earnings and capital adequacy are 
substitutes for each other, although he thought that retained earnings 
are the first line of defence.
Clearly then as the functioning of financial intermediaries relies 
on confidence; adequate capital and profits are required to reassure 
depositors, bank supervisors and markets generally.
Definition of capital
Gardner (1981) defines net worth as the book value of shareholders' 
interests in the company. The essential components of net worth are paid
up share capital and accumulated reserves. These reserves are increased 
by revaluation of assets, transfers from provisions, or from retained 
earnings. New share issues will add to net worth by adding to capital.
It is the increased net worth through new issues of share capital 
or increased earnings which represent an increased cushion or insurance 
fund. However, it should be noted that Gardner refers to the book value 
of shareholders' interests. To the extent that published financial and 
internal management accounts do not reflect the true value of assets and 
liabilities, the book value of shareholders' interests will not reflect 
the true value of the insurance fund.
If the bank's net worth is to be used as an insurance fund, it must 
be seen to be capable of being used to meet creditors' demands. Clearly 
many fixed assets are not in that category and also book values of 
relatively liquid assets which are in excess of realisable values 
distort the measure of the insurance fund.
The extent to which the net worth constitutes an insurance fund in 
the mind of creditors depends upon the liquidity of the assets 
represented by the net worth compared with the liquidity of the 
creditors' claims. Thus if one is a depositor with expectations of high 
liquidity, the insurance fund would only be constituted of those assets 
that can quickly be turned into cash. However, if one is a long term 
subordinated debt holder one's perception of the insurance fund may 
include the whole of the net worth.
Clearly, therefore, at least in the case of financial 
intermediaries, the notion of net worth is inadequate as a measure of 
capital within the context of capital adequacy. To overcome the 
weaknesses of net worth, the concept of Free Capital is used by some 
analysts. Free capital comprises Net Worth - Fixed Assets.
However, this concept of free capital is only as valid as the 
accounts from which it is calculated. One problem is that many 
provisions, such as 'doubtful debts' made against profits are
subjective; excess provision deflates profits and therefore the book 
value net worth, while under provision inflates profits and the book 
value of net worth. Currently there is debate about the lack of 
provision being made against LDC sovereign debt. While the high bad debt 
provisions of the UK clearers in 1981 are said to be because of the 
current recession, could they not also be a response to the political 
concern about high bank profits in 1980?
Given the weakness of using accounts as indicators of capital, the 
traditional ways of measuring capital adequacy via balance sheet ratios
must also be suspect when used without additional information.
Capital adequacy and bank supervision
The role of the bank supervisory authorities with respect to 
capital adequacy is to ensure that the capital is of adequate quantity 
and quality. With respect to quality, the capital must be such that it 
is perceived as an insurance fund by depositors and other creditors. 
With respect to quantity, this must be sufficient to absorb unforeseen 
losses without causing the bank to become insolvent, nor to lose 
confidence in its ability to continue functioning.
So, how much is enough capital? The capital to assets ratios of 
four leading US banks fell from 5.01% in 1970 to 3.58% in 1979. For the 
UK clearing banks the ratio fell from 7.63% to 6.02% over the same
period. Likewise for German banks the figures are 4.26 to 3.93 (Cohen & 
Basagni 1981, pl52). The ratio of free capital to deposits for the
London clearing banks fell from 4.1% in 1969 to 2.5 in 1974 rising to 
3.0% in 1976 (Willson Committee 1978)1
The reduction in these capital ratios has coincided with increased 
liability management and growth of interbank markets, both domestic and 
eurocurrency. There have been greater possibilities for portfolio 
diversification particularly for US banks after 1973. Improved bank
management systems have also contributed to the relatively more 
efficient use of capital. However, increased volatility of interest 
rates and exchange rates together with the increased perception of risk 
associated with lending to LDC sovereign borrowers make it prudent, 
ceteris paribus, to increase the 'cushion' in order to maintain market 
confidence.
What is an adequate level of capital depends upon the nature of the 
institution's business as reflected in its balance sheet and profit and 
loss accounts. It is therefore unlikely that any single measure of 
capital adequacy will be equally suitable to all banks. In particular 
the riskiness of each bank's assets and the liquidity profile of its 
liabilities are important, and yet their significance will probably be 
lost by the sole use of ratios complying with fixed predetermined 
criteria.
Accordingly, it is necessary for the supervisors to judge capital 
adequacy separately for each bank in the light of the constituency of 
its balance sheet, level of profitability, the current market conditions 
and the efficiency of each bank's management.
In the words of the Bank of England:
"The acceptable relationship of free capital to risk assets 
to be sought will vary for different categories of banks 
and even from bank to bank within a category. It will need 
to take account of each bank's historic experience, the 
spread of business and other special factors which might 
affect future profits", (Bank of England 1975b).
The Bank of England looks upon balance sheet ratios "..... only as
adjunct to individual assessment of each bank in the light of its own 
particular circumstances", (Bank of England 1975a). The Bank also notes 
the importance of adequate earnings in that if these can confidently 
cover normal loss experience there will be less need for capital 
resources.
Again, like other areas of supervision, there are international 
differences in attitudes to capital adequacy. We have only looked at the
attitude of the Bank of England. If other governments are less 
concerned, their banks may become the weak link in the chain of 
interbank transactions. The insolvency of one bank abroad may reduce 
confidence in the whole market, with costly results for the borrowers in 
developing countries.
Attitudes to capital adequacy will influence the banks' ability to 
lend to the developing countries in two ways. Firstly if the banks 
perceive that their capital asset ratios have reached a prudential 
minimum, they will not increase their loan portfolio. Secondly if the 
banks' capital asset ratio has reached the minimum set by the regulatory 
authorities, bank lending will not be increased.
Both these constraints apply if the banks cannot increase their 
capital base. However, the ability to increase this base depends upon 
what the regulatory authorities consider to be capital, the attitude of 
capital markets to banks as investments and the profitability of the 
banks. On the first point, shares and subordinated long term debt are 
generally accepted as capital by the authorities. However, the issue of 
shares by UK and US banks does not seem to be popular. Indeed in the 
case of US banks it will be difficult because shares have recently been 
trading at below net asset value. Furthermore, US bank bond prices have 
recently been falling due to investor concern about bank loan 
portfolios.
There is concern that reduced spreads on international lending will 
reduce the profitability of this lending and the need to make increased 
provisions for bad debts will reduce profits and therefore the ability 
to maintain an adequate capital base. This is particularly important 
considering the influence of inflation upon the growth of bank assets.
Clearly there is a possibility that there may be a capital 
constraint on new lending. The regulatory authorities, therefore, have 
three duties:
1) Not to develop prudential attitudes to capital adequacy 
that are more stringent than necessary.
2) Not to unduly restrict the banks' ability to raise new 
capital.
3) To ensure that excessive competition or imprudent 
banking practices do not reduce profitability to 
unacceptably low levels. This point confirms the 
spuriousness of dichotomising domestic and inter­
national banking for supervisory purposes. Reduced 
profits on international or domestic business will 
have the same influence upon capital adequacy.
Of the nine questions about prudential regulation included in the 
survey, four related to capital adequacy. They covered the reasons for 
declining capital asset ratios of recent years, whether further decline 
will be detrimental and the most appropriate ratio for the respondent's 
bank. The results are reported on page 351-54 of chapter seven.
Liquidity
Liquidity is the ability to convert assets at minimal cost into the 
means of payment. Thus liquid assets not only comprise cash and demand 
deposits held with banks, but also other assets depending upon the costs, 
implicit and explicit, involved in their conversion. Clearly the cash 
flow of a bank has an important influence on its liquidity. This cash 
flow may come from revenue, amortization of loans, maturing debt assets 
and sale of assets.
Liquidity is required by banks to maintain confidence by meeting all 
demands for withdrawals of deposits and for new loans. It is also 
required to meet the unanticipated shortfalls in inward cash flow for any 
reason, increased operating or capital expenditure and losses.
Maturity transformation has an important bearing upon a bank's need 
for liquidity as does the level of certainty in banking operations. If 
banks had perfectly matching maturity structures to their assets and 
liabilities and complete certainty as to repayment of their loans, their 
need for liquidity would be considerably reduced. Furthermore, greater 
liquidity will be required the greater the uncertainty associated with 
the inward cash flow of the financial intermediary.
It is important to differentiate between liquidity for an individual 
institution and that for a whole market. An asset is liquid because the 
holder can sell it easily and without substantial loss. One or two banks 
holding, say, treasury bills could sell their holdings without greatly 
influencing the price. However, if a whole market is selling treasury 
bills to gain liquidity, those assets will lose their liquid properties 
because they will be difficult to sell and any sales will be at 
substantially discounted prices.
Clearly then, prudential supervision of liquidity, like that of 
capital adequacy, should avoid sole reliance on liquidity ratios. In 
particular the degree of uncertainty attached to each component of cash 
flow and the availability of standby facilities should be taken into 
account.
International differences in the degree of supervision of liquidity 
increase the possibility that a crisis may affect the euromarkets via the 
banks subject to the weakest supervision. However, it is frequently true 
that prudential liquidity considerations are closely related to monetary 
control regimes which differ between countries and within countries from 
time to time. This may render it impossible to develop a framework for 
worldwide application of liquidity 'analysis that is internationally 
acceptable (Cook 1981).
Both liquidity and capital adequacy are related to the solvency of 
the organisation. To the extent that minimum solvency criteria set by 
supervisory authorities are greater than those that would be voluntarily
set by the organisation, they constitute a tax on its activities. When 
there are geographical differences in the tax being imposed, there will 
be pressure on the banks to move, via the establishment of branches and 
subsidiaries, to those areas imposing the lowest taxes. This problem can 
only be solved by imposing solvency conditions on the basis of worldwide 
consolidated accounts for each bank.
Furthermore, these geographical differences in the tax will mean 
that those banks located in low tax areas will have a competitive 
advantage over banks in high tax areas. There may therefore be pressure 
on the authorities imposing stringent regulations to relax those 
regulations (Colje 1982). If such regulations are not relaxed, a greater 
proportion of new lending will be from less regulated banks, thus also 
weakening the whole system. This clearly shows how the weaknesses of the
international financial system are related to the weakest set of
regulations. In order to overcome this problem there is a need for 
international agreement as to the stringency and nature of supervisory 
practices.
In the survey questions relating to liquidity were asked within the 
context of international differences in regulation which is the subject 
of the next section.
International cooperation in supervision and regulation
Differences in national attitudes to the methods and stringency of 
bank supervision weaken overall control and therefore security of the
global banking system. In particular footloose banks may gravitate to the
least regulated jurisdictions or engage in the least regulated types of 
business. Examples of the former include US banks opening branches in 
London or banks moving to the 'off-shore' banking centres such as Bahrain 
and Singapore.
Furthermore, because of the international nature of the interbank
market, banks in highly regulated jurisdictions may be exposed to the 
risks of banks in less regulated jurisdictions (Dale 1982). However, it 
must be remembered that the euromarkets are very efficient. It may be 
that the differing rigour in regulations leads to a tiering in the 
interbank market with strongly regulated banks being perceived as lesser 
risks and therefore obtaining funds more cheaply. If the interest rate 
differential reduced costs by more than the tighter regulations increased 
them, then banks would not gravitate to the least regulated 
jurisdictions. In fact, if there were any tiering in the interbank market 
because of location, banks would not wish to be identified as being 
higher risk institutions and therefore would not locate in the least 
regulated jurisdiction.
Differing governmental attitudes regarding the control of euromarket 
banking arise not just for prudential reasons, but for macroeconomic 
policy reasons. Although it is not intended to discuss this aspect of 
banking control, its very existence makes the achievement of a uniform 
system of prudential supervision all the more difficult.
An awareness of the dangers of the disparities in bank supervision 
and regulation, at least amongst the GlO and Switzerland, lead to the 
establishment in 1975 of the BIS Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices (The Cooke Committee). The general guidelines were 
published in the so-called Basle Concordat in 1975. A subsequent 
communique (15 April 1980) from the BIS stated that closer surveillance 
of international banking was to be carried out by the Standing Committee 
on euromarkets, meeting at least twice a year. In addition, the GlO 
countries and Switzerland instructed the Cooke Committee to step up its 
efforts, via member country authorities, to monitor the banks' 
international activities using consolidated accounts and to monitor the 
methods of assessing country risk exposure and maturity transformation 
(BIS 1980).
A very important area of concern, at least until 1983, was the
uncertainty as to which authorities are responsible for taking action in 
times of crisis. While it is recognised that a central bank will be 
responsible for the supervision of foreign branches of banks whose head 
offices are within its jurisdiction, it is by no means clear that the 
same applies to subsidiaries and consortium banks (Dale, op cit). This 
concept of 'parental responsibility' was, however, not uniformly applied. 
This is because countries such as Luxembourg and Switzerland maintain 
rigid secrecy laws which prevent foreign supervisory authorities from 
obtaining the required information about the activities of their own 
banks' operations in these centres (International Currency Review, July 
1982).
May 1983 saw the publication of an improved version of the Basle 
Concordat. This document noted that banks' operations abroad could be 
classified as those of branches, subsidiaries, or joint ventures 
(consortia). It also considers that there are two basic principles of 
international cooperation in bank regulation between parent and host 
authorities. Firstly, no foreign bank should escape supervision and 
secondly, that supervision must be adequate. Thus host authorities should 
inform parent organisations of any problems regarding a bank's foreign 
establishment and parent authorities should inform host authorities of 
any problems affecting the parent bank that also influence the bank's 
foreign establishment.
Host authorities are to be responsible for foreign bank 
establishments operating within their territories, while the parent 
authorities, on the other hand, will be responsible for the bank's 
general worldwide activities on a consolidated basis.
The 1983 Concordat lays down the host and parent responsibility in 
respect of solvency, liquidity and exchange exposure and each of these 
items in respect of branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures.
So, with regard to solvency, while the host authorities are 
responsible for the financial wellbeing of branches within their
jurisdiction, the parent authority has primary responsibility for the 
solvency of branches. This is because branch solvency is 
indistinguishable from that of the parent bank. However, the supervision 
of solvency of subsidiaries is jointly the responsibility of host and 
parent authorities, the latter supervising on a group consolidated basis. 
With respect to supervising joint ventures, this should be the 
responsibility of the authority in the country of incorporation.
Supervision of liquidity is generally the responsibility of the host 
country for branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures, with the parent 
authority looking at the consolidated liquidity situation of the whole 
bank. The supervision of liquidity in this respect excludes the lender of 
last resort facility. The host authority has a duty to inform the parent 
authority of any serious liquidity inaccuracy in a parent bank's foreign 
establishment.
Supervision of foreign exchange exposure is also the joint 
responsibility of parent and host authorities. Host authorities should 
supervise the foreign exchange positions of the establishments within 
their jurisdiction, while the parent authorities will monitor the 
position of the bank on a consolidated worldwide basis.
These statements in the 1983 Concordat assume that both host and 
parent authorities have similar views as to what are banking and non 
banking companies, as well as mutual respect in regard to supervisory
ability. With regard to this latter point, if the host authority is
unhappy with the ability of the parent authority, the host should
restrict the activities of establishments with such parent authorities. 
On the other hand, if a parent authority has reservations about the 
ability of a host authority, the parent authority should extend its
supervision to the foreign establishment or discourage the parent bank 
from operating any establishment in the host authority's jurisdiction.
The current approach to international banking supervision has 
several weaknesses.
The first weakness is that compliance by the national authorities 
with the recommendations made under the auspices of the BIS is voluntary. 
This results in a lack of uniformity between national regulatory systems 
as to definitions of banks and the stringency of regulations.
The second weakness is that only the central banks of the GlO 
countries and Switzerland have been covered by these recommendations. Yet 
there is a growing presence in the euromarkets of banks from outside this 
geographical area. Until the central banks of all countries whose banks 
are engaged in international lending adhere to the BIS recommendations, 
there may be a weak link in the system. However, it must be noted that 
the Cooke Committee is extending its consultations with supervisory 
authorities who were not signatories to the Basle Concordats.
Thirdly, there are no recommendations about the functioning of an 
International Lender of Last Resort, nor about an International Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. This point has lead some commentators to suggest 
that neither Italy nor Luxembourg broke the Basle Concordat when they 
allowed Banco Ambrosio Holdings to fail in July 1982. Supervisory 
responsibility does not necessarily mean Lender of Last Resort 
responsibility (Euromoney, October 1982).
Fourthly, national differences in the rigour of bank supervision may 
itself produce an inherent instability. This will result from depositors 
perceiving that some banking centres are safer havens than others. Thus 
at the first signs of a crisis, funds may move from centres of lax 
regulation to centres of strong regulation, irrespective of the financial 
health of the individual institutions losing the deposits.
There is clearly a need to remove the inherent instability caused by 
national differences in the stringency of regulations. However, the 
obvious method - that of negotiating internationally uniform regulations 
- does not seem to be a practical solution. An alternative approach, 
which may at least be partially enforceable by the GlO countries is to 
stop banks operating branches overseas and allow them to operate only
Jib
locally incorporated subsidiaries. Furthermore, the concept of parental 
responsibility should be limited in its applicability to subsidiaries 
operating in overseas centres with a comparable degree of supervision. 
This policy would result in the perceived safety of banks being 
influenced by the regulatory climate of their location, not that of their 
parents. Unless these less regulated locations ,put their supervision on 
an internationally comparable basis they would risk losing banking 
business.
The survey included five questions about the international 
cooperation in supervision. The questions centred on bankers' willingness 
to locate in or deal with banks located in less stringently regulated 
locations. However, one question was asked about whether the bankers 
thought that supervisory responsibility also implied the provision of 
lender of last resort facilities. The responses are reported in chapter 
seven, pages351-354.
* 10 Lender of last resort
In the domestic context the lender of last resort function is 
carried out at two levels. One, in relation to the day-to-day orderly 
conduct of financial markets where institutions have access to the 
central bank's discount window on a formal and frequent basis. The second 
in relation to providing substantial resources, often with the assistance 
of other private institutions, to selected institutions who- face a 
fundamental financial crisis that threatens their viability as financial 
intermediaries. It is this latter function which is discussed here.
Concentration of deposits from a few large depositors increases the 
impact of liquidity risk if those deposits are withdrawn from the 
euromarkets. Given the degree of maturity transformation by eurobanks, 
this may put the intermediating function at risk. However, theoretically, 
this risk should only affect one or some banks but not the whole market.
This is because unless the depositor is willing to hold cash instead of a 
deposit, the funds must end up in the world banking system somewhere.
Nevertheless, the weakness of one bank may cause such increased 
perception of risk in the market so as to create temporary financial 
instability. Accordingly the central banks of the GlO countries indicated 
in 1974 that they will provide such assistance to the euromarket in their 
individual jurisdictions so as to avoid any disruptive consequences. 
However, the markets seem to be unclear as to the true meaning of this 
statement. Does it mean that no large bank will be forced into 
liquidation or does it mean that help will only be granted to the market 
as a whole, thereby allowing large and small insolvent banks to fail?
Moreover, the supervisory concept of parental responsibility 
discussed on pages 313 to 318 above does not necessarily mean lender of 
last resort responsibility. This has resulted in the Bank of England 
requiring 'letters of ,comfort' from each of the head offices or parent 
organisations of the banks operating in the UK euromarket. Similar action 
has also been taken by a number of other central banks.
One weakness of the support system is that to date the one time that 
it has been tested, ie the Banco Ambrosio affair, it failed and therefore 
cannot engender confidence for the future. Although there was 
disagreement.as to whether Banco Ambrosio Holdings was in fact a bank, it 
was the differences in supervisory attitudes between Luxembourg and Italy 
that resulted in lack of financial support for the ailing institution. 
Furthermore, the agreement only covers banks in the GlO countries. There 
is some uncertainty regarding parental responsibility for subsidiary and 
consortium banks who have shareholders outside these countries. 
Therefore, before much confidence can’ be placed upon this system, it is 
essential that a uniform policy be established and that central banks 
from non GlO countries and in particular Arab countries should be 
involved.
It was noted above (page 317) that the differences between national
banking regulations created an inherent instability in the international 
banking system. Nowhere is this more obvious than in national differences 
in domestic lender of last resort facilities. If a lender of last resort 
is desired to add stability to the international banking system, then 
either the various national systems must exhibit considerable uniformity 
or an international body to carry out such a function will have to be 
established.
When considering the establishment of an international lender of 
last resort, it should be realised that the domestic equivalent is
accompanied by the power of supervision and regulation. Therefore, an 
international system should only be established if the international
organisation has similar and sufficient powers (de Vries 1982). However,
given the differences in national attitudes to supervision and
regulation, an international lender of last resort is unlikely to be 
established because the individual member central banks could not be 
expected to underwrite the activities of banks over which they had no 
control. Thus uniform attitudes to supervision and regulation seem to be 
prerequisites to the establishment of an international lender of last 
resort.
If such a system were to be established, it may encourage some banks 
to take imprudent risks if the banks knew the circumstances and 
conditions under which they would get assistance. McMahon suggests that 
this problem can be overcome by not publicising these terms and 
conditions "Emergency assistance is inherently a process of negotiation
and judgement ....." (McMahon 1977). If the Bank of England's activities
in the UK secondary banks' crisis and the recent building society 
failures can be taken as a guide, those negotiations will result in other 
private institutions coming to the assistance of the defaulting one. 
Similar action has been followed in the USA, in relation to local banks, 
under the guidance of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
If there is to be reliance upon flexibility in the criteria used for
access to a lender of last resort, there must be even greater emphasis on 
continuous and uniform supervision and monitoring by central banks. 
Indeed monitoring would ideally be executed by the international lender 
of last resort organisation. However, banks operating in international 
markets also operate in domestic markets, thus this organisation would 
need to monitor and have influence over domestic banking as well. This 
may prove politically unacceptable and it may be more fruitful for the 
international consultations on bank supervision to strive for uniformity 
for domestic lender of last resort facilities. If this is combined with 
agreement about the concept of parental responsibility, there will be an 
effective system of lender of last resort for international banking.
Notwithstanding uniformity of domestic lender of last resort 
facilities, there will still be a major weakness of relying on individual 
national systems. This weakness stems from the fact that the stock of 
international banking debt is large relative to a single nation's 
reserves. Therefore a single domestic lender of last resort may have 
difficulty supporting the foreign currency operations of banks under its 
control without experiencing adverse movements in its exchange rates 
(Williams 1982). Therefore international cooperation regarding the 
availability of lender of last resort resources is essential.
The problems associated with an international lender of last resort 
have been summarised by Dean and Giddy as follows:
1) When should the lender of last resort intervene? If this
institution has autonomy in this respect, central banks' 
domestic monetary control may be undermined. Yet without 
that autonomy, depositors look to domestic lenders of 
last resort.
2) Where would this institution get its funds from? If it
creates its own credit it will, in effect, be a global
central bank.
3) Will this institution support banks from non participating 
countries? If it does not, instability will remain;, if it 
does, there will be a tremendous free rider incentive.
(Dean & Giddy 1981, p41)
To overcome these problems, they suggest that central banks should 
encourage mutually supportive lines of credit commitments between banks 
for use in an emergency. A fee would be charged by the central bank on 
the difference between total deposits on one hand and insured deposits 
and credit lines on the other in order to encourage such a system. This 
fee would be in exchange for lender of last resort facilities. Two 
problems with this suggestion are that it may result in a cost 
differential against some banks unless all countries were within the 
system; and secondly, it assumes that there is international agreement 
about lender of last resort facilities.
However, to the extent that all banks will suffer if one bank fails, 
it is in their interests to provide a system of mutual support. Indeed, 
it already exists in a rudimentary way because lines of credit between 
banks were shown in chapter two to be one way in which banks attract 
funds. The reason why all banks will suffer if one fails is that there 
may be a general lack of confidence and loss of deposits or they could 
suffer a decline in asset values following a forced sale by some banks.
The suggestions of Dean and Giddy have the advantage of placing a 
limit on the support that the central bank would be required to give - 
this limit being the difference between total deposits on the one hand 
and insured deposits and credit lines on the other.
Furthermore, because the market is providing the credit lines, the 
cost of those lines to each bank will be related to the perceived 
riskiness of that bank's business. Thus banks' desires for risky assets 
will be constrained by the higher cost of credit lines.
Even if an international lender of last resort is established, much 
of its success will be difficult to measure because the aim of
establishing such an institution is to maintain depositor confidence. If 
it is successful it will not be called upon to act.
Ossola (1980) suggests that the IMF and BIS should combine to enter 
into standby swap agreements with the major banks in the euromarket. 
These agreements would be activated if the banks suffered liquidity 
crises because of defaults, reschedulings or government action. The 
requests for support would come from the bank but be judged by the 
IMF/BIS.
The IMF/BIS would reimburse themselves by drawing upon the swap 
agreements with eurobanks not affected by the liquidity crisis. This 
would amount to intra-market recycling. The duration of the assistance 
would be limited thus imposing a potential cost to imprudent banking.
It is notable that Ossola gives the IMF/BIS authority to dictate 
criteria for capital adequacy, loan concentration and provisions of 
reserves against risks. Furthermore, the IMF/BIS would expect collateral 
against activated swap agreements.
These suggestions have the advantage of more clearly formalising the 
interlocking lines of credit that already exist in the euromarket but 
also have one other advantage. Swap agreements between the banks and the 
IMF/BIS would not be withdrawn when crisis is impending thus the system 
is more durable than the current system of lines of credit.
Four questions about an international lender of last resort were 
included in the survey. These questions asked if the bankers were in 
favour of an international lender of last resort, the form that they 
would most favour and whether such an institution would encourage banks 
to engage in more high risk lending. The results are reported on page 354- 
356 of chapter seven.
6.11 Bank deposit insurance schemes
Bank deposit insurance was initiated in the USA with the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. A similar scheme has recently been
instituted in the UK under the Banking Act 1979 and a scheme is operated 
in Germany by the Federal Association of German Banks.
At first sight it would seem natural to extend the insurance 
coverage to the foreign currency deposits with the domestic banks and all 
deposits held by domestic banks' branches overseas. However, such a 
scheme would mean insuring deposits in localities with varying degrees of 
prudential control and differing political climates.
Furthermore, the maximum sum of each deposit insured under the 
domestic schemes would be inadequate in the international market.
One criticism made by the UK banks to the proposed UK scheme was 
that the undoubted banks had to pay towards insuring the doubtful banks. 
This inequity would be compounded if the domestic scheme were simply 
extended to overseas branch deposits.
A well known suggestion for an international deposit insurance 
scheme was made by Grubel (1979). He proposed an International Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. Its proposed features were as follows:
- voluntary membership but with measures to persuade 
countries to join;
- the moral hazard problem is reduced through setting 
insurance premia according to risk or by having 
only partial insurance;
- funds for the IDIC would be guaranteed by member 
governments;
- IDIC would impose conditions upon members so as to 
eliminate jurisdictional problems.
Grubel notes that if one country refuses to join then banks may 
transfer their business to that country to avoid payment of premiums and 
would therefore have a cost advantage over other banks. Thus the low 
margin in eurobanking would make it necessary for all eurobusiness to be 
domiciled in the insurance free country and the scheme would fail.
But would it? Surely an insured deposit is a better quality asset 
for the depositor than an uninsured one, ceteris paribus. In a market 
with a fear of default eg USA, banks find it worthwhile to advertise the 
fact that they are members of the FDIC. So maybe in the euromarkets the 
banks would find it good publicity to be insured. The difference is that 
the size of deposit covered would have to be very large relative to the 
domestic schemes.
Grubel noted that the full value of such a scheme may never be known 
because it acts as a deterrent to crises. Probably the greatest quantity 
of resources would be used in designing and negotiating a suitable scheme 
rather than in bailing out failed banks.
One criticism of such a scheme is that it might make depositors, 
including interbank and other wholesale depositors, less prudent. For 
instance, banks may increase their exposure limits on interbank dealings. 
This can be tempered by insuring only a proportion of the deposit held.
This insurance company would have to protect deposits subject to 
widely differing degrees of prudential control; Grubel attempts to 
overcome these problems by allowing the insurance company to impose 
uniform regulatory standards and set variable insurance premiums related 
to risk.
Such a scheme would only work if a considerable amount of regulatory 
power were transferred to the IDIC from member governments. Moreover, 
because the same banks engage in domestic and eurobusiness, the IDIC 
would have to have considerable influence over domestic as well as 
foreign banking. Domestic monetary authorities will therefore lose some 
of their regulatory autonomy. Furthermore, who is to decide when a crisis 
is in the realm of the domestic monetary authority, the IDIC or the 
world's central banks? {Dean & Giddy 1981 b) . Thus the establishment of 
an IDIC would be more a political than a commercial act.
Many of the problems of establishing an IDIC are similar to those of 
establishing an international lender of last resort and uniform standards
of bank regulation. The overriding problem is political in the sense that 
domestic banking authorities will have to surrender some of their 
autonomy if these systems are to be established.
One question about deposit insurance was included in the survey; it 
asked if banks were in favour of deposit insurance generally, whether it 
should cover deposits at overseas branches and whether it should cover 
interbank deposits. The results are reported on page 356 of chapter 
seven.
6.12 Portfolio diversification
It has been shown in chapter five, page 242 that it is possible to 
classify portfolio risk as either systematic or unsystematic, and that 
under certain conditions it should be possible to increase the efficiency 
of an asset portfolio by diversifying away the unsystematic risk.
The efficiency criterion is where the income of the portfolio cannot 
be increased without increasing the overall risk of that portfolio. In 
order to be able to diversify away the unsystematic risk, the expected 
returns on the individual assets must be uncorrelated with each other.
If portfolio diversification is to be useful as a way of reducing 
the banks' exposure to LDCs, the portfolios must exhibit considerable 
unsystematic risk. Furthermore, the banks must be able to diversify their 
portfolios.
It has been noted in chapter five, page 247 o f  this thesis that bank 
loans to LDCs exhibit considerable systematic risk. The main reasons are:
1) Servicing costs are all related to LIBOR or a 
similar rate;
2) Many loans are denominated in one currency and the 
majority in only 3-5 currencies, thus there is a 
common currency risk;
3) Because foreign exchange is required to service debt, 
exports depend upon sales to industrialised countries;
4) Many LDCs use loans to produce similar primary products; 
thus if the price of a product falls in world markets, 
many borrowers are adversely affected.
There is, however, clearly some unsystematic risk in bank loan 
portfolios and to the extent that this can be diversified away, more 
funds can be lent to LDCs, including a wider range of those countries, 
without reducing the efficiency of the bank's portfolio.
To reach the position of an efficient portfolio, the banks must have 
unfettered ability to diversify. Currently there seem to be three major 
restrictions on portfolio diversification. These are:
1) Lack of detailed knowledge of unsystematic risks by 
the banks.
2) Large minimum size of participations combined with 
relatively few countries that have had access to the 
eurocurrency market.
3) Market imperfections, particularly indivisibility of 
the loan asset, and the small secondary market in 
loan participations.
Work by Hager (1981) and the Robert Morris Associates (1980) 
suggests that bank management do not have the information to assess the 
degree of portfolio diversification beyond the country level. Thus a bank 
may lend to many countries but if all the borrowers rely on production of 
the same commodity to service the debt those loans will be subject to 
considerable systematic risk. The above studies did not attempt to assess 
as large a number of banks as this study but their findings are
similar to those of the writer reported on page 334 below.
Clearly improved management information systems regarding lending risks 
will help reduce the overall unsystematic risk of the loan portfolio.
The current absence of a deep secondary market in loan 
participations means that the only way in which a banker may change the
structure of his loan portfolio is to change the exposure limits for each 
borrower. This can only be achieved by changing the rate of new lending 
relative to amortization payments and will be a time-consuming process.
Although there has been a market in loan participations for some 
time, it is a shallow market and considerable transactions costs are 
involved. Furthermore, recourse still relates to the original participant 
bank and not to the debtor country. As such, selling a participation does 
not reduce the original lender's country exposure. Clearly a deep 
secondary market and a change in the status of sold participations will 
be helpful in portfolio diversification.
Will the banks, however, be willing and able to take losses by 
selling participations on fixed spread loans when market spreads are 
above those on the loans being sold? What will the secondary market price 
of bank loans do to depositor confidence?
It therefore seems clear that for adequate and continuous loan 
portfolio diversification to reduce the unsystematic risks to be borne by 
the banks, the banks themselves must:
1) Develop management information systems to enable them
to determine the degree of loan diversification at least 
down to industry, commodity and conglomerate level.‘
2) Develop a deeper secondary market in loan participations.
This may require the development of floating rate spreads 
or at least more frequent predetermined increases in the 
spread during the life of the loan.
Question 4 of part one of the survey asked about the ability of the
banks' management information systems to determine the degree of
diversification in the loan portfolios. Diversification was by five
categories of borrowing and determined on a branch only or group
consolidated basis. The results are reported in chapter seven, page 334.
Four questions were included in the survey to ascertain bankers'
attitudes to a deeper secondary market in loan participations and to 
floating spreads. The results are reported in chapter seven, page 356.
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Chapter 7
THE SURVEY
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this survey was to determine the attitudes of the lending 
bankers to the suggestions, detailed in chapter six, for facilitating the
continued flow of new lending to LDCs. At the same time the opportunity
was taken to ask questions about bankers' corporate aims and objectives 
with regard to their international lending activities.
The survey population was selected on the basis that the banks 
fulfilled three criteria:
that they were included in The Bank of England's list of 
Banks and Licensed Deposit Takers;
that they were included in the List of the Top 500 Banks
published by 'The Banker' magazine;
that they were included in the Euromoney/Hambro directory 
of Euromarket banks.
This selection procedure resulted in 212 banks being included in the 
survey. However, this figure proved to include banks which did not, for 
one reason or another, lend to developing countries. Thirty banks 
returned the questionnaire uncompleted for this reason. It is therefore 
considered that the valid sample size for this survey is 182 at a 
maximum.
Of these 182 banks, 62 responded positively, 31 banks said that they 
were not willing to partake in the survey, 6 banks made joint responses 
with their parent or associate organisation in the United Kingdom. Eighty 
three banks failed to respond at all after one reminder and a period of 
four months had elapsed since the despatch of the main survey on 28 
February 1983.
Prior to this date a pilot survey covering 30 banks was completed 
with 10 banks responding. These responses indicated that the
questionnaire only needed minor amendment to the wording of two 
questions. These amendments were made and the main survey embarked upon.
The positive responses to both surveys accounted for 33.5% of 
those surveyed. Of those that made negative responses 12 said that it was 
not their policy to respond to "unofficial questionnaires" and 3 said 
that their office did not make corporate policy in these matters, such 
policy being dictated from an overseas Head Office.
Of the 83 banks who did not reply to the survey request 19 were 
banks from developing countries.
Of the 62 banks responding positively to the survey, 15 were US 
banks located in London, 7 were UK merchant banks, 3 were UK clearing 
banks, 4 were other British banks, 2 were consortium banks, 7 were 
Japanese banks in London and 23 were other overseas banks located in 
London. One response could not be classified due to the respondent 
mutilating the code number on the questionnaire. The respondents
included the major eurocurrency syndicate leaders of recent years.
The questionnaire itself (see Appendix VII) was divided into two main 
sections. Section one asked questions about the constraints and perceived 
risks of international lending and asked questions about the corporate 
aims and objectives of banks engaged in such lending. Questions 1 , 3 and 
4 specifically related to constraints and risks and the answers thus 
relate to chapter six of this thesis. Questions 2 and 5 related to 
corporate aims and objectives and thus relate to chapter three of this 
thesis.
The second section asked questions about methods of reducing the 
risks of international bank lending. These questions were grouped under 
eight sub headings:
1) Reducing the debt service burden of interest payments
2) Debt restructuring
3) Improving the quality of information about LDCs
4) Co-financing with the IBRD or similar international institutions
5) Credit Insurance and Loan Guarantee Schemes
6) Prudential controls
7) International Lender of Last Resort
8) Miscellaneous
The subsections 1-7 follow sections in chapter six discussing the 
benefits and disadvantages of each of the various suggestions. Subsection
8. asks one question about deposit insurance and four questions about the
advantages of a deeper secondary market in syndicated loan 
participations.
The responses to the questions which indicated that a limited choice 
of response was required eg Yes/No or Important/Not important, etc have 
been aggregated and analysed for the whole group of respondents and for 
subsections of banks as follows:- 
US banks 
Japanese banks 
UK clearing banks 
British merchant banks 
Other British banks 
Other overseas banks
X2 tests and analysis of adjusted residuals were carried out as 
suggested in Everitt (1979) to determine any statistically significant 
differences between the responses of subgroups of banks and the overall 
group of responses.
In general, the theme of the responses in this chapter is that of 
the responses of the whole group but where a subgroup or groups gives 
statistically significantly different responses, these are highlighted in
the discussion. The full details of the overall responses are given 
in Appendix VII.
It was not considered appropriate to classify the 1 comment' 
responses by subgroup because no two responses were exactly similar and 
therefore interpreting the "feeling" of such responses is somewhat 
subjective. Any subjectivity would, in many instances, be invalidated by 
the small number of comment responses received from certain subgroups for 
certain questions.
7.2 Section I of the survey
Corporate objectives of banks lending to LDCs 
Constraints on and risks of lending to LDCs
This section asked five questions. Numbers 2 and 5 related to the 
banks' corporate aims and objectives in lending to LDCs. Questions 1 and 
3 related to the constraints on and risk in international lending. 
Question 4 asks about the level of knowledge that the banks possess about 
the degree of diversification of their loan portfolios. The mixed order 
of questions was decided upon in order that questions 2 and 5 could be 
set apart so that responses to question 5 could be used as checks on 
those of question 2.
7.2.1 Constraints and risks
Question 1 in this section showed that doubt about future debt 
servicing ability is the major constraint to further bank lending to 
LDCs. Full utilisation of exposure limits and capital adequacy were 
respectively second and third in importance. Question lii shows that 44 
out of the 61 respondents considered debt servicing ability as the main 
constraint.
There is little difference in the relative importance accorded to 
each constraint by the individual subgroups of banks in the survey. One 
exception was that the Japanese banks found utilisation of exposure
limits relatively more important than other banks. This is probably due 
to the control exercised by the Japanese central bank over the 
international lending of Japanese banks.
Question liii asked about the relative changes in the constraints 
over the last five years.
Most respondents considered that debt servicing capacity and capital 
adequacy had become relatively more important constraints in recent 
years.
However, some thought that capital adequacy was relatively even more 
important than debt servicing capacity. This constraint was particularly 
exacerbated by reschedulings that distorted debt service flows but also 
required fresh lending. Tighter prudential controls were also considered 
to exacerbate this constraint.
It was also noted that the exposure limits and capital adequacy 
constraints were related to debt servicing ability in that exposure 
limits and capital were more likely to increase when debt was being 
serviced properly. Poor stock market ratings for the banks due to bad 
debt service on LDC loans will make raising capital more difficult.
Some respondents thought that profitability was less of a constraint 
now that spreads generally, including those on rescheduled debt, were 
rising. However, the overall response to the profitability constraint is 
that it was never substantial.
Forced rescheduling was considered by one bank as creating a 
constraint of inadequate portfolio diversification. Another respondent 
considered that a future constraint would be the crowding out of LDC 
borrowers as lending opportunities increased in the industrialised 
countries as their economies recovered.
Question 3 was- aimed at ascertaining what type of risk the banks 
considered most important. Inability to service debt, corporate credit 
risk and concentration of borrowers were most frequently included under 
the classification "very important". Interbank credit risk, project risk,
concentration of depositors were most frequently included as "important".
The most important risk was considered to be the inability to 
service debt.
With respect to the changing relative importance of these risks, the 
inability to service debt was growing in importance as was the 
concentration of borrowers, this latter risk being exacerbated by debt 
rescheduling.
There were no statistically significant differences between the
groups of banks and their perception of the relative importance of the
various risks except for the US banks’ perception of the importance of 
corporate credit risk. Relatively more US banks classified this risk as 
"important" and relatively fewer classified it as "very important" 
compared with the groups as a whole.
Question 4, relating to portfolio diversification, showed that the 
majority of banks had information at the bank group consolidated level 
for diversification by country, by industrial classification of the
borrower and by parent organisation. However, sizeable minorities, 18 for 
industrial classification and 15 for parent organisation, did not have 
such information. Moreover, only 26 respondents indicated that they had 
information at the group level regarding diversification by source of 
borrowers' income while 6 had such information at the branch level only.
Responses to item e (other forms of diversification) indicated 
diversification by maturity, by currency, by guarantor or shareholder of 
borrower.
There were no statistically significant differences between the
subgroups of banks.
Clearly there is an undesirable lack of information about the 
diversification of loan portfolios particularly regarding the source of 
borrowers' income. Some banks will, therefore, be unaware of the extent to 
which their loan portfolios are subject to unsystematic risk in this respect.
Lack of such information is a hindrance to the use of bank 
consolidated accounts by the regulatory authorities, as without such
supplementary information the usefulness of group consolidated accounting 
information must be less than optimal for the task of regulating the 
international banking system. The responses to this question indicate that 
some improvement in consolidated coverage is required.
7.2.2 Corporate objectives of banks lending to LDCs
Question 2 was the first of two questions aimed at ascertaining 
banks' corporate aims and objectives in relation to their lending to LDCs.
Profitability followed by support for home based export industries 
were by far the most frequently mentioned aims. New market development and 
risk control followed in frequency, while support for local economies and 
growth of balance sheets were also mentioned.
In terms of relative importance, as reflected by the answers to 2ii, 
profitability was the most important, followed by support of export 
customers. Responses to 2iii regarding changes in the relative importance 
of these objectives over the last five years, suggested that banks' 
objectives were dominated by the need for asset growth and profits growth 
in the early years. Furthermore, post 1973 many banks wanted to be seen as 
international banks and this lead to an expansionary lending strategy.
Responses to 2iv suggest that objectives change not so much because of a
learning process but because of the achievement of previous objectives. 
Here the achievement of a growth objective and the subsequent 
concentration on profits or risk/reward relationship was mentioned on
several occasions.
Question 5 listed some aims of firms frequently found in economic
theories of the firm and asked about the relative importance of each aim
to the responding bank.
In the overall response the aims of maximising profits and of 
reducing risk were very important with asset growth and asset growth
subject to a profits constraint dominating the "important" category. In 
terms of the relative importance the reduction of risk was considered the 
most important aim with profit maximisation second.
There was a statistically different response from the US banks and
the Japanese banks compared with the whole sample in respect of the aim of 
asset growth. The American banks found asset growth relatively less 
important than the sample as a whole and the Japanese found it relatively 
more so. This difference can be explained by the relative maturity of each 
group as international lenders.
A notable feature of the responses to question 5i is the number of 
responses where asset growth or asset growth subject to a minimum profits 
constraint were combined with profit maximisation. Subsequent discussion 
on this matter with a number of respondents indicated that during the 
1970's at least the banks were looking for growing profits from growing 
balance sheets and that to the extent that banks were aiming to maximise 
profits in the economic sense they were aiming for long run profit 
maximisation and that the adjustment to the long run in sovereign lending 
was still taking place.
The attitudes of the US banks and Other Overseas banks to the aim of 
minimising risk differed from the sample as a whole. The US banks gave 
greater weighting to this subject as "important" compared with "very 
important", while Other Overseas banks gave greater weighting to this aim 
as "very important" compared with "important".
Answers to question 5iii indicated that minimisation of risk was now 
the most important aim, as indeed is suggested in responses to question 
5ii. However this is a new phenomenon and in the recent past growth of 
assets with or without a profits constraint was the most important 
objective.
Answers to question 5iv raised the aim of client support particularly 
export clients by providing buyer credits. The objective of support for 
home based export business was a frequent response to question 2i, such 
responses being confirmed by those to question 5iv.
To summarise so far, the responses to section one of the survey 
suggest that the bankers perceive the main risk as inability to service 
debt and that this risk is seen as the major constraint upon further
lending. The questions in section two of the survey explore some ways of 
reducing this risk to the banker and thereby removing the constraint.
The responses to questions 2 and 5 give considerable credence to the 
model of lending bank behaviour suggested in chapter three.
Although the banks see maximising of profits as a major objective, 
asset growth with or without a profits constraint is also very important. 
Profitability does not seem ever, and particularly not currently, to have 
been a constraint. However, a new objective of minimising risk is 
currently the most important constraint for many banks; this being a 
relatively new phenomenon replacing asset growth or profit maximisation. 
The relative importance of minimising risk as a constraint in lending to 
LDCs is supported by the major risk as being the perceived lack of ability 
of the LDCs to service their debt.
The fact that profit has not been a serious constraint on bank 
lending to LDCs suggests that the supply function of loans has shifted to 
the right more rapidly than the demand function. This seems the 
appropriate interpretation given that for at least part of the 1970's 
spreads were falling and therefore growth of lending was accompanied by 
falling average revenue. This seems to rule out the suggestion that banks 
have positively sloped long run cost functions and that the increased 
lending resulted from shifts in the demand for loans. This is because 
spreads would have had to rise during the whole period under review.
The importance of asset growth for banks as a whole combined with the 
lack of a profits constraint during the 1970's indicates that bankers 
interpreted maximising profit as compatible with increasing assets in each 
time period. Therefore, with falling or zero marginal cost, the 
appropriate strategy in the absence of other constraints, was to lend more 
in each time period. With constant, positive marginal costs the 
appropriate strategy would be to lend, again in the absence of other 
constraints, until marginal cost equals marginal revenue in some future 
time period in long run profit maximisation. In either case it seems clear
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that maximising profits in the period under review is compatible with 
balance sheet growth. However, there does seem to have been a constraint 
in addition to that of MC = MR or of minimum profits and that is a maximum 
acceptable level of perceived risk. It was suggested in chapter three that 
if this constraint rose, the quantity of lending would fall, ceteris 
paribus. The fact that the recent rise in risk minimisation is coinciding 
with a slowdown in lending to LDCs at a time when spreads are rising 
suggests risk and not profit are the major constraints upon balance sheet 
growth.
From this analysis the writer concluded that during the period 
1970-1980 bank lending behaviour is best explained by a model where asset 
growth subject to a minimum level of profit or maximum level of risk is 
the relevant objective. This must throw some doubt upon the explanatory 
value of work on eurobank behaviour where the banks were assumed to be 
profit maximisers in the short term.
7.3 Section II of the survey
Methods of reducing risk in international bank lending and instability 
in loan markets
7.3.1 Reducing the debt service burden of interest payments
Question 6 asked if the bankers would like to see aid payments used 
to subsidise interest costs on bank loans to LDC borrowers. As expected, 
the majority (34 to 22) said 'yes' on the basis that such payments would 
make the banks' income from these loans somewhat more certain. However, 
there was a sizeable minority which were against such a subsidy. Even 
where the subsidies were favoured, the respondents generally thought that 
the payments should not be made without adequate control over the use of 
subsidised funds by the LDCs.
There was concern that subsidies would reduce risk differentials and 
thus hinder the market allocation of risk. Indeed some respondents 
considered that such a subsidy scheme could induce politically motivated
credit rationing. Furthermore, subsidising loans would not lift 
constraints such as capital adequacy, exposure limits, etc.
There were statistically significant differences in the responses 
from the US banks and the Other Overseas banks compared with the whole 
group. The majority of US banks (9 to 5) did not want subsidies on 
interest payments. On the other hand, the majority (17 to 4) of Other 
Overseas banks favoured such subsidies.
Question 7 aimed to determine the influence that any subsidy would 
have on increasing the supply of funds to LDCs. The answers to question 7i 
indicated that countries that are current borrowers would not receive more 
funds despite such a subsidy nor would countries which to date had not 
gained access to bank funds. However, for both cases there was a sizeable 
minority responding positively, 22 and 23 respectively.
There were statistically significant differences for Japanese banks, 
UK merchant banks and UK clearing banks compared with the responses as a 
whole. The Japanese banks responding were unanimous that such a subsidy 
would not increase the flow of finance. On the other hand, 5 out of 6 UK 
merchant banks and 3 out of 3 clearing banks responding suggested that the 
financial flow to existing LDC borrowers would be increased by such a 
subsidy.
Question 7ii regarding the use of the subsidy to allow LDCs to pay 
higher spreads got an overwhelming (37 to 10) negative response. Thus the 
suggestion of higher returns for higher risk does not seem on the face of 
it to be holding true. However, it must be remembered that spread is not a 
true measure of risk because during the late 1970's competition to lend 
compressed risk premia.
Generally the comments relating to question 7 were negative in 
nature, the common theme being that subsidising interest rates or spreads 
does not necessarily make the borrower creditworthy. High interest 
payments are only part of the borrower's problems.
It was suggested that the higher spread would not induce sufficient
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additional risk bearing because the risk return trade-off only functions 
within a narrow band and bankers are generally risk averse.
The respondents that thought a subsidy would increase the financial 
flow to LDCs also noted that the subsidy would have to be in the form of 
additional aid and not a reallocation of the present aid budget.
Question 8 suggested a temporary IMF facility to help LDCs finance 
the balance of payments burden due to fluctuating interest rates. There 
was general support (32 to 23) for this suggestion but safeguards will be 
required to ensure that the system does not encourage a lack of discipline 
by eligible borrowers. Furthermore, there must be a fair method of 
calculating the normal rate of interest from which the deviation can be 
calculated.
Respondents showed concern for costs of administering such a scheme, 
the financial commitment of the IMF given recent volatility of interest 
rates and the ability to ensure that the facility was repaid when interest 
rates moved to more favourable levels. There was also concern about the 
LDCs dislike for IMF conditionality and therefore whether this facility 
would be popular with those countries, particularly as it may result in 
more interference by the IMF in their economies and even world financial 
markets.
If the IMF had to borrow the resources from the markets, directly or 
indirectly, it would exaggerate the volatility of interest rates by 
borrowing when rates are high and repaying when rates are low. It was also 
noted that for the long term viability of the scheme there should be no 
upward trend in interest rates. However this could be overcome by 
periodically redefining the normal rate of interest to reflect this trend.
There were no statistically significant differences between the 
responses from the subgroups of banks and the group as a whole to question 
8.
There was an overwhelming negative response (46 to 8) to question 9 
about the viability of index linking bank loans. Comments from the
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respondents indicated that such loans would not be available until bank 
funding was put on the same basis. Additional comments suggested 
difficulties in choosing an index appropriate to international lending. 
Furthermore, indexing of loans would mean deferring a large element of the 
return from bank lending until final payment is received and in 
circumstances such as the present that is uncertain.
The bankers1 attitude to subsidies etc on interest rates is that on 
their own they will not necessarily increase the flows of bank finance to 
LDCs. However, they may tip the balance in favour of more borrowings for 
some borrowers. Index linking of loans seems to be out for the present. 
However, some sort of interest cost specific facility from the IMF would 
seem to have support providing adequate safeguards and an appropriate 
formula for the "normal" rate of interest can be developed.
7.3.2 Debt restructuring
Question 10 was the first of seven about debt restructuring. 
Responses gave overwhelming support (39 to 15) to the suggestion that 
changing the maturity structure of debt is a legitimate aspect of debt 
management policy.
However, comments suggest restructuring of debt must be accompanied 
by economic adjustment policies aimed at balancing the external account. 
Furthermore, any restructuring should be by mutual agreement and not 
forced upon the banks as some suggest is happening at present.
It was recognised several times that some of the current 
restructuring results from lenders previously granting loans with a 
maturity profile inappropriate to the financing of economic development.
Question 11 about the desirability of restructuring the maturity 
structure of debt before a crisis looms received an even more definitely 
positive response; 46 to 8 with no statistically significant differences 
amongst the subgroups of banks. However, respondents thought that 
alternative economic policies should be tried before debt is restructured.
It was also frequently noted that a crisis concentrates the mind and that 
it may be difficult to get the parties to agree to changes in contractual 
terms without an air of crisis.
Question 12 asked the bankers to say which were the major costs to 
the banks of debt rescheduling. The most frequent answer, 34 out of 59 
respondents, considered staff time, administrative and legal costs as the 
most important. This would suggest that any standardisation of procedures, 
say along the lines suggested in chapter six, page 281 above would help 
reduce these costs.
Other responses to question 12 suggested the following to be 
important: loss of opportunity in alternative uses of funds, loss of
independence in determining the make-up of the loan portfolio and possible 
increase in funding costs, either by increased perceived risk by 
depositors, or increased competition for longer term loans.
The responses to question 13 showed majority support for a code of 
conduct for debt rescheduling. The positive respondents nevertheless did 
not want such a code to add respectability to rescheduling ie defaulting 
on loans. The negative respondents considered that:
- each rescheduling is different from others
- such a code would be difficult to enforce
- such a code would encourage default
Clearly the exact nature of such a code would be crucial. However, 
given the responses to question 12 about the resource costs of 
rescheduling, it is considered by the writer that further research into 
the most appropriate form of such a code of conduct should be undertaken.
Responses to question 14 did not generally favour representation for 
all types of creditors at the same rescheduling meeting. The negative 
responses emphasised the difficulty of reaching a satisfactory conclusion 
with so many different vested interests. This is particularly so where 
different creditors have different degrees of power eg official having 
more power than private creditors or banks having more power than the many
individual non bank creditors.
Positive responses, on the other hand, emphasised that a joint 
meeting of creditors would preclude the debtor playing off one group of 
creditors against another.
Note was also made of the fact that recent successful bank 
reschedulings had a steering committee of banks from various countries. 
Each member of the committee then had the duty to sell the decisions of 
the steering committee to the banks it represents. This could be extended 
to include representatives of senior non bank creditors who then had the 
responsibility to sell the decisions to the other non bank creditors.
The majority response to question 15 was that rescheduled debts still 
being serviced in accordance with the renegotiated terms should not be 
treated as inferior assets. However, some respondents wanted to 
differentiate between countries suffering what the lenders perceived as 
temporary difficulties from those countries that had more fundamental 
problems of debt servicing.
Responses to question 15i included increasing general bad debt 
provisions, writing down the book value to a level that would provide a 
buyer for the debt and just disclosing the quantity of rescheduled debt as 
a note in the published accounts.
Forty-six positive responses and only seven negative responses were 
received to question 16 about the increased willingness of banks to 
reschedule if the rescheduling is linked to IMF loan facilities. There 
were few comments, none of which added to our understanding of the 
advantages or disadvantages of such a link.
It is clear from the responses to the debt restructuring questions 
that the major costs to the banks were related to the resource costs of 
negotiation. It does, therefore, seem beneficial to both debtors and 
creditors for a streamlined negotiating procedure to be developed.
Furthermore, responses also suggest that restructuring of the 
maturity profile of the debt as the debtor's circumstances change is
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acceptable at least to the lenders. Therefore there seems to be a prima 
facie case for representatives of the bankers and of the international 
organisations to enter into a continuous dialogue with debtor countries in 
order to develop an amortisation schedule that is continually adapted to 
meet changes in a country's expected foreign currency cash flow over the
life of the debt. Given the greater willingness of banks to reschedule
when that is tied to IMF conditional finance, such a continuous dialogue
may be most productive if the IMF acts as the negotiating catalyst.
7.3.3 Improving the quality of information about LDCs
Question 17 was the first of six about the quality of information 
used in assessing the risks of lending to LDCs. The majority (43 to 11) 
thought that the information they possessed about the LDCs was not as good 
as that of the IMF or IBRD. However, comments suggested that at least some 
banks have access to IMF or IBRD data.
Responses to question 18 suggest that, despite the answers to 
question 17, the banks have adequate information for risk analysis.
Responses to question 18i indicate the following improvements would 
be welcomed by the banks:
- the LDCs to publish more regularly and more up to date figures
- statistics published in a common format
- greater exchange of information between IMF and IBRD and the banks
- more information about short term debt
- more information about the political and diplomatic activities 
of the borrowers.
Respondents to questions 18 and 18i emphasised the usefulness of a 
branch and/or personal visits as a way of supplementing published 
information.
Responses to question 19 indicated that the majority of bankers (42 
to 13) considered that informational difficulties lead the LDCs towards 
poor economic and debt management policies. However, it must be noted that
in the comments some respondents did not want to generalise across all 
LDCs. Some respondents noted that the political cost of good policies, the 
political will or administrative ability to follow such policies, were 
often as important as the informational shortcomings.
Although the majority of respondents to question 20 (25 to 14)
thought that better quality of information would not lead to greater 
lending to LDCs, the comments indicated that the actual outcome would 
depend on how different a picture the better information painted and how 
that information was used in economic policy making.
To an extent question 21 was unfortunately timed in that shortly 
after the questionnaire was despatched it was announced that an 
international institute was to be established, one of its objectives being 
similar to that suggested in question 21. The majority support, 44 to 12, 
for such an institution will be good news for its founders. However, some 
respondents cautioned that the institute must be independent of government 
and any particular group of banks. It was also noted by some that 
centralised information will not be a substitute for individual analysis 
and personal visits.
Some respondents thought that common information would reduce 
competition between the banks, noting that those banks that invest in a 
superior system of credit analysis reap a competitive advantage.
It was also thought that banks have followed the 'herd instinct' in 
recent years and such an institution may reinforce that instinct. If so, 
what would happen to international financial stability if the central 
institution downgraded, one particular borrower? The stability of markets 
stems from a variety of views within that market. Reduce that variety and 
you reduce the stability.
Although the responses to question 22 about a system of credit rating 
for interbank and non bank borrowers, were finely balanced, 27 for and 29 
against, all the comments were negative, the main theme being that banks 
cannot abrogate their responsibilities for credit analysis, particularly
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as some have different risk criteria according to their objectives in the 
market place. Furthermore, the comments about market stability made in 
question 21 above are relevant to question 22.
The responses to questions 17 to 22 suggest that the banks have 
sufficient information for the purposes of risk analysis. However, the 
lending banks seem to think that informational shortcomings impact upon 
the LDCs policy achievements to a greater extent. If improved information 
allowed the LDCs to more easily achieve policy objectives compatible with 
being a lower credit risk, more finance is likely to be available to those 
countries.
It therefore seems useful to both debtors and creditors for the 
developing countries to construct, with the assistance of the banks and 
international financial institutions, better information systems as an aid 
to achieving policy objectives.
7.3.4 Co-financing with IBRD or similar international institutions
Responses to question 23 confirmed the advantages and disadvantages 
of co-financing suggested in the literature except that the supposed 
savings in risk analysis and loan administration were not supported. It 
,was suggested that there would be a probable increase in the complexity of 
administration and that banks have little say in the documentation linking 
their loan to the IBRD one.
There were statistically significant differences in the responses to 
question 23a from US banks and other overseas banks. The majority of US 
banks responding 7 to 6 did not agree that co-financing reduced the risk 
of default. However, the majority of responses (19 to 1) from Other 
Overseas banks supported the suggestion of reduced risk. Moreover, 7 out 
of 12 US banks did not think that the IBRD was better at evaluating risk 
than they were. This view was supported by 3 out of 4 Other British banks 
Advantages additional to those cited in the question included better 
control over the destination of funds and the chance that principal may
escape rescheduling because of the established preference given by- 
borrowers to IBRD loans. An additional disadvantage mentioned was that fee 
income may be reduced for the private banks.
One respondent made the interesting point that co-financing may force 
the banks into longer term restructuring of debt if the IBRD's attitudes 
towards the timescale of development differed from those of the private 
banks.
Question 24 about the ability of co-financing to increase the total 
private flow to LDCs was asked in two parts. These parts may have been 
mutually exclusive. However, many respondents did not interpret them that 
way. Moreover, lack of comment to these questions has not assisted in 
their interpretation.
Thus, although a majority of respondents to 24a (35 to 23) thought 
that co-financing would increase the flow of credit to LDCs, an even 
larger majority, 43 to 17, responding to part b suggested that existing 
levels of credit would be switched into co-financing.
Little help can be gleaned from responses to question 23 because, 
although co-financing was generally thought to be beneficial, co-financed 
loans also showed lower returns thus for example lower risk was matched by 
lower returns and therefore lending may not increase.
The responses to question 25 support the view that total lending may 
not increase because the majority, 34 to 17, suggested that increased 
co-financing would not result in flows to LDCs that to date have been 
considered too risky for private bank credit. The general theme of the 
comments to this question was that such countries should be financed on 
softer terms than those obtaining in the commercial markets. Furthermore, 
if there is any reduction in perceived risk by co-financing with the IBRD, 
this reduction may not be enough to bring the substantial risk of lending 
, to these poorer countries within acceptable bounds. Much would depend upon 
how the risk was shared between the banks and the IBRD.
Clearly these responses go some way to explain why co-financing has
not increased as much as some would have liked. However, despite the 
negative response, it does appear that it may be fruitful for further 
research into an appropriate loan and risk bearing arrangement built 
around co-financing.
Although overall co-financing is seen, at least by a large proportion 
of bankers, as having some advantages, the impact upon increasing 
financial flows to LDCs is doubtful. In particular it does not seem to be 
a vehicle for facilitating increased private flows to the poorest LDCs.
7.3.5 Credit Insurance and Loan Guarantee Schemes
Six questions were asked about credit insurance and loan guarantee 
schemes beginning with question 26. A majority of 42 to 17 were in favour 
of extending independent guarantees to loans not currently covered by 
export credit insurance agencies. However many respondents were only in 
favour if the guarantors were governments sufficiently strong to be able 
to safeguard the banks in time of crisis.
Negative comments centred upon the credit rationing which could 
result for unguaranteed borrowers. Moreover, the reliance upon government 
or other official guarantees may blunt the bankers' critical judgement in 
evaluation of credit risks.
Furthermore, borrowers may show lack of discipline if the guarantor 
is a single state. The borrower may be able to bring political pressure to 
bear on the guarantor which it could not bring to bear on a market 
orientated group of institutions.
The majority of respondents (38 to 19) to question 27 did think that 
a system of guarantees would lead to less prudent lending. Comments 
qualified the ’yes' responses by adding 'unless the guarantees were only 
partial'.
Respondents also raised the question as to whether lending where the 
main chance of repayment is from the guarantor is less prudent than 
lending to a good credit risk and expecting repayment direct. The original
question was set in the belief that bankers do not lend money if they 
expect to have to enforce their security, a point confirmed by other 
respondents1 comments.
There was a strong negative response to question 28 asking whether or 
not institutions such as ECGD in the UK should insure balance of payments 
loans to LDCs. The comments, all negative, suggest that such insurance 
would be expensive, that such agencies are instruments of national export 
promotion policy and with balance of payments finance insurance they would 
be helping the export industries of other countries.
Furthermore, when a borrower defaulted the creditor would claim off 
the insurance company who can only try to claim off the debtor while in 
the meantime refusing further insurance. There is no incentive for the 
banker to be flexible in relation to financing or restructuring the 
debtor's finances as his circumstances change, although the withdrawal of 
credit insurance may be a strong incentive not to default.
Sixty out of sixty-one respondents to question 29 expected insured 
loans to attract lower spreads. However, the reservations were that the 
insurer must be visibly stronger than the borrower and that there must be 
an acceptable minimum rate of return to cover all costs including bearing 
risk.
This is an important point because it means that the reduction in 
spread/fees may go some way to covering the insurance premium, if payable 
by the borrower.
Interestingly, comments also implied that the spread was a risk 
premium, yet responses to other questions in this survey and analysis 
elsewhere in this thesis (ref chapter four) suggest that the relationship 
between spread and risk is at times not very strong.
Responses to question 30 suggest that there would not be any tiering 
in the interbank market according to the proportion of uninsured loans in 
a bank's portfolio. The main reasons given were that the proportion of 
insured loans in a portfolio would only be one of several factors taken
into account in establishing interbank credit risk. Anyway, it was 
generally thought that such information would not be available. However, 
some respondents thought that if the information were to become available 
it would affect credit risk assessments.
Question 31 asked whether or not insured loans should be treated 
preferentially when the prudential authorities analyse the quality of 
banks' balance sheets. The response was almost balanced, 29 in favour and 
26 against. Again the quality of the insurer was considered an influence. 
It was considered that the insurance could only be partially adequate if 
it only covered repayment of principal because the banks were concerned 
about the quality of earnings as well as the quality of assets. Again 
concern was expressed about the potential crowding out of uninsured 
lending.
Although the bankers would welcome a system of strong guarantees in 
their favour, the nature of the backing of the guarantees should be 
multinational when backing balance of payments loans and national when 
backing national export contracts.
Concern was expressed about the impact of a system of guarantees 
crowding out unguaranteed borrowers and dampening the bankers' risk 
analysis skills. It therefore seems probable that a system of guarantees 
will increase the flow of bank finance to those LDCs that benefit from 
loan guarantees. However, the same system could reduce flows to those 
countries not favoured by the guarantee system. Therefore, the extent to 
which a system of guarantees facilitates an increase in the flow of bank 
credit to LDCs depends upon how wide is the group of countries that are 
beneficiaries of guarantees.
The costs of extending insurance cover to the general balance of 
payments loans was considered prohibitive despite the suggestion that 
insured loans would attract lower spreads. The writer therefore concludes 
that the banks favour guarantees to insurance because the former will be 
provided without explicit cost to banker or borrower.
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It was also noted that if the insurance company or the guaranteeing 
agency insisted on enforcing their rights against the defaulting debtor 
the debtor's ability to continue servicing debt may be reduced.
7.3.6 Prudential controls
Nine questions were asked relating to prudential controls.
The majority of respondents to question 32 thought that less 
stringently regulated banks did behave less prudently. However, there were 
reservations; the quality of the management was important and it was noted 
that some banks in stringently regulated areas eg USA, acted imprudently. 
The concept of imprudence was questioned noting that political factors may 
cause banks to assess risks differently. Furthermore, the relationship 
between the banks and their governments may influence standards in terms 
of capital adequacy and liquidity.
The standard of prudence depended less on regulation and more on 
local traditions, local standards of management and the intensity of 
supervision.
The majority of respondents to question 33 (45 to 12) thought that 
differences in national regulations influenced their willingness to lend 
to banks in less stringently regulated countries. However, again there 
were qualifications. A weak balance sheet made a borrowing bank a poor 
risk however well regulated. The quality of management and of balance 
sheet were more important than stringency of regulation.
Question 34 asked about the influence of different regulations upon 
the price different banks paid for interbank money. The majority of 
respondents (36 to 12) suggested that banks in less well regulated 
locations paid more for such funds. However, although that may generally 
be so, respondents also noted that the bank's reputation was more 
important than location and that in respect of reputation, bank ownership 
was very important.
Responses to question 35 about the influence of national prudential
regulations upon banks' decisions to locate abroad were finely balanced, 
26 respondents thought that such regulations did influence location, 27 
respondents said that they did not.
The positive responses emphasised the banks' liking for orderly 
markets. The negative responses emphasised that the banks' internal 
attitudes to prudence were unlikely to be exceeded by local regulation. 
However, if all banks thought that way one would have to ask why 
prudential regulations were required.
Question 36 asked whether the bank supervising a particular branch is 
morally bound to be lender of last resort to that bank. Thirty-one 
respondents thought not, while 26 thought that the supervisory and lender 
of last resort functions were synonymous.
The attitudes gleaned from the comments suggest that locally 
incorporated organisations are more entitled to lender of last resort 
facilities than branches of foreign banks. There was support for the 
lender of last resort facility if the disturbance occurred within the 
country in question and less or no support if the disturbance came from 
outside.
It was thought by some that the head office supervisory authority was 
the most appropriate lender of last resort. If the local authority does 
not ensure that the head office authority will provide such facilities 
then that local authority should provide them if it provides such 
facilities for local banks.
The group as a whole responded to question 37a by suggesting that the 
decline in the capital asset ratios in recent years was not the result of 
a learning process; 38 'no' and 10 'yes'. However, 6 out of 15 US banks 
thought that the decline was because of a learning process. Two out of 3 
UK clearing banks and 5 out of 6 UK merchant banks responded in similar 
vein.
The responses of question 37b suggest that the decline in capital 
asset ratios has been forced upon the bank by competition. The subgroups
for US banks, UK clearing banks and UK merchant banks responded in similar 
vein as the whole group.
At first sight there seems to be an inconsistency between the 
responses to question 37a and 37b. However, this is resolved when it is 
suggested that competition has forced the banks to learn how to be more 
efficient in the use of capital. This would be particularly so if the 
banks have been forced to compete for new business but at the same time 
have been deprived of new capital from the major capital markets.
For the UK registered institutions, respondents have suggested that 
recently introduced capital adequacy guidelines have allowed them to 
reduce their capital asset ratios.
The overwhelming response (37 to 12) to question 38 was that capital 
asset ratios will not continue to fall. However, some respondents 
suggested that the fall will continue in the short run, say up to two 
years, and then reverse itself. Other respondents felt that the decline 
may continue depending upon how much involuntary lending (rescheduling) 
there is in the future. Yet others felt that cooperation between the 
regulatory authorities had ensured that capital asset ratios were 
currently at their minimum.
Question 39 received an overwhelming positive response (46 to 6) to 
the suggestion that a further decline in capital asset ratios would be 
detrimental to the stability of the banking system. There were few 
comments to the responses.
The responses to question 40 suggest that the bankers perceive their 
optimum capital to assets ratio as between 1:25 and 1:10. The majority (13 
out of 21 respondents) suggested 1:20.
With respect to the responses regarding prudential regulation, it 
would seem that it is better in terms of other bankers1 perceptions of 
risk to come from a stringently regulated area but a bank cannot assume 
that because it is in a stringently regulated area that its reputation 
will not be strongly influenced by other factors.
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With respect to capital asset ratios it seems clear that competition 
and lack of access to capital markets have caused such a decline. However, 
at least for US banks, UK clearing and merchant banks there has been a 
learning process allowing the banks to be more efficient in their use of 
capital resources.
Having said that, it is generally thought that currently capital 
asset ratios are as low as is commensurate with stability of the 
international banking system.
The general view regarding lender of last resort facilities is that 
the head office supervisory authority should be responsible for such 
facilities to branches in foreign centres. However, the bankers consider 
that the local supervisory authority should concern itself with the 
liquidity of branches of foreign banks.
Clearly the movements towards uniformity of regulatory environment 
between countries would seem to have majority support within the banking 
community because it is seen by the bankers as being beneficial to 
themselves.
7.3.7 International lender of last resort
Question 41, the first of four questions about an international 
lender of last resort, showed very strong support for such an institution 
(37 to 21) . Yet responses to question 42 indicated that the most popular 
form would be national central banks providing such facilities to the 
worldwide business of banks registered in their jurisdiction. The 
establishment of a supra-national organisation was the second most popular 
choice. There was little support for systems utilising formal lines of 
credit between institutions.
Respondents that disagreed with the introduction of a lender of last 
resort frequently suggested that such a facility will lead to carefree 
banking practices and a deterioration in debt management by borrowers. In 
effect the facility was seen as analogous to a guarantee. Some bankers did
not like the idea of increased bureaucracy which such a facility may bring 
particularly as all banks, good, bad or indifferent, would be treated 
equally. Furthermore, some respondents suggested that there should be 
conditions attached to such a facility, or the extent of the facility 
should be kept secret and should not be aimed at bailing out the bank's 
management. It was thought that the extent to which a lender of last 
resort facility reduced the risk to bank management was a bad thing - for 
risk concentrates the mind.
The majority of respondents (2 3 to 6) to question 43 suggested that
even though the first three forms of facility suggested in question 42
were cost free to the banks, their implementation would not give rise to a
greater proportion of high risk lending. It was particularly emphasised 
that such additional high risk lending will not arise if the central banks 
have an adequate system of supervision.
No alternative structures of lender of last resort facilities were 
suggested in response to question 44.
Clearly the banking community would like some form of lender of last 
resort facility to protect depositors and meet crises of liquidity. 
However, generally they do not wish to see the risks of banking removed. 
In this respect some reticence by the central banks in publishing the 
terms under which the facility will be granted was welcomed.
The fact that such a facility was to be made available in a crisis 
does not preclude the central banks from maintaining vigilant supervision 
over the activities of the banks within their jurisdiction.
Responses to this section are corroborated by the responses to 
question 36 in that the majority of bankers prefer the lender of last 
resort facility of a head office supervisory authority to the worldwide 
business of banks registered in its jurisdiction.
However, given the comments to question 36 that local central banks 
should supervise liquidity, the responsibilities of the head office 
supervisory authorities as lenders of last resort would seem, logically,
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to be limited to the eurocurrency business of foreign branches. This 
however may still impose considerable foreign exchange problems for a 
central bank of a small to medium sized country. Therefore international 
cooperation and lines of credit between central banks would be required if 
such a system was to be strong enough to withstand any substantial shock.
7.3.8 Miscellaneous questions
Question 45 was the first of five miscellaneous questions and 
referred to bank deposit insurance. The majority of respondents (42 to 16) 
were in favour of such insurance but only for private depositors. The 
majority (33 to 18) thought such insurance was inappropriate for foreign 
currency deposits and deposits in overseas branches. Furthermore, 45 out 
of 52 respondents thought that interbank deposits should not be covered.
The comments indicated that the respondents considered deposit 
insurance was to protect the unsophisticated depositor thus the emphasis 
upon small domestic depositors. The financial institutions should be able 
to make their own credit assessment of the bank where they intend to 
deposit funds. Furthermore they should be able to diversify their deposits 
- something that the average personal depositor will find it difficult to 
do.
 ^ The negative responses suggest that adequate supervision and the
lender of last resort facility should be sufficient. Moreover, the 
insurance should not cover business at foreign branches because foreign 
customs and regulations cannot be controlled.
Question 46 related the desirability of floating rate spreads and a 
deeper secondary market in syndicated loans. This question was asked in 
the form that it was because the writer thought that a deeper secondary 
market required floating spreads. Some of the bankers thought otherwise; 
fortunately those bankers generally answered question 46 in two parts. 
There was a favourable response to a deeper secondary market although 
likely to be sometime before it became much deeper than it is at present.
Indeed it will need a return to more confidence in financial markets 
generally. However, the response to floating spreads was unfavourable, 
mainly on the grounds of the additional administrative costs involved. It 
was suggested that floating rate spread would require a minimum threshold.
Question 47 attempted to gain some idea of the bankers' perception of 
the characteristics of a wider secondary market in loan participations. As 
a catalyst for the responses the Floating Rate Note Market was used as a 
comparison. The respondents noted that the loan participation was not a 
negotiable instrument whereas the FRN is treated as such. Therefore 
complicated documentation would be required in transferring loan 
participations. This would tend to limit the size of the market. Because 
of the difference in negotiability the two instruments would be treated 
differently in bank balance sheets. In particular selling a participation 
may not rid the selling bank of default risk if the LDC should default. In 
some cases the borrowers' permission is required to sell participations in 
a loan.
It was noted that FRNs were designed to appeal to non bank lenders. 
Bank loans on the other hand were designed to develop a banker-customer 
relationship in many cases with its attendant fee earning business. Thus 
the instrument will be different. The sub-participation market was thought 
to be only an interbank market.
Question 48 aimed at eliciting how the banks perceived the use of a 
secondary market in loans in helping them diversify their loan portfolios. 
A large majority thought that it would be helpful. Many respondents 
thought that 'yes' was the obvious response to this question. In fact it 
was not because of the 'herd instinct' in bankers; if one banker wanted to 
diversify out of one country's loans there is a good chance that others 
would want to as well. The result would be difficulty in selling such a 
participation at an acceptable price and possibly no further 
diversification.
Respondents also noted that the original lending was part of a
358
portfolio diversification exercise so that selling sub-participations may 
not significantly reduce the overall portfolio risk. Indeed unless there 
are new entrants to the market it may be difficult to sell participations 
if the constraints of exposure limit and capital adequacy bite as 
suggested in question 1.
However, one advantage of such a market was seen to be the realistic 
valuation of rescheduled loans.
There was a statistically significant response to this question by
the Other British banks. All of them thought that a deeper secondary
market would not assist portfolio diversification.
Question 49 asked whether a deeper secondary market would widen the 
participation in LDC loans to a) banks who have not loaned to date and b) 
to non bank financial intermediaries. Both questions had small majorities 
in favour, 49a (28 to 24) and 49b (30 to 23) . There were a few comments 
that both developments but especially 49b would be undesirable, but there
were also comments with the opposite attitude.
From the responses to questions 46-49 it would seem that a deeper 
secondary market in loan participations may be beneficial to the banks and 
the LDC borrowers. However the level of benefit is far from certain. 
Therefore, it is considered by this writer, that further research is 
required into the economic, legal and practical administrative aspects of 
expanding this market.
7.4 Conclusions from the survey
The major constraints upon the further supply of bank finance to the 
LDCs seem to be doubts about debt servicing capacity, capital adequacy and 
exposure limits. To the extent that the borrowers' servicing of debt, the 
banks' ability to raise capital and willingness to increase exposure 
limits are all related, adjustment of LDCs1 deficits will be an important 
influence on the flow of private funds to those countries.
Adjustment does not have to be by the LDCs alone. As the global
deficit should sum to zero, some adjustment by the surplus countries may 
actually increase world financial stability by reducing the perceived risk 
of lending to LDCs. However, note must be made of the potential crowding 
out of LDC borrowers as demand from OECD based borrowers increases.
However, to the extent that the banks' corporate objectives in 
lending to LDCs include incremental profits, asset growth, servicing 
export customers' needs, developing new markets and risk minimisation, 
banks will probably continue to be willing to lend to LDCs provided that 
the risk is at an acceptable level.
As perceived risk is going to be such an important influence on the 
flows of bank finance to LDCs, it is not surprising that no single 
suggestion for reducing that risk has emerged as a panacea for risk 
reduction. Therefore a combination of measures suggested is required.
There was substantial support for restructuring the maturity profile 
of debt provided it was carried out on a voluntary basis from the banks' 
point of view. It is therefore considered that an urgent review of the 
maturity structure of the debt of the LDCs should be carried out with a 
view to renegotiating a maturity structure more appropriate to the 
economic development prospects of the borrowers.
To complement this review, action should be taken to improve the
quality of information about the LDCs that flows to the banks and the
borrowing governments themselves.
There must also be an improvement in the debt management function of 
the borrowers so that bunching of maturities is avoided and the maturity 
profile of the debt is made flexible in order to accommodate changes in 
economic circumstances. Appropriate debt management should then make 
refinancing increasingly frequent and rescheduling less so. There is some
support for a code of conduct for rescheduling. The implementation of such
a code, in an appropriate manner, will reduce the resource costs 
associated with negotiations. However, further research into the nature of 
this code is required.
Subsidising interest rates by itself will not substantially increase 
the flow to developing countries although new aid aimed at assisting the 
debt service burden of interest payments would be helpful.
As a matter of urgency a system for financing the unanticipated 
increase in interest servicing costs due to rising market rates of 
interest must be established. The suggestion of establishing an IMF 
facility for such a purpose finds support from those surveyed. The use of 
an IMF facility is particularly appropriate as the majority of its 
resources come from the developed countries. The increased interest costs 
on LDC loans results, in part, from the impact of domestic economic policy 
in these richer countries upon the level of interest rates in the world's 
financial markets. It is therefore only equitable that some of the burden 
of the increased cost be borne by those that cause it.
There are administrative and definitional problems to overcome but 
the IMF does have experience in running a similar facility for export 
shortfalls and the increased costs of cereal imports.
Co-financing with development banks in the most common forms of the 
1970's does not seem to have been popular and therefore it is unlikely to 
be a major force increasing flows to LDCs in the 1980's. However, we must 
note that the recent linking of the IBRD with commercial banks in 
syndicated loans may prove to be promising and it is considered that more 
research should be carried out into the most appropriate relationship 
between the commercial banks and the development banks.
Guarantees would increase the flow of bank finance to those countries 
that are guaranteed provided that the guarantors were the governments, 
preferably acting in concert, of the richer industrial countries. 
Therefore to increase the flow to LDCs as a group, guarantees would have 
to be available to all potential LDC borrowers otherwise unguaranteed LDCs 
would be crowded out of the market.
It may be that guarantees could be used in conjunction with the 
restructuring of the maturity profile of the debt. In particular, in order
to encourage the banks to reschedule to an appropriate maturity, the 
guarantees, may cover only the later years of the debt's life. The 
guarantee would have to cover interest and principal. Thus the combination 
of a guarantee over the later years of a debt, together with the reduced 
annual amortisation payments and thus reduced annual debt service burden, 
should reduce the risk of lending and thus increase the flow of bank 
finance to those countries that obtain the guarantees and restructure 
their debt.
The great weakness of combining guarantees with debt rescheduling is 
that the largest borrowers will need the largest guarantees. Yet it is the 
richest LDCs which have borrowed most and therefore if these guarantees 
are viewed in the same vein as aid, the richest countries will be seen as 
receiving the greatest amount of aid. This problem is really a political 
one in that the government guarantors may not wish to be seen providing 
additional aid to the richer LDCs. However, they are indeed already doing 
just that via their export credit insurance agencies.
Furthermore, the distribution of credit will be determined largely by 
the distribution • of guarantees. This distribution is likely to be 
political. If the guarantor governments do not wish to be seen 
guaranteeing the richest LDCs, these countries may be crowded out of 
private markets thus exacerbating their current financial situation.
It is clear therefore that the suggestion that loan guarantees be 
used to encourage the restructuring of LDC external debt is only viable if 
the guarantees are available to all LDC borrowers. Moreover, the 
distribution of future guarantees should be flexible enough to ensure that 
countries not currently accessing the bank credit market will be able to 
if private external finance is an appropriate form of finance for them in 
the future.
If the combination of debt restructuring and guarantees reduces the 
bankers' perceived risk of lending to LDCs, the incremental profit and 
asset growth objectives will ensure the bank funds will flow to the LDCs
unless crowded out by the increased demand for credit from OECD countries. 
To avoid this crowding out, it will probably be necessary for the LDCs to 
pay higher spreads to make such lending more attractive to the banks.
Although the above suggestions concentrate on reducing the risk and 
increasing the reward of bank lending the risks of deposit taking must 
also be reduced. In this respect greater uniformity of prudential 
regulation and the uniform provision of deposit insurance would be 
welcomed by the bankers. These provisions would therefore reduce those 
bankers' perceived risk in deposit taking.
Chapter 8
THE EUROBOND MARKET AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
8.1 Introduction
Developing countries receive finance from bond markets in two ways; 
either directly by issuing bonds themselves or indirectly by borrowing 
from supranational organisations which tap the bond markets. Such 
organisations include the IBRD. This chapter is only concerned with the 
direct access of developing countries to the bond markets, and to the 
eurobond market in particular.
There are in fact two types of international bond market. One is the 
so-called foreign bond market where a bond is issued by a non-resident in 
one market only and denominated in the currency of that market. The other 
is the eurobond market where the bond issue is made in several centres 
simultaneously and the bond is not denominated in the currency of any of 
those markets. An example of a foreign bond would be one issued by/ say, 
a developing country in London and denominated in sterling. An example of 
a eurobond would be one issued by, say, a developing country in several 
European centres but denominated in US dollars.
In order to put the size of the international bond market into 
perspective, the following figures compare total international (euro) 
bond and foreign bond issues with the total of medium and long term bank 
credits.
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Table 8.1 Comparison
Medium and
Long-term
Credits
of volume of bond issues and bank
International Foreign 
Bonds Bonds
loans
Total
1973 20.83 4.70 5.35 30.88
1974 28.54 4.51 7.72 40.77
1975 20.58 10.52 12.30 43.40
1976 27.92 15.37 18.94 62.23
1977 33.78 19.48 16.61 69.87
1978 66.00 15.93 21.54 103.47
1979 78.26 17.36 19.98 115.60
1980 78.04 20.48 17.46 115.98
Source: OECD Financial Statistics US $ billions
It is clear that the growth of the bond markets has not kept pace
with the growth of bank lending. Moreover, the following table extracted
from World Bank publications shows that the growth of bond finance to
developing countries has grown even more slowly and that such finance is
only available to the richer LDCs.
Table 8.2
International Bond Disbursements to LDCs
Upper Middle Intermed Middle Lower Middle Low Total
Income Income Income Income
1973 508.0 451. 3 36.5 995.
1974 283.6 482.9 32.7 799.
1975 431.2 410.5 52.5 894.
1976 244.5 1016.7 379.6 1640.
1977 729.2 2757.5 234.1 3720.
1978 384.0 2868.8 451.3 3704.
1979 424.9 1478.6 204.1 2107.
Source: IBRD World Debt Tables, various issues 
Figures in millions US $
It is also instructive at this stage to note the currencies of 
denomination of the types of bonds issued. The following figures show how 
the relative importance of various currencies has changed during the 
1970's for the aggregate of international bond issues.
Table 8.3
Major Currencies used in bond issues 1971 and 1980
1971 1980
% %
US dollar 50.7 42.4
European currencies 36.0 51.1
Deutschemark 15.8 22.3
Swiss franc 10.8 19.8
Netherlands guilder 4.3 2.3
Pound sterling 2.5 3.0
Belgium/Luxembourg franc 1.4 0.7
French franc 1.2 3.0
Yen 4.2 5.0
OPEC currencies 1.2 0.5
Units of account 3.3 0.3
Other 4.6 0.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Source: OECD Financial Statistics
These figures, although showing a declining importance for the US 
dollar and the rising importance of European currencies, hide differences 
in the relative importance of currencies between eurobonds and foreign 
bonds. The following figures for 1980 extracted from World Financial 
Markets published by Morgan Guarantee Trust Company of New York shed some 
light upon these differences.
Table 8.4 Dominant currencies in the eurobond and foreign bond 
markets in 1980
Eurobond US $ 51.6
Eurobond DM 37.2
Foreign bonds US $ 28.7
Foreign bonds Swiss Franc 28.3
Foreign bonds DM 18.8
Foreign bonds Yen 19.0
These figures show that the US dollar is still dominant in the 
eurobond market but European currencies have a much greater dominance in 
the foreign bond markets.
The figures on page 364 above also show that the proportion of bond 
finance going to developing countries is small and that only the richer 
countries have been able to avail themselves of this finance. In
analysing the reasons why developing countries have not received a larger 
proportion of their finance from the bond markets, it is fruitful to
analyse the nature of the eurobond market and the nature of the eurobond 
instrument.
However, in this analysis the writer has been hindered by the lack
of data, particularly relating to bond investors and to the size of the
secondary market. These data weaknesses stem directly from the 
uncontrolled nature of the market and the bearer nature of the eurobond 
instruments. The next two sections therefore establish the theoretical 
principles of the eurobond market and eurobond instrument which would 
influence the ability of the developing countries to access that market. 
These principles are tested in the last section by analysing the 
responses to a questionnaire sent by the writer to the major managers of 
eurobond syndicates in London.
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8 .2 The Nature of the Eurobond Market
The Primary Market '
The eurobond market in fact consists of two distinct components: the 
primary market where new bonds are first issued to investors and the 
secondary market, where existing bonds are traded.
New bonds are issued by a syndicate of institutions on behalf of the 
borrower. The syndicate will consist of:
1) the lead manager
2) the co-manager
3) the underwriter
4) the selling group
The lead manager will be a major eurobank who has secured the 
mandate from the borrower to raise the finance.
The co-managers will be selected by the lead manager because they 
are substantial institutions, are market makers in the secondary market 
for the type of security in question, or have substantial placing power. 
There are often 5-10 co-managers to an issue and together with the lead 
managers they form the management group.
The underwriters are substantial banks selected for their placing 
power of bond issues or on the basis of reciprocity with members of the 
management group.
The selling group will consist of smaller institutions which are 
trying to prove their placing power in order to pave the way to their 
becoming underwriters.
Generally the lead and co-managers are also members of the selling 
and underwriting groups in that they also place bonds.
The bonds are placed with the institutions1 customers so that banks 
with a substantial discretionary investment management business have 
strong placing power. The Swiss banks are substantial placers for this 
reason.
As a consequence of this placing technique, most bonds are owned by 
individuals or institutions that are not financial intermediaries eg 
trusts or pension funds. Unfortunately, because eurobonds are bearer 
instruments, no data are available as to who are the investors in such 
instruments.
Where the investors are institutions they are frequently restricted, 
by official regulation, as to the quantity of foreign securities in their 
portfolios (Ahmad 1976).
The view that the majority of investors in new bond issues are 
individuals or restricted institutions is the explanation suggested by 
some commentators (Ahmad, op cit; Einzig, 1969 pi97; Scott Quinn, 1975 
p221) for the small proportion of bonds being issued by developing 
countries.
This explanation suggests that the market is dominated by 
individuals who do not have the ability to carry out appropriate risk 
analysis and that these individuals are risk averse. However, the same 
explanation is compatible with the view that the market is dominated by 
investors, individual or institutional, which do carry out the 
appropriate risk analysis but perceive the risks to be too great. Both 
these suggestions are tested in the questionnaire.
If the eurobond market were dominated by sophisticated individual 
and institutional investors, why is it that one group of institutions, 
financial intermediaries, have invested substantially in developing 
country liabilities - the syndicated loan?
The answer to this question may be found in the differing attitudes 
to investment by a financial intermediary on one hand and a wealth holder 
on the other. It is the nature of the function of the financial 
intermediary to take on the role of risk transformation and maturity 
transformation and it earns its reward for fulfilling these roles amongst 
others. Both these functions of a financial intermediary assist in 
meeting the requirements of savers and those of borrowers. In
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particular the role of risk transformation ie transforming risky assets 
(loans) into riskless liabilities (deposits) satisfies the savers' desire 
for a risk-free store of wealth, while providing the borrower with 
finance for a risky project (Bain 1981, p50).
The fact that risk transformation does not take place via an 
intermediary in the bond market will result in an unsatisfied demand for 
credit for risky projects.
The financial intermediary can only continue its. function and thus
earn an income if it has a stream of potential savers and borrowers.
However, considerable maturity transformation is typical of this 
intermediating process. Thus, the turnover of deposits is likely to be 
greater than that of loans. It is essential therefore that financial 
intermediaries maintain a flow of deposits. One important influence on 
the size of that flow will be the rate of interest paid on deposits. It 
seems reasonable to assume therefore that financial intermediaries are 
more concerned with certainty of income than certainty of principal. In 
the extreme it does not matter whether a loan is repaid as long as 
sufficient interest earnings accrue in order to pay a sufficiently high 
rate of interest so as to ensure a flow of deposits to fund the loan, 
(refer chapter six, page 271 for a more detailed account of this 
argument).
Of course when a borrower defaults income and principal are lost. 
However, as chapter six, page 270 has shown, banks are eager to avoid
outright default by engaging in lengthy rescheduling programmes. They are
in effect delaying repayment of principal in return for continuity of 
income.
The bond market investor, on the other hand, does not .carry out the 
functions of a financial intermediary. He is not rewarded for carrying 
out risk and maturity transformation. We would therefore expect the 
typical bond market investor to be relatively more risk averse than a 
financial intermediary. Thus we would expect bondholders to be relatively
less important investors in assets of a risky nature such as LDC 
eurobonds.
Finally, it should be realised that the number of investors in a 
typical eurobond issue will be more numerous than the members of a 
eurocurrency loan syndicate. Furthermore, many investors are attracted by 
the anonymity provided by the bearer nature of the eurobond instrument. 
Given these circumstances any concerted renegotiation of eurobond 
investment becomes almost impossible. This in itself increases the risks 
to the eurobond investor because the terms of the bond issue cannot be 
changed as the borrower's financial circumstances change. This reduced 
flexibility of bonds compared with say bank finance increases the chances 
of default within the terms of the bond agreement.
The Secondary Market
Most eurobond issues are listed on a stock exchange such as London 
or Luxembourg. However, very little trading goes on via these exchanges. 
The majority of trading transactions in existing eurobond securities take 
place in the Secondary Market. This market is truly international, the 
trading being carried on via telephones and telexes around the world.
Some operators in the market are dealers operating on behalf of 
buyers and sellers. Other operators, usually banks or investment 
institutions, trade on their own account. They hold a position in bonds 
and act as market makers, being willing to buy and sell at certain 
prices. The activities of these market makers ensure that investors can 
resell their bonds, albeit at the market price, should funds be required 
before the bonds mature. Thus the secondary market provides a degree of 
liquidity to what may otherwise be an illiquid investment.
Since liquidity is a factor in favour of any investment, the 
attitude of financial institutions to market making in developing country 
bonds is an important influence in the ability to issue such bonds.
The size of the secondary market is very important in this respect.
The market makers are analogous to the members of the London Discount 
Market in that they suffer considerable fluctuations in the book value of 
their portfolios as interest rates change. Yet the eurobond market makers 
have no lender of last resort as such. Thus market making is more risky, 
this risk being evidenced by higher bid-offer spreads and thus greater 
capital value fluctuations for the investors.
Furthermore, because of the riskiness of acting as a market maker, 
the secondary market is smaller than it otherwise would be. This factor 
alone increases the price fluctuations resulting from a given sale by an 
investor.
This situation is exacerbated with regard to LDC bonds because the 
secondary market in these bonds is somewhat limited. In several instances 
secondary market yield fluctuations have been markedly more pronounced in 
the LDC compartment than elsewhere (OECD June 1977, p78).
It is therefore postulated that if the secondary market in 
developing country bonds is small, this will contribute to the lack of 
popularity of such bonds. In particular the lack of liquidity provided by 
a deep secondary market will increase the risk of a forced sale 
disproportionately influencing the price against the seller.
Nevertheless, it is also realised that the lack of a deep secondary • 
market may be caused by the relatively small volume of new issues by 
developing countries, and the small size of those issues that are made.
8.3 The Nature of a Eurobond
Bonds issued by developing countries have either been fixed interest 
(straight debt) or variable interest (floating rate debt) instruments. 
Floating rate instruments have become increasingly popular accounting for 
10.9% of all eurobond issues in 1970 and 19.1% of such issues in 1978 
(Fisher 1979, p!42). However, the majority of bonds issued are in the 
form of straight debt.
Another feature of eurobonds is that they tend to be long term
instruments with maturities ranging from five to twenty years.
A third feature is that for many investors in eurobonds the bonds 
are a foreign currency investment with the attendant problems of foreign 
exchange risk.
A useful understanding of the causes of the relatively small role of 
the bond market can be gained by comparing the eurobond as a borrowing 
and investing instrument with the eurocurrency syndicated loan and 
eurocurrency deposit markets.
Taking first the fixed interest nature of the majority of debt 
issued: prices of fixed interest debt fluctuate widely as a result of 
interest rate changes. In particular the volatility will be greater for a 
given change in interest rates a) the lower the coupon rate or b) the 
longer the maturity. Thus if investors took a long view that interest 
rates were going to rise, they would expect to incur capital losses on 
straight debt if sold before maturity. If expectations of rising future 
interest rates dominated market thinking the demand for fixed interest 
rate instruments would be small.
The fixed rate nature of most eurobonds means that borrowers also 
have to take a long view of interest rates. They may find themselves 
locked into paying historically high rates of interest, the only relief 
coming from any purchase fund or sinking fund arrangements or any call 
provision.
Assuming that both investors and borrowers are risk averse in 
relation to unforeseen interest rate changes, both would prefer floating 
rate instruments to ones bearing fixed rates of interest. We can 
postulate, therefore, that during periods of secularly rising interest 
rates, investors will be less willing to buy fixed rate bonds.
For many investors a eurobond is a foreign currency investment and 
the demand for that investment will be influenced by the investors' 
expectations of future exchange rates. It must be remembered that for 
most investors, whether individual or institutional, trading in foreign
currencies is not in the ordinary course of their business. Given the 
long term nature of most eurobonds, the investors have to bear the 
foreign exchange exposure risk because the forward exchange markets are 
too thin at the longer maturities.
It is assumed that borrowers do not face such exposure because they 
borrow in a currency in which they expect to earn revenues.
On the other hand loans provided by banks can be funded from the 
eurocurrency interbank market. This market enables the banks to obtain 
foreign currency ie eurocurrency funds for their foreign currency 
lending. Thus, for the banks, eurocurrency lending does not of itself 
imply foreign currency exposure risk.
Some indication of the influence of exchange rates over investors 
may be gleaned from the declining role of the US dollar in denominating 
bonds. OECD figures (Financial Market Trends, November 198 , p97) show
that the US dollar was used in 82.8% of eurobond issues at the end of the 
1960's but this declined to 54.2% at the end of the 1970's. In contrast 
the importance of the German Mark rose, from 13.4% to 33.6% of new issues 
over the same period.
It is suggested therefore that the foreign currency nature of the 
eurobond investment adds the additional risk to the investor of foreign 
exchange risk and that this additional risk deters investors. However, 
this only explains the smaller size of the eurobank market generally and 
not the small amount of bond finance going to LDCs. However, the small 
size of the bond market generally will mean that pro rata only limited 
finance is available to LDCs.
Questions relating to the interest rate risk and foreign currency
risk are included in section three of the questionnaire.
Note has already been made of the different risk borne by
intermediating and non intermediating investors. The importance of this
can be seen in the period after the 1973 oil price rise. OPEC members 
with substantial US dollar funds required short term liquid investments
while borrowers with structural disequilibrium on their balance of 
payment required long term funds. It was natural for the banking system 
to carry out the required risk and maturity transformation in order to 
meet the requirements of both borrowers and lenders.
The bond markets on the other hand did not satisfy the OPEC 
investors' requirements of short maturities. Furthermore, the interest 
rate risk associated with the fixed interest bonds and the default risk 
did not satisfy their requirements of capital certainty.
The fixed interest nature of the majority of LDC eurobonds precluded 
the banks in receipt of OPEC funds from investing in the LDC bonds. 
Firstly there was the interest rate risk but also the fact that the fixed 
interest rate portfolio of bonds would be funded from deposits bearing 
variable (floating) rates of interest. Thus, there is a risk that the 
revenue from the portfolio of bonds would be less than the costs of 
funding that portfolio. Therefore the banks used the OPEC deposits to 
fund floating rate syndicated loans.
In addition to the long term view of interest rates which borrowers 
in the bond market must take, there are also administrative factors which 
may deter some. One such factor is the use of a credit rating. Another is 
the administrative costs of a bond issue. These latter are in addition to 
any front-end fees that may be payable.
Taking the case of the credit rating first, there are three rating 
agencies located in the United States: Moody's Investors Services Inc, 
Standard & Poor's Corporation and Fitch Investors Services Inc. The first 
two of these are more important and have relatively wide experience in 
rating issues of foreign borrowers (Fisher 1979). Because the lack of a 
rating is interpreted as a poor fating, eurobond issuers find it 
worthwhile, in terms of interest rate savings, to obtain a rating for the 
issue. On the other hand, there is evidence in the US foreign bond market 
that developing country issuers have preferred not to obtain a rating 
rather than be given one that is not triple A, the top rating.
Accordingly these countries have had to pay higher coupons, (Fisher 1979, 
op cit) . The costs of obtaining a rating and the fact that developing 
countries may not get top rating may deter sovereign borrowers from using 
the eurobond market.
Turning next to the costs associated with a bond issue but not with 
a syndicated loan, the credit rating could cost up to US $25000, printing 
of bonds and prospectuses US $60000, Stock Exchange listing US $10300, 
authentication of bonds US $7000. (These figures were extracted from 
Fisher, op cit, and relate to a 50 million dollar bond issue.)
On top of these costs there are front-end fees which according to
Fisher are standard in the eurobond market at 2% for maturities up to
five years, 2.25% for maturities five to seven years and 2.50% for
maturities ten years and over. Mendelsohn (1980) gives the following fees
for euro and foreign bonds of various types:
Table 8.5 Fees on euro and foreign bond issues
Eurobonds 2 - 2 i %
New York Foreign Bonds | - 1%
Yen Foreign Bonds 2%
DM Foreign Bonds l|- 2tf%
Dutch Foreign Bonds 2i%
Swiss Foreign Bonds 4%
These figures for front-end fees compare unfavourably with such fees 
paid by Brazil, one of the more frequent LDC borrowers on the bond 
market, of less than i%.
As well as these technical factors, the ability of developing 
countries to tap various foreign bond markets has been influenced by the 
attitudes of the regulatory authorities for each foreign bond market. 
Such attitudes have even influenced eurobond issues. These regulations 
were aimed at a) reducing the internationalisation of a particular 
currency, particularly during periods of weakness, or b) to restrict 
capital inflows during periods of currency appreciation.
Reducing the internationalisation of a currency was desired by some
countries eg Germany and Japan, because otherwise "....  transactions on
the foreign exchange markets and capital markets ......  may be
disproportionate to the size of their economies", (OECD November 1980, 
pl02).
Policies aimed at reducing inflows had the effect of reducing the 
pool of investors' funds and thus the demand for a particular bond issue. 
The role of these markets as a source of finance for developing countries 
was therefore reduced. These controls, generally in the non US dollar 
bond markets, were applied at various times during the 1970's. This was a 
time when the popularity of the US dollar both with investors and with 
borrowers was waning. Therefore the ability of these other markets to 
make up for the shortcomings of US dollar markets must have been 
restricted.
Where these regulations have not influenced the eurobond market 
directly they may have had an indirect influence. In particular, these 
regulations have limited the ejsperience which investors have been able to 
gain of LDC bond issues. Because of this lack of experience they may 
perceive the credit risk to be greater than it actually is.
This section explains why the eurobond in general has not been as 
popular a credit instrument as the eurocurrency syndicated loan as 
indicated by the figures given on page 364 above. The significance of 
this reduced general popularity in explaining the limited access of the 
LDCs to the eurobond market lies in the fact that the smaller the total 
demand for eurobonds, the smaller will be the quantity available to LDCs 
from that source, ceteris paribus.
8.4 The Questionnaire
It can be seen from the previous two sections that the nature of the 
primary and secondary bond markets will have a strong influence on the 
ability of the developing countries to access those markets. In
particular the nature of the investors, their perception of the risk 
associated with lending to developing countries and investors' attitudes 
to risk are important. Moreover, the depth of the secondary market in 
developing country bonds will influence the attractiveness of new issues 
of those bonds.
It is also clear that the fixed interest rate nature of most 
eurobond issues, the foreign exchange risk, and the long term maturity of 
many issues should theoretically influence investors' willingness to take 
eurobonds generally. Widely recognised standard credit ratings and 
transactions' costs may also influence borrowers' willingness to issue such 
bonds. Any factors that reduce the overall size of the eurobond market 
will, ceteris paribus, restrict the access of LDCs to bond finance. 
Therefore, the questionnaire was composed of five sections. Section one 
consisted of one composite question in four parts enquiring to what 
extent the nature of the market and its participants or the nature of 
eurobond instruments were the reasons for the limited access of LDCs to 
the eurobond market.
Section two consisted of six questions, two relating to the type of 
eurobond investor, two about the thinness of the secondary markets, one 
about the reluctance of LDC governments to obtain credit ratings and an 
open-ended question about other aspects of the eurobond market that 
limited the access of LDCs to that market.
Section three asked six questions about the nature of the eurobond 
instrument. Three questions related to exchange risk and interest rate 
risk of eurobonds, two questions related to the costs of eurobond issues 
and one question was open-ended and enquired of any other factors about 
the instrument that limited the access of LDCs to this market.
In order to obtain some idea of why developing countries tap the 
eurobond market when they already have considerable access to bank 
finance, one question to this effect was asked in section four of the 
questionnaire. It was felt that the simple question in section four was
sufficient because it was not intended to investigate why developing 
countries sought external finance but only why they seek bond finance 
when they already have bank finance.
Lastly, in section five, it was hoped that respondents to the 
questionnaire would provide a ranking to each answer they gave along the 
scale a - very important to c - not important.
8.5 The Results of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire was sent to the chief executive in charge of 
eurobond syndications at 53 institutions in London. The population of 
institutions consisted of members of the London section of the
Association of International Bond Dealers, a number of merchant banks, 
most of which are affiliated with UK clearing banks, and the British 
Overseas Banks who have strong connections with developing countries.
All executives were contacted by telephone in advance to get their 
agreement to participate in the study, the number of agreements 
determining the number of questionnaires despatched. One month after the 
date of despatch of the questionnaire telephonic communication was made 
with all those executives who had not responded. Within two months of the 
original date of despatch, 28 responses were received, 53% of the
population. This encouragingly high response is attributed to getting 
previous agreement to participation and the small size of the
questionnaire.
The responses to the questionnaire are divided into two parts for 
purposes of analysis. The first part analyses the response to the
questions which provided Yes/No answers, and the ranking of those 
answers. The second section analyses the comments, some of which were 
very detailed.
Analysis of Yes/No Answers in sections 1 to 3
The exact number of Yes/No answers to each question and the relative
importance of each question is given in appendix VIII with the 
questionnaire. The total of Yes and No answers to each question does not 
always equal 28 because not every respondent answered all questions. The 
same comment applies to the rankings because not all respondents ranked 
their answers.
Looking first at the response to section one, the majority response 
was that the nature of the market was most important. However, one fifth 
of the responses thought that it was a combination of the market and the 
instrument which was the cause.
Turning to section two, the majority of respondents did not think 
that the eurobond market was dominated by individuals. This runs counter 
to a popular theme in the literature (eg Ahmed, op cit; Scott Quin, op 
cit) . Twenty three of the respondents considered that the market was not 
dominated by individuals but that the investors perceived the developing 
countries as being too great a risk. Fifty per cent of the respondents 
ranked the risk factor as being ’very important'.
The majority of respondents considered the secondary market to be 
disproportionately thin and an even larger proportion of respondents 
considered that this was a deterrent to potential investors. However, 
considering the importance of these two points, only about 25% of the 
respondents considered them to be very important and only one third 
considered them to be moderately important.
The question of credit ratings influencing the developing countries' 
access to the bond market was closely divided between limiting access and 
not limiting access but no respondents thought that this point was 
important.
It was noted by some respondents that there is no credit rating 
system solely related to the eurobond market and therefore ratings for 
the foreign bond and domestic bond markets would have to be used. The 
reluctance to obtain these ratings was considered to be due to the fact 
that governments do not generally apply for a rating unless they are
certain of getting the highest rating ie 'AAA'. However most developing 
countries would only be rated as 1 highly speculative1.
Turning now to section three, only two respondents considered that 
the exchange risk deterred investors. Only one respondent considered that 
fixed interest rates deterred investors and only one respondent thought 
that borrowers were deterred by the long term and fixed interest rate 
nature of the eurobond instrument. However, note should be made of the 
comments on page .381 below.
Analysis of the responses to section four
Of the 28 responses, 24 respondents answered question 13 asking why 
countries which already have access to the syndicated loans market also 
tap the bond market. The answers had three common themes a) the need to 
tap every possible source of funds, b) to enjoy the certainty of fixed 
cost finance and c) prestige.
The comments regarding the need to tap every possible source of 
funds often noted the desperate plight of the developing countries in 
their search for funds. Other respondents saw the use of the bond market 
as a prudential diversification of geographical and sectoral sources of 
funds. Some respondents also noted the prudential diversification of 
maturities in that eurobonds are traditionally repaid only at maturity. 
This gives certainty regarding maturity of commitments which may be 
lacking with a roll-over credit.
An interesting comment which is an extension of the diversification 
of sources was that "the banks are over-extended to LDCs, therefore if 
the banks see an opportunity to share this burden with non bank 
investors, they will bring an issue to the market". This indicated that 
the banks themselves have an interest in diversifying the sources of 
funds to developing countries in order to relieve the pressure on their 
own exposure limits.
The many respondents who considered that the bond market was
accessed in order to achieve some fixed cost element in the total
borrowing considered this to be advantageous even if rates were high at 
the time of issue. It is also interesting to note that if markets have 
expectations of rising interest rates borrowers are encouraged and 
investors discouraged from fixed rate issues. This view was confirmed in 
comments relating to questions 8 and 9 in section three. The 1970's has 
experienced a secular rise in interest rates. As the majority of LDC bond 
issues to date have been fixed rate issues (80%) , this may add to the 
factors that deter investors.
One respondent noted that although the banks were the only investors 
capable of carrying out the necessary risk analysis, they cannot lend on 
fixed rate instruments because of the floating rate nature of their
liabilities (deposits). In this respect it should be noted that, with the 
growing popularity of floating rate notes, the banks have been willing to 
invest more for their own account in the bond market.
The prestige of the borrower figured prominently as a reason for
tapping the bond market* The achievement of a successful bond issue put 
the borrower in a select club of good names. There was also an element of 
an educating role in that if one bond issue is seen to be successful, and 
the borrower meets its commitments, not only will future bond issues be 
possible but the borrowers' credit rating in other markets will improve. 
The role of publicising the borrower's name via the bond market so that 
underwriters and investors alike become familiar with the name was also 
considered to be a beneficial reason for tapping the bond market.
Analysis of additional comments in responses to 
sections 1 to 3 and section 5
Turning now to the additional comments from the respondents, the 
overwhelming comments related to reasons why the eurobond market, and 
indeed bond markets generally, had been so little used by developing
countries. The main reason for this little use was considered to be the 
perception of the credit risk involved. It was considered that investors, 
whether institutional or individual, invest only in good quality names. 
Some respondents thought that investors in bonds did not have the ability 
to carry out sophisticated analysis of the credit and political risks 
involved. Furthermore, many investors see the anonymity provided by 
eurobonds as beneficial. However, the desire to maintain anonymity 
precludes the establishment of bondholder organisations that can seek to 
enforce bondholders' rights upon default. A considerable proportion of 
eurobonds are bought by discretionary funds which are precluded from 
buying into risk situations. Furthermore, although the market was 
generally thought to be dominated by institutional investors, at least in 
terms of volume of funds, the dominance can shift towards individuals. 
For example one respondent considered that in the latter half of 1981 
75-80% of fixed rate bonds were bought by Swiss banks on behalf of their 
individual clients.
Implicit in the statements that all investors lack the 
sophistication to carry out the appropriate risk analysis is the 
suggestion that institutional investors also lack that capability. This 
seems a surprising conclusion and some doubt as to its validity may be 
gleaned from the comments of a few respondents who thought that 
institutional investors were less quality conscious than individual 
investors. Maybe the institutional investors can carry out the 
"appropriate" risk analysis. Again, a few respondents considered that one 
reason why banks found LDC risk acceptable is that they could fully 
diversify their risks because of the large size of their balance sheets. 
However, one would expect the same of many institutional investors but 
maybe not of individuals.
The off-shore nature of eurobond issues was considered by some 
respondents to make the job of risk analysis and monitoring the condition 
of the investment more difficult. This is particularly so when the most
difficult risk to analyse is political risk. Even countries with sound 
economies can be politically unstable as changes of government do occur 
very rapidly.
A further set of comments may shed more light upon the attitude of 
investors to the credit ratings. After all, even individual investors may 
feel safe lending money to the same governments as their bank has lent 
to. One may think that potential investors would use the credit rating 
implicit in the publicised terms of the banks' lending. That this does 
not seem to be so may be explained in the differing attitudes to the 
principal value of the loan. Several respondents considered that bonds 
were treated by both individual and institutional investors as safe 
havens for capital. Capital certainty rather than high income is the 
desire of the investor. This corroborates the theoretical point made on 
pages 8 and 9 above that investors who are not financial intermediaries 
are more concerned with capital certainty because the investment is made 
with their wealth (equity) and not intermediated funds.
The behaviour of a bank as an investor in syndicated loans is 
different in that they need income certainty so that they can cover the 
costs of funding their investments. The banks are therefore willing to 
roll-over loans, reschedule loans or repay existing loans with new loans 
providing income is certain. As banks have to maintain the attractiveness 
of deposits and because deposits often come from different sectors of the 
economy than those to which loans are made, banks are often under 
pressure to take upon themselves the high risks associated with financial 
intermediation in order to deploy deposit funds profitably.
Many respondents, considering that banks and not bond investors are 
equipped to carry out risk analysis of LDCs, cited the fixed interest 
nature of the majority of bonds issued as the reason why banks were not 
greater investors in LDC eurobonds. In this respect it is notable that 
with the growing use of floating rate note issues the banks are becoming 
more important investors and that many LDC FRN issues have been sold to
banks. However, it should be noted that one respondent considered that
FRN issues were more expensive in terms of issue costs than a syndicated
loan on similar terms. Moreover, FRN issues over $100 million were 
difficult to make. Thus an FRN issue was inappropriate to the needs of 
developing countries.
The thin secondary market, which was commented on by several
respondents, will have a detrimental influence on the ability of 
investors to divest themselves of their bonds without suffering capital 
losses. The role of a deep secondary market in giving investors 
confidence in the liquidity of their bond investments was considered to 
be so important that one respondent considered the small secondary market 
in LDC eurobonds to be one of the most important factors limiting the 
access of LDCs to the eurobond market. Of course there is a 'chicken and 
egg' problem here because unless there are substantial issues of LDC 
bonds, and that each issue is large, not enough individual bonds will be 
traded to establish a secondary market. However, it must be noted that 
the ranking of the Yes/No answers implied that the size of the secondary 
market was less important than the comments suggest.
The depth of the secondary market is crucial for institutional
investors because they frequently change their investment criteria with 
regard to currency and maturity risk. If the secondary market is thin, 
there may be considerable implicit transactions costs involved in these 
shifts and therefore a thin secondary market will make LDC eurobonds less 
than attractive to institutional investors. The dominance of 
institutional investors noted earlier will make this factor all the more 
important.
It was also suggested earlier that investors in eurobonds were more 
interested in low risk rather than high income. Nevertheless, some 
respondents did consider the question of the adequacy of compensation for 
the risk involved. Three respondents thought that considerably higher 
risk premiums than are currently available would be required to make LDC
bonds acceptable. It was also noted that at the appropriate price the 
LDCs would perceive the finance as too expensive and would seek 
alternative sources of finance. Furthermore, countries that are currently 
least attractive to the bond markets can borrow bond market funds at fine 
rates via the IBRD, IADB and similar institutions.
Considering the comments that the yield on bond issues whicli
compensated for the risk involved would be perceived as too high, it must 
be remembered that the yield on a eurobond is only the coupon yield plus 
any change in the secondary market price. Thus, this yield is explicit to 
the borrower and investor. However, the yield on a bank loan has an 
explicit element - spread plus fees - but also an implicit element in
terms of the other business income that can be generated from the
borrower's wider banking connection. This may even amount to goodwill in 
allowing branches to operate in the borrower's country. Thus the explicit 
yield on syndicated loans can be lower than the explicit yield on
eurobonds for the same risk. Furthermore, one respondent
considered that the risk premium between, LDC and, say, OECD borrowers is 
greater in the bond market than in the syndicated loans market. Therefore 
the LDCs may wish to avoid this premium.
In the responses comment was made not only of the small size of the 
secondary market, but the small size of the total eurobond market 
compared with that of syndicated loans. Two points were made about this 
relative size. One was that good quality issues crowded out poorer 
quality ones. Secondly, because there was an adequate supply of good 
quality paper investors do not have to lend to developing countries. The 
corollary of this is that investors do not learn about developing 
countries - these countries do not become 'household names'. Thus the 
credit reputation of all LDCs is tarred by the defaults of a few. While 
this crowding out persists the 'education' of investors will be a slow 
process and therefore the bond market will not be generally available to 
LDCs for a long time to come.
The slowness of the educating process in the bond market is contrary 
to that in the syndicated loans market where, because of a combination of 
opportunity and necessity, the banks learned very quickly to assess the 
risks of LDC lending*
It is clear that the greater proportion of comment was about the 
reluctance of investors to buy LDC eurobonds. However, there were a few 
comments about the bond market not being considered desirable by LDCs.
Firstly it was noted that the bond instrument was a very rigid 
instrument with many covenants which, when broken, constitute default. 
Thus if the developing country's circumstances change such that it cannot 
comply with the covenants, it has the choice of repaying the bond or of 
defaulting. A syndicated loan on the other hand is much more flexible. 
Re-negotiation of the terms of the loan is possible, first because banks 
are used to providing a flexible form of finance and, secondly because 
relatively few members of a syndicate are involved. This compares with 
the impossibility of negotiating with a large number of anonymous 
eurobond investors.
It was also suggested that developing countries prefer to borrow 
from the banks because they perceive that only the banks are equipped to 
carry out a fair and accurate risk assessment. Thus only from a bank will 
they get fair (favourable?) terms for the finance. This may reflect the 
fact that banks get a greater proportion of implicit yield on syndicated 
loans than bondholders do from their bonds. This comment may also reflect 
greater competition in syndicated lending following the necessity to 
deploy a growing volume of deposits during the 1970's.
Finally one respondent considered the interest cost of eurobonds to 
be unfavourably high for LDCs compared with syndicated loans.
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8.6 Conclusion
This study does not give rise to 'a confident outlook regarding 
future increased access of the developing countries to the eurobond 
market. Particular features which will preclude access are the perception 
of credit risk by investors, legalistic limitations upon institutional 
investors and the crowding out of developing country paper because of the 
limited size of the eurobond market.
It seems essential to take steps to deepen the secondary market in 
these bonds in order to make them more attractive generally. However, it 
is realised that this may be difficult until the primary market for LDC 
paper is enlarged.
There does seem to be a need to pay substantially higher yields if 
the developing countries are to increase access. This in itself may be
unattractive to the borrowers. One way may be to provide some fiscal
\
benefit to those investors who pay taxes along the lines provided to 
banks who make tax-spare loans to developing countries. There may be a 
greater role to play by the supranational institutions such as the IBRD 
in that they may be able to increase their access to the bond markets and 
then engage in more programme finance of the developing countries.
There is clearly the need for an educative process aimed at changing 
the attitudes of investors to developing country risks. However, in this 
respect, recent publicity regarding the rescheduling of bank debt must 
detrimentally affect confidence.
Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Resume
In chapter one it was shown that growth aspirations, external shocks 
and the quantitative inadequacy of official external finance forced the 
LDCs to make use of private sources of external finance during the 1970's. 
However, this increased access to private finance was not available to all 
LDCs and indeed the poorest LDCs were net depositors with the 
international banks.
The relative profitability of loans to LDCs, the increased liquidity 
of the euromarkets after 1973 and - for the US banks at least - the 
relaxation of controls, encouraged the banks to make strategic changes in 
their loan portfolios and satisfy the increasing demand for loans by LDCs. 
Such was the satisfaction of this demand that banks became the major 
suppliers of such finance.
Chapter two showed that the syndicated roll-over loan was well suited 
to the supply of the individually large medium to long term credits 
required by the LDCs.
Chapter three showed that it is feasible for many of these loans to 
be provided at zero or at least very low marginal cost to the banks where 
the interest costs of funding the loan are passed directly to the borrower 
within the terms of the loan agreement. Because of the low level of 
marginal cost and very elastic demand curves for loans due to the degree 
of competition in the eurocurrency loan market, the banks were able to 
pursue the objective of asset growth without reaching the profit 
maximising size of portfolio. The constraints postulated were not the 
equality of marginal cost with marginal revenue but a minimum return on 
total assets or a maximum level of perceived risk. The existence of this 
latter constraint early in the 1980's was confirmed in a survey of bankers
reported more fully in chapter seven.
Chapter four investigated the cost of funds to LDC borrowers by way 
of syndicated loans and eurobonds. This chapter showed how interest rates 
on both were related to the domestic rates of the countries whose currency 
was being used. In particular the US domestic interest rates had a strong 
influence upon eurodollar rates and therefore upon the debt servicing 
costs of LDC borrowers. Moreover, it was shown that rising interest rates
on floating rate debt that compensate for inflation reduce the real
maturity of that debt such that it may be inappropriate for the
development or adjustment process.
Chapter four showed the magnitude of the substantial risk premia paid 
by the relatively few LDCs that have gained access to the eurobond market. 
It was also shown that the spread on syndicated loans was a poor indicator 
of risk or yield. Firstly, this is because of inadequate information about 
fees and secondly, because during periods of high liquidity, spread 
differentials between borrowers have narrowed considerably.
The conclusion of chapter four is that the costs of external finance 
to LDCs are very strongly influenced by the monetary-fiscal policy stance
of the OECD countries, particularly the USA. As is being experienced at
the time of writing, the level of interest rates in some of these
countries bears little relationship with the level of inflation that the
LDCs experience in their export markets.
Chapter five showed that the growth of worldwide bank lending to LDCs 
had been more rapid than the growth of GNP or exports for LDCs
collectively. However, this may be expected where much of the borrowing is
to finance long term projects or macroeconomic adjustment.
It was also noted that loans to LDCs had grown faster than the UK 
banks' capital and this phenomenon was presumed to apply to all major 
banking centres. However, for the UK banks at least it was shown that 
despite this increase between 1978-82 such lending had not grown 
significantly as a proportion of total non resident advances and only
slightly in terms of total balance sheet size.
The degree of profitability on bank loans to LDCs was shown to be 
greater than on loans to OECD based borrowers. This was because of higher 
spreads and lower loan loss ratios than experienced with domestic banking 
- at least during the 1970's.
This chapter showed that the debt servicing costs had risen 
substantially during the 1970's, not just because of the increasing size 
of the debt but because of the movement towards private sources of 
finance. In particular the movement towards floating rate debt and the 
high nominal and real interest rates experienced towards the end of the 
decade considerably increased the ratios of interest payments to GNP and 
exports and the proportion of interest going to private financial markets.
Furthermore, this chapter illustrated the weaknesses of assessing 
debt service requirements with the currently inadequate data regarding 
debt with an original maturity of one year or less. It was shown on page 
236 that assuming an average LIBOR for the year in question due on all 
bank debt and repayment of all debt due within one year, servicing 
commitments were nearly five times as great as that suggested by taking 
interest and amortisation due on medium and long term debt as reported by 
the IBRD.
Chapter five also indicated the benefits of diversification of loan 
portfolios. However it was shown that loans are subject to systematic risk 
due to rising interest rates and the attendant impact upon exchange rates.
Although diversification by country seemed to be adequate, when
diversification was looked at from the point of the source of export
revenue, a different picture emerges. LDCs as a group depend upon the
export of primary products to earn foreign exchange. On average 62% of
these exports go to only five markets and the US market accounted for 36%.
.Moreover, several countries had considerable degrees of concentration in
one export commodity. It was therefore considered that the banks'
portfolio of LDC loans was not adequately diversified in terms of source 
of debt servicing ability.
Chapter six investigated ways of reducing the risk associated with 
international bank lending. The suggestions formed two groups: those that 
reduced the risks of lending to LDCs specifically and those that reduced 
the risks of international financial intermediation generally. The 
acceptability to the bankers of the various suggestions was tested by a 
questionnaire survey of over 200 banks in London.
In the responses to this survey, reported in chapter seven, there 
was considerable support for restructuring the maturity profile of LDC 
debt, although the banks generally hoped that it would be voluntary from 
their point of view. Furthermore, it was considered that restructuring 
should be accompanied by adjustment policies. In this respect there was 
substantial support for the writer's suggestion that debt rescheduling 
should become a legitimate aspect of debt management policy.
There was also a view that the borrowers' debt management must be 
improved in order to avoid bunching of maturities and to make the 
maturity profile flexible within the light of the changing circumstances 
of the borrower.
Suggestions of direct subsidy of LDC interest payments by richer 
countries were not strongly supported. However, there was support for 
the writer's suggestion that an IMF facility be established that will 
allow countries to finance short term increases in debt servicing costs 
caused by upward fluctuations in interest rates provided that these cause 
balance of payments difficulties. It was thought that there may be some 
definitional problems particularly about interest rate trends and 
administrative problems regarding repayment but these are not considered 
insurmountable.
It was thought that guarantees would increase the flow of finance to 
LDCs provided that the guarantors were the richer industrial countries 
acting in concert. It was considered that the guarantees would have to be 
available to all LDCs otherwise those that are unguaranteed would be 
crowded out of the market.
If a system of guarantees were applied to the later years of a 
restructured debt this may encourage a general restructuring to longer 
maturities more appropriate to economic development. One problem is that if 
the giving of guarantees is perceived as akin to aid, the richer LDCs - who 
have borrowed most - will be seen to be receiving the most aid.
Chapter eight investigated, with the aid of a second questionnaire 
survey, the reasons for the limited access to the eurobond market for LDCs. 
The indicated reasons were that bond investors were more risk averse than 
banks and that LDC bonds were perceived to exhibit too great a risk.
9 . 2 Conclusions and Recommendations
Given the level of the LDCs1 external debt and the reasons for the 
accumulation of such debt, it is unrealistic to expect any significant
reduction in the level of that debt. Indeed as growth and gradual economic
adjustment are objectives to be achieved within an inflationary environment, 
an increase in that debt will be required.
If this increase in debt is to be achieved without jeopardising the
stability of the international financial system, the bankers' perception of
the risk of default on debt servicing must be reduced. If this reduction in 
perceived risk can be achieved, the writer is confident that, given the 
desire of the banks for asset growth, additional bank finance will be 
available to LDCs.
Abstracting from suggestions related to world economic growth and 
growth of trade, such as less protection in LDC export markets or additional 
growth in OECD economies, it is possible to suggest changes to the current 
financial order which will make debt service more certain.
Firstly, a way must be found to remove the interest servicing burden 
resulting from upward movement in interest rates, particularly where these 
are unrelated to the inflation rates in the LDCs' export markets. Aid 
payments would be politically difficult and, moreover, unless such payments 
come from additional aid nothing would be gained.
The suggestion that an IMF facility analogous to the Compensatory 
Financing Facility but related to higher interest costs of debt is 
considered to be in urgent need of investigation and is recommended here
as a subject for further research.
It is also felt that there is a need for a radical review of the role 
of official bilateral credits in development finance. In particular, as it 
is not the primary function of governments to act as commercial money 
lenders and given that such loans are often made for altruistic, political 
or export promotion reasons, one must consider the impact of converting 
all such debt into grants. In this respect it is recommended that further 
research is required into the impact of such a conversion upon the debt 
servicing commitments of the borrowers and the public finance of the 
lenders.
There is an urgent need for the maturity structure of all debt to be 
reviewed. In particular the maturity of loans must be extended, where 
appropriate, to match the gestation period of the project financed. The 
term project includes macroeconomic adjustment. Moreover, the banks must 
be more flexible in their attitude to changing the maturity structure as 
borrowers' circumstances change. However, it must be doubted whether it 
will be possible to incorporate supplier credits into such a scheme.
When undertaking the review of the maturity profile of the debt, the 
reviewers should be mindful of the fact that the risk of default is 
reduced if timing of the cash flow of the project financed matches the 
amortisation schedule of the loan.
Furthermore, given that bankers do not rely upon the repayment of 
loans to meet depositors' claims and that it is natural for financial 
intermediaries to engage in risk and maturity transformation, banks are 
capable of converting existing debt onto a much longer average maturity 
than presently applies. The point for the bankers to note is not whether 
the debt will ever be repaid but whether interest payments will remain 
current. ■
Hand in hand with the restructuring of the debt, there must be 
improved debt management by the borrowers. This will ensure timely payment 
of amortisation and interest payments which themselves will create a
better climate for refinancing and may even reduce the rate of interest 
required by the banks. Moreover, better debt management should enable the 
borrowers to anticipate their refinancing requirements with sufficient 
lead time so as to avoid lack of market confidence and the need to 
reschedule in crisis conditions.
There may be a role to play in providing guarantees over the later 
years to maturity for the poorer countries. However, the decision to 
implement such a suggestion should await the findings of the investigation 
into the role of official bilateral finance, the reason being that the 
poorer LDCs get a greater proportion of their external finance from 
official sources. Converting any such loans into grants may obviate the 
need for guarantees.
Although the above recommendations relate to debt ie bank assets, any 
instability in the financial system will probably manifest itself as a run 
on deposits of a particular bank or group of banks. It is therefore 
essential that a uniform and adequate system of prudential regulation is 
developed, together with a uniform lender of last resort facility that 
ensures that banks will not fail just for lack of liquidity. This 
suggestion does not include supporting insolvent banks. Nevertheless, the 
regulatory authorities and the accounting profession must consider fully 
their approach to the treatment of rescheduled debts in bank balance 
sheets.
With respect to the eurobond market, the writer considers that little 
can be done in the present financial climate to encourage a substantially 
larger proportion of development finance directly from investors. However, 
the official multilateral institutions must be ever vigilant to tap the 
bond markets where the segmentation of the euromarkets makes this possible 
without artificially raising interest rates.
In addition to these recommendations several areas of study are 
worthy of further research before conclusions can be made about their 
benefits to the international financial system. These are:-
research into an appropriate code of conduct 
for rescheduling;
- research into the most appropriate form of loan 
documentation and risk sharing agreement for 
co-financing with multilateral agencies;
- research into the economic, legal and administrative 
implications of expanding the secondary market in 
eurocurrency loans.
The recommendations made in this chapter will not transform the 
international debt problem overnight. They will take time to work, not 
least because the attitudes of the bankers, the borrowers and the 
authorities need time to change. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of LDCs as 
major users of international financial markets is likely to be permanent 
and therefore it is essential that it does not have a destabilising 
influence on the international monetary system.
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APPENDIX I : COUNTRY GROUPINGS 
LIST OF COUNTRIES BY INCOME GROUPS
1980 World Bank Atlas Definitions 
(Based on 197& GKP Ptr capita in 19?8 US dollars)
Upper Middle Income (/3|CX)D-./6,999)
Bahrain
Gabon
Greece
Hong Kong
Israel
Singapore
Spain
Trinidad & Tobago
Intermediate Kiddle Income (/?00-/2,999)
Algeria 
Argentina 
Barbados 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Fiji
Guatemala
Iran
Iraq
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Korea, Republic of
Lebanon
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Nicaragua
Oman
Panama
Paraguay
Portugal
Syrian Arab Republic
Taiwan
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
V e n e z u e la
Iugosluvi a
Lower Middle Income 0^300-^699)
Bolivia
Botswana
Cameroon
Congo, People's Republic Of
Egypt, Arab Republic of
El Salvador
Ghana
Guyaria
Honduras
Indonesia
K e n y a
Lesotho
Liberia
Morocco
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea 
Peru
Philippines
Senegal
Sudan
Swaziland
Thailand
Togo
Yemen, Arab Republic of 
Yemen, People'a Dem Republic of 
Zambia
Low Income (less than /300)
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bonin, People's Republic of
Burma
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Haiti
India
Madagascar
Mai awi
Maldi ves
Mali
Mauritania
Nepal
Niger 
Paki stan 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Soc.al i a 
Sri Lanka 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Upper Volta 
2,u i re
\
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OECD DEFINITIONS OF LDC GROUPS 
T lic  D A C J is l  o f  ^developing countries includes a ll countries and territories: in
c'rT"? V  ’? i979 "nd CW"» 1,35 "01 been included in .hVe c o n o m ic  ni i.i l> ms o f  de v e lo p in g  co u n tr ies1 I i c n d s  n n d  p r o b l e m * .
„  UM
. rn ."I™*” CO,,"[',rs <U C s > iIC  ricr'n^  in ih h  rep o rt as those whose per capita 
A , l a i C O" •>« « « i  in the IB R D  “ W o .M  Bank
«- # - • - j- . v * vi PJLAILU, JUril
doUnors)aVia’ 3nd tl,C °ihCr M1CS  CuiUillly as " n o n -o il M J C s " by excluding O P E C
C ’r>nniiio
/..■It n i t  i - i ' j f  i m m i r i i w
A fg h a n is ta n  . Bahrain
A m ro la  . R-ubadns
B ang ladesh Belize
B e n m  . . . . . Berm uda
B h u la n  . . . Bolivia
B u i m a . . . Eolswana
B runei .
C a p e  V e rd e C am eroon
C c n tra l A fr ic a n  R e p C a ym an  Islands
*  C h a d  ........... C h ile
* C o m o r r j  . . C o lom bia
C ongo . . .
............................................ C o ok Islands
E q u a to r ia l G u in e a  . I  osia Rica
E l li io p ia  ___ C uha . .
Cvprtis
G h a n a  . . . . . D j ib o u t i ............................. -______
* G u in e a  .
G u in e a -B is s a u L I Salvador
*  H a it i  ____ F alk lan d  Islands
F i j i ___
G ib ra lta r
K a m p u c h e a  . G re n ad a .
K e n v a  ____ G uadeloupe-
“ Lao s ........... G u atem ala
*  L c s n lh o  ____ G u ia n a . Ficnch
G u yan a
M a la w i  . Honduras
M a ld iv e s  . . Israel . 1
‘  M a l i  . . . Iv o ry  Coasl . . .
Jam aica .
Jordan
N e p a l ................ K ir ib a ti (G ilb ert I s l )
*  N i c e r ............................... Lebanon .
N iu e  Is lan d L ib eria  . . .
M a c a o  .
M alays ia  .
S i, V i n c e n t ................ M a lia  . .
Senegal . M a rtin iq u e
S ie rra  L eo n e M a u ritiu s
S o lo m o n  Island-; (B r ) M ontserrat
M orocco
S ri L a n k a N a u ru
* S u dan  . . . . N e il in la n d s  A ntilles
“ T a n z a n ia  . . New  C a lrd o n ia
N ew  Hebrides
N 'lraiapua
T n n g a  . . . N ip n ia  . .
* C r a n J a  .......... O m a n
Llpf>vr V o l i a .................. B ar.fie  Islands ( l i .S  )
V i r l  N a m  Sue. H ep. . . P anam a
Y e m e n . D c m . 1 a jtu a N 'fte G uinea
Z a ire PutJgUJV
Cpuniiin
B.ili.i
M i . U i , -  
and N IC 's )  
A iw ,m I!.j 
A n lii'u .t  .
( r v r l  O l ’ I C '
Priu......
Philippines ....
Pt'h nrMj 1 |, n, J, 
R r u m n n
S' M e t r n a ............
Si K im  N r i i i
C  ouniritn
S i. L u c ia  ..............................
S i. JV -tre  A. M iq u e lo n  . 
Sao T o m e  A  P rinc ipe  . .  
S c jc h c l lc s ...........................
S n im a in  .......................
S w a z i la n d......
S j r i j  ......................................
T h a i l a n d ..............................
T o k e la u  K ljn d s  . . . . . . . .
T r in id ad  A: Tob ag n
T u n is ia  ....................
T u rk e y  .................................
T u rk s  A  Caicos Islands
T  i n a l u ...................................
U ru g u a y  ......
V irg in  K lunds (Hr.) 
\ \ a l l i s  A  F u iu n a
*  W es ien i Sam oa
* Yemen .. >..........
Z a m b ia  .................................
Z im b a b w e  (R hod esia)
UPI.C
A lg e r ia .......................
Ecuador . . . . . . . . .
G a b o n ............................
Ira n  ......................................
Ira q   .................................
K u u a ii  .............................
L ibs a . .
Qatar.....
S au d i A ra b ia  .................
L rn iicd  A ra b  E m ira les
V e n e z u e la ..............................
T o ta l . . .
Nrti/i J n r ! u \ i r i i i ! i : i i i x  C t t t i t i i r l n  / .K fC 's J
A rg e n tin a  ..........................................
B r a z i l ........................................
G r e e c e ...................     ’ ’
I  long K o n g .....................................
K o re a . H e p .......................................... >
M r s u ’o ..............................
Po rtugal ...............................................
S ingapore ..................................................
S p a i n  ..................................................
T a iw a n  ...
Y u g o s la v  ia
*LLDCs
Source: Review Development 
Corporation 1980 
Table H2
0 ^ 0
Appendix II*
UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
Government
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 3359.3 667.3 240.0 427.3 142.0 285.3
1974 3906.8 737.9 316.1 421.8 160.3 261.5
1975 4482.2 1016.1 317.7 698.4 190.3 508.1
1976 5591.8 1377.1 363.0 1014.1 207.1 807.0
1977 6580.1 1190.0 280.8 909.2 234.1 675.1
1978 7868.3 1521.2 353.8 1167.4 265.5 901.9
1979 9220.4 1841.3 541.6 1299.7 391.4 908.3
International Organisations
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing-
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 664.5 142.7 42.3 100.4 44.0 56.4
1974 785.7 154.2 47.6 106.6 51.0 55.6
1975 875.1 152.9 53.5 99.3 60.6 38.7
1976 983.7 169.2 72.8 96.4 69.2 27.2
1977 1104.0 158.7 75.0 83.8 76.6 7.2
1978 1197.8 122.5 83.8 38.6 93.7 -55.1
1979 1229.7 124.8 108.2 16.6 106.1 -89.5
* Amounts in this table are in US $ millions. 
Source: IBBU World Debt Tables various issues.
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UPPER MIDDLE INCOME 
Financial Institutions
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 1715.3 646.1 318.2 327.8 120.0 207.8
1974 3079.6 1552.3 234.3 1318.0 198.2 1120.8
1975 4556.5 1882.7 348.5 1534.2 295.3 1239.9
1976 6046.1 2058.3 467.4 1590.8 357.1 1233.7
1977 8178.4 2658.3 716.3 1942.0 434.7 1507.3
1978 9030.6 2545.5 2009.0 536.5 684.8 48.3
1979 10025.6 1950.6 1064.0 886.5 1013.9 127.4
Bonds
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 2318.2 508.0 101.1 406.9 58.5 348.4
1974 2502.0 283.6 165.6 118.0 62.6 55.4
1975 2729.9 431.2 193.1 238.2 74.8 163.4
1976 2981.8 244.5 21.6 222.9 41.1 181.8
1977 3714.9 729.2 151.2 578.0 92.3 486.7
1978 4183.5 384.0 135.9 248.0 161.0 87.0
1979 4381.3 424.9 239.2 185.7 208.7 23.0
UPPER MIDDLE INCOME
Suppliers
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 661.3 260.4 121.7 138.7 36.8 101.9
1974 717.6 144.8 115.7 29.1 41.2 -12.1
1975 742.0 186.6 129.6 57.0 37.3 19.7
1976 734.1 141.7 139.3 2.5 39.4 -36.9
1977 821.1 183.3 151.7 31.6 35.9 4.3
1978 762.5 283.3 425.0 -141.6 63.4 -205.0
1979 735.5 181.4 213.8 -32.4 55.6 -88.0
Appendix II continued
INTERMEDIATE MIDDLE INCOME
Government
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 13522.8 2500.9 764.1 1736.8 350.3 1386.5
1974 15997.6 2762.8 853.7 1909.0 397.8 1511.2
1975 17702.2 2877.4 987.9 1889.5 592.3 1297.2
1976 19970.1 3256.8 1163.7 2093.1 726.5 1366.6
1977 22723.4 3384.2 1393.7 1990.6 814.4 1176.2
1978 27752.6 4396.6 1721.6 2675.0 979.2 1695.8
1979 30805.7 4792.2 2514.6 2277.6 1154.9 1112.7
International Organisations
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 6218.5 1234.5 287.4 947.1 384.0 563.1
1974 7588.3 1678.9 325.1 1353.7 479.2 874.5
1975 9192.2 2026.5 372.1 1654.4 573.3 1081.1
1976 10944.8 2185.5 451.2 1734.3 701.3 1033.0
1977 12946.4 2408.2 601.1 1807.1 885.6 911.5
1978 15526.1 2933.7 673.1 2260.6 1175.0 1085.6
1979 18493.2 3725.4 802.1 2923.3 1365.1 1558.2
INTERMEDIATE MIDDLE INCOME
Financial Institutions
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 12162.6 5679.3 1413.5 4265.8 653.5 3612.3
1974 17694.3 7185.5 1960.8 5224.8 1310.2 3914.6
1975 25242.1 9641.2 1907.9 7733.4 1808.0 5825.4
1976 36388.1 14005.2 2618.8 11386.4 2262.6 9123.8
1977 49195.1 17081.7 4786.2 12295.5 2898.8 9397.7
1978 70353.1 29858.0 10168.6 19689.4 4506.4 15183.0
1979 93419.9 36778.2 14306.1 22472.2 8081.7 14390.5
Bonds
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 1 9 4 5 .8 4 5 1 . 3 300 .  1 151 .1 1 3 9 .5 11 .6
1974 2 1 4 5 . 7 4 8 2 . 9 3 2 2 . 4 1 60 .5 155. i 5 . 4
1975 2 2 8 5 . 6 4 1 0 . 5 2 0 5 . 4 205.  1 1 87 .8 17 .3
1976 3 0 7 4 . 5 1 0 1 6 .7 2 6 5 .3 7 5 1 .3 2 0 1 . 0 5 50 .3
1977 5 8 6 0 . 3 2 7 5 7 . 5 2 8 9 . 5 2 4 6 8 . 0 2 5 5 . 2 2 2 1 2 .8
1978 8 8 8 5 . 3 2 8 6 8 . 8 5 2 7 . 7 2 3 4 1 .1 5 1 0 . 5 183 0 .6
1979 9 5 0 1 . 2 1 47 8 .6 6 9 4 . 9 7 8 3 .7 7 2 2 . 6 6 1 .1
INTERMEDIATE MIDDLE INCOME
Suppliers
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 6394.9 1884.4 1088.7 795.7 403.2 392.5
1974 7140.8 1739.8 1273.4 466.4 383.1 83.3
1975 7597.9 2281.2 1528.1 753.1 414.5 338.6
1976 8533.6 2748.5 1715.5 1033.0 537.5 495.5
1977 10359.5 3268.3 2033.5 1234.8 586.7 648.1
1978 14159.6 5144.2 2370.9 2773.3 793.1 1980.2
1979 13774.3 2967.0 2998.1 -31.1 953.8 984.9
Appendix II continued
LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
Government
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 9884.8 1753.7 574.5 1179.2 214.4 964.8
1974 11728.0 2026.7 554.4 1472.3 220.8 1251.5
1975 14555.7 3849.8 572.8 3277.0 305.8 2972.2
1976 17033.0 2985.3 527.0 2458.3 331.3 2127.0
1977 21036.9 3781.8 695.1 3086.7 607.4 2479.3
1978 24948.2 3691.1 842.3 2848.8 670.4 2178.4
1979 27218.7 4083.5 1088.0 2995.5 789.0 2206.5
International Organisations
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 2042.9 398.4 85.7 312.6 103.4 209.2
1974 2535.8 591.7 101.5 490.2 124.4 365.8
1975 3467.1 1038.7 102.5 936.2 155.3 780.9
1976 4603.5 1259.2 123.2 1136.0 204.0 932.0
1977 7212.0 2734.7 145.5 2588.7 306.8 2281.9
1978 9713.0 2646.2 190.9 2455.3 503.1 1952.2
1979 11792.2 2347.1 280.8 2066.4 559.4 1507.0
LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
Financial Institutions
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 1863.6 1027.7 399.5 628.2 82.7 545.5
1974 3137.8 1649.9 391.0 1258.9 163.8 1095.1
1975 5407.4 2746.6 377.3 2369.4 319.9 2049.5
1976 7813.7 2883.4 417.4 2466.0 466.2 2000.8
1977 10312.1 3336.0 1045.1 2290.9 672.4 1628.5
1978 13603.9 4515,2 1818.8 2696.4 825.4 1871.0
1979 17828.9 6863.4 2640.3 4223.1 1455.8 2867.3
Bonds
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 329.1 36.5 8.8 2-7.7 14.9 12.8
1974 352.9 32.7 16.2 16.5 18.4 -1.9
1975 364.1 52.5 18.9 33.7 17.1 16.6
1976 709.5 397.6 20.5 359.1 29.8 329.3
1977 951.5 234.1 20.3 213.8 55.3 158.5
1978 1418.3 451.3 55.3 396.0 64.1 331.9
1979 1545.2 204.1 37.2 166.9 80.3 86.6
4UD
LOWER MIDDLE INCOME
Suppliers
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 2221.9 560.8 466.4 94.4 51.3 43.1
1974 2825.6 1008.3 503.6 504.7 69.3 435.4
1975 3474.6 1399.4 714.7 684.7 104.1 580.6
1976 3919.9 1390.9 867.9 522.9 125.2 397.7
1977 4500.0 1391.5 994.6 396.9 109.9 287.0
1978 4921.0 1231.4 1041.0 190.3 158.0 32.3
1979 5196.5 1578.7 1169.5 409.2 307.1 102.1
Appendix II continued
/
LOW INCOME
Governments
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 14721.8 1463.6 419.3 1044.4 275.3 769.1
1974 16467.4 2472.7 525.2 1947.5 288.2 1659.3
1975 18174.8 3242.0 640.9 2601.0 320.9 2380.1
1976 20557.4 2599.9 594.0 2005.9 347.0' 1658.9
1977 22993.4 2150.4 722.1 1428.3 404.4 1023.9
1978 25201.8 2305.7 790.4 1515.4 474.9 1040.5
1979 25318.0 2335.8 825.4 1510.4 530.1 980.3
International Organisations
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 4009.3 666.2 105.2 560.6 103.7 456.9
1974 4814.3 812.3 111.5 700.8 107.9 592.9
1975 5775.6 1167.9 ■ 120.4 1047.5 114.6 932.9
1976 6924.6 1275.7 123.1 1152.6 155.2 997.4
1977 8259.7 1462.0 139.6 1322.4 162.7 1159.7
1978 10018.2 1869.6 151.0 1718.5 210.0 1508.5
1979 11725.2 1984.8 183.0 1801.9 254.2 1547.7
LOW INCOME
Financial Institutions
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 627.8 305.7 68.2 237.4 33.8 203.6
1974 916.7 371.6 82.9 288.7 51.3 237.4
1975 1108.4 304.0 86.0 218.1 55.0 163.1
1976 1314.4 331.8 67.4 264.4 42.8 221.6
1977 1671.7 399.5 71.9 327.6 56.7 270.9
1978 2052.4 410.4 89.0 321.4 94.0 227.4
1979 2342.9 394.2 132.7 261.5 103.4 158.1
Bonds
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
transfer
1973 117.3 - 20.5 -20.5 7.2 -27.7
1974 112.0 7.2 -7.2 5.9 ' -13.1
1975 86.2 12.9 -12.9 5.1 -18.0
1976 61.4 - 10.0 -10.0 4.6 -14.6
1977 54.1 - 13.0 -13.0 3.2 -16.2
1978 53.7 - 3.2 -3.2 3.0 -6.2
1979 56.1 - 1.2 -1.2 3.0 -4.2
LOW INCOME
Suppliers
Disbursed 
debt out­
standing
Disburse­
ments
Amortise Net
flow
Interest Net
Transfer
1973 1178.0 294.9 187.0 107.9 48.3 59.6
1974 1369.0 429.1 228.3 200.8 54.8 146.0
1975 1365.1 349.6 254.8 94.8 55.5 39.3
1976 1417.5 •385.7 231.2 154.5 48.4 106.1
1977 1592.8 323.0 209.9 113.1 44.8 68.3
1978 1799.2 345.0 212.4 132.6 56.4 76.2
1979 1975.6 229.6 214.7 15 62.4 -47.4
Appendix III
Comparison of Yields on Eurobonds for IBRD and Selected 
Private UK Issues
Date of 
issue
Amount of 
original issue
Yield to 
maturity Life
IBRD 7/77 250 16.09 0.43
6/76 250 15.50 4.34
7/75 200 15.37 3.38
12/75 250 15.50 3.8
6/80 200 15.41 3.3
6/81 500 15.42 4.34
8/81 210 15.40 4.09
10/81 300 15.94 4.68
9/81 130 15.29 4.59
9/81 100 15.57 6.59
10/81 200 16.36 9.68
Barclays Bank 
International 6/75 50 14.72 0.34
Barclays Bank 
0/S Inv 9/77 100 14.26 10.55
National
Westminster Bank 6/78 75 14.68 4.32
National 
Westminster 
Bank Finance 12/81 100 15.25 9.83
3 other issues 
1 other issue 
no other issues
Source: Association of International Bond Dealers 
Quotations and Yields March 1982 
published by Datastream PLC
NB The comparison has been limited to bonds where
the yield to average life does not apply and 
where the residual maturity is-similar
APPENDIX IV
Primary and Secondary Commodity Trade as % of Total Trade in 1978* or 1979
Share of primary 
commodities in 
total exports
Share of manu­
factures in 
total exports
Share of fuel 
in total 
exports
Argentina*
Brazil
Chile*
Colombia*
Mexico (1974) 
Venezuela 
Ecuador 
Algeria*
Nigeria 
Indonesia 
Korea S
Philippines (1974)
Thailand
Malaysia
73-6
60.9
44.4
80.5
51.5 
97.9
99.2
98.2 
94.4 
10.? 
85.1 
67.0 
60.7
26.^
38.2
55.6
19.2
48.2 
21.1
0.8
0.5
5-3
89.2
11.0
30.6
38.5
12.4
37.1
0.6
1-5
1-9
11.1
18.6
20.1
21.3
12.0
’Countries marked thus give 1978 figures as most recent 
Mexico and Philippines give 1974 figures as most recent 
Source UN Yearbook 1979/80
APPENDIX V
Major Export Partners 1978 
Country________ Export mitt
$ of exports going to individual 
markets as % of total exports 
USA______ Germany Netherlands Japan
Argentina Netherlands 10,28
Brazil 9-02
USA 8.56 '
Italy 7*9*4
West Germany 6.*42
Other 57.78
Brazil USA 22.6?
Germany 8.59
Netherlands 6.18
Japan 5*1*4
France *4.18
. Other 55.*4*4
Chile Germany W 1*4.9
USA 15.58
Japan 11.97
Brazil 10.1?
Argentina 6.65
Other *45.*t6
Colombia USA 28.62
Germany 20.08
Venezuela 8-97
Netherlands *4.78
Sweden 5-61
Other 33-9*4
Mexico USA 65.6
Germany W 2 .98
Brazil 2.93
Spain 2.10
Japan 1*77
Other 2*4.62
8.56
6.*42
22.67
8.59
6.18
5.1*4
1*4.9
13.58
11.97
28.62
20.08
*4.78
65-6
2.98
1-77
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Venezuela
Ecuador
Algeria
Nigeria
Indonesia
Korea S
USA 36.49
Belgium 15.78
Netherlands 7.28
Colombia 5.92
Honduras 3.06
Other 31.47
USA 43.6
Panama 9.57
Peru 8.50
Chile 6.41
Germany W 3.92
Other 27-99
USA 50.7
Germany W 13.75
France 11.35
Italy 7.45
Spain 2.61
Other 14.13
USA 42.28
Netherlands 14.23
France 9-66
Germany W 9.43
UK 6.42
Other 17.98
Japan 39.21
USA 25.44
Singapore 
Trinidad &
10.66
5-07Tobago
Netherlands 3.04
Other 16.57
USA 32.09
Japan 20.58
Saudi Arabia 5.65
Germany W 5.22
UK 3.10
Other 33.36
USA______ Germany
36. i»g
*43.6
3.92
50.7
1 3 . 7 5
42.28
9.45
25.4*t 
32.09
5-22
Netherlands Japan
7.28
14.23
39-21
3.04
20.58
4Appendix V continued
Philippines USA 3*4.25
Japan 22.93
Netherlands 8.56
Germany W *4.29
Indonesia 2.70
Other 27.*47
Thailand Japan 20.3
Netherlands 1*4.6?
USA 11.02
Singapore 8.09
Hong Kong 5»3*4
Other * 40.57
Malaysia Japan 21.66
USA 18.62
Singapore 16,16
Netherlands 5*63
UK *4.81
Other 33*21
USA______ Germany Netherlands Japan
3*4.25
22.93
8.56
*4.29
20.3
1*4.67
11.02
21.66
18.62
5*63
Source: UN Yearbook 1979/80
APPENDIX VI
ExportB by SITC Code - # of Country Total or World Total 1978
SITC % of country 
total
% ot world 
total
Argentina 044 9-2 7.6
045 6.6 31.0
013 4.1 14'.3
19.9 52.9
Brazil 071 15.3 0
281 8.if ■ 19.
061 8.4 14.2
072 6.2 18.9
421 2.8 10.1
41.1 62.6
Chile 682 53.^ 16.0
Colombia 071 65.5 16.5
Mexico 331 44.3
274 0.9 13.7
45-2 13.7
Venezuela 331 65.5 5-2
1975
332 27.0 7.8
92.5 13.0
Ecuador 331 4o 0.4
071 17. 2.2
57-^ 2.6
Algeria 331 85-9 ■ 7
"18 commodities exported
20 commodities exported
5 commodities exported
8 commodities exported
14 commodities exported
2 commodities exported
4 commodities exported
4 commodities exported
J. \J
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SITC % of country 
total
$ of world 
total
Nigeria - - Figures not available
Indonesia 331 52.1 ?
2h2 1 0 .0 2 2 .9
231 6 .0 1 2 .3
6 8 .1 35.2 ^ commodities exported
Korea S 8i»1 1 8 .6 10.1
Philippines h22 1 6 .2 23.9
283 1 1 .0
2 7 .2 39.^ 11 commodities exported
Thailand 01)2 l*t.? 25.1
231 1 1 .6 7-9
03^ 10.4 9.1
36.7 ^2 .1 9 commodities exported
Malaysia 331 1 7.^
231 15 .1 2 1 .9
2*i2 9*7 15-9
k2.2 37.8 6 commodities exported
‘i l l
Appendix VII All banks that responded
QUESTIONNAIRE
REDUCING THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL BANK 
LENDING TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
SECTION I : INTRODUCTION
Constraints to increasing bank lending
1i Please indicate the importance of the following constraints to increasing 
bank lending to developing countries:
Constraint
a)Current exposure limits are 
fully utilised
b)Bank capital adequacy
c)Doubt about future debt 
servicing ability
d)Profitability of LDC loans
e)0thers, please specify:
Very
important Important
Not
important
30,
,25,
.5A
13
.2.5.
2,9
..7,
32 14
1ii Which of these constraints do you think iB the most important? 
a A . b . P. c ,4A d ... e A  *
1iii Has the relative importance of these constraints changed in the last 
five years? If so, please specify:
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers;
2i What do you think are the major corporate objectives of the banking 
industry in relation to lending to developing countries?
2ii Which of these objectives is the most important?
2iii Has the relative importance of any of these objectives changed in 
the last five years? If so, please specify:
2iv Do banking firms change their corporate objectives as their experience 
in the euromarkets increases? If so, please specify:
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
Risks In international lending
31 Please indicate the relative importance of the following risks associated 
with international banking:
Very
important Important
Not
importf
a)Risk of repudiation . 3 9 . ' . 3 9 . . 1 3 .
b)lnability to service debt . 5 9 . . . 3 . . . . .
c)Corporate credit risk .3$. . 3 5 . . . I .
d)Interbank credit risk . 3 2 . . 3 7 . . . 3 .
e)Project risk . 3 1 . . 3 7 . . . 3 .
f)Portfolio risks:
i Concentration of borrowers . 3 1 . . 3 9 . . . 1 .
ii Concentration of depositors . 1 7 . . 3 9 . . . 5 .
iii Liquidity risk of banks . 3 5 . . 3 3 . . . 3 .
iv Currency risk . 1 3 . . 3 3 . . 1 4 .
v Interest rate risk . 1 4 . . 3 9 . . 1 5 .
g)Others, please specify: . . . . .... ....
3ii Which of these risks do you consider to be the most important?
a .9. b .39 c ... d .1. e ... fi ... fii ... fiii ... fiv ... fv
3iii Has the relative importance of these risks changed over the last five years 
If so, please specify:
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
Does your bank have a formal management information system which allows you 
to determine the degree of diversification of your loan portfolio as follows:
For individual 
branches only
On a group 
consolidated basis
a) Diversification by country
b) Diversification by industrial 
classification of borrower
c) Diversification by major 
sources of borrowers' income 
eg major sources of export 
income in the case of 
sovereign borrowers
d) By parent organisation in the 
case of corporate borrowers
e) Other degrees of diversification, 
please specify: ,6.
,w.
44 
. 26.
5 did not 
respond
11 did not 
respond
30 did not 
respond
15 did not 
respond
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
pi The economic literature regarding the aims of firms generally suggest 
the following:
Aims Very _ , . Not
Important . ^ P0.3?, important
a)Maximisation of profits .37. ,??p
b)Asset growth .3f. .??.
c)Asset growth subject to a
minimum level of profit .?J. .2C. .10.
d)Hinimisation of risk .??. .?0. ....
Please tick according to the importance that your bank places on each of 
these aims.
5ii Which of these objectives is the moBt important?
a .79. b ..1. c d .23.
5iii Has the relative importance of any of theBe objectives changed in the 
last five years? If so, please specify:
5iv Does your bank have any aims in relation to lending to developing 
countries which are not listed above? If so, please specify:
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
422
SECTION II : METHOD OF REDUCING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING TO 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES “  "
REDUCING THE DEBT SERVICE BURDEN OF INTEREST PAYMENTS
This section assumes that, all other things equal, if the interest element 
of debt service costs is reduced the risk of default is also reduced.
g. Would you be in favour of a system of official aid payments 
being used to subsidise the interest costs of bank loans to
the developing countries? yes .34 No .33
Comments:
7i If such subsidies were granted in respect of the LIBOR, or 
similar, element of loan costs would it result in:
a) Current developing country borrowers being able 
to borrow more? Yes . 3 3  No . 3 9
b) The poorer developing countries, that have not 
yet gained access to external bank credit, 
gaining access to that credit?
7ii Would your answers to question 7i be different if the 
subsidy allowed borrowers to pay higher spreads on 
loans? If so, please specify: Y e s  . 1 9  No . 9 ?
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
Given the volatility of interest rates in recent years, would 
you favour the establishment of an IMF facility that allowed 
developing countries to accommodate increased interest costa 
due to rising interest rates? For example if they could 
borrow from the IMF to finance increased interest coats when 
interest rates are rising on condition that interest savings
when rates fall are used to repay the IMF: YeB No ?.3.
Comment
9. Do you consider the establishment of index linked bank
loans to be viable in the near future? Yes . f3. No
Comments:
DEBT RESTRUCTURING
10. Given that financial and economic circumstances change
during the life of a loan, do you think that restructuring 
of the maturity structure of debt is a legitimate aspect
of debt management policy? Yes 3?. No
Comments:
11. The rescheduling of external debt seems to take place in 
an air of crisis whereas refinancing seems to attract 
3d'Lie comment. Therefore do you think banks and borrowers 
should cooperate in order to renegotiate the maturity 
structure of the borrower's debt well before a crisis
looms? YeB No .A
Comments:
12. What do you consider to be the major coats to a bank 
of rescheduling developing country debt?
13. A feature of each recent publicised debt rescheduling has
been the protracted period of negotiation and its attendant
resource costs for the banks. Would you therefore be in
favour of some form of code of conduct for debt rescheduling
maybe under the auspices of the IMF, IBRD or BIS in order to
reduce the negotiating costs? Yes PA No PA
Comments!
14. Do you think that debt rescheduling negotiations should
include representatives of all types of creditors, official
and private, at the same meetings? Yes PP. No PA
Comments:
15, Should banks treat rescheduled debts which still yield 
the negotiated rate of interest as inferior assets in
their balance sheets? .Yes PP. No PA
I5i If the answer to question 15 iu Yes, please explain 
how you would value such assets:
This space may be used to expand answers to questions 1*i and 1*ti:
Would the linking of debt reschedulings to IMF loan 
agreements with conditionality make banks more willing 
to reschedule debtB before a crisis occurs?
Comments:
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT LOG'S
Do you consider that the quality of information that 
your bank possesses regarding the developing countries 
is at least as good as that possessed by the IBRD, IMF 
or similar organisations?
Comments:
Do you consider that the information that you do 
possess is adequate for country risk analysis?
If the answer to question 18 is No, please indicate 
what improvements you would like to see:
Yes
Yes
Yes
This space may be used to expand answers to questions ?7 and 17i:
19.- For the majority of developing countries do you think
that the quality of the information they have about
their own economies is adequate for good economic and
debt management policies? Yob A 3. No
Comments:
20. If the quality of information available to the banka
and the developing countries improved, would this result
in the banks lending more money to those countries? Yea A 4. No
Comments:
21. Would you like to see the establishment of a central 
organisation for the collection, analysis and dissem­
ination of data about developing countries? Yes A\ No A2.
Comments:
22. Would you like to see the establishment of a system of 
credit rating for interbank and non-bank borrowers in
the eurocurrency market? Yes A Z  No .‘A
Comments:
i
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CO-FINANCING WITH IBRD OR SIMILAR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
23.' The following have been suggested as advantages and disadvantages of
co-financing. If you agree, pleaBe tick Yes, if you disagree tick No,
Advantages
a) Reduced risk of default because of cross default 
clause with IBRD loans:
b) IBRD is better at evaluating projects:
c) Reduction in bank risk analysis effort and loan 
administration:
d) Gives vicarious access to superior information 
which IBRD possesses about developing countries:
Disadvantages
a) Reduced spreads therefore less profitability:
Any other advantages or disadvantages, please specify:
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers;
2k. Do you think that increased opportunities for co-financing will result
a) More private credit in total going to
developing countries? Yes .35
b) Existing levels of credit being switched into
co-financing? Yes .4?
Comments:
Yes .4? 
Yes .29
Yea ,19 
Yes ,15
Yea .91
No .12 
No .21
No .41
No .11
No .23
in:
No 33. 
No 33.
Do you think that increased co-financing will result in 
commercial bank loans being extended to those countries 
that, to date, have been considered as too risky for 
private bank credit?
Comments:
CREDIT INSURANCE AND LOAN GUARANTEE SCHEMES
Are you in favour of a system of independent, say OECD 
government, guarantees being extended to balance of pay­
ments loans and other loans not covered by official 
export credit insurance agencies?
Comments:
Do you think that a system of guarantees may make some 
banks less prudent in their lending decisions?
Comments:
Would you be in favour of national export credit insurance 
agencies, such as ECGD in the UK, extending their insurance 
role to cover medium and long term balance of payments 
finance to the developing countries?
Comments:
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29. Would you expect insured loanB to attract lower spreads/
fees combination than uninsured loans to the same borrower? Yes ,6.0.
Comments:
30. As insured loans will be less risky than uninsured ones, do 
you think that the establishment of a loan insurance scheme 
will result in banks being tiered in the interbank market based 
upon the proportion of insured loans in their loan portfolio? Yes A l
Comments:
31. Do you think that insured loans should be treated prefer­
entially in bank balance sheets when calculating capital 
assets ratios, liquidity ratios, loan concentration and 
total exposure? • Yes
Comments:
PRUDENTIAL CONTROLS
32. Do you consider that the current differences between 
national prudential banking regulations result in the 
banks in less stringently regulated countries behaving 
less prudently than banks in more stringently regulated 
countries? Yes .4? No .15
Comments:
430
33* Do these differences in the national banking regulations 
influence your willingness to lend to banks in the lees 
stringently regulated countries? ' Yea ,4,5,
Comments!
3*+. Do banks or branches in less stringently regulated centres 
pay more for interbank deposits than banks in more string­
ently regulated centres? Yes P.®.
Comments;
35. Do differences in national prudential regulations influence
the location of your bank’s offices abroad? Yes
Comments:
?6. Do you consider that the central bank responsible for the 
supervision of a particular bank office is morally bound 
to act as a lender of last resort to that office if
required? , Ves .2,6
Comments:
No A 2.
i
No A 2.
No
No JU
37. Do you think that the decline in capital aeBet ratios over 
recent years has been;
a) The result of a learning process by bank management
and therefore desired by that management? Yes A Q  No
b)Not deBired by the bank management but forced upon
management by competition? Yes .'A No A Q
Comments;
38. Do you think that the trend of declining capital asset
ratios will continue? Yes A A  No AA
Comments:
39• Do you consider that a further decline will be detrimental
to the stability of the international banking system? Yes A A  No .A
Comments:
i+0. What do you consider to be the most appropriate capital 
asset ratio for your bank?
Comments:
INTERNATIONAL LENDER OF LAST RESORT
Would you like to see some form of lender of last resort
operating in the international banking system? Yes 27.
If the answer to question iB Yes, which of the following formB
would you favour:
a) Supranational institution with international regulatory powers.
b) National central banka providing lender of laBt resort facilities 
to the total worldwide business of banks registered in their 
jurisdiction.
c) A system of formal lines of credit from the IMF or BIS to each 
bank combined with equally formal lines of credit in the reverse 
direction. Thus banks in difficulty borrow from the IMF/BIS 
which in turn borrow from banks that are not in difficulties.
d) Officially encouraged formal lines of credit between private banks 
priced according to the interbank market's perception of each 
bank's riskiness; official encouragement would be in the form
of a penal fee charged by the central bank in each jurisdiction 
if a bank has negotiated an inadequate quantity of lines of credit 
in its favour.
a 11. b 12. c .£>. d .2.
Comments:
}
Alternative d) of question **2provides a cost to banks
engaging in high risk business while alternatives a) to c) do
not. Therefore if you have chosen alternatives a), b) or c)
do you think that banks generally will be encouraged to engage
in more high risk lending? Yes ...
Comments:
Is there an alternative structure of international lender of laBt 
resort that you favour?
4MISCELLANEOUS
h5. a) Are you generally in favour of bank deposit insurance? Yes No
b) Do you think that bank deposit insurance should be 
extended to all non bank deposits of each bank including
those in foreign currency and at overseas branches? Yes .Vi No PP.
c) Should such insurance also cover interbank deposits? Yes ..1 No ?P.
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
k6. Would you favour a movement towards floating spreads on
syndicated loans and the establishment of a deeper secondary
market in loan participations? Yes . P? No ip.
Comments:
^7. If a deeper secondary market were established, do you think 
that the result will be much different from the floating
rate note market? Yes .2? No 27.
Comments:
*f8. Do you consider that a deep secondary market in loan 
participations would be helpful in enabling banks to
diversify their portfolios? Yes . £2 No 12.
Comments:
^9* Do you think that a deep secondary market in syndicated 
loans would widen the participation in loans to LDC's 
beyond the eurobanks to:
a) banks that have not to date engaged in eurobanking? Yes .21* Nu 2P.
b) non bank financial institutions? Yes . PP No ?p.
Comments:
T H A N K  Y O U
Appendix VIII
QUESTIONNAIRE 
THE EUROBOND MARKET AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Section 1
Do you consider that the main reasons for the relatively small 
use made of the'eurobond market by developing countries are:
Yes.?Q 
YeB..1 
YeB..9.
d) Other reasons. Please specify: .....................
a) Because of the nature of the eurobond market, its
investors and borrowers
b) Because of the nature of the eurobond instruments
that could feasibly be issued by developing countries
c) Because of a combination of a) and b) above
No.
No.tt
No.
This space may be used to expand any of the above 
answers:
Section 2
If you consider the nature of the eurobond market to be important in 
section 1, please answer the questions in section 2. Please also 
complete this section if a combination of a) and b) was considered 
important in section 1.
The eurobond market has not been a greater source Df finance for 
developing countries because:
1) It is a market dominated by individual investors who Yes..®,
perceive developing countries generally as too great
a risk a = 8 b = 7 c
2) The market is not dominated by individual investors but Yes.2A
that investors perceive developing countries as too
great a risk ' a = 1 4 b = 5 C
3) The secondary market in developing country bonds iB Yes.2.®,
disproportionately thin compared with such a market for
OECD government bonds or corporate bonds a - 6 b ■ 11 c
*0 This thinness of the secondary market seriously reduces Yes,2.2,
the liquidity of developing country bonds and therefore
deters investors a >= 7 b = 10 c
5) The reluctance of some developing countries to obtain a YeB.1.®.
credit rating seriously limits their access to the
eurobond market a *= 0 b = 9 c
6) Are there any other aspects of the nature of the eurobond Yes...
market which you think have limited the access of devel­
oping countries to that market? Please specify:
a = 5 b = 5 c
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
Section 3
If you consider the nature of the eurobond instrument to he important 
in section 1 above, please answer the questions in this section.
Please also complete this section if a combination of a) and b) was 
considered important in section 1.
7) As the bonds are issued in eurocurrencies, many investors Yes..? No.1.1*,
endure exchange risk in addition to the other risks
associated with bond investments. This additional risk
deters investors a = 0 b = 6 c = 10
8) The fixed interest rate nature of the majority of eurobond 
issues deters investors a =
9) The fixed interest rate nature of the majority of eurobond 
issues combined with the long term nature of the instrumen 
deters borrowers a ■ 1
10) In your experience, are the costs of making a eurobond 
iBsue by a developing country greater than those incurred 
in raising a syndicated loan * *
11) If the answer to 10) above is Yes, does this deter 
borrowers a =
12) Are there any other aspects of the nature of the eurobond Yes... No..,
instrument that have limited its ubb by developing
countries? Please specify: a » 3 b * 4 0 * 5
Yes.. } No ,15.
1 b = 3 c = 11
Yes..} No.1.6.
t
1 b « 7 c
i
= 8
Yes. No..1.
1 b “ B c - 7
Yes...5 No.,7.
1 b = B c = 4
This space may be used to expand any of the above answers:
cont/..
4  J  /
Section *4
13) Pleaae indicate briefly why you think that some developing 
countries, which have already had considerable accesB to the 
eurocurrency syndicated loanB market, also raise funds in 
the eurobond market:
Section 5
1*0 Please assign a meaeure of importance to questions 1 through 
12. The measure of importance should be along the Beale 
a - very important, b - moderately important, c - not important.
15) If you specify other reasons in section 1, please also assign 
a measure of importance to each reason along the scale a to c 
as in question 1*0 above.
Reason 1  .... .
2 ........
3 ........
16) Eo you have any other comments to make about the use of the 
eurobond market by developing country borrowers:
17) May I contact you again in order to discuss further some of Yes... No 
your answers?
18) Do you wish to receive a copy of the study to which this Yes... No
questionnaire relates?
If you are not the person to whom the covering letter was addressed, 
please give your name and position within the company:
2
8
3 5 ^ ; 5 i 6 }
9 ; 10 ; 11 ; 12 ;
THANK YOU
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